I’m glad you wrote this, ethnicallynot, because it helps clarify our points of disagreement. Here’s what happened, as I see it: [ol][li]Clinton, Barak and Arafat were negotiating.[]Clinton suggested an offer, which was far more generous to Arafat than any prior offer. []Barak grudgingly accepted it []Arafat did not accept. We are debating the exact nature of his non-acceptance. []Soon thereafter Arafat called for an intifada, which meant the wounding and murder of hundreds of civilians. After this intifada had gone on for over a year, Israel finally responded. On other threads we have debated the proportionality of that response.[/ol]In my book, Arafat stared the killing. Israel waited a long time to respond. Their eventual response was NOT to intentionally kill Palestinian civilians, even though an aerial bombing campaign would have saved the lives of Israeli soldiers.[/li]
You may assign blame to Israel in other situations, but this one was 100% Arafat. BTW, what would you have done if you were in charge of Israel?
December, excuse me, but Israel did not wait for a year of intifada before responding. Look at the body count. Palestinian casualties outnumber the Israeli’s from practically day one. Military response with regretable collateral damage by Israel occured from practically day one, culminating in that massive military response that is still going on.
Another point I have to pick is that although CD2 may have been the most generous offer ever made, that does not necessarily equate with being a “good” offer or “just” offer. Maybe it was, but the two terms do not necessarily equate. As Collounsbury and many others have pointed out, the CD2 offer had some non-starters in it for the Palestinians that were not resolved.
chinaguy,
Read what Malley said was on the table (my next to previous post).
We can debate “just.” Some believe that Israel shouldn’t exist and that anything that rcognizes Israel is unjust. But let’s deal in a realistic world, working constructively to a settlement that gets both sides what they need. Israel needs security. It will never give up control of all of the Temple Mount, the Holy of Holies. Palestine needs room for its people, access to resources, and the ability to develop an economy (which will, at first, be reliant on international support and Israeli industrial investments.
Tell me if it was realistic to expect anything more from the Israeli side ever. (You’ll be unlikely to see an offer like that again anytime soon, I can tell you that. It was predicated on an assumption of good faith and a belief that he had an ability and a desire to control the violence, both of which have been destroyed.)
If your approach to negotiation is “give us everything we want or else its a nonstarter and we’ll start riots and terrorist attacks” then you are not negotiating. You are making terrorist demands. Negotiation is give and take. (Malley’s point is that agreeing with that Israel can exist at all is “giving in” from the Palestinian side, Arafat feels that that said he should get everything else he wants.)
If your goal is to have a future for the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza, a chance to form an identity of “Palestinian” that means something other than hopelessness, then a good offer was made. A lot less would have been a good offer.
Doc D:
I’d just like to hop in with a couple of quick comments. You and I have discussed these questions at length before, so I won’t bother with the preliminaries:
I’m not exactly sure what you mean by this last sentence, but I just want to point out the reason why I find Malley to be a more reliable source of information on the talks than Ross: Malley criticizes everybody – the Israelis, Palestinians, and the Americans. He critically analyzes the framework of the talks as well – such as the unwillingness of the American negotiating team to put down any proposals in writing. I simply find his position to be more equitable than that of anyone else I’ve read thus far, and to be honest, more reasonable.
Ross, on the other hand, seems hell-bent-for-leather on scapegoating Arafat for the breakdown of the talks; even Israeli newspapers have commented on his extremism in this regard.
Thus, I don’t see Malley as “creating an explanation,” or “spinning” the story of the negotiations. He feels sincere to me. I’ve seen a transcript of a talk he gave to a Palestinian audience, for example, in which he said (I’m paraphrasing here), “Considering the make-up of my listeners, I would like for the purposes of this talk to concentrate primarily on the mistakes made by the Palestinian side.” There are people involved in this conflict who sincerely strive for a balanced view, and from what I know now, I think Malley is one of them.
I’m just not prepared to believe that the entire Palestinian people are bloodthirsty baby-killers, or that Arafat is unwilling/incapable of negotiating a peaceful settlement because he’s some kind of rabid psycho. And like ethicallynot, I find it difficult to believe that the conflict is caused by the intransigence of a sole actor.
Well, if you’re referring to the offer at CDII, I’d like to point out that after the “breakdown,” negotiators continued to meet for several months – right up to a few weeks before the Israeli elections. And as you well know, the “Taba” agreement was significantly more “generous” than anything tabled at CDII. It just happened to late, that’s all. So, considering that a more generous offer was presented after CDII, it would seem to go without saying that it was realistic of the Palestinians to expect more. They even got it.
