American ICBMs and targeting.

The AGM-129 was retired in 2012, leaving only the less advanced and higher observable AGM-86B nuclear armed air launched cruise missile warhead, primarily designed for air burst attcks against air fields and lightly hardened aboveground facilities. B-52s flying to and loitering outside of North Korea would also be readily apparent to the Chinese with the problems that would entail. The entire ALCM program was largely just an excuse to keep the B-52 and bomber arm of the nuclear triad relevant until the advent of stealt aircraft technology, but it isn’t a great option tactically or strategically.

The B-2 deployed with the B61 Mod 11 can be used against hardened facilities and even submerged bunkers to a limited extent (albeit with dramatically increased fallout generation) and has variable yield from ~0.5 to 170 kT[SUB]TNT[/SUB]. While there are valid questions about the effectiveness of the stealth technology of the B-2 against low frequency radar in used by China and Russia for penetration detction, I doubt North Korea has access to this technology and could respond in time to either intercept an attack or launch whatever nuclear weapons they might have on standby. This kind of hypothetical attack is exactly the mission the B-2 was designed to perform.

Stranger

There is no quick way to disable most, let alone all, of the artillery threat even with nukes. They are too dug in, frequently into the granite sides of mountains with reinforced concrete doors. The hilly to mountainous terrain also offers quite a bit of protection from blast and radiation to warheads that aren’t landing on the side with the door.

Close still matters, even with nukes, against those types of targets. Using a lot of nukes would be quicker than strictly conventional fires, but not quick.

If North Korea wasn’t already, the degradation of capability after the first couple, or couple dozen, nuclear explosions might tempt them to escalate and start lobbing persistent nerve agents into Seoul. They also have a large short and medium range ballistic missile threat that could be much more dispersed and is also believed to be chemical capable to help. Nukes, applied in quantity early, could help mitigate how badly Seoul is screwed. They could also make things worse even while attriting the threat.

It’s like NK spent the last six decades preparing for a rematch against a nuclear armed superpower that is in love with copious applications of firepower.

I agree, except that I also do not think that use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack by NK is proportional either, as we can do far more damage to NK with conventional weapons than they can do to us with their nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear weapons should only be used when there are no other options. Even if an aggressor uses them, if they are not needed to provide an effective response, then they are just going to escalate world tensions with their use.

It depends on the target. For stealthiness, even with the latter guidance updates, they are basically 1970’s technology. They best NK air defense missiles are capable of engaging them successfully if just flying low doesn’t keep them undetected. Where those defenses are relative to the target matters.

Right, we can vaporize NK without a single ICMB.

No, if they use nukes on us, we need to respond in like kind. But with smaller, tactical nukes, placed carefully to destroy their nuke program, major military targets and of course, Kim.

But why do we need to respond in kind? I don’t see the point. We don’t need to, we can do the job just as effectively with conventional weapons.

Responding in kind would set a precedent that there are times when a nuclear power should use their nukes against weaker enemies. It’s a precedent I’d rather not set, as the reasons for using nukes will ratchet into lessor and lessor offenses until nukes are fair game in any conflict.

Not responding in kind would set the precedent that there is no time when a nuclear power should use nukes against a weaker enemy. This precedent would slow or stop the escalation of the use of nuclear weapons in conflicts.

IMHO, nukes should only be used against a power that has launched enough nukes at us that we will not be able to retaliate. Someone popping off one or two, even if they manage to hit and detonate and kill a bunch of our fellow citizens is not preventing us from carrying out our war making efforts.

“Never cruel or cowardly”, nuking a country that poses no threat to our war making capability is both.

There may be a few circumstances, where they have launched some, but not all of their missiles, and the only way to prevent them from launching more is to use a nuke, that it would be justified, but that is a very unlikely scenario, IMO.

This seems to be the reflexive response, but before rushing to a decision with far reaching implications, it would probably be wise to weight all options for a response. We don’t know how many weapons North Korea has but it is probably no more than a handful of not very high yield weapons of questionable reliability, and delivery systems that are even less reliable. (Much has been made out of North Korea’s ostensibly ability to launch a vehicle with range to strike nearly the entire continental US, but it shoudl be noted that that vehicle appeared to tumble out of control upon reentry, and the development of suitable RVs was a major hurdle for early ICBM efforts by both the United States and Soviet Union despite extensive test programs which were far beyond what North Korea can afford.).

