# Ask the Creationist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 12, 2005, 1:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555 "2005-05-12T13:18:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 11
**Author:** ![cosmosdan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/a6a055/32.png) [@cosmosdan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/cosmosdan)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 3:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/201 "2005-05-18T15:26:26Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > Well, then you should have been more specific, because that’s not what I took from your statement at all. I thought you were using the story of Buddha as evidence of what would happen. I see now that I should have been. Since you question seemed an impossible hypothesis I saw any answer as a mere suggestion. > [@](#): > > How exactly does a harbourer of Jews answer the question “Are you harbouring Jews?” truthfully without revealing the harboured Jews? Being truthful does not require that you always answer the question directly if you choose not to. If someone asks me a personal question I can truthfully answer “i prefer not to answer that personal a question. or even “It’s none of your business” Our own 5th amendment is a great example. Did you commit this crime?” I refuse to answer on the grounds etc" Being truthful is about intent. Politicians use a lame tecnique which never makes an recorded dishonest statement but and their intention is to decieve and mislead. In my book, thats a lie. The Anne Frank one is very tricky. Imagine your intent is to save the lives of those in hideing. Your intent is also to be truthful. Now there’s a Nazi at your door asking “Are you harboring Jews?” Lives are at steak. I understand how honesty would seem to pale as a priority. {Are we just these bodies?} possibilities; ``` " please don't harm us I don't want any trouble" "Come in see for yourself " {Since you know they're going to search.} or, "will you believe me if I say No?" Please come in and see for yourself" this response removes their need to ask, and your temptation to lie. Of course there is risk involved and we can't predict the outcome. Lieing doesn't insure we accomplish our purpose either. It only guarentees that we have betrayed our comittment to honesty. I believe being truthful can lead to wisdom and insight into how to respond truthfully without hurting others. This is all theoretical. What would I do in the heat of the moment? I don't know. I might lie. Because of my beliefs I would feel like I had been untrue to my principles. Fortunatley I also believe in forgiveness. ``` ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 5:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/202 "2005-05-18T17:17:24Z")
**I guess one more hijack can’t hurt…** > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Neither of these are necessary. There are _eg._ no “life” or “computation” particles either, nor are there mechanisms by which life or computation are _greater than_ the sum of their parts. Life and computation **emerge** from _arrangements_ of physical particles: they are physical _processes_. **Sentient** , as you know, this aspect of physicalism is one that I’ve always found problematic- maybe I still just do not understand your argument here. Let me give an example using an abacus, since it involves computation (and the beads should function nicely as particle analogues). I ask Grandfather Yee to multiply two large numbers on his abacus. He scoots the beads back and forth, and, when they reach a particular _arrangement_, he stops scooting and tells me the correct answer. He then hands the abacus to his 7-month old grandson, who scoots the beads back and forth for exactly the same amount of time, and, when they reach a particular _arrangement_, simply looks bored and hands the abacus back to Grandpa. Computation **emerged** from the first arrangement of beads, but not the second. Yet none of the physical properties of the abacus or it’s beads changed (there was no increase or decrease in its mass, volume, density, etc.). You say that computation emerges from arrangements of physical particules, but I can’t see how _what emerges is physical_, after all, _something_ has emerged, something is _different_, yet the properties of the physical particles remain the same. What are the physical properties of _arrangement_? What are the physical properties of _process_? ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 5:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/203 "2005-05-18T17:28:28Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > **I guess one more hijack can’t hurt…** > > **Sentient** , as you know, this aspect of physicalism is one that I’ve always found problematic- maybe I still just do not understand your argument here. > > Let me give an example using an abacus, since it involves computation (and the beads should function nicely as particle analogues). > > I ask Grandfather Yee to multiply two large numbers on his abacus. He scoots the beads back and forth, and, when they reach a particular _arrangement_, he stops scooting and tells me the correct answer. > > He then hands the abacus to his 7-month old grandson, who scoots the beads back and forth for exactly the same amount of time, and, when they reach a particular _arrangement_, simply looks bored and hands the abacus back to Grandpa. > > Computation **emerged** from the first arrangement of beads, but not the second. Yet none of the physical properties of the abacus or it’s beads changed (there was no increase or decrease in its mass, volume, density, etc.). > > You say that computation emerges from arrangements of physical particules, but I can’t see how _what emerges is physical_, after all, _something_ has emerged, something is _different_, yet the properties of the physical particles remain the same. > > What are the physical properties of _arrangement_? > What are the physical properties of _process_? The physical properties of the _abacus_ are different in the second case than in the first. Where something is located is, to me, a physical property and the beads are located at different places within the abacus in the two examples. ---
**Author:** ![andros](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/e480ec/32.png) [@andros](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/andros)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 5:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/204 "2005-05-18T17:42:22Z")
> [@David Simmons](#): > > the beads are located at different places within the abacus in the two examples. Not necessarily. ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 6:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/205 "2005-05-18T18:11:36Z")
> [@andros](#): > > Not necessarily. Right you are in general, but unless the arrangements are different it’s hard to prove that the kid wasn’t computing even though he made different moves in his process than did grandpa in his. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 8:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/206 "2005-05-18T20:06:53Z")
