# Are materialism and logic incompatible? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [July 26, 2002, 8:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002 "2002-07-26T20:38:16Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 8:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/1 "2002-07-26T20:38:16Z")
In the thread about what contains the universe, Scylla observed: > [@](#): > > You can prove whatever you want if you run fast and loose with your axioms and definitions, and their [sic] ain’t no reason to camoflage [sic] it with fancy and esoteric forms and equations. There is presently a flurry of activity in philosophical circles centered around the resurrection of ontological arguments for the existence of God. In particular, the tableaux of S4 and S5 modal logic have changed the ontological argument from vague to valid. Even philosophers and logicians who do not believe the argument to be sound do acknowledge its validity. (In logic, an argument is valid if its inferences follow from one another, and it is sound if it is valid and its axioms are true.) One of the very latest tableaux has caused a noted British logician and materialist, Trent Dougherty, to change his mind and concede, “I conclude, somewhat reluctantly, that God exists”. Of course, Dougherty understands both logic and materialism profoundly — the former is why he concludes what he does, and the latter is why he concludes it reluctantly. But I think it’s fair to say that Dougherty’s concession is exceptional. And obviously, he can’t be a materialist anymore. But I’d be interested in hearing from the materialists who, like Scylla, take exception to the definition and axiom offered in the tableau in the other thread. I’d like to reprint it here in full, but that might be interpreted as cross-posting. I hope that I can be allowed to quote from there just the definition and axiom. That’s all we need here anyway, because there’s no question whether the argument is valid (unless you refuse to accept logic as a whole). The only question is whether it is sound. I’d like to know why materialists think these two elements “run fast and loose.” **Definition** God = necessary existence What that means is that God is defined as the greatest possible existence, i.e., existence that is necessary. In addressing what you believe to be fast or loose about that, please explain how it might be unreasonable to define God to be that which is the greatest possible. The definition seems cogent to me — whatever is less is hardly God, and nothing greater is possible. **Axiom** It is possible that God exists Jab apparently didn’t like this one, but isn’t it reasonable to assert that the greatest POSSIBLE existence is, um, possible? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 8:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/2 "2002-07-26T20:47:05Z")
Eris posted this in the other thread: > [@](#): > > Lib, not to revive this discussion, but it seems clear that if we use “possible” to mean “must exist in some describable world” and “necessary” as “must exist in all worlds” then any being which must exist necessarily if it exists and is described as possible must exist in all worlds. The five following steps add a nice touch, but don’t seem necessary to develop the point. Well, the five steps simply serve to state formally what you just stated informally. ---
**Author:** ![Tars\_Tarkas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/6a8cbe/32.png) [@Tars\_Tarkas](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tars_Tarkas)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 8:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/3 "2002-07-26T20:51:57Z")
Could you explain what you mean by “materialist” please? Thanx ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 8:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/4 "2002-07-26T20:57:43Z")
Sure, Tars. I mean a person who believes that “physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.” ([dictionary.com](http://dictionary.com)) ---
**Author:** ![xenophon41](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xenophon41/32/253_2.png) [@xenophon41](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/xenophon41)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 9:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/5 "2002-07-26T21:09:00Z")
> [@](#): > > What that means is that God is defined as the greatest possible existence, i.e., existence that is necessary. In addressing what you believe to be fast or loose about that, please explain how it might be unreasonable to define God to be that which is the greatest possible. The definition seems cogent to me — whatever is less is hardly God, and nothing greater is possible. Well, I’m not clear about what “greatest possible existence” means in real terms. How does this reconcile with the common religious definitions of God? If we’re simply defining God as “that which necessarily exists”, I don’t see the difference in this proof and the statement “What must be, is.” That statement is philosophically pleasing to me, and frankly, I think it’s a reasonable concept, but I don’t see that it implies anything about love, salvation, or any of the immutable characteristics we’re used to associating with God. Am I just being thick-headed? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 9:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/6 "2002-07-26T21:22:00Z")
