# Are the expectations we have for the accuracy of covert US Intelligence unrealistic? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 5, 2006, 1:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524 "2006-05-05T13:20:20Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![astro](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/9dc877/32.png) [@astro](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/astro)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 1:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/1 "2006-05-05T13:20:20Z")
A lot of people think the morass in Iraq is partially due to a failure of the US intelligence infrastructure to accurately gauge the threat posed by Saddam, and (among other things) that huge amounts of stock were put into the testimony of unreliable informants. Overall, from the perspective of acquiring and utilizing accurate intelligence it often seems like we really don’t have a good handle on the threats posed to US, and that for all practical purposes it will be nearly impossible to effectively penetrate the terrorist cells. Popular culture (at least until recently) seemed to view spies and intelligence agencies as these all knowing, super powerful entities, and yet when it comes to looking at the “on the ground” results, and listening to CSPAN testimony before Congress by various agency heads, they come across like a bunch of stumbling rubes, so eager for any morsel of info they gobbled up the stories of questionable Iraqi defectors with nary a raised eyebrow. Beyond this, restrictive hiring practices by these agencies seem to ensure that unless a person has led what amounts to a highly conservative lifestyle, and has a near spotless background they don’t have a prayer of being hired. This might work well for recruiting missionaries, but it doesn’t seem to be the best strategy for getting a good stable of effective undercover spies. Hindsight is 20-20 so beating on the past will yield limited benefits. Going forward what are the things we can do to make US intelligence better and more accurate. Throwing billions in agency funding at the problem doesn’t seem to work all that well unless we can penetrate these terrorist organizations and governments that threaten us, and we seem to (so far) have no effective way of doing that. Or should we just be more limited in our expectations? ---
**Author:** ![Throatwarbler\_Mangrove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/8c91f0/32.png) [@Throatwarbler\_Mangrove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Throatwarbler_Mangrove)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 1:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/2 "2006-05-05T13:54:37Z")
First of all, I’m not sure whether there actually was an intelligence failure that led the US into Iraq, as opposed to simple lobbying by Bush&Co. I don’t think it would have mattered what the CIA report would have said. I just a few days ago finished [_See no Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism_](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/140004684X/sr=8-1/qid=1146836818/ref=pd_bbs_1/103-8756833-1897461?%5Fencoding=UTF8) by Robert Baer. It’s a little out of date now but it answers many of your questions. Basically, Baer and the Post WW2 CIA were very good, trained to operate mostly on Humint and not satellite photos. The way it works is that the CIA hires American “case officers”, who would operate in foreign countries posing as businessmen or scholars or archeologists, while covertly recruiting local agents to do the actual spying. This is basically how the KGB and the Iranian PASDARAN operated too. Baer tells of the frustration he hasin the Clinton and Bush admins when trying to infiltrate terrorist organizations with agents, of not being allowed to meet with terrorist leaders to gather important information because of fear of repercussions if the word went out, and basically watching the CIA decline in capability due to entrenched bureacracy, fear and reliance on technology instead of good human intelligence as he and the “old school” case officers did. ---
**Author:** ![misterdls](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/f4b2a3/32.png) [@misterdls](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/misterdls)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 3:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/3 "2006-05-05T15:27:25Z")
In considering whether there was an intelligence failure, one should perhaps consider the activities of people like Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, David Wurmser, etc., before they came into the Bush administration. These people were advocating going to war with Iraq long before Bush became president. Perle, Wurmser, and Douglas Feith had in fact proposed to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel attack Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. They suggested that the reason for attacking Syria be given as it’s “weapons of mass destruction program”. Also interesting is the prior relationship Perle had with Ahmad Chalabi, the man that Perle and Wolfowitz had wanted to run Iraq after Hussein was ousted. The fact that we went to war after 9/11 in the same manner as these people were pushing, seems to put the rationale for war elsewhere than just the misinterpretation of intelligence reports. ---
