Try executive jets.
But if they’re lyin’, then people be dyin’. And then they’re in shit twice as deep - first for failing to protect the public, and second for lying about it. It makes no sense whatsoever for them to lie about a system the entire country can see whether or not it’s working. It would be like Toyota claiming that their new Corolla can fly.
Check out this current article
http://thebulletin.org/iron-dome-public-relations-weapon7308
I see the “only 5%” success rate mentioned in the article, but nowhere do I see any data or context for that claim, which is ironic, because that’s exactly what the article is complaining about the government in Israel and the American press of doing.
There’s a big difference between 5% of all rockets fired, and 5% of all rockets fired which are likely to hit a populated area or other target, or 5% of some other undefined quantity of rockets.
Again - if the Iron Dome isn’t working, show me pictures of the Israeli buildings being hit. Give me the names of those killed.
Bomber command in 1940-1942 was so inaccurate that the Germans often times did not know what the city target was and actually thought that the allies were bombing their fields for some reason.
These are homemade and down right inaccurate rockets. TLAMs they are not.
True, but they can generally hit the city they’re aiming at, and Israeli cities are fairly dense - not much suburbia here, just miles and miles of apartment buildings. Throw a rock at random at an Israeli city, and chances are you’ll hit someone’s home.
To be fair, German night bombing against the UK could be just as inaccurate. On at least one occasion, they bombed the wrong country. The USAAF notoriously pulled that particular trick off at least once themselves on a daylight raid (hooray for cities located on international border crossings).
Thank you! Somebody finally said it!
There’s a difference between “intercept” and “destroy”.
Lots of patriots hit scud missiles during the Gulf War. And the scuds continued on their way. That counts as an interception, but since the scud wasn’t destroyed it’s not so impressive.
However, since the scud probably wasn’t going to hit anything worthwhile in the first place it doesn’t matter that much.
Aside from what I assume are differing opinions on what you and and ABM engineers consider “relatively easy,” much of what you say on the entire design is incorrect.
The problem of stationary based laser ABM systems is real, as is attacking missiles in boost phase; the cancelled Airborne Laser, a strategic asset, would have had to loiter in extraordinary dangerous environments to try it. But your understanding of the very mechanisms in the kill sequence are completely incorrect, for “conventional” rockets or any other.
The “smack,” as you put it, is not intended to blow up anything. Nor is it intended to fry electronics. It is entirely predicated on creating enough heat to weaken the structure of the missile and deform the surface such that it buckles and is destroyed under the mechanical stress it is undergoing by the flight itself.
And I do believe the $800 of chrome is not an attractive option for re-entry, or other shiny stuff. I have this image of Superman seeing a laser beam coming in, grabbing Lois Lane’s purse and snatching out her makeup mirror, and the laser is not only bounced safely away but right back at its source to destroy it. Now that would be cool.
Part of this I think is from a misunderstanding of how mirrors work. They don’t reflect 100% of the light, as some energy is always lost in the process of reflection (just as energy is lost in transmission through wires or any other medium). Nobody has devised a means of transferring energy without a loss (in the form of heat).
If you’re talking about a high-powered laser, there is quite a bit of energy involved (or else it wouldn’t do anything to an ICBM warhead anyways). Chances are, reflective armor would either get slagged quickly along with the important bits beneath it from all the heat it’d be absorbing, or it’d weigh enough to have a significant impact on the missile’s performance.
IANARocket Scientist though.
That’s a two-edged sword, though. You need to use a mirror to aim the laser, too. So you need a laser that will burn through mirrored armor, but which won’t burn through your aiming mirror.
I think people who oppose missile defense don’t seem to grasp the alternative.
Is missile defense unreliable? Arguably yes; if a terrorist organization fires a nuke-tipped missile at Dallas, there’s a good chance it won’t be intercepted. We might even be looking at a rate of success as low as 50%.
But if there is *no *missile defense system, then it’s virtually guaranteed that millions will die or be wounded, not to mention perhaps trillions of dollars of damage and economic loss.
A 50% likelihood of preventing a bad outcome is always better than 0%.
(This assumes that the missile defense system is built for reasonably affordable cost.)
But there are other costs. Building a missile defense system might alarm one’s rivals, who might feel they need to put more money into their own missile systems (and defense systems) to keep up. In the worst case, it might spark a conflict from a jumpy rival who is worried that your defense system is a precursor to an attack.
Mutually-assured-destruction, so far, has worked. It’s true that with irrational non-state actors, like a terrorist group, MAD is ineffective. But there are ways to prevent a terrorist group (who, as a non-state, would be unable of manufacturing one on their own) from nuking American cities (chiefly, preventing them from getting a nuke) without seriously antagonizing our big-state rivals.
Missile defense against nuclear-armed nations is mostly ineffective, so it’s mainly about terrorist organizations.
I wouldn’t underestimated terrorist ingenuity; where there’s a will there’s often a way. And one cannot always be aware of the whereabouts of every nuke in the world.
True, but depending on the laser, hoisting it into space isn’t a requirement, so weight incurs less of a penalty than it would for a ballistic missile.
It’s about perception – and the perception of our nuclear-armed rivals might become very alarmed were we to pursue it.
So we stay vigilant, and use intel, etc. And the terrorists are far, far less likely to gain an ICBM (and launching and aiming equipment) then a nuclear “suitcase bomb”, against which a missile defense system would be useless. The risk, in my view, is not nearly high enough to justify the physical cost plus the cost of damaging relations with allies and rivals.
Don’t the Rusian defence systems outside Moscow and the US defence system of the 1970’s only protect certain sites rather than a whole country. Is that not more feasible?
Depends on how many re-entry vehicles the enemy was willing to throw at the target.
Chances are, in a nuclear WWIII, Moscow (defended by the Soviet ABM system) and Grand Forks Air Force Base (defended by the Safeguard ABM system) would have been overwhelmed by sheer numbers of RVs or penetrated by bombers/cruise missiles to be destroyed in a manner the ABM systems were ill-equipped to defend against.
(Note that this would have had to occur in 1975 or early 1976, since Safeguard was deactivated in 1976.)