Palestinian and Israeli negotiators had agreed to use the Taba map as a basis for further negotiations, so your assertion that the Palestinian position was/is, “** …give us everything we want or else its a nonstarter and we’ll start riots and terrorist attacks**” seems like a very unfair characterization to me – especially considering the fact that Israel is currently violating international law, and occupying territory that doesn’t belong to them.
The Palestinian side has been subjected to a good deal of Israeli violence as well, you know, and the differentiation between terrorist activity and legitimate defense can be hair-thin at times.
Is it fair to say that under further pressure Arafat would have mumbled less and grudgingly accepted? Unfortunately, 2001 was a real upheaval of a year:
- The new intifada
- Shift from a Democratic to a Republican Administration.
- The election of Ariel Sharon to office
- Reinstitution of illegal settlements
- 9/11
- Afghanistan
- Continued global recession
2001 was a real recipe for failure. I think December’s causal view where the new intifada is entirely at fault is astoundingly simplistic. I suspect 9/11 put this dark doomsday cloud over especially Israel. After 7 months of virtually no U.S brokered peace talks (thanks to our brilliant president), the collapse of the twin towers must have reprecussioned like a “this is it, they’re going for the big kill” through Israel. The reaction? We better do what the U.S. did to the Taliban. What a sad analogy…
Now, I hope you’re not gonna go blaming Arafat for 9/11, are you? This is my contention: Arafat could have been pressured further but wasn’t. Saying “we won’t talk peace until the killing stops” would be like Woodrow Wilson exclaiming to Max von Baden on October 4 1918, “Sorry, no ceasefire until the shooting stops”.
Hey Mr. S.!!!
How’s the birthday and the new baby?
Did anyone here say that Palestinians are bloodthirsty baby killers? Or that the conflict is caused by one person’s intransigence?
My point here, and in our past discussions, is that according to Ross, Clinton, and Malley a very good offer was on the table. Arafat turned it down without any counter offer. All three agree that a fair agreement was doable if Arafat was willing to engage in good faith negotiations. All agree that Arafat would not engage in any negotiating. Ross and Clinton blame Arafat alone. Malley shares the blame around. Malley is trying to be constructive and I respect that. His interpretation leaves hope that negotiation with Arafat is not automatically doomed to failure despite Malley’s interpretation that Arafat squandered a very “good hand.” He, rightly, believes that the interpretation that Arafat is uninterested in any settlement leaves no hope for the future. I may think that he’s overly generous in his appraisal, that two out of three probably are more likely accurate, but I hope that he is right.
The reason Barak was unwilling to lay his best offer out was exactly that concept of “we’lll use this as our next starting point.” The offer is gone. The situation is different now. Israel will need more than Arafat’s word of security assurance. They’ll need more space and more control.
ethicallynot, According to Malley’s view more pressure was the last thing needed. It was the major reason, according to Malley, that Arafat wouldn’t budge.
And no, 9/11 didn’t likely trigger the Israeli reponse; weekly mass murders equivilent on a population scaled basis to 9/11 each were the motivation for it. *No government should negotiate with terrorists. * Until the PA proves that they are willing and able to deliver a cessation of terroist attacks, Israel will not and should not talk.
Let’s see Arafat capture and punish Hamas leadership responsible for the most recent set of murders. Then he’ll be believed as a potential negotiating partner.
Doc D:
Birthday party cancelled due to complications in scheduling.
Baby coming very, very soon!
Okay, granted – the “baby-killer” line was a bit over the top. But certainly Ross and Clinton seek to place the blame for the failure at CDII squarely on Arafat’s shoulder’s – Ross has even gone so far as to suggest that other members of Arafat’s negotiating team were willing to accept the “offers” (whatever they might have actually been), but were vetoed by Arafat personally. So, looking back on your previous formulation:
…well, I would say that pretty much places all the blame for the breakdown of the negotiations on Arafat.
Agreed. Eventually, the Israelis and the Palestinians are going to have to sit down at the negotiating table and start talking again.