**Author:** ![Triskadecamus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b19c9b/32.png) [@Triskadecamus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Triskadecamus)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/4 "2006-05-05T15:38:54Z")
When you find yourself fifty miles into a swamp, with no roads, and no idea where you were going in the first place, it seems to me that this problem is not entirely the fault of the guy who made the map. Just sayin’, ya know? ---
**Author:** ![Sevastopol](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/cdc98d/32.png) [@Sevastopol](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sevastopol)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 4:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/5 "2006-05-05T16:03:01Z")
Further consider that when it came to the vote of the UN Security Council concerning Iraq, you know the one where Bush said everyone would have to lay their cards on the table, there was a solid reason why the US couldn’t get the majority it wanted and piked. That reason? That each nation’s own intelligence agency was telling its leadership not to believe the US’s public claims about Iraq. How then did the rest of the world get the intelligence so right and the US get it so wrong? The question at heart wasn’t a difficult one; Was Iraq reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program - not an easy thing to conceal. The obvious answer is most likely the correct one. There was no intelligence failure by the US agencies either. What there was, was a failure of character, as demonstrated so evocatively by our very own intelligence officer ex-member **bluesman**. We may have expected covert intelligence officers to act as objective professionals, committed to evidence-based analysis. Instead enough of them, like **bluesman** are co-opted by the Republican party and view their salary from the public purse as a stipend for services to the GOP. ---
**Author:** ![ralph124c](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/8797f3/32.png) [@ralph124c](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ralph124c)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 4:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/6 "2006-05-05T16:24:03Z")
I agree that the CIA had VERY good intelligence data on Iraq-Bush and his advisors ignored it. I still remember Colin Powell’s speech to the UN-wherein he described those mobile “biological warfare labs”. My take is that Bush thought that things would go so well, that the lies would be forgotten. insterad, we are now going on 4 years into a mess that seems to be getting worse. Is there a chance that things “will” go well? I’d say pretty slim. Like it or not, we will be stuck in Iraq for years, perhaps decades…and the author of the whole mess is GWB. ---
**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 4:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/7 "2006-05-05T16:39:07Z")
> [@Sevastopol](#): > > How then did the rest of the world get the intelligence so right and the US get it so wrong? The question at heart wasn’t a difficult one; Was Iraq reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program - not an easy thing to conceal. The obvious answer is most likely the correct one. There was no intelligence failure by the US agencies either. You are implying that countries like France and Germany were certain that no WMDs existed. Quite the contrary. Most people thought Iraq had some sort of WMDs somewhere. The disagreement was on how much they might have had and what to do about it. There’s no question that Bush overhyped the WMD postition. There’s no question that he and others in his administration were trigger happy. But it wasn’t like the other countries were saying-- Hey, they ain’t got no WMDs. They were just saying that war was not the way to deal with it. That was my position, too. ---
**Author:** ![Merijeek](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/f05b48/32.png) [@Merijeek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Merijeek)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 4:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/8 "2006-05-05T16:42:54Z")
> [@ralph124c](#): > > I agree that the CIA had VERY good intelligence data on Iraq-Bush and his advisors ignored it. I still remember Colin Powell’s speech to the UN-wherein he described those mobile “biological warfare labs”. My take is that Bush thought that things would go so well, that the lies would be forgotten. insterad, we are now going on 4 years into a mess that seems to be getting worse. Is there a chance that things “will” go well? I’d say pretty slim. Like it or not, we will be stuck in Iraq for years, perhaps decades…and the author of the whole mess is GWB. Not to put in an undue hijack, but **ralph124c** , didn’t you used to be a GWB superfan? Or am I mixing you up with someone else? -Joe ---