> [@David Simmons](#): > > Right you are in general, but unless the arrangements are different it’s hard to prove that the kid wasn’t computing even though he made different moves in his process than did grandpa in his. If I’m understanding you correctly, the kid could have been _alone_ in the room, and had he ended up with the same arrangement of beads (indeed, he could even just happen to be moving the beads in the exact same way as Grandpa), he would be computing. Sez who? Certainly not the kid; as far as he was concerned, he was just playing with pretty beads. What determines the difference between “playing with pretty beads” and “computing”? ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 9:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/207 "2005-05-18T21:05:33Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > If I’m understanding you correctly, the kid could have been _alone_ in the room, and had he ended up with the same arrangement of beads (indeed, he could even just happen to be moving the beads in the exact same way as Grandpa), he would be computing. > > Sez who? > > Certainly not the kid; as far as he was concerned, he was just playing with pretty beads. > What determines the difference between “playing with pretty beads” and “computing”? What I said was that if he did arrive at the same arrangement as grandpa it would be hard to prove he _wasn’t_ computing. And I envy your ability to read this hypothetical tot’s mind in saying that “he was just playing with pretty beads.” What you are pretty sure is true is not the same thing as what you can prove is true. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 11:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/208 "2005-05-18T23:01:34Z")
> [@David Simmons](#): > > What I said was that if he did arrive at the same arrangement as grandpa it would be hard to prove he _wasn’t_ computing. Which is pretty much my point. If computation emerges from the arrangement of physical particles, what determines whether a given arrangement of particles is or is not part of a computational process, or the result of one? (IOW, What determines the difference between “playing with pretty beads” and “computing”?) > [@](#): > > And I envy your ability to read this hypothetical tot’s mind in saying that “he was just playing with pretty beads.” What you are pretty sure is true is not the same thing as what you can prove is true. No problem. Make the hypothetical tot _me_. I certainly couldn’t multiply two large numbers on an abacus at 7 months (or now for that matter). Grandpa’s not in the room. _You’re_ not in the room. I’m the only one in the room and I barely have a concept of mommy, let alone computation. If no one else is there, and it’s not computation to me, who sez it’s computation? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 18, 2005, 11:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/209 "2005-05-18T23:32:19Z")
> [@Abe](#): > > I am not saying that your _opinions_, which you mention above, are necessarily arbitrary; I am saying that “assumption” philosophies such as dualist systems are necessarily arbitrary because they rely on the assumptions of so many unknowns that it makes it impossible to establish a proper system of knowledge (not faith). Can you name any epistemic system that has no arbitrary foundation? Take logic. Why must it be the case that p v ~p? As it turns out, there’s no non-arbitrary reason for it, and in fact, some systems of logic reject that very fundamental premise of first order propositional logic. Take geometry. Why must it be the case that parallel lines, as defined by Euclid, never intersect? As it turns out, there’s no non-arbitrary reason at all, and in fact, non-Euclidean systems abound. “Ah, but these unorthodox systems are useful!” you might say, and I would say that whatever finds a use is useful. Things are useful for whatever purpose they are used. Deductive logic is of no use if you need to induce. Topology is of no use if you need to examine something without a surface. Now, take science. One can almost hear the collective gasps of people who find science to be too holy to touch, but science is as arbitrary an epistemic system as any other. In fact, like all closed epistemic systems, it is entirely tautological. Its epistemology is empricism. The senses observe the physical, even while the senses themselves are part of what they observe — they are physical too. Science is of no use at all unless what you find useful is the verification of whether something is false. The purpose of science is to test the veracity of falsifiable hypotheses. If testing that is important to you, then you will find science useful. If, for example, you want to test a theory that a particular chemical coctail can increase a wheat harvest ten-fold, then science is the tool to choose. But of what use is your scientific test to millions of starving people whose corrupt and tyrannical governments cooperate with your own corrupt and tyrannical government to deny the distribution of your wheat, or to use it to profit themselves as they watch others die? What scientific theory will compel men not to leave their wheat in silos to rot? What scientific hypothesis will reach the hearts of heartless men, and encourage them to do good? > [@](#): > > Essentialism, for example, makes sense only if you accept the assumption (among a couple others, I am simplifying here) that any entity, object, idea, etc., contains a limited number of **essential** characteristics that all entities, objects, ideas in the same group must share. Has this arbitrary system of knowledge, this sub-standard attempt at taxonomy, ever worked for anything in a rigid frame of reference that does not tolerate unwarranted assumptions? Not to my knowledge. There is no requirement to grant essentialist premises. And if you do not first grant the fundamental premises of Essentialism, it is an inert hunk of broken machinery. If you do grant the premises, that makes Essentialism arbitrary, much like… If you know what a unicorn is, then you have proved that essentialism is true. Essentialist interpretations fall under that same rules of usefulness as all others. In fact, what you have done in your own post is attack the essential nature of essentialism. You have not denied that it exists as a philosophy; rather, you have declared that it is essentially useless. Essentialism is invoked in all disciplines of philosophy from science to law. Biologists study life without having a definition for it upon which all can agree. Courts declare things obscene that they cannot define, but can recognize when they see it. Useful is as useful does. > [@](#): > > As were Freud and Jung. Indeed, though Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis and sciamachy are often garbed in the attire of scientific hypotheses, they are pseudoscientific in the extreme. For example, according to Freud’s theory of dreams, which is nonsense of the worst kind, dreaming of a sword is to be interpreted as phallic symbolism. How did Freud decide things like that? Through reasoning that was itself highly arbitrary, based on his private _a priori_ opinion. How did Freud figure out that personality consists of Id, Ego, and Superego? Arbitrary assumption. How did he figure out that the conflicts between this tripartite structure are repressed and lead to anxiety? Arbitrary – pretty and interesting, yes, but arbitrary nonetheless. The priority of reliable systems of knowledge is the reduction of unknowns; as you well know, assuming unknowns in any application of reason is like throwing sand in the machinery. If just one of your premises is flawed (by, for instance, assuming an unknown) you can use iron-clad logic to prove anything at all. But essentialism is not pseudoscientific. It does not posit anything; it does not predict anything; it does not model anything; it does not test anything. The theories you have cited are the very ones cited by the great philosopher Karl Popper in his examination of science versus pseudoscience. There is a reason he did not mention Hegel or Kant when he mentioned Freud and Adler — the latter pair attempted to state irrefutable theories of empiricism that were untestable, while the former pair stated analytical theories that they deduced or induced by systems of logic. By your standard of application, arithmetic is a pseudoscience: it observes nothing, it makes no predictions, and it is not empirically testable (unless you posit that it models the real world, in which case you’d better have a brand new defense that no one else has thought of). > [@](#): > > That was the nature of my example. Not the people involved or even the nature of their work, but the assumption of unknowns and, following that, the reliance on a system of knowledge/reason based on