Perhaps Arafat did “squander a good hand.” But as I see it, not enough ground-work had been done before the summit. A negotiated agreement on maps, such as had been reached at Taba afterwards, seems like it would have been a better starting point for a summit. The negotiating positions of both parties were too far away from each other, and as Malley would have it, Arafat was afraid that the Israelis were pushing him into a trap, and that the US was acting as their lap dog.
Perhaps. We’ll never really know what was going on in his head, probably. We do know that both Barak and Clinton were pressing for a “final settlement,” and that Clinton placed full pressure on Arafat to accept the agreement or “suffer the consequences.” At any rate, this is a somewhat different position from claiming that the Palestinians would “never receive a better offer,” don’t you think?
Putting the blame for the failure of negotiations primarily upon Arafat is not the same as saying that the whole conflict is caused by his intransigence. Its continuation is.
The interpretation of what was in Barak’s head is Malley’s. Just his speculation, like he speculated on what was in Arafat’s head.
No, I don’t think that a better offer will be had. Ever. I doubt there will ever be one as good.
Perhaps. Further pressure might not have helped if the pressure was simply “accept or…”. However, the suspension of further negotiations after January 2 was a grave mistake. December thinks it was a good idea for Bush to stand aside and let Sharon do what was necessary for Israeli security. But I strongly question that interpretation of the President’s intentions. I don’t think Bush stood aside. He merely hesitated to get involved, letting one month after the other drag on. This isn’t a very controversial view. Bush has been criticized time and again for his unwillingness to get embroiled in the Middle East.
Again, the bike analogy comes to mind. The whole process was suspended and by the time an unwilling Bush was forced into the midst by the sheer gravity of the situation, it was too late. No one was willing to get back on the Harley anymore. Had Bush simple kept negotiations alive, even with no progress, we would be better off today. And, of course, the more Arafat was portrayed as a uncompromising terrorist looking to eliminate Israel as a state, the less Bush was willing to get involved. Failure in the international arena is bad very for the image of a president elected by such a narrow margin. It’s very unfortunate that Bush just didn’t have the guts to fail. But then again, what should I expect from a man who never had a dream, only the selfish need to surrounded himself with good buddies and funny nicknames.
You find me a place beyond the remotest areas of Amazon rainforest that wasn’t profoundly affected by the imagery of the Twin Tower’s collapsing. I, admit, I live in Brooklyn and may have a skewed perspective given the proximity of the experience. But from what I hear from abroad, EVERYONE has been deeply affected by 9/11. The U.S., the world’s mightiest military force, Israel’s main ally, gets whacked smack in the plexus. The symbol of their financial might destroyed by a few Islamic fundamentalists. Domestic suicide bombings are beyond all doubt the main force compelling Israelis to support Operation Defensive Shield. But 9/11 must have made the doomsday prediction that Israel was about to vanish into the sea forever so much more real. I’m sorry, but I’m going to be brutally honest and unfair to those who have suffered here: someone blowing him or herself up in a market place is ABSOLUTELY HORRIBLE. But two collapsing 110 story skyscrapers with over 3000 people in them is ATROCIOUSLY UNFATHOMABLE. Perhaps not quite on the scale of Hiroshima, Nagasaki or the Holocaust but definitely up there on the list of centennial traumas. Now, put domestic suicide bombings and 9/11 together and we have a very bad equation.
Wow. Not much of a conflict resolutionist, are you DSied? This is an absolute ridiculous notion that’s going to have to be beaten out of our 21st century minds (apparently still stuck in the 20th century!). The type of conflict we see in the Middle East is going to get more and more common given the disparity between well-armed and not-so-well-armed governments. The issue merits a thread of its own: What is a Just War in Today’s World? With the above attitude you voice, DSeid, which unfortunately seems common (even in this forum), I have little hope for Middle Eastern peace. Or peace overall in this century. But, if we don’t extinguish ourselves before we come to our senses, we will eventually realize how untenable such a position is when Goliath meets David in coming years.
Negotiations should not have been suspended. The sooner everyone admits this was a mistake, the better for all of us…
Doc D:
Actually, my point is that I think, from what I know about the situation, that it is unfair to one-sidedly blame Arafat for either the breakdown of the CDII talks or the continuation of violence after the failure of the negotiations.
Perhaps. But I feel that Malley’s “speculations” are supported by a pretty sophisticated analysis of the motivations, and the misconceptions, of all the players involved.