**Author:** ![Ravenman](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ravenman/32/2929_2.png) [@Ravenman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Ravenman)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 5:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/9 "2006-05-05T17:27:54Z")
I agree with **John Mace** – I don’t know of any evidence that other intelligence services got it right, while ours got it wrong. Let me quote a few passages from Hans Blix’s 2004 book, “Disarming Iraq.” > [@](#): > > On the morning of January 17 [2003]… Mohamed ElBaradei and I went to Elysee Palace to see President Chirac. … A number of intelligence services, including the French, were convinced that weapons of mass destruction remained in Iraq, but we had no evidence showing it. … Chirac said France did not have any ‘serious evidence’ that Iraq retained proscribed weapons. Having met people from French intelligence and listened to them, I registered with keen interest that Chirac did not share their conclusion on Iraq. … Personally, he did not believe that Iraq had any weapons of mass destruction. Chirac seemed to have been proved correct. Bush chose which parts of contradictory intelligence to believe and has been proved wrong. Which means that I also disagree with **ralph124c** – the intelligence was unreliable and the holes were filled in by suspicion, guesses, and fiction. I think it would be awfully difficult to expect highly accurate intelligence from repressive places like Iraq or North Korea. There’s just always going to be some guesswork, and it is incumbent on policy makers to use intelligence wisely. For example, if someone sees an intelligence report that says: “The CIA isn’t sure when Iran is going to have a nuke: best case scenario, it could be 20 years away. Worst case scenario, it could be weeks away.” The response to that report shouldn’t be, “If we don’t bomb Iran now our intelligence says they’ll have the bomb!” That same report, however, should spur other actions: more intel collection, more diplomacy, etc. ---
**Author:** ![Happy\_Clam](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/3bc359/32.png) [@Happy\_Clam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Happy_Clam)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 10:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/10 "2006-05-05T22:18:12Z")
> [@](#): > > You are implying that countries like France and Germany were certain that no WMDs existed. Quite the contrary. Most people thought Iraq had some sort of WMDs somewhere. The disagreement was on how much they might have had and what to do about it. There’s no question that Bush overhyped the WMD postition. There’s no question that he and others in his administration were trigger happy. But it wasn’t like the other countries were saying-- Hey, they ain’t got no WMDs. They were just saying that war was not the way to deal with it. That was my position, too. I disagree. I think that the constant revelations that every claim that the Bush administration put up was false, the complete failure of the weapons inspectors to find anything in Iraq (hey, anyone remember Hans Blix? Cool name!), and even things like the extremely belated mass of documents that Iraq released to the UN (I think just days before the invasion) made a lot of people think that there really were no weapons there. Cetainly I never beleived that they were present, but of course I am neither a representative sample, nor do I have a hotline to the joint intelligence agencies of the Western world. ---
**Author:** ![Happy\_Clam](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/3bc359/32.png) [@Happy\_Clam](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Happy_Clam)\ **Post date:** [May 5, 2006, 10:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/11 "2006-05-05T22:24:37Z")
> [@](#): > > I think it would be awfully difficult to expect highly accurate intelligence from repressive places like Iraq or North Korea. Hmm. We seemed to manage fairly well in the Cold War- not that there wasn’t false information flying around, of course, but there were a number of high-level spies/defectors within (say) the Russian administration (just finished Gordievsky’s book, KGB, for instance). I would of thought there would be at least equal opportunities for gathering human intelligence it what are, one might argue, less successful police states. ---
**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\ **Post date:** [May 6, 2006, 12:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/12 "2006-05-06T00:12:23Z")
> [@Happy Clam](#): > > I disagree. I think that the constant revelations that every claim that the Bush administration put up was false, the complete failure of the weapons inspectors to find anything in Iraq (hey, anyone remember Hans Blix? Cool name!), and even things like the extremely belated mass of documents that Iraq released to the UN (I think just days before the invasion) made a lot of people think that there really were no weapons there. Cetainly I never beleived that they were present, but of course I am neither a representative sample, nor do I have a hotline to the joint intelligence agencies of the Western world. You disagreee with what? That other countries didn’t believe the WMDs were there? Then why were they urging us to continue sending in inspectors? You’re looking with hindsight, I think. There were still some significant gaps in the list of weapons that SH was suppose to destroy. Keep in mind that the terms of the cease fire weren’t simply that he had to destroy his WMDs, but he had to do so in a verifiable way with the UN arms inspectors. > [@](#): > > [Iraq disarmament crisis](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_disarmament_crisis) > > During most of 2002 and into 2003, the United States government