resulting faulty foundations. Those may apply to Marx, but they do not apply to Von Mises. You cannot compare a theory born of emotion and whim to a theory constructed by rigorous logic. > [@](#): > > Physicalism is, as **Bytegeist** pointed out, the safest of all philosophies, epistemically speaking. It does not posit unknowns and unknowables; it simply operates with the material available at hand (which happens to be entirely matter-based, hence its name physicalism). There is nothing arbitrary about physicalism, with the possible minor exception of the reason why many scientists find it to be valid: either the universe is entirely physical, or it is not; if it is not, there appears to be no way to reliably tell anything about what is not physical (from ghosts to gods), and Occam’s razor simply slashes away that entire unfathomable undetected unknown part from the equation. It is a sad thing for me to witness so-called scientists making their craft into an art, appropriating unto themselves the de facto status of grand philosphers. These unsteady men do not discern a difference between deduction and empiricism, and have declared that all and sundry is scientific — the revelation that forms the hypotheses, the induction that designs the tests, the statistics that form the data, the deductions that make conclusions, and even the math that manipulates the numbers. Math. One can scarcely conceive a more abstract and arbitrary thing. And now you are telling me that scientists have adopted a philosophy. Great. Before long, we will be full circle into a new Dark Ages. Innovation, which is not brought on by science, but by imagination and risk, will evaporate, and in its place will be a slimy political entity. Science will be the new Church. > [@](#): > > In one sense, I don’t think physicalism assumes that everything must be physical: it simply describes the state of the universe to the best of our knowledge, without so many of the fascinating but epistemically null trimmings that dualist philosophies rely on. We have a resident physicalist, a man with an intellect that dwarfs my own: Sentient Meat. Ask him to name one non-physical thing. > [@](#): > > No no no, you are reading me wrong. I’m not out to damn you, I am out to ask you specific questions that will hopefully lead us to a discussion on why your prose frequently exudes so much certainty in your own view and why you see fit to dismiss other points of view you are obviously set against (such as the logically superior weak atheism, probably the strongest and most defensible position of them all). Dismiss? To me, dismissal means discarding out of hand, without thought or analysis. That is not what I do. I reject atheism (both soft and hard) precisely because I find it to be untenable. And I explain exactly why. Nevertheless, I also state consistently that I find it to be a valid point of view. It is the point of view that you would expect from someone who has had no experience with God. It is a point of view that I myself have held. > [@](#): > > You routinely provide as support for your arguments the claim that God saved your life, and, when that claim is pointed out as suspect (at least on an anecdotal basis), you say that god saved the lives of plenty of other people too. But we both know you are too well read and too well versed in philosophy and logic to seriously make that particular fallacious argument. Hence my questions: I have no idea where that came from. It is as though you’ve confused me with someone else. I do believe that this is the first time I ever have made the statement that God saved my life. I have stated before that I have had experiences with God, and that Her revelations made me see in new ways. But I cannot recall ever saying that She saved my life or anyone else’s. > [@](#): > > -How did God save your life? (I don’t mean to ask for details, in fact the other questions are probably more relevant than this one) By rescuing me from harm, danger, or loss. (_American Heritage_, def. 1A.) I did not know that goodness was beautiful; I had thought it was onerous. > [@](#): > > -How did you know that it was god? At the risk of your finding this trite, but with assurances that you want me to be honest — because He said so. > [@](#): > > -Is it conceivable to you that it was not in fact god? Conceivable to me? No, that is inconceivable. (Preemptive recognition of opportunity for _Princess Bride_ joke.) > [@](#): > > … and its companion: > > -Is it conceivable that you may be mistaken on this subject? For you, probably, but for me, no. I can no more be mistaken about those experiences than my experiences of going to the mailbox, or watering the hanging baskets on the porch. To deny them would manifest a psychosis. I know what hallucinations are. I have experienced the delirium and bliss of drug induced, mind bending stupor. I was an acid head for more years than I care to admit. I have also experienced reality. I know the difference. I am not delusional. > [@](#): > > If, as I suspect, you are able to entertain the notion that you may be mistaken in spite of your faith, do you not think that your frequently expressed certitude is in fact irrational (i.e., based on a powerfully emotional belief but ultimately arbitrary or similarly invalid in any system external to your own conviction)? And please do not take “irrational” as an insult, I mean it strictly without any offence or loaded meaning, but solely intended as described in the parentheses (kind of the way Dawkins meant “delusion” in that Salon article that you found offensive a couple weeks ago). Moot, I suppose, since I cannot entertain the notion. I can entertain the notion that, as far as you are concerned, there is no God. But how could you expect me to entertain that same notion, since my experience differs from yours? Why can you not allow that I have seen Him, but you have not? > [@](#): > > Tsk, tsk, you are assuming how I will react to whatever you say, which is either a tad too defensive or doesn’t give me a whole lot of credit. Anyway, I point out the extremely important term you used above: “belief”. You have FAITH. I do not intend to judge your faith, rather I am addressing how you sport your faith in a number of these discussions when confronted with other points of view that rely considerably less on faith. You believe the nature of man and the universe is dualist; we’re clearly not going to solve that discussion here, I am just pointing out that mocking the “artificial land of atheism” on the basis of a belief that is ultimately arbitrary is not very cautious. But the SDMB is an artificial land of atheism; it is not a microcosm of general society. Just as you meant no offense, neither did I. Besides, I have found that most atheists here do indeed rely on quite much faith. Quite exceptional are men like Sentient who do not merely accept what they’ve heard that Bohr proved, or about Copenhagen interpretations, and such. He checks their math. He does not read books about books; he reads the books themselves. Most other men merely parrot what they have heard, and they believe for no reason other than they trust it to be true. > [@](#): > > Well, that simply is not true. Revelation is largely unfalsifiable and subject to the whims and forgeries of mankind. It automatically requires you to believe in something for which no real support is provided. Whose revelation are we talking about? Why is it such a valid epistemology? Now, see. You got all over me about the application of arbitration to epistemic systems, and here you are, declaring falsifiability to be a requisite for validity. You cannot falsify p v ~p, and yet you have invoked it yourself in your own post. I leave it as an exercise for whoever wishes to find it. > [@](#): > > I’m not attaking your belief or choice of beliefs, but to state that a personal belief is as valid an epistemology as, for example, physicalism or the scientific method is quite an extreme position and requires strong support. A system is valid if it follows its own rules. Validity has nothing to do with truth value. E is equal to mc[sup]2[/sup] whether it was deduced or whether it just suddenly occured to you. (Incidentally, I believe it is significant to our discussion that Einstein deduced his theories using ordinary propositional logic, rather than empricial testing. The tests came later, and were done by others.) ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 1:33am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/210 "2005-05-19T01:33:42Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > who sez it’s computation? Can you understand that I’m not claiming it is computation? Some are claiming, without proof, that it’s not. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 8:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/211 "2005-05-19T08:51:34Z")