For example, in the article that you quote above, Malley presents a detailed list of what he thought each negotiating team brought with it to the table in terms of motivation, constraints, and misconceptions. He then attempts to demonstrate the way in which the misconceptions from the various sides “interlocked” with each other, as it were, to create a kind of negative dynamic that prevented the talks from ever making any real progress. Since I know from my college poli-sci classes that all political actors are constrained by the context in which they operate, and that most political decisions are the oucome of conflicts among groups competing for power, I find that Malley’s analysis makes sense to me – more so, at least, than Ross’s anti-Arafat rantings.
You quote very selectively from Malley’s article, concentrating exclusively on that section of his paper that presents Arafat and his team in its worse light – which makes me wonder if you have something personal invested in presenting this issue from a pro-Israeli, pro-American angle. I hope you don’t find the question offense; maybe you have perfectly good reasons for wanting to blame Arafat, personally, for the continuation of the conflict after CDII. But I have to say honestly that you haven’t convinced me yet, although if you have more evidence, I’d be interested to hear about it, or deeper reasons for your position, I’d be interested to hear about them.
If you are referring to the “offers” made at CDII, then I can only point out to you again that, in fact, better offers were made, and agreed upon, at Taba, months after the talks broke down. This is a matter of historical fact, and a simple glimpse at the agreed-upon negotiating maps from Taba reveals quite clearly that as “generous” as the Israeli offer might have been, Israel was still capable of even greater generosity.
Only a few minutes here so a few points and then more later…
ethicallynot You are reminding me of that New Yorker cover with the world as seen from NY. Sure Israelis felt for the America’s pain. But relative to the size of the country 9/11 was a trafffic accident compared to what Israel lives with. I’ve talked with Israelis and read the Israeli press. It just isn’t true that Israelis felt any more under threat because of 9/11. When 9/11 was considered it was more of the ungenerous thought of that now maybe Americans will understand what it feels like.
Let us follow out the logic of your belief that terrorists should be negotiated with, in order to get the violence to stop. Osama wants the US out of Saudi Arabia, and all of the mid-east. Let’s talk to him. Hamas wants Israel gone. We’ll negotiate. History judged Lord Chamberlin a fool.
Reward terroism and it will stop? I don’t think so.
Constructive? I posted a thread on it. Easily found (I’d post a link but gotta go) Unilateral partial withdrawl and the big big wall. Then negotiate. Safety first.
The link is http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?threadid=111948
Now, onto Mr. S
Still no baby? May labour be short and your baby sweet.
No offense taken. I merely responded to the questions raised. All three Americans reporting what happened agree on several points, including that Arafat would not engage in any give and take negotiating and that Barak was willing to deal and that the Israeli side gave up a lot. Clinton and Ross are not fools and tyhey have their take on why Arafat wouldn’t engage. Malley has another point of view that is perhaps more constructive, is more even-handed in criticisizing everyone, and maybe more accurate, maybe not. I have been, I think very fair in acknowledging that Malley’s view blames Barak for mishandling the preamble and miscalculating at several key points. And that Malley has some sympathetic explanations for Arafat’s behavior. The bottom line still remains: if Arafat was willing to make a deal, a deal would have been made. The opportunity was there. The conflict would be over. It was within his power and he let it go. Barak and Clinton may have, if we believe Malley, fumbled, but they were willing to negotiate and were desperate to come to an agreement that would bring peace. Arafat wouldn’t even suggest counter-offers.
You are correct, Taba was a slightly better offer. Significantly better? Nah. The key issues remain. Some settlements will remain, Arabs will not control all of the Temple Mount, no unfettered “Right to return”. If Arafat had been willing to negotiate at CD2 it would have come to that then. But he wouldn’t deal.
My agenda? I’d love to see peace in the Mid-East and I am pessimistic that Arafat will or can deliver it. As discussed in that “constructive” thread, I think that Arab children deserve a world were they can aspire to other than becoming suicidal murderers. I think that Israelis deserve to be able to have a cup of coffee without being afraid of being caught in a bomb blast. How to get from where we are to there? What is the evidence that Arafat is interested in a negotiated settlement that may not be everything he wants? That he can deliver on a cessation of violence if one was reached? In the abscence of such evidence how should Israel proceed?
Agreed. The apocalyptic aspect of my argument is too New York - centric. Seen from an Israeli perspective, the only effect it probably has had is a sense that Americans will now be more tolerant of a hard-line policy towards the PA. This in itself, though, has factored negatively into the equation.