continued to call for “regime change” in Iraq and threatened to use military force to overthrow the Iraqi government unless Iraq rid itself of all weapons of mass destruction and convinced the UN that it had done so. See also Disarmament of Iraq. > > US diplomatic pressure to bring Iraq to compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441, quickly created a diplomatic crisis in the UN, where some were in agreement with the US position, while others dissented, notably the permanent security council members France, Russia and the People’s Republic of China and fellow NATO members Germany and Belgium. > > \ > > The US had given the following reasons for its seeking to force Iraq’s compliance: > > 1. That the government of Iraq has failed to produce evidence of the destruction of caches of weapons of mass destruction, i.e. biological, chemical, as well as the existence of secret programs to produce nuclear weapons. > 2. That the government of Iraq has supported terrorist operations and groups, and is likely to supply them with weapons of mass destruction at some future point. > 3. That the government of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, are anti-democratic and violate human rights - and have even been implicated in attempts at genocide. > > Several close allies of the U.S. (e.g. Germany, Belgium and France), although mainly sharing that estimation of the United States, opposed a military intervention because they claimed that it would increase rather than decrease the risk of terrorist attacks. Emphasis added. Sounds pretty much like what I said. (I wouldn’t say that the European governments agreed with item #2 so much, but certainly with items #1 and #3.) ---
**Author:** ![Sevastopol](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/cdc98d/32.png) [@Sevastopol](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sevastopol)\ **Post date:** [May 6, 2006, 1:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/13 "2006-05-06T01:04:40Z")
> [@John Mace](#): > > You are implying that countries like France and Germany were certain that no WMDs existed. Quite the contrary. Most people thought Iraq had some sort of WMDs somewhere. The disagreement was on how much they might have had and what to do about it. There’s no question that Bush overhyped the WMD postition. There’s no question that he and others in his administration were trigger happy. But it wasn’t like the other countries were saying-- Hey, they ain’t got no WMDs. They were just saying that war was not the way to deal with it. That was my position, too. You’ve muddled the difference between “_reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program_” and mere possession of Chem/Bio weapons. An active program means producing usable weapons. More importantly it displays very particular intentions. Such weapons and such intentions mean very dangerous things. This is why President Bush and **Bluesman** elected to lie to you and I about what the evidence before them suggested. So that aggressive action seemed a reasonable response. By contrast the intelligence agencies of everywhere else, such as Mexico and the other sitting members of the UNSC, staffed as they were by people of integrity, reported no evidence of active programs, but rather the possibility of the residual possession of old Chem/Bio weapons. Refer to [Robin Cook’s resignation speech](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2859431.stm) for a good example of this. So no, mere possession was never the question. It was a question of what, if any danger Iraq posed. In this there was a unanimity of opinion amongst the intelligence community. However, the low-integrity end of the community made a decision to lie about it. As to “_France and Germany were certain_;” no-one in the intelligence community uses the word ‘certain.’ Not a fair inference then. ---
**Author:** ![rjung](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/45deac/32.png) [@rjung](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rjung)\ **Post date:** [May 6, 2006, 7:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/14 "2006-05-06T07:17:36Z")
Related data point: [Germany: We told CIA that Iraq “Curveball” informant was untrustworthy](http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1121/dailyUpdate.html) And ignoring the efforts of some apologists to muddle the issue, my money for the true cause of the Iraq clusterf\*ck is on the reliable “the US had reliable intelligence that was ignored by senior Bush Administration officials.” From the PNAC’s decade-long dream of invading Iraq to Rumsfeld’s [“sweep it all up”](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml) call on the afternoon of 9/11 to the OSP cherry-picking pre-war data, all signs point to information being accepted or rejected solely on whether it supported a call to war. ---
**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\ **Post date:** [May 6, 2006, 4:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/15 "2006-05-06T16:23:54Z")
> [@Sevastopol](#): > > You’ve muddled the difference between “_reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program_” and mere possession of Chem/Bio weapons. No, I haven’t. I was only talking about the latter. ---
