I wouldn’t say so. The term comes from Latin ( Roman logista = quartermaster ) by way of Greek and I’d probably give pride of place to the Romans for being the first real masters of logistics ( if such a thing is possible in any but the most relative of senses in terms of time period ), if only because of their excellent infrastructure. Diocletian in particular through necessity turned the Roman empire into, to quote Edward Luttwak, ‘one vast logistic base’. Though there were certainly innovators before them, Philip of Macedon not least of them. It should also be mentioned that the ( roughly contemporary to the Roman principate ) Han empire in China was no slouch as well.
The other thing to bear in mind is that warfare in ages past was SLOW. Well, it was slow as compared to today. It should be pretty obvious that the difficulty of logistics is directly proportional not only to the size of the army in question and their provisional needs, but also the rate at which they moved.
Armies in times past simply didn’t move very fast.
It’s interesting, though, that as plnnr points out, the armies of the Civil War would still steal anything they could get their hands on. These were armies that, especially on the Union side, had railroads and very large and advanced networks of riverboats and ocean-going ships to supply them. And they’d still take your food.
As Luttwak points out ( and I hope everyone has read his The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire:* From the First Century A.D. to the Third* - if you haven’t, you should ) that the occasional criticisms of the Roman policy of the early to mid-principate of not maintaining a significant permanent strategic reserve of troops in the center, as opposed to spreading them out in a great circle near the borders, are silly. At the stately pace of 3 mph, any central reserve of heavy infantry were almost functionally immobile considering the distances involved and therefore virtually useless.
In The Civil War, the South stretched itself to thin and Grant discovered that once he got passed the main lines there were few, if any, reserve troops in the rear. Grant, in particular, sent troops into the Confederate rear to cut supply lines. These units, generally only 1000-2000 strong, if that, were quite effective at times.
There is an old saying “An army travels on it’s stomach.” At times, the rebel army had no choice but to scrounge around for any food it could get. Even the Union army had to raid the local farms, they either outran the supply lines or didn’t have enough to begin with (or, for that matter, wanted fresher rations.)
And if you think those days are gone, you may be mistaken. I don’t know of any recent case of a modern army running out of food, but in the First Gulf War, Fred Franks and his group almost outran their fuel trucks. Walt Boomer (I think, I’m doing this from memory) and the marines anticipate this problem and put their supply depots **in front of ** the main lines before the attack. Food, fuel and amunition, all of it.
Another book you may want to look at is Sun Tsu’s “Art of War”. Along with strategic advice, there’s a little information on budgeting and maintaining a Chinese army circa 500 BC or so.
There’s also the classic Chinese historical novel “Romance of the Three Kingdoms” about the civil war that ensued during the Three Kingdoms era (~180 to 260 AD, IIRC). It goes into great detail about the waging of war and logistics, though it’s a huge read. In addition to requisitioning food from towns and foraging off the land, the Chinese also maintained military farms purely for the purpose of feeding hundreds of thousands of troops at a time.