You’re argument is extremely selective. Drawing an analogy between Islamic fundamentalist a la Mohmad Atta and Palestinian suicide bombers is facile. On the surface they may appear identical but on further inspection the analogy begins to fall apart. The Attas of the world are fighting what they consider a profound cultural corruption on a global level. Let’s not forget that they don’t just want the US out, they also want their own government gone! Most Palestinian suicide bombers are fighting what they consider a military occupation of their land. This is why they haven’t gone bombing U.S. embassies whereas the Attas have. The distinction can be made clearer by considering one a local military conflict and the other a global ideological conflict.
Reconciliation in the case of ideological conflicts is extremely difficult, nay impossible. Even Chamberlin’s failure can be better understood in this light. What Chamberlain was attempting to appease wasn’t a tragic and bloody squabble over land, but the ideological madness of a political cult lead by an unpredictable man. Had cultish madness not been a factor, the Munich Conference over Sudetenland might have been successful. Germany’s claim to the area wasn’t an insane demand from nowhere. I used to live in Munich. Did you know that 1 million Germans where forced out of Czechoslovakia and into Bavarian exile after WW II? And that there’s still a yearly conference held by the Sudetendeutschen regarding the injustice done to them after the war? Nobody ever did is or ever will concede any right of return given what atrocious things the Third Reich did to Czechia and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, I’d be more careful with quick analysis of why something worked or didn’t.
Essentially, what I’m saying is that you can’t group all terrorists and conflicts in the world into a heterogeneous set. Therefore, you can’t come up with rules that apply to all. Saying “no one should negotiate with terrorists” is simplistic and deters us from resolving potentially resolvable situations. Rebel forces with terrorist tactics have been integrated into (somewhat) workable governments before. It’s not a problem free solution but in many cases it’s the only viable one left. Terrorists come in all flavors. When their objectives are cultish and purely ideological, I would have to agree with you DSeid. The PA is not Al Qaeda or a marginalized Rote Fraktion.
Nor are their behavior and objectives in any way comparable to the National Socialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei that Lord Chamberlain was dealing with…
You are right. This derserves a thread of its own.
[Fixed link. – MEB]
If you guys are interested, there is an interesting debate at http://www.nybooks.com on this topic, featuring Ehud Barak on one side and Robert Malley on the other. Definitely worth reading.
davidw, thank you for the link. An interesting exchange. I look forward to the next installment.
It is, on the one hand very easy to see how Barak would interpret Arafat’s actions in the way he does. He is frustrated that he bet his career on Arafat’s jumping at the chance to have a reasonable setlement, that Arafat would be a willing negotiating partner at CD2, and Arafat couldn’t bring himself to say yes, wouldn’t deal at CD2. But I doubt that, at that particular point in time Arafat was as totally committed to the destruction of Israel as Barak portrays (even if other Arabs were)… many parts of Malley’s analysis seem reasonable … not all, but many.
Still, the answer to the op remains - Arafat was offered a very reasonable deal, better than anyone was expecting to be put out there, and he couldn’t find the courage to say yes, despite knowing what the alternative was (look around). Still, the current situation remains that Israel should not negotiate while terrorist acts continue; other, unilateral options remain and must be attempted.
Wow, such long threads. Let me try a short, simple one.
Regardless of whether he wants peace or not, he’ll never convince groups like Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and Hamas to accept living in peace side by side with Israel.
Also, he knows that in order to keep his position of power (what little he has left), not to mention possibly his life, he has to appease the radical elements of Palestine.
So, in a nut shell, either he doesn’t want peace, or if he does, he doesn’t have the will or the power to oppose those who don’t.
Can anyone explain Arafat’s relationship to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades?
So maybe I goofed. Sheeze, show a little tact will you?
You did not goof joel.
december is of the opinion that Arafat is the leader of the Al Aksa Martyr Brigades, he embraces this view stubbornly despite that some evidence has it to be more than just a somewhat flawed view. The Fatah faction has fragmented since the start of the Intifada and its militant parts such as the Al Aksa are under the control of amongst others Naser Badawi, part of Arafat’s oposition in the Fatah party. After the raids on Ramallah Israel presented seized documents as evidence of Arafat’ involvement. American and international scrutiny of these documents has pointed out a number of fallacies and fabrications by the Israeli making the evidence tenuous at best. Maybe he is, maybe he isn’t behind the Al Aksa, but he definitely does not command it.
Sparc