whoops…my apologies for screwing up the coding there.
Tee:
Unbelievable. Even when Tenet has publicly stated that the “yellowcake” claim shouldn’t have been in the SOTU, even when Bush’s own Deputy National Security Advisor testifies that this was one issue in which the US intelligence community disagreed with the British, you guys just won’t give up. It’s like listening to someone argue that Clinton really didn’t have sex with that woman, Ms. Lewinsky. After all, they only shared a cigar.
So many word games, so little time!
The IAEA and the CIA (along with the State Department) concluded that the Niger documents were forgeries. Wilson had already submitted his report debunking the claim the previous year, supported by similar assessments by the US ambassador to Nigeria (among others). The CIA had been telling Congress that the reports of attempted purchases were not reliable. In the November 2002 NIE, the State Department’s INR dissented from the assessment that Iraq had attempted to purchase yellowcake, flatly stating, “[T]he claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious.” Two months prior to the SOTU, a similar accusation had been removed from Bush’s speech in Cincinnati because the CIA did not feel adequate evidence could be found to support it. And not for lack of trying!
Taken as a whole, by January 2003 the consensus of the entire US and the majority of the international intelligence community was that the “yellowcake” stories were simply false. The one exception was a lone British intelligence report; had that report not existed, Bush would not have been able to make the assertion at all. But you’re right of course; these agencies had come to the conclusion that they had uncovered no reliable evidence that Hussein was attempting to acquire yellowcake from Niger. Nevertheless, it was still possible, however remotely, that he was trying to do so, despite a lack of hard proof.
In fact, it is still possible, even today, that Iraq is attempting to acquire yellowcake from Niger. Can you prove it isn’t?
Wow! Is Niger selling weapons-grade “stuff” to other countries? Better notify the CIA – they’ll certainly be surprised to find that out!
I’m glad for them. Have they produced any evidence – any evidence at all – to support that assertion? Can you explain why Iraq, possessing 2.5 tons of uranium oxide (subject to annual UN inspection) along with 500 metric tons of yellowcake at Tuwaitha (also subject to annual UN inspection) would be interested in the inexpedient and politically risky purchase of more? Can you explain why the Bush administration would chose to place more faith in this lone report than in the assessment of its own intelligence services, combined with judgement of the IAEA?
Indeed. In fact, why give more weight to US intelligence than to British?
Let’s just go with the report that tells us what we want to hear. Damn the evidence and full speed ahead!
It’s not a yellowcake story. Like you said Iraq had yellowcake already and the only benefit they’d get would be to shorten production time if they could. If the best objection Tenet can come up with to a claim of British intelligence is that it’s inconclusive, and the best said about Wilson’s visit is that it was inconclusive, then it’s not possible for you or I to conclude that the claim is false. We don’t normally dismiss British intelligence as raving crackpots and they do stand behind this, so I would think it deserves a mention.
All of the agencies within the IC were in agreement that Saddam was continuing his efforts to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This is from Tenet: “The NIE points out that by 2002, all agencies assessed that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make any, but never abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions.” (http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm) He then goes on to list the points of disagreement within the agencies, none of which are saying that Saddam is not after producing a nuclear weapon. And oh look! the title of the NIE itself is :“National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq’s Continuing Programs For Weapons of Mass Destruction.” We expect these people not just to find out what he’s holding but what he intends to get, and what he intends to do with all of it, and nobody is saying that it’s doubtful that Saddam is seeking proscribed weapons. Tenet saying reports are “inconclusive” must be viewed in context of an already established POV that Saddam is planning to develop WMDs, especially nuclear ones. The disagreements arose in how, when, and where he planned to do it.
So nothing is proven false except the stockpile claims because none have been found. Since these are also contained in the NIE with no disclaimers as to their existence, a suitable explanation should be forthcoming like “we were wrong”, “we’re inept”, or “he destroyed them”…or some combination of those, some indication that we should be giving more weight to US intelligence than to the British. You seem to be defending this same intelligence community, so perhaps you should answer that one.
Tee:
Whatever you’re smoking, I want some of it.
Wilson’s visit was not inconclusive. Wilson concluded that there was no truth to the assertions that Iraq had attempted to acquire yellowcake from Niger. His conclusion was corroborated by the US ambassador to Niger. Concerning the handling of this matter, Wilson stated:
The NIE was produced in November of 2003. Even before it’s conclusions were distributed to Congress, in early October, the CIA had forced Bush to remove a reference to Iraq’s alleged purchase of “yellowcake” from his speech in Cincinnati. They did this in part because the CIA had already told member of Congress that they had concluded that those allegations were not based on reliable evidence. Somehow between October and November the yellowcake allegations slipped back into the NIE. But they were subsequently debunked again, when experts from IAEA concluded (within mere hours of having received them from the US State Department) that that they were forgeries.
