I never seem to be able to get into one of these discussions before they reach several pages in length. But I’m going to put in some of my thoughts. First, some preliminaries:
I do believe in free will, but not in libertarian free will. I am a physicalist, and as such I believe that free will is an entirely natural phenomenon. I believe that Daniel Dennett has painted a picture of a naturalistic free will that is largely correct (or at least on the right track), but certainly not the complete and perfect truth. His books that I draw the most from are Darwin’s Dangerous Idea and Freedom Evolves. In terms of this thread, I suspect that I basically agree with Apos, that our disagreements are largely semantic in nature. Free will is not a binary concept, there are gradations of free will. Nor is free will a “black box”. Its mechanisms can be explained without destroying its meaning. The problem of defining “free will” can be rather tricky. If you’re looking for a complete list of necessary and sufficient conditions for a creature to have free will, you will not find it because it doesn’t exist. I would like to make a couple comments that will, I hope, explain some of the points listed above.
On “The” definition of free will The notion that we must respect the ancient definition of free will in these discussions seems absurd to me. We have inherited countless terms from generations before us that function perfectly well for our colloquial discussions and as a basis for our scientific investigations. Concepts such as matter, light and heat are centuries old, but they remain useful because we have modified our theories on what they are and how they work. We have not needed to discard the terms along with their antiquated theories, nor have we felt compelled to declare that heat is an “illusion” when we discovered that the fluid caloric does not exist. Why should free will be any different?
So what is free will? It is (roughly) the prerequisite to moral responsibility, the potential for being praiseworthy or blameworthy. Free will is the capacity to act in the interests of your causes (to borrow a term from Pábitel), and to have causes that are your own. The exact mechanism through which we make causes “our own” is quite opaque to me because I lack the knowledge of neuroscience necessary to understand it, but it does not need to be opaque. The ability to describe the structural changes that take place in the brain is not a refutation of the functional significance and meaning of these changes. For a bit more on free will, we must turn to the next subject.
On the Infinite Regress of Will I would like to motivate discussion on this by way of analogy with another infinite regress (this is in one of Dennett’s books that I listed, but I can’t seem to find it at the moment, so the argument is not verbatim):
All dogs have a dog for a mother.
Thus, if there are any dogs now (and there are), there must have been an infinite number of dogs in the past (this dog had a mother dog, who had a mother dog, who had a mother dog, who had a …). But there can’t be an infinite regress, so we clearly have a problem. Traditionally this type of regress has been stopped by positing the existence of a first dog, a dog that did not have a dog for a mother–an act of special creation. However, our contemporary thought has moved beyond this necessity. We now recognize that the concept of a “dog”, or of any species, is somewhat fuzzy. As we move backwards in time, we will see dog ancestors that are clearly not dogs, and we will see dog ancestors that seem to straddle the line between “dog” and “notdog”. The great insight of Darwinian evolution is not that it’s difficult to draw the line distinguishing the two, but that it is impossible to do so. Thus, we find our way out of an infinite regress with no need for supernatural explanations.
Libertarian free will is the classic attempt to stop an infinite regress with an act of special creation, but we no longer need to use this sort of solution. We, as humans, have gained our free will through the gradual accumulation of design through countless generations. And we, as individuals, have gained our free will through gradual accumulation from our clearly non-willing pre-natal selves. Yes, it’s natural, and yes, that means that it’s not perfect, but so what? Nothing we deal with is perfect, but that certainly doesn’t call into question its very existence. A naturalistic account of free will can get us everything that we want from the Libertarian account, with the advantage of being real.
This post has gone on for long enough, so I will submit and see if anything I said makes any sense at all, or if this is too much of a hijack for this tread. Thanks everyone.