Good to see you again, **other-wise**. I think [this recent OP](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=315717) (which went precisely _nowhere_!) might also interest you. > [@](#): > > Let me give an example using an abacus, since it involves computation (and the beads should function nicely as particle analogues). > > I ask Grandfather Yee to multiply two large numbers on his abacus. He scoots the beads back and forth, and, when they reach a particular arrangement, he stops scooting and tells me the correct answer. > > He then hands the abacus to his 7-month old grandson, who scoots the beads back and forth for exactly the same amount of time, and, when they reach a particular arrangement, simply looks bored and hands the abacus back to Grandpa. > > Computation **emerged** from the first arrangement of beads, but not the second. I disagree. The 7 year old’s is a _random_ arrangement (_ie._ a random computation, like a dice roll), the Grandfather’s is a computation based on _prior_ arrangements of abacuses. On a computer made of atoms, a random number generator is one example of a computer application, a calculator is another example. Both applications are ultimately **temporal** arrangements of the electrons, silicon gates and memory. > [@](#): > > You say that computation emerges from arrangements of physical particules, but I can’t see how what emerges is _physical_, after all, something has emerged, something is different, yet the properties of the physical particles remain the same. **Temporal** arrangements of physical particles are still physical. A lake is physical and _so is a waterfall_. An ice cube is physical and _so is its melting_. An atomic object is physical and _so is its **photonic** reflection_. Physical **processes** are _as phsyical as_ objects. > [@](#): > > What are the physical properties of _arrangement_? > What are the physical properties of _process_? The words “arrangement” and “process” are linguistic referents, computational _labels_, which human computers running the application called “English” physically utter or mark on paper/monitor to encode a computational category, itself _as physical as_ a recycle bin or dictionary file. Perhaps you could reply in that other thread, or start your own OP, quoting this post? I’d suggest they’re a little more appropriate. > [@Lib](#): > > We have a resident physicalist, a man with an intellect that dwarfs my own: Sentient Meat. Ask him to name one non-physical thing. Nonsense, friend - I’m just some guy trying to make sense of his own existence, like anyone here. As for non-physical things, I have already [admitted](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?p=5931395&postcount=403) that I might well be considered a “metaphysicalist of the gaps”. Some things such as the number seven, logic and Sherlock Holmes currently sit so precariously on the edge of the category “physical” that I hesitate to _declare_ them so, preferring to ask whether they _could_ be (and advancing only the most marginal of affirmatives thereto). ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 9:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/212 "2005-05-19T09:50:46Z")
Hmm. The abacus analogy misses out a HUGE part of the system. In theory, I can manufacture an “abacus multiplying engine” out of levers and springs, axles and rivets. Powered by steam, it detects the bead positions by their blocking rows of steam jets blowing onto rows of spring-loaded, tilting paddles… If I move the abacus into a configuration corresponding to the two numbers to be multiplied and open a big valve wheel, the machine will clack away and do the calculation. The machine emulates the operations going on in Grandfather Yee’s head. The calculation emerges from **the complete system of the abacus and the multiplying engine together**. The abacus in fact simply serves as memory during the computation. When the child is playing with the beads, its brain is not functioning as an abacus multiplying engine, and the abacus beads are not acting as memory. The two situations are almost entirely dissimilar. It’s like saying that if conciousness emerges from a brain, why doesn’t it emerge from a brain that’s been passed through a blender? Now, can I manufacture an “abacus playing engine” that will move the beads experimentally, enjoy the clacking noises they make, take pleasure in the patterns created, and eventually get bored? A Dualist says no, a Physicalist says yes, if the engine is complex enough. I lean towards the Physicalist view, but the most honest answer is probably “insufficient data”. ---
**Author:** ![Abe](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f1d935/32.png) [@Abe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Abe)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 12:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/213 "2005-05-19T12:39:21Z")
By all the spirits, **Lib** , are you heading down the path to nihilism just to reject my criticisms of arbitrary systems? By what criteria do you select and distinguish between the stimuli you experience? How, really, do you know anything, other, of course, that you know nothing? Very well, let me refine my view to _excessively_ arbitrary systems, those that do not function except (as I mentioned before) within their own framework. In this case your faith works for you because you have a well-established framework for it. You can’t transfer that to anyone else because your faith is your own particular internal system. Mathematics on the other hand, works regardless of where it is applied or by whom it is applied. It is not at all what I describe as arbitrary. It is a genuine, global system of knowledge with rules that are consistent not just within its own system, but also externally – from SAT scores to calculating the age of the universe. To take your example of Euclidean geometry, unless I am seriously mistaken Euclidean geometry consists of self-evident axioms (i.e., self-evident meaning not arbitrary; what is the corresponding axiom in a matter of faith? “God exists”? That is not self-evidently axiomatic, it is an assumption). As long as the concepts you handle possess the required axioms to satisfy Euclidean geometry, then all Euclidean theorems are true under most circumstances – a system with a high consistency. The exception, which you mention, is Euclid’s Parallel Postulate, which is an exception in that it is not really axiomatic, and that is logically independent of Euclidean axioms. When you perform geometry on any curved surface you get **non** -Euclidean geometry and may cross straight parallel lines to your heart’s content. But Euclidean geometry doesn’t apply to non-Euclidean space, obviously, so this is a known limitation. Your arguments on faith, on the other hand (and I may be mistaken, of course, especially based on your recent response) do not seem to be aware of similar limitations. Which brings us to science. > [@Liberal](#): > > Now, take science. One can almost hear the collective gasps of people who find science to be too holy to touch, but science is as arbitrary an epistemic system as any other. In fact, like