A week after the president’s SOTU, Powell presented his case before the UN. Conspicuously, it did not contain the yellowcake accusation. Afterward, Powell explained:
But you are correct, in a manner of speaking. I cannot conclude 100% that the claim is false. I can only say that the preponderance of the publicly available evidence indicates that it is, in the words of the INR, “highly dubious.”
There is one thing I can conclude from this discussion thus far, however: I’m beginning to sound like a broken record.
Otherwise, I see little more in your post than a continuation of the usual partisan word games.
Indeed, as I’ve pointed out time and time again, the tentative/inconclusive summaries and language of the intelligence reports were twisted into certainties in the public statements of important members of the Bush administration. Therein lies the lie. I’ve made that point about 5 times in this thread alone.
But it’s okay. I can write it 5 more times, if I have to.
Let us look at the specific language in the NIE regarding Iraq’s stockpile of chemical weapons.
I submit this example as typical of the language used in the NIE in general. Please note how the assessment is heavily caveated: “we have little specific information,” the NIE claims, regarding Saddam’s stockpiles, but he “probably” has 100 metric tons of “CW” agents, and “possibly” up to 500 tons. In fact, the NIE is full of such equivocating language.
Now compare that to some of the public statements made by members of the Bush administration, such as:
or:
And so on – there are numerous examples.
Now, I ask you: on what, exactly, did they base these claims? Certainly not the NIE (or any previous intelligence assessments, which are even more equivocal). You will not find the statement “We know for a fact that Saddam has chemical weapons stocks” in the NIE.
So where did they get this info?
It’s odd how you’re saying everything objecting to the possibility of acquiring uranium is conclusive, yet everything having to do with estimating Saddam’s weapons at hand is filled with equivocations, and you wonder what I’m smoking.
Wilson is the only one under the impression that he conclusively answered anything. From Tenet, again: *"…The former official interpreted the overture as an attempt to discuss uranium sales. The former officials also offered details regarding Niger’s processes for monitoring and transporting uranium that suggested it would be very unlikely that material could be illicitly diverted. There was no mention in the report of forged documents – or any suggestion of the existence of documents at all.
**Because this report, in our view, did not resolve whether Iraq was or was not seeking uranium from abroad, *it was given a normal and wide distribution, but we did not brief it to the President, Vice-President or other senior Administration officials." (my bolding) http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr07112003.html
So yes, it was inconclusive. As was the opinion on the British allegation, meaning that the CIA cannot say for sure whether it was true or not. It’s the INR view vs. British intelligence, and I’m still left wondering what gives one more weight than the other.
I can’t vouch for Powell’s statement but the Bush quote there is fact, proven by records from previous inspection teams. I’d be inclined to take Powell at his word - that there is no doubt that SH had chemical weapons stocks - because I never came across any serious argument that he didn’t have chemical weapons stocks of some sort.
Furthermore, it’s a matter of opinion whether this NIE is heavily caveated or not…remember that title? To the reader it leaves little room for doubt as to whether or not Saddam was producing these things. The word “probably” doesn’t raise doubt…quite the opposite. For them to suggest today that they never claimed anything within was fact is the worst sort of political CYA maneuvering there is, given our actions against Iraq past and present. I’m not saying they are, but if they did, in reference to this document, it would be indefensible.
Yes.
d) They knew the weapons of mass destruction charge was trumped up, they knew the al-Qaeda connection was bogus, but they still saw regime change in Iraq as a (potentially) good policy move. Why? Our troops had been stationed in Saudi Arabia to keep Iraq in check for 12 years. Their presence in Saudi Arabia was a continuing source of irritation to the Muslim world, and a key recruiting point for al-Qaida. If the US could successfully oust Saddam and establish a democratic state in Iraq, the need to station troops in Saudi Arabia might be eliminated. In the bargain, we might earn some goodwill points for ousting the hated Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, a democratic Iraq might be held up as an example to pressure/encourage other Arab regimes to democratize.
Now this line of thinking might turn out to have been very naive in hindsight, but it is a legitimate fourth line of reasoning for supporting the war. Since you asked.