**Author:** ![Sevastopol](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/cdc98d/32.png) [@Sevastopol](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sevastopol)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 1:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/16 "2006-05-07T01:51:47Z")
> [@John Mace](#): > > No, I haven’t. I was only talking about the latter. You have. You wrote this: > [@John Mace](#): > > You are implying that countries like France and Germany were certain that no WMDs existed… In response to this: > [@Sevastopol](#): > > …The question at heart wasn’t a difficult one; Was Iraq reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program… To sum up: US intelligence joined other intelligence agencies in contemplating the evidence that Iraq: - had _no_ Chem/Bio weapons program & - posed _no_ real danger, notwithstanding its possible residue of Chem weapons. Other intelligence agencies made objective, professional assessments of that evidence. In the US, the conclusions drawn from that evidence were determined by allegiance to the policy of the Republican Party. Summary of summary: France, Germany: - Integrity & professionalism. USA: - [Office of Special Plans](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_Special_Plans), & **Bluesman**. ---
**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 4:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/17 "2006-05-07T04:15:29Z")
> [@Sevastopol](#): > > You have. You wrote this: In response to this: To tell the truth, the word “reconstituted” in your first post didn’t even register with me-- because it really doesn’t matter. You wrote: > [@Sevastopol](#): > > The question at heart wasn’t a difficult one; Was Iraq reconstituting a Chem/Bio weapons program - not an easy thing to conceal. What I should have said is that WASN’T the question at heart. Whether or not SH was “reconstituting” a weapons program wasn’t the key issue. The key issue was whether or not he had completely destroyed the weapons he had already built and/or acquired during the 90s. > [@](#): > > To sum up: US intelligence joined other intelligence agencies in contemplating the evidence that Iraq: > > - had _no_ Chem/Bio weapons program & > - posed _no_ real danger, notwithstanding its possible residue of Chem weapons. No, that does not sum it up. The central debate was about the weapons themselves, not “weapons program(s)”. Whether or not those weapons posed a danger to the US was a policy decision made by Bush. He saw largely what he wanted to see in the intelligence assessments. ---
**Author:** ![GIGObuster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gigobuster/32/421_2.png) [@GIGObuster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GIGObuster)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 5:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/18 "2006-05-07T05:29:05Z")
> [@John Mace](#): > > You disagreee with what? That other countries didn’t believe the WMDs were there? Then why were they urging us to continue sending in inspectors? Because the last inspections were taking care of item #1 on the reasons the US gave: [http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/article.php3?id\_article=4962](http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/article.php3?id_article=4962) 02-10-2003 > [@](#): > > Joint declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq > > Russia, Germany and France, in close coordination, reaffirm that the disarmament of Iraq, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions since UNSCR 687, is the common aim of the international community, and that it must be pursued to its conclusion within the shortest possible period. … > > UNSCR 1441, adopted unanimously by the Security Council, provides a framework whose possibilities have not yet been thoroughly explored. > > The inspections conducted by UNMOVIC and the IAEA have already yielded results. Russia, Germany and France favour the continuation of the inspections and the substantial strengthening of their human and technical capabilities by all possible means and in consultation with the inspectors, within the framework of UNSCR 1441. A month later, a few weeks before the invasion: > **[Full text of the joint declaration](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/06/france.germany)** > > The official text of the joint declaration by the foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany: > [@](#): > > Thursday March 6, 2003 > The Guardian > The official text of the joint declaration by the foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany: > Our common objective remains the full and effective disarmament of Iraq, in compliance with resolution 1441. We consider that this objective can be achieved by the peaceful means of the inspections. > > We moreover observe that these inspections are producing increasingly encouraging results: > > · The destruction of the Samoud missiles has started and is making progress > > · Iraqis are providing biological and chemical information > > · The interviews with Iraqi scientists are continuing. > > In these circumstances, we will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorise the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the security council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point. That proposal BTW was not voted on when Bush realized he did not have the votes. > [@John Mace](#): > > No, that does not sum it up. The central debate