JThunder: “So you’re saying that the claim, “There are no absolute truths” is not absolutely true, right?”
I agree that it is contradictory with the means of analysis we use. But that’s all. It is as “not absolutely true” as the queen being able to jump pawns. Think of it like Lib using it as a definition. A definition isn’t true (or, if you wish, it is a tautology and necessarily true, but I think this conflates the issue). We can always create analyzable sentences from definitions (like the mistake I made, and corrected, in my chess statement) by using relational statements as in, “Is it absolutely true that this […] is the definition of […]?” (which makes us look at definitions as tautologies)
Let me say: if the issue is semantics, then the resolution is to disregard the notion of all statements having some truth value. If the issue is ontological, then the resolution (to me) is that there must be some absolute truths because of the way the negation of absolute truths is parsed (that is, it is contradictory). But this also makes it semantic: the means I have for analyzing statements include absolutes, and if I consider them true then it is no surprise that the statement “There are no absolutes” is contradictory since we already knew there were absolutes: my tools of analysis. And of course my tools of analysis exist. But I can’t prove that: I simply use them.
The truths my tools demonstrate can be no more true than the rules themselves. But since the rules declare truth, they aren’t true at all (which doesn’t mean false, of course). Which means that if there are absolute truths they don’t necessarily have the ontological status of a necessary being/element of knowledge/ etc.
There is no proof of the existence of absolutes, there is a game we play with absolutes as rules. I guess we could torturously say that absolutes must then exist in the forms of rules for games by definition, but again, this is back to the definitions-as-tautologies which doesn’t seem to shed much light on the matter (but that might just be my distaste for the a priori creeping in).
I remember a conversation with Spiritus Mundi once on epistemology, and we were discussing the truth-status of an epistemology itself. I had declared that an epistemology could analyze itself if we wrote its rules down on a piece of paper. Since we can presumably know reality with the epistemology, and this paper and these symbols were in reality, then we could know our epistemology epistemologically. I think I see now why he disagreed with me and said that the stuff on the paper was not the epistemology.
When we discuss absolute truths, we often don’t mean things that we all think, or things that no one denies, but things that no one can deny. photopat’s facts, not necessarily truth. “The propositions of logic all say the same thing: to wit, nothing.” This is because, if logic is truth, then the definitions are tautologies. And this means all truths are then necessary truths. But this means everything that is true is true in any world, however it can be imagined, meaning the propositions of logic fail to attach to (describe the) world at any point… rather, they attach at every point. So they can’t say anything about this world (unless this world is necessary, good for a hard-core determinist I suppose).
[deep breath]
I’ll shut up now.