Nuclear devastation of North Korea and the collapse of what infrastructure exists would be a humanitarian catastrophe of proportions not seen since WWII, one that neither the US or China could likely deal with. The US being responsible for the deaths of tens of millions of people in response to, say, a nuclear attack on Guam (populaton about 161k) would not bode well for its influence in the region, essentially ceding the moral high ground, such as it is, to China. While China doesn’t seek open conflict per se, they’d like any reason to push the US away from Japan and South Korea, and of course Taiwan, and a shift in power for any one of those nations could increase the potential for conflict. It would be far better to obtain concurrence or even participation by China in any response, and to minimize the impact of that response (purely conventional attacks or highly targetted nuclear attacks on specific facilities). A unilateral response, even if ‘justified’ in terms of security, is likely to increase tensions and destabilize a region that touches on the two other nations with large nuclear arsenals, as well as potentially justifying the increasing political pressure within Japan to consider developing a nuclear arsenal of its own. There are just so many things that could go radically sideways as a result of nuclear retaliation that it really does require cooler heads to prevail rather than the reflexive “pave over Pyongyang with radioactive glass” response.

I have little confidence that the current US administration has the wisdom or wherewithal to step back and and make such reasoned decisions or work with other nations. Even Rex Tillerson, who has at least demonstrated restraint despite bombastic pressure from above, would be well out of his league and without experienced advisors, and I have little faith that the military counsel would be to restraint.

Stranger

I didnt suggest “*Nuclear devastation of North Korea r… the deaths of tens of millions *”

I suggested:

  • But with smaller, tactical nukes, placed carefully to destroy their nuke program, major military targets and of course, Kim.

Of course there would be some collateral civilian casualties but each target would be military, and designed solely to remove NK from any future nuke attack options.

A good post, marred by the highlighted comment. De-railing.

It seems that this has drifted from the original question in the OP into GD territory, so I’m moving it over there.

Colibri
General Questions Moderator

There is no way to destory the North Korean nuclear program and stategic sites, nor to take out Kim Jong-un without killing millions, if not directly than through radiation from fallout, famine, and destruction of infrastructure. The notion that it would be possible to use “smaller, tactical nukes” in some kind of surgical strike is not realistic, and without obtaining public concurrence from China we’d be risking escallation and instability in the region going forward. Retaliation with nuclear strike should be the last option considered and only if there is a clear and immediate danger of follow on attack.

Why! Was there something untrue about it?

Stranger

“…in love…”

  • shrug *

That was then, in GQ. Here, knock yourself out… :slight_smile:

Why not? Cite? Why couldnt we?

The number of long term radiation deaths from Hiroshima and Nagasaki was fairly low, and those were very dirty bombs.

DinoR is a former Army officer, who has had to point out in earlier threads on N Korea, that contrary to popular opinion, the North Koreans are not stupid, they are aware of US doctrine and capabilities and have worked to mitigate them.

What counter do you have to that?

The attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were airburst attacks against unhardened targets (most of the construction was wood and rice paper, contributing to the firestorm) and produced very little fallout. I’m not sure what you want me to “cite”, but Pyongyang itself has about 2.5M people, and North Korea has nuclear facilities distrubted across the country including a couple near the Chinese border. Surgical strikes that don’t impact already famine-ridden civilian populations and food distribution infrastructure are not plausible, and if we have to engage in a nuclear response there needs to be a clear justification rather than just “eye for an eye”.

Stranger

Not all ICBMs are ready to go at all times. Many have to have quite a bit of work to get them primed, these are aging weapons systems.

The real response if needed will be from nuclear subs. They can deploy a multi warhead weapon with many megatons of destructive power, and they are ready to go all the time.

Are there nuclear facilities in Pyongyang ? If not, what is your point?

How do you know they are not? What do you know about the impact of a sub-kiloton device?

Yes, it is perfectly clear that at least part of DPRK’s nuclear enterprise is in Pyongyang, because it is the center of the command, control and communications enterprise for the senior leadership. Given that we know that DPRK seeks to maintain a significant portion of its strategic forces on road mobile TELs, the proposition that in the face of a nuclear attack, the US would only seek to target the TELs, and not the C3 infrastructure that would control the TELs, seems risky. After all, if a President is contemplating launching a first strike to save the lives of tens of millions of Americans, that doesn’t exactly lend itself to taking half measures. And an attack on Pyongyang to prevent an imminent attack (not concerns of a future attack, but one that would shortly be underway) in Los Angeles, Seattle or whatever would be a first strike that would be very likely in clear conformance to the laws of war.

The use of small nuclear weapons would be dictated by the type of target to be destroyed, not likely so much as “let’s limit fallout above all other considerations.”

trump already let it slip that a boomer was sitting off North Korea. Not like we didn’t assume that was the case. I don’t know at what point in time they actually target the missiles, or if in flight changes can be made. I’m pretty sure the Navy has our backs with a few of their surprises close to the hot spots.