all closed epistemic systems, it is entirely tautological. Science, at least if we take the Popperian model, is the opposite of tautological. A tautology is unfalsifiable, since it is automatically true by its own definition. Tautology therefore invalidates science and is its antithesis (with a very few exceptions, one being the definition of energy which is indeed of a tautological nature – but still works accurately). > [@](#): > > Its epistemology is empricism. The senses observe the physical, even while the senses themselves are part of what they observe — they are physical too. Science is of no use at all unless what you find useful is the verification of whether something is false. The purpose of science is to test the veracity of falsifiable hypotheses. That is one component of the scientific method, but I think it fails to properly describe science or the scientific method. Leaving aside the differences between _pure_ and _applied_, science, the discipline is simply the formulation of models (by a variety of means) _that are consistent with reality_. We _test_ to make sure that a particular model is consistent with reality, yes. But I do not see that as the limitation I think you are saying it is. In fact it suggests that a scientific hypoothesis is not tautological, and that it must conform with physical reality (in addition to various systems such as logic and mathematics) or risk being discarded. > [@](#): > > If testing that is important to you, then you will find science useful. If, for example, you want to test a theory that a particular chemical coctail can increase a wheat harvest ten-fold, then science is the tool to choose. But of what use is your scientific test to millions of starving people whose corrupt and tyrannical governments cooperate with your own corrupt and tyrannical government to deny the distribution of your wheat, or to use it to profit themselves as they watch others die? What scientific theory will compel men not to leave their wheat in silos to rot? What scientific hypothesis will reach the hearts of heartless men, and encourage them to do good? Some forms of positivism call for science to manage human affairs if I recall correctly. But science is simply a tool, able to destroy as easily as assist: the appropriate motivation must (whether one accepts that altruism is biologically useful or not) be injected into scientific efforts to give them direction (which is how we end up with, for example, the World Health Organization or various specialized disease research societies). Do you argue that the desire to do good, to be altruistic, must necessarily be divinely inspired? Because my previous post pointed out that god is in this case (as with virtually all facets of science) epistemically unnecessary to the equation: altruism may lead to familial and social benefits, so that the great Unknown of God is not required to explain it. I believe that was my point. > [@](#): > > If you know what a unicorn is, then you have proved that essentialism is true. What is a unicorn? And does the existence of some essential unicorn mean that an actual unicorn exists? > [@](#): > > Essentialist interpretations fall under that same rules of usefulness as all others. Essentialism always struck me as a sloppier version of taxonomy. It’s the Theory of Forms on a low-fat, high-protein diet. I simply do not see its usefulness. > [@](#): > > In fact, what you have done in your own post is attack the essential nature of essentialism. You have not denied that it exists as a philosophy; rather, you have declared that it is essentially useless. Yes, that was my intent. I do not deny that it exists as a philosophy, because it obviously does. Likewise, I consider dualist philosophies useless, given their arbitrary natures, but I do not deny that they exist, and that a lot of really smart people have spent vast amounts of time thinking about them. > [@](#): > > Essentialism is invoked in all disciplines of philosophy from science to law. Biologists study life without having a definition for it upon which all can agree. Courts declare things obscene that they cannot define, but can recognize when they see it. Useful is as useful does. If you claim that the above are examples of essentialism in action, I would disagree based on the definition of essentialism that “any entity, object, idea, etc., contains a limited number of essential characteristics that all entities, objects, ideas in the same group must share”; indeed, biologists in particular have a problem with essentialism, given that there is no provision in essentialism (to my knowledge) for change (evolution). > [@](#): > > But essentialism is not pseudoscientific. It does not posit anything; it does not predict anything; it does not model anything; it does not test anything. I did not say that essentialism is pseudoscientific! I merely cited the multiplication of unknowns as a hazard to any system of knowledge. I used pseudoscience as an example, since it was the foremost example that leapt to mind. Why must I assume that something with one horn (or whatever) is a unicorn? Who decides? On what basis? How reliable is the information, given that it cannot be tested? What are the myriad other characteristics an object may have and _still_ be considered a unicorn? > [@](#): > > It is a sad thing for me to witness so-called scientists making their craft into an art, appropriating unto themselves the de facto status of grand philosphers. These unsteady men do not discern a difference between deduction and empiricism, and have declared that all and sundry is scientific — the revelation that forms the hypotheses, the induction that designs the tests, the statistics that form the data, the deductions that make conclusions, and even the math that manipulates the numbers. Indeed, these are all, correctly, part of the scientific method. > [@](#): > > Math. One can scarcely conceive a more abstract and arbitrary thing. Abstract yes, of course. Arbitrary by no means. Mathematics is internally and externally consistent and functions admirably well in concept as well as in worldly applications. How is it arbitrary? > [@](#): > > And now you are telling me that scientists have adopted a philosophy. Great. Before long, we will be full circle into a new Dark Ages. Innovation, which is not brought on by science, but by imagination and risk, will evaporate, and in its place will be a slimy political entity. Science will be the new Church. Heh. That seems to be a recurrent fantasy, though not among scientists (who would probably view such a development with consternation). > [@](#): > > We have a resident physicalist, a man with an intellect that dwarfs my own: Sentient Meat. Ask him to name one non-physical thing. I suspect he would cite concepts as the _nearest_ item to a non-physical thing. But my point – and this goes back to why physicalism (or its closely related philosophies) is the safest bet – is that not only is there no evidence for the existence of non-physical things, but that the minute something “non-physical” is found by physical means it is itself rendered physical. Unless there is some mechanism that allows physical and non to interface – which of course requires the assumption of another unknown. > [@](#): > > I reject atheism (both soft and hard) precisely because I find it to be untenable. And I explain exactly why. Nevertheless, I also state consistently that I find it to be a valid point of view. It is the point of view that you would expect from someone who has had no experience with God. It is a point of view that I myself have held. OK. However I do not understand how you find atheism to be untenable by any objective standard when theism has systematically failed in an objective frame of reference (it is, as a matter of faith, an entirely subjective thing). If you are arguing that, subjectively, you reject atheism, I can understand that. Objectively, however, weak or soft atheism is extremely hard to refute. > [@](#): > > I have no idea where that came from. It is as though you’ve confused me with someone else. I do believe that this is the first time I ever have made the statement that God saved my life. I do not think I am mistaken, as I have noted very similar statements from you over the years, which is what prompted me to ask this time. Anyway, not really important. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > -How did God save your life? > > By rescuing me from harm, danger, or loss. (_American Heritage_, def. 1A.) OK. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > -How did you know that it was god? > > At the risk of your finding this trite, but with assurances that you want me to be honest — because He said so. OK. > [@](#): > > > [@](#): > > > > -Is it conceivable to you that it was not in fact god? > > Conceivable to me? No, that is inconceivable. (Preemptive recognition of opportunity for _Princess Bride_ joke.) OK, so you are absolutely certain of this and of the companion question, you have not a single doubt? > [@](#): > > I can no more be mistaken about those experiences than my experiences of going to the mailbox, or watering the hanging baskets on the porch. To deny them would manifest a psychosis. I know what hallucinations are. I have experienced the delirium and bliss of drug induced, mind bending stupor. I was an acid head for more years than I care to admit. I have also experienced reality. I know the difference. I am not delusional. I understand where you are coming from, BUT: have you never dreamed of going to the mailbox or watering your plants, and thought until presented with evidence to the contrary (letters in the mailbox or parched plants) that you had carried out these actions the next waking day? > [@](#): > > Moot, I suppose, since I cannot entertain the notion. I can entertain the notion that, as far as you are concerned, there is no God. But how could you expect me to entertain that same notion, since my experience differs from yours? Why can you not allow that I have seen Him, but you have not? Well, I suspect this is the fundamental difference between our epistemologies. I **can** and do entertain the notion that you have seen Him. Or, rather, I entertain two possibilities: one, that you saw _something_ and assumed it was God; two, that you in fact saw God. It is, after all, impossible to prove an unrestricted negative, and I do not intend to try with the claim that there is no God. Weak atheism is open to the possibility that God exists, as am I; it is merely considered a highly improbable occurrence and one for which (strictly speaking) more rigorous evidence than anecdotes are required. > [@](#): > > But the SDMB is an artificial land of atheism; it is not a microcosm of general society. Just as you meant no offense, neither did I. OK, sorry, my misunderstanding. > [@](#): > > Besides, I have found that most atheists here do indeed rely on quite much faith. Quite exceptional are men like Sentient who do not merely accept what they’ve heard that Bohr proved, or about Copenhagen interpretations, and such. He checks their math. He does not read books about books; he reads the books themselves. Most other men merely parrot what they have heard, and they believe for no reason other than they trust it to be true. Are faith and trust the same? I do not think they are. At any rate, the beauty of science is that you do not have to take anything on faith and/or trust. You are free to check all the facts right down to the finest resolution and propose as many refinements or corrections as you like to any level of the system. Of course, most people invest a degree of trust in textbooks, but there is no restriction on anyone who wants to test the textbooks. > [@](#): > > Now, see. You got all over me about the application of arbitration to epistemic systems, and here you are, declaring falsifiability to be a requisite for validity. You cannot falsify p v ~p, and yet you have invoked it yourself in your own post. I leave it as an exercise for whoever wishes to find it. I think you are conflating the limitations of specific items in certain systems with the capabilities of the greater systems. Can you falsify the number 0? Numbers, and formal logic, are abstractions, but we should not make the mistake of thinking they are not real simply because they do not always apply to the real world. Likewise, simply because I cannot claim that p v ~p is falsifiable, we should not conclude that such exceptions are the rule. > [@](#): > > A system is valid if it follows its own rules. A system is _internally_ valid if it follow its own rules. It must be applied externally to test for a greater range of validity, must it not? I can think of just a very few examples, such as certain exercises in mathematics – which, however, are based on externally applicable tenets. > [@](#): > > Validity has nothing to do with truth value. E is equal to mc[sup]2[/sup] whether it was deduced or whether it just suddenly occured to you. (Incidentally, I believe it is significant to our discussion that Einstein deduced his theories using ordinary propositional logic, rather than empricial testing. The tests came later, and were done by others.) And the greatest moments for Einstein’s theories were when they were successfully tested. The neutrino was not detected until 25 years after its postulation. Without such tests a theory may be as elegant and consistent as you want, but remains hypothetical. God is a fascinating concept, IMO, but still a hypothetical one supported only by largely negligible materials (holy books, dogma, doctrine, etc.) and anecodtes. That was my thrust, largely in response to what I perceived as a projection on your part of unwavering objective theological certitude – something on which I may have been wrong, I freely admit. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 5:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/214 "2005-05-19T17:39:38Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I disagree. The 7 year old’s is a _random_ arrangement (_ie._ a random computation, like a dice roll), the Grandfather’s is a computation based on _prior_ arrangements of abacuses. This bothers me. We’re both clear that the arrangement of the kid’s beads wasn’t _intended_ to be a computation; the computation was happenstance, a fluke (unlike the Grandfather’s). But physically, the arrangement of beads on the two abacuses are _identical_. You’re saying it’s a random arrangement _and_ a random computation, but I don’t understand how it can be both; computations are decidedly _not_ random. (also, please see my response to **matt** ) > [@SentientMeat](#): > > **Temporal** arrangements of physical particles are still physical. A lake is physical and _so is a waterfall_. An ice cube is physical and _so is its melting_. An atomic object is physical and _so is its **photonic** reflection_. Physical **processes** are _as phsyical as_ objects. Let’s take your example of an ice cube. At 12:00 the ice is solid, and at 12:15 the ice is a puddle of water. It’s still H20; the only difference is the way the molecules are arranged, and this change in the state of their arrangement took place _over time_. With the abacuses, however, the arrangement of beads at 12:00 is identical to the arrangement of beads at 12:15. It’s like starting with a solid ice cube and, over time, _ending_ with a solid ice cube. What physical difference does the **temporal** difference make? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > The words “arrangement” and “process” are linguistic referents, computational _labels_, which human computers running the application called “English” physically utter or mark on paper/monitor to encode a computational category, itself _as physical as_ a recycle bin or dictionary file. Ahhh, maybe we’re getting somewhere. We may not be using the referents “arrangement” and “process” in the same way. To me, an “arrangement” isn’t physical, it’s _conceptual_: I can arrange three marbles on a table to form a triangle, a square, or any other pattern and the physical properties of the marbles _themselves_ will remain unaltered. Marbles are marbles regardless of how I arrange them. That’s why I’m asking “What are the physical properties of _arrangement_?”: things that are arranged have physical properties, “arrangement” does not. **Sentient** , perhaps there are more precise labels we could use than “arrangement” or “process”; I’m quite open to suggestions. (BTW, I _did_ see your OP, thought it was fascinating, and was sorely tempted to bump it up the ladder. But it seemed to be addressed specifically to the viewpoints of a few other posters, and I didn’t want to derail your OP with the very first response) ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 5:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/215 "2005-05-19T17:47:08Z")
