Not sure that this adds anything, but what the hell. In Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 US 305 (1966) SCOTUS sturck down a reimbursement statute that only applied to people sentanced to prison, but not to those given a suspended sentence/probation. FWIW.
Was this a personal slam? I’m not sure if you were directing that at me or at people on the message boards in general.
You’ve been whooshed, Creative_Munster. IIRC, Bricker has been a PD.
He ignored my disclaimer. He might have been one of the good ones. Hell if I know.
Okay, so if I follow, someone found guilty only might have to pay? It all hinges on how the term hardship is interpreted? So, if you can’t afford an attorney at the time of your arrest, but win the Lotto or sell a kidney sometime between then and your conviction, you have to pay?
I think I get it.
OK, this seems really wrong to me. We that some folks who are aquitted are guilty. But they wouldn’t have to pay. We know some innocent folks are convicted, and therein lies my question:
If you are found guilty, and the state recoups its money from you, and your conviction is later overturned, does the state give the money back?
In Virginia, guilty defendants are billed for the Public Defender’s services. NPR commentator (and Arlington lawyer) Nora Raum wrote a newspaper column about it very recently, but I can’t find an online cite.
In the Alaska statute, IIRC, the defendant won’t have to pay until his appeals are complete. So this scenario won’t happen.
But he’s feeling better.
However, as we have seen in the various cites mentioned in this thread, the “recoupment” statutes that pass constitutional muster are not absolute, but dependent on what is the financial condition of the convicted when they actually start to serve their time; and do not affect the attorney actually getting paid. Sounds to me like that would be important information to give to the accused UP FRONT, lest they get the impression that any conviction – even if the lawyer is able to bail them out of, say, the worst 4 out of 5 charges – WILL stick them with the full legal bill, which could have a “chilling effect” in their minds. As long as that’s clear, I see no great moral issue with recouping some partial expense on an ability-to-pay basis from those only marginally or only temporarily “indigent”.
(on a hijack note: Is it me, or is criminal justice mostly in a transactional model where the state’s aim is to close the case ASAP by getting someone to plead guilty to somethingw/o an actual prosecution and trial?)
Well, if one adopts your views, it isn’t just SCOTUS, but a majority of State Courts who have ruled the same way when considering their individual state statutes. And it isn’t even the opinion of the dissent.
Some initial points about the responsibility of the defendant in the Fuller case:
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The recoupment statute is only implicated if there is a plea/finding of guilty.
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No one is forced to pay unless they have the ability to. Someone who is indigent and remains indigent will never have to pay for the attorney.
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Defendants always retain the ability to petition the court for discharge from these debts.
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The fees are significantly less than the current market for legal representation.
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The debts are unenforceable by contempt and do not result in any additional imprisonment.
Requiring an indigent defendant to pay for his attorney IF HE HAS THE ABILITY TO is no different than the same burden for someone who is not indigent. As Douglas said in his concurrence:
This simply isn’t a case where a defendant is being denied representation, they are only being told that, if at a later time they become capable of paying, they may have to.