No, Xeno, not at all. In fact, you sound quite level-headed. Ontology can’t qualify existence with broader metaphysical attributes, but may only assign attributes of existence itself. In real terms? It means that you can say things like God has the greatest possible knowledge or the greatest possible power. But you can’t say anything (not with any validity anyway) about the metaphysical nature of those. ---
**Author:** ![Colibri](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/colibri/32/1841_2.png) [@Colibri](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Colibri)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 9:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/7 "2002-07-26T21:27:12Z")
> [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Libertarian \* > \*\* definition_\* > > God = necessary existence > > What that means is that God is defined as the greatest possible existence, i.e., existence that is necessary. In addressing what you believe to be fast or loose about that, please explain how it might be unreasonable to define God to be that which is the greatest possible. The definition seems cogent to me — whatever is less is hardly God, and nothing greater is possible. > \*\* It’s fast and loose, because in normal parlance “possible” does not equal “necessary.” (Don’t make me go and get the dictionary - but I will if I have to.) You appear here to be using some non-standard definitions of these two words at least. ---
**Author:** ![ultrafilter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/3d9bf3/32.png) [@ultrafilter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ultrafilter)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 9:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/8 "2002-07-26T21:28:53Z")
Replace “God” with “the universe” in the argument, and it’s wholly unremarkable. Furthermore, the conclusion of a valid argument may certainly be false; after all, it only must be true _if the hypotheses are true as well_. ---
**Author:** ![Phoenix\_Dragon](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/65b543/32.png) [@Phoenix\_Dragon](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Phoenix_Dragon)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 9:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/9 "2002-07-26T21:32:43Z")
Okay, the statement “It is possible that God exists” is true enough, at least untill someone supplies evidence one way or the other. But it’s as true as saying “it’s possible that the Loch Ness monster exists” or “it’s possible Anubis exists.” It’s also as true as “it’s possible that God doesn’t exist.” Without any evidence for any of those statements, though, it’d be pretty hard to convince me that any of these things _do_ exist, however. As for “God = necessary existence” I think you’re jumping to conclusions. First off, you’re asking us to define something we don’t know. It’s about as reasonable to ask me to define what a quark looks like; I don’t know. Never seen one, after all. Actually, it’s probably less reasonable. I _can_ reliably find information on quarks, information that has been reliably proven true. Unlike any gods. Further, I don’t see how “greatest possible existance” equals “existance that is neccessary.” The definition assumes a god to be true, while supplying no reasoning to support this. It can be true enough that if the christian god exists (I’m assuming that’s the one you’re using, due to various elements of your post), then he must be the greatest possible existance, but without anything to support a god’s existance it’s irrelavant. And saying something “is necessary” without anything to support it just doesn’t work. I could say there are millions of insubstantial creatures that are impossible for us to detect, and there are no laws of physics, merely these little critters going around and making sure things work right (Very thorough critters, aren’t they?). They hold people down to the ground just like gravity would, keep the atmosphere in place, make sure things react properly to being touched or pushed, even keeping an eye on bodily functions to make sure people can live. Without them, atoms wouldn’t be able to stay bound, and all matter in the universe would rapidly fall appart and disperse into an even density. They even started the universe. “Obviously,” they are necessary. No? ---
**Author:** ![xenophon41](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/xenophon41/32/253_2.png) [@xenophon41](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/xenophon41)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/10 "2002-07-26T22:00:38Z")
Oh, OK. Thanks **Lib**. I think this argument actually reinforces materialism just as much as any other metaphysic then, but I need to marshall my thoughts about that. (I’m thinking along the lines: If God is that which possesses the _greatest possible_ power and knowledge, this implies God must _contain all possible_ power and knowledge, which means God is necessarily Omnipresent, which means God is all that exists. Materialism considers that all thought, feeling, mind, and will are derived from that which exists materially, which, if we accept the above means…) I dunno. I have to let this stew. (You do such intereting threads, **Lib**.) ---
**Author:** ![Apos](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/838e76/32.png) [@Apos](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Apos)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/11 "2002-07-26T22:05:26Z")
—But I think it’s fair to say that Dougherty’s concession is exceptional. And obviously, he can’t be a materialist anymore.— Why not? You’ve not yet explained how you get from “greatest possible existence” to “non-physical existence?” Personally, I’ve never seen the point of talking about “materialism” or asserting that “physical matter is all that exists,” because I’m not even sure what the actual implication of that statement is. Talking about materialism or amaterialism seems, at the least, highly, misleading in such a situation. If you think something has a certain characteristic, specify specify. And I still don’t think that existence (in other possible worlds) is a valid characteristic of a being that exists in any particular possible world, or that a list of negatively defined maximums defines a being. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/12 "2002-07-26T22:12:38Z")
I think I’m going to tackle the OP from a different angle than a proof of god and stick, instead, with a logic versus materialism. This is a long post, but I believe it must necessarily be to make the point I want to make. **My first beef with materialism** is that it assrets quite plainly that “everything is material”, that is, physical or affecting _and_ affected by other physical things. It is nice to note that when _everything_ is [something] we no longer need to define [something] (unfortunately I’ve found a few critiques of materialism which insist that it can still be defined, or at least should be). The definition is: “look around”. Dangerous grounds to stand on. **My second problem with materialism** is the problem it presents for discussions of consciousness. I encountered in long-windedly but forcefully in my recent thread on private phenomena (reference private language, Wittgenstein). No one stepped up to offer a motivated discussion of how language can discuss private phenomenon; it either must be irrelevant (rug sweeping), defined as that which cannot be spoken of (rug sweeping), or denied (IMO, _prima facie_ false: I sure as hell experience the sensation of green). I can find no _account_ of consciousness, materialistically speaking. That does not mean I believe in a soul in any mystical or religious sense. But if I cannot _account_ for consciousness, if I cannot recount my personal experience in language, then materialism needs to explain why we cannot form a perfect map between words and all physical things. Now, ok, it is true that just because those private phenomena cannot be accounted for at all doesn’t mean they aren’t physical. But then, it seems to me that there should be some reason why they aren’t able to be accounted for. I don’t know, maybe not, that thread never came to any conclusions. But if the doctrine is that everything is physical, that must include consciousness. So why can’t we discuss consciousness in the same way we discuss other things that we can’t directly perceive (like, for instance, atoms). **My third problem with materialism** is that it leaves no room for free will. At least, let me say, I have not seen a discussion of how free will manifests itself in a world where everything is physical (except for compatibilism, which I think sort of twists the idea of free will but whatever). Metaphysical materialism seems to demand no free will, where “free will” is a force that may manifest itself without cause and may not be acted on by anything other than itself (keep that in mind for discussion where reality is contingent on God’s will ;)). Where would it come from, and what could we do to it or with it (since it is physical)? Again, I understand that just because it can’t account for it _now_ doesn’t mean it will _never_ be accounted for. And though I am not sure I am a proponent of free will, I am not sure I am a materialist, either. **Materialism seems bound in _this_ness** ; which is to say: everything that _is_ may be pointed at (I think that is a regular notion of physicalness). But if a material investigation into the nature of physical things leads us to the point where we demonstrate that individual particles don’t _have_ a _this_ness (they cannot be pointed at) then I think there is a problem with the underlying assumption of _thisness_ or at least our conception of it. In matters of theoretical science, however, it is possible that there are explantions which we may possess later that will restore _this_ness to reality (say, for instance, string theory). Materialists, bound in _this_ness, have a hard time motivating a discussion on universals that isn’t immanent realism or nominalism, though no one who is a nominalist can claim to _say_ anything about reality since all words are universals anyway (universals depend on _same_ness). But we then reach a strange case of literal pointing. Two people see a red ball, albeit from different angles. We may point to the ball and say “ball” and we may point to the ball and say “red”. We may _also_ point to their (completely physical) brains’ state(s) of electrical and chemical activity and say “ball” and “red” as well. Right? (an epistemological limitation in saying “no”, a problem describing the sensation of green in saying “yes” since I’ve never seen it done). **Logic and materialism are not fundamentally opposed** except to note the apparent discrepancy between building a complete and consistent framework of logic with which to study the universe. This is to say, we can never _demonstrate_ that everything is physical through a rigid symbol-set unless everything can be explained by something like first-order predicate logic. Not something we would normally take very far, though I would appreciate any input on the matter ( **ultrafilter** , if you are reading this then you might recognize my response to your research here!). (see if anyone can follow me here in the next paragraph) I think this last point is especially important WRT free will. If everything is physical, and disregarding a symbol for “physical”, then in order to describe the universe we reach a point where we must lay out a symbol set representing classes of things: particles, forces, and so on. If there are no “random” forces in the universe, then the universe seems to be a completely deductive system (no free will). If there _are_ random forces, how can they be described? Are they really _physical_, then? That is, a random force cannot be acted upon (else it wouldn’t be very random: that’s fixing the roulette wheel, my friends) but they can act. Is this not the standard conception of a “soul” or “free will”? I am at a loss to resolve this conflict. **Lib** , WRT to my quoted comment. I mean to say that you can’t expect people to disagree with the _proof_. You _can_ expect people to disagree with the definition or the axiom. This most recent example defines God as necessary existence period. No one would deny that necessary existence exists; it does so by definition, I would think. For me to be satisfied by a logical proof of God’s existence, I would need to see a logical description of God… a symbolic definition, should I say? A “meaningful” definition might not imply that we can simply pop it into a proof, miscible fluids being one such (possibly overused) example. **xenophon** , not inly is it that “whatever must be, is” but “whatever must be, is, _if_ it is”, except that the axiom of possibiliy asserts it “is” in at least one case, sealing the deal. Sorry for the long post, and hope it isn’t excessively tangential. ---
**Author:** ![december](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/838e76/32.png) [@december](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/december)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/13 "2002-07-26T22:24:29Z")
Here’s a quick thought, since I’m on my way out. The phrase, “It is possible,” could mean at least two different things: 1. It could express ignorance. “For all I know it might be true that…” 2. It might express a definite belief that something could take place. “It is possible to get a non-stop flight from Newark to Anchorage.” Note that the statement “It is possible that God exists” is true under meaning #1, but false under meaning #2. I wonder if the argument makes use of the slipperiness in meaning. ---
**Author:** ![RexDart](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/b77776/32.png) [@RexDart](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RexDart)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/14 "2002-07-26T22:39:11Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > \*\*I’d like to reprint it here in full, but that might be interpreted as cross-posting. I hope that I can be allowed to quote from there just the definition and axiom. That’s all we need here anyway, because there’s no question whether the argument is valid (unless you refuse to accept logic as a whole). The only question is whether it is sound. > > \*\* You don’t have to “refuse to accept logic as a whole.” I deny only **modal logic**. Modal logic is absolutely worthless, as it represents nothing. The universe is a certain way and no other ways. Certain things exist with certain attributes. Those things exist with the attributes they do because the preceding state of the universe determined that they do. That preceding state was determined by the state preceding it. You can throw around the “uncertainty principle” all day, but when it comes right down to it the uncertainty principle is a statement about _epistemology_ not _metaphysics_. What we know and don’t know about the universe has nothing to do with how the universe functions. The universe is causal. The way the world is right now, that’s the only way the world could be. It had to be that way because of simple causality. Nothing occurs without sufficient cause, and if there is sufficient cause the event must occur. So it is meaningless to say “Possibly X”. There is no such thing. There is only X or ~X. Any statement regarding “possible worlds” is meaningless as it has no referent in the actual world from which it can derive meaning. The Correspondence Theory of Truth, espoused even by famed antirealist Hilary Putnam in his younger years, quoted simply here from one of my favorite texts, Searle’s _Mind, Language, and Society_: > [@](#): > > ## Statements are true if they correspond to, or describe, or fit, how things really are in the world, and false if they do not. > > …statements are true only if there is something independent of the statement in virtue of which, or because of which, it is true. Clearly, from this definition, if we accept the Correspondence Theory of Truth then “Possibly X” cannot ever be true. There is nothing in the world to which it relates. ---
**Author:** ![jab1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ee7513/32.png) [@jab1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jab1)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/15 "2002-07-26T22:43:47Z")
[QUOTE] \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* \*\*(In logic, an argument is valid if its inferences follow from one another, and it is sound if it is valid and its axioms are true.)\*\*My emphasis. Once again, you have yet to demonstrate why anyone ought to believe that it is possible for God to exist. Until you have done so, I will not concede that your axiom IS true. (I won’t concede that it is false, either. I’m taking the neutral position.) > [@](#): > > **God is defined as the greatest possible existence, i.e., existence that is necessary.