> [@matt](#): > > Hmm. The abacus analogy misses out a HUGE part of the system. \<_ **snip** _\> > The calculation emerges from **the complete system of the abacus and the multiplying engine together**. **matt** , I feel you may be missing my point. I’m perfectly happy with your claim that the calculation emerges from the complete system of the abacus and the multiplying engine together. My point is: What exactly is it that emerges?, i.e., _what makes the calculation a calculation?_ Let’s say you built your “abacus multiplying engine”, set it up to do the calculation, and suddenly the apocalypse shows up and all sentient beings everywhere get toasted. Several hundred years later, a piece of ceiling plaster falls on the lever of your machine, setting it in motion. Eventually the machine stops at a particular arrangement of beads. Is the arrangement a calculation? With nothing to recognize the arrangement of beads _as_ a calculation, I don’t see how it could _be_ a calculation, unless “calculation” itself has some mysto platonic ethereal existence. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 6:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/216 "2005-05-19T18:50:44Z")
> [@Abe](#): > > By all the spirits, **Lib** , are you heading down the path to nihilism just to reject my criticisms of arbitrary systems? By what criteria do you select and distinguish between the stimuli you experience? How, really, do you know anything, other, of course, that you know nothing? Let me say first that I’m enjoying this discussion with you. I really get the sense that we are reading and comprehending one another, although certainly there is much uncommon ground. I can’t speak for anyone else, but personally, I use whatever epistemological system I believe to be appropriate for whatever task is at hand. If I want to test whether something will work the way I imagine it will, I’ll use a scientific method. If I want to help my wife figure out where she lost her gardening shoes, I’ll use a deductive method. If I want to create a new poem or song, I’ll use a revelatory method. If I want to figure out how much lumber I’ll need to build a den in the basement, I’ll use a mathematical method. If I want to figure out why it is that I’m the only one wearing short pants in our foursome, I’ll use an inductive method. I won’t use science to listen for inspiration. I won’t use induction to reason from the general to the specific. And I won’t use math to test whether my roses would do better in partial shade. To me, epistemic systems are just tools, and choosing the right one for the right job is an important component of understanding the essential nature of epistemology. If this in me is nihilistic, then I’m surprised to learn it. > [@](#): > > Very well, let me refine my view to _excessively_ arbitrary systems, those that do not function except (as I mentioned before) within their own framework. In this case your faith works for you because you have a well-established framework for it. You can’t transfer that to anyone else because your faith is your own particular internal system. Mathematics on the other hand, works regardless of where it is applied or by whom it is applied. It is not at all what I describe as arbitrary. It is a genuine, global system of knowledge with rules that are consistent not just within its own system, but also externally – from SAT scores to calculating the age of the universe. I’m sorry, but it is just _remarkable_ that you attack what you call “excessively arbitrary systems” even as you identify them quite arbitrarily. I mean, who says what is excessive? And who says everyone understands math? My niece understands it quite well, but my nephew could not divide a restaurant check if his life depended on it. What you have chosen for a “genuine global system of knowledge” is not well understand by a sizable portion of the world’s population. I dare say that music is more universal than mathematics in terms of its usefulness in communication. Math isn’t even necessarily useful at all to many people. A bushman who knows that feeding a monkey some salt will yield a source of water is quite intelligent in my opinion (ingenious, in fact). But I doubt whether he knows how to compute the length of an hypotenuse. Incidentally, I really wouldn’t crow too much about the consistency of a system as though that meant the system is superior to an inconsistent one. After all, [if a system is consistent, then it is incomplete](http://home.ddc.net/ygg/etext/godel/godel3.htm). > [@](#): > > To take your example of Euclidean geometry, unless I am seriously mistaken Euclidean geometry consists of self-evident axioms (i.e., self-evident meaning not arbitrary; what is the corresponding axiom in a matter of faith? “God exists”? That is not self-evidently axiomatic, it is an assumption). As long as the concepts you handle possess the required axioms to satisfy Euclidean geometry, then all Euclidean theorems are true under most circumstances – a system with a high consistency. The exception, which you mention, is Euclid’s Parallel Postulate, which is an exception in that it is not really axiomatic, and that is logically independent of Euclidean axioms. When you perform geometry on any curved surface you get **non** -Euclidean geometry and may cross straight parallel lines to your heart’s content. But Euclidean geometry doesn’t apply to non-Euclidean space, obviously, so this is a known limitation. Your arguments on faith, on the other hand (and I may be mistaken, of course, especially based on your recent response) do not seem to be aware of similar limitations. I think that “God exists” is a conclusion, although it may be stated axiomatically. I would say that the Parallel Postulate equivalent in faith is the axiom that “it is possible that God exists” — especially since it is substantively superior to either of its negations which, when combined, restate it. That is, (~\<\>G OR \<\>~G) -\> \<\>G. (Reduced from ~\<\>\<\>~G). > [@](#): > > Science, at least if we take the Popperian model, is the opposite of tautological. A tautology is unfalsifiable, since it is automatically true by its own definition. Tautology therefore invalidates science and is its antithesis (with a very few exceptions, one being the definition of energy which is indeed of a tautological nature – but still works accurately). Well, now you’re mixing some things up. Science itself is not intended to be falsifiable, and as Popper himself noted, the underlying philosophy of science — falsifiability — is not itself falsifiable. What is falsifiable is the theory to be tested, not the epistemic system that investigates the theory. Relativity is falsifiable, but the statement that says it is is not. > [@](#): > > That is one component of the scientific method, but I think it fails to properly describe science or the scientific method. Leaving aside the differences between _pure_ and _applied_, science, the discipline is simply the formulation of models (by a variety of means) _that are consistent with reality_. We _test_ to make sure that a particular model is consistent with reality, yes. But I do not see