was about the weapons themselves, not “weapons program(s)”. Whether or not those weapons posed a danger to the US was a policy decision made by Bush. He saw largely what he wanted to see in the intelligence assessments. There is a difference between seeing the path and making the path: Just by memory: important pieces of the intelligence were obtained very likely by torture ( **false** connections of Al-qeada with Iraq) ordered by this administration, another piece was obtained planting information to the press that then the administration used to say the press was supporting their view (the Plame affair) speaking of the Plame affair: that was just one of many efforts to silence critics with connections to the intelligence community. Add the Downing street memos: [http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html](http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html) > [@](#): > > Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. When one realizes that the memos came from **July 2002** , then that and the items mentioned before, shows IMHO a concerted effort to mislead the American people. These are good reasons why this administration needs to be subjected to two or more investigations with subpoena power and putting many of their members under oath, but since Republicans with their “see no evil” mentality continue to enable this administration, it is clear to me what it needs to be done in the next elections. Are supporters of the administration ignoring timelines once again? [downingstreetmemo.com](http://downingstreetmemo.com/timeline/) looks like TAS again. ---
**Author:** ![Sevastopol](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/cdc98d/32.png) [@Sevastopol](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sevastopol)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 5:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/19 "2006-05-07T05:55:40Z")
> [@John Mace](#): > > … > What I should have said is that WASN’T the question at heart. Whether or not SH was “reconstituting” a weapons program wasn’t the key issue. The key issue was whether or not he had completely destroyed the weapons he had already built and/or acquired during the 90s. No, that is an after the fact rationalisation. As more evidence emerged the Bush administration redefined the war target as larger and larger and closer and closer, although they still couldn’t hit it ultimately. Mere evidence of failure to account, for the entirety of weapons, at one stage possessed, was never the key issue. Refer to Colin Powell’s UN speech and the Presidential war resolution. They are all about the material danger of Chem/Bio weapons being used by the terrorists against the US, any day now. > [@John Mace](#): > > …No, that does not sum it up. The central debate was about the weapons themselves, not “weapons program(s)”. Whether or not those weapons posed a danger to the US was a policy decision made by Bush. He saw largely what he wanted to see in the intelligence assessments. We were there and saw it all unfold. It sums it up cleanly. Bush did not largely see what he wanted to see. He made a decision in cold blood to compel conclusions from the intelligence community that it did not independently support. There was no failure of covert intelligence gathering. It was a failure of character. ---
**Author:** ![John\_Mace](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/john_mace/32/185_2.png) [@John\_Mace](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Mace)\ **Post date:** [May 7, 2006, 6:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524/20 "2006-05-07T06:15:52Z")
> [@Sevastopol](#): > > No, that is an after the fact rationalisation. As more evidence emerged the Bush administration redefined the war target as larger and larger and closer and closer, although they still couldn’t hit it ultimately. Actually, it was just the opposite. it went from WMDs to WMD dvelopment to WMD devlopment related programs. > [@](#): > > Mere evidence of failure to account, for the entirety of weapons, at one stage possessed, was never the key issue. Refer to Colin Powell’s UN speech and the Presidential war resolution. They are all about the material danger of Chem/Bio weapons being used by the terrorists against the US, any day now. That makes no sense. Your last sentence contradicts your first one. > [@](#): > > We were there and saw it all unfold. It sums it up cleanly. Bush did not largely see what he wanted to see. He made a decision in cold blood to compel conclusions from the intelligence community that it did not independently support. There was no failure of covert intelligence gathering. It was a failure of character. Look, you can rant all you want about the decision to go to war. I never supported it, so I’m not going to disagree. The one and only thing I’m saying is that I don’t believe the intelligence agencies of other countries (UK, France, Germany) had concluded no WMDs existed. If you think otherwise, let’s see a cite. France and Germany didn’t object to the war because they thought there were no WMDs, they thought the war was unnecessary even if there were WMDs. So, let’s see a cite for your claims instead of you just restating them. [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/are-the-expectations-we-have-for-the-accuracy-of-covert-us-intelligence-unrealistic/355524.md?page=2)