** Why is God necessary? Necessary for what? > [@](#): > > **In addressing what you believe to be fast or loose about that, please explain how it might be unreasonable to define God to be that which is the greatest possible. The definition seems cogent to me — whatever is less is hardly God, and nothing greater is possible.** My quibble is that you have yet to show how your definition conforms with reality as we know it. You can define God anyway you wish. But why you think it’s unnecessary to show how accurate your definition is, I don’t know. To sum up, your argument is the finest example of circular reasoning I’ve ever seen. You want to show that God exists, and your axiom states that He does; your axiom is the same as your conclusion. If that isn’t circular, what is it? ---
**Author:** ![jab1](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ee7513/32.png) [@jab1](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jab1)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/16 "2002-07-26T22:50:22Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Libertarian \* > \*\*Sure, Tars. I mean a person who believes that “physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.” ([dictionary.com](http://dictionary.com)) \*\* That describes me perfectly. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/17 "2002-07-26T22:51:48Z")
Possible can mean “not forbidden” with no implication of “necessity”, this is true; however, this is where the logical phrase “possible world” comes into play: the hypothetical construction of all worlds so that a birds eye view shows that everything not forbidden is compulsory (imagine an insane amount of chessboards covering all possible positions). given this description of possible, and the relationship that “necessary” means “exists in all these worlds” or is equated with “compulsory” then there’s your discrepancy, **december**. But note that the logical meaning of G is ~\<\>~G; it is not possible for no G, or that G is necessary. This _is_ what we mean by “necessary” and what we would also mean by “not possible” (in the case of ~G). BUT, let’s rephrase the proof here for kicks. _Translate_ it in your head as you go. I. G-\>G [erl’s note: something that could probably only apply to God] II. \<\>G [Ah, agnosticism!] III. \<\>G -\> G || ~G (|| means “or”) IV. ~G -\> ~G (though it could still be \<\>G) V. ~G -\> ~(~\<\>~G) (tautology explained above) V…which -\> \<\>~G does \<\>G -\>\<\>~G? To me, yes. That’s what “possible” means: may or may not exist(part III). But that _isn’t_ what it means in modal logic. “possible” means “is, _somewhere_”. Normally, if something was possible but never happened we wouldn’t then conclude that it was _im_possible (forbidden), only that it just didn’t happen (but was still possible). Modal logic eliminates this meaning of possible, however, and thus _asserts God’s existence in some logical construct_. As I said in the other thread, if we are going to assert God’s existence then why mess around with logic? Just assert his existence in _this_ world (the actual one) and be done with it. **RexDart** , possibility expresses itself in the model of reality, not reality, 'tis true, for the materialist (where something either is or is not, an ontologial law of the excluded middle). If the notion of “possibility” cannot be expressed in your model of reality, then you see that you are saying that everything which is not forbidden is compulsory? Does that sound right to you, metaphysically speaking? ---
**Author:** ![ultrafilter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/3d9bf3/32.png) [@ultrafilter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ultrafilter)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/18 "2002-07-26T22:53:54Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Colibri \* > \*\*It’s fast and loose, because in normal parlance “possible” does not equal “necessary.” (Don’t make me go and get the dictionary - but I will if I have to.) You appear here to be using some non-standard definitions of these two words at least. \*\* What is necessary is always possible; however, not everything that is possible is necessary. These are formal, logical terms, so there’s no reason to assume that they should follow standard parlance. The possibility operator \<\> is undefined, while the necessity operator is defined as follows: P \<-\> ~\<\>~P (i.e, P is necessarily true iff it is not possible that P is false). ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 10:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/19 "2002-07-26T22:57:01Z")
In fact, hell, my analogy of chess is very appropriate to what I see is the problem with this proof. Consider having enough chessboards and pieces laid out in such a manner as to compose _every single possible state_ of the game. In _all_ boards there will be two kings. The kings are necessary. But _that is the rule!_ Of _course_ they’ll be there… we required them to be there before we even laid out the boards! ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [July 26, 2002, 11:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002/20 "2002-07-26T23:03:40Z")
Ah, er, some of my “implies” arrows should be ,-\> not just -\>. Still, minor point when the distinction I wanted to make was modal logic’s "possible versus English’s “possible”. [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-materialism-and-logic-incompatible/121002.md?page=2)