that as the limitation I think you are saying it is. In fact it suggests that a scientific hypoothesis is not tautological, and that it must conform with physical reality (in addition to various systems such as logic and mathematics) or risk being discarded. Again, the hypothesis is not tautological, but the method of investigating the hypothesis is. And I explained why. Your senses are themselves a part of the universe you are observing. It is important to understand that science does not (and does not claim to) prove anything true. If a scientific test proved an hypothesis true, then there would be no need for any further testing. The truth has been found. Rather, science only proves an hypothesis false. All you can say about the result of a scientific test is that what you have learned is not false. But science is not bivalent (like first order logic), and therefore, just because something is not false does not mean it is true. All it means is that we may proceed with the understanding we have until and unless some other theory proves our understanding to be inadequate. Thus, Einstein did not assume that Newton’s gravitational theories were true in the sense of an analytic truth, but only that they were not false as applied. He therefore was free to consider certain applications in which Newton’s theories were inadequate. > [@](#): > > Some forms of positivism call for science to manage human affairs if I recall correctly. But science is simply a tool, able to destroy as easily as assist: the appropriate motivation must (whether one accepts that altruism is biologically useful or not) be injected into scientific efforts to give them direction (which is how we end up with, for example, the World Health Organization or various specialized disease research societies). We agree on that. > [@](#): > > Do you argue that the desire to do good, to be altruistic, must necessarily be divinely inspired? Because my previous post pointed out that god is in this case (as with virtually all facets of science) epistemically unnecessary to the equation: altruism may lead to familial and social benefits, so that the great Unknown of God is not required to explain it. I believe that was my point. Well, let’s set aside that I think altruism is evil rather than good. Let me just say that I believe that goodness is an aesthetic that compels a free moral agent to exist Who will facilitate it perfectly. > [@](#): > > What is a unicorn? I’ll take that as rhetorical. > [@](#): > > And does the existence of some essential unicorn mean that an actual unicorn exists? No, but that’s the point. Essence preceeds existence: a thing may have essence and not exist, but a thing may not exist without essence. > [@](#): > > Essentialism always struck me as a sloppier version of taxonomy. It’s the Theory of Forms on a low-fat, high-protein diet. I simply do not see its usefulness. Those are rather strange things to say, but I suppose I could say that I do not see the usefulness of baseball. So what? > [@](#): > > Yes, that was my intent. I do not deny that it exists as a philosophy, because it obviously does. Likewise, I consider dualist philosophies useless, given their arbitrary natures, but I do not deny that they exist, and that a lot of really smart people have spent vast amounts of time thinking about them. Would it surprise you to know that your position on these matters seems to me to be… arbitrary? > [@](#): > > If you claim that the above are examples of essentialism in action, I would disagree based on the definition of essentialism that “any entity, object, idea, etc., contains a limited number of essential characteristics that all entities, objects, ideas in the same group must share”; indeed, biologists in particular have a problem with essentialism, given that there is no provision in essentialism (to my knowledge) for change (evolution). That’s a rather lay definition of essentialism. Essentialism is a theory of metaphysics that holds that essential qualities are distinguishable from accidental ones. The essence of a thing is “to ti ên einai” (literally, “the what it was to be”). As Aristotle put it, “a definition is verbage that signifies an essence” (\*Topics \* 102a3). To define a thing, therefore, is to describe its essence. > [@](#): > > I did not say that essentialism is pseudoscientific! I merely cited the multiplication of unknowns as a hazard to any system of knowledge. I used pseudoscience as an example, since it was the foremost example that leapt to mind. Why must I assume that something with one horn (or whatever) is a unicorn? Who decides? On what basis? How reliable is the information, given that it cannot be tested? What are the myriad other characteristics an object may have and _still_ be considered a unicorn? These are questions I have asked you. Who decides what is arbitrary? And so forth. It seems to me that you make demands on other philosophies that you are unwilling to examine in your own. This incessant demand, for example, that everything under the sun be testable, when testability is applicable to absolutely nothing other than hypotheses, is just… bizarre. What is testable about any definition, including definitions of words that you use yourself? Quite honestly, there is something rather desperate about your argument now that you are here professing not to know what a unicorn is. I can’t recall that you’ve ever tapped into a post that has mocked faith by invoking the IPU to demand of your fellow atheists just what a unicorn is, let alone invisibility and pinkness, and to ask who decided what the words mean. > [@](#): > > Indeed, these are all, correctly, part of the scientific method. Just so we all understand that they are _borrowed_ by science for its method, and not that they are born of science. Induction, deduction, inspiration — none of these is falsifiable. > [@](#): > > Abstract yes, of course. Arbitrary by no means. Mathematics is internally and externally consistent and functions admirably well in concept as well as in worldly applications. How is it arbitrary? One plus one cannot even equal two with the benefit of [five axioms](http://mathworld.wolfram.com/PeanosAxioms.html). I cannot believe you are asking me how it is arbitrary. And again, if it is consistent, then it is incomplete. Is the world incomplete? > [@](#): > > I suspect he would cite concepts as the _nearest_ item to a non-physical thing. But my point – and this goes back to why physicalism (or its closely related philosophies) is the safest bet – is that not only is there no evidence for the existence of non-physical things, but that the minute something “non-physical” is found by physical means it is itself rendered physical. Unless there is some mechanism that allows physical and non to interface – which of course requires the assumption of another unknown. And my point, which you have denied, is that the senses are themselves physical; therefore, how can they possibly detect anything that is not? But not all knowledge comes from empiricism. Knowledge comes also from analytical systems. If you disagree, then let me ask you a question. A man in Madrid wears blue each Thursday. Today is Thursday. If you can answer what the man in Madrid is wearing without seeing him, then you acknowledge that information can be acquired by means other than empiricism. And another: what is the value of x when x[sup]2[/sup] = -1? If you can answer, it is not because you can see, smell, taste, hear, or feel it. > [@](#): > > OK. However I do not understand how you find atheism to be untenable by any objective standard when theism has systematically failed in an objective frame of reference (it is, as a matter of faith, an entirely subjective thing). If you are arguing that, subjectively, you reject atheism, I can understand that. Objectively, however, weak or soft atheism is extremely hard to refute. Well, now that’s just rich. Theism is subjective, but atheism is objective? Would you say that 2 is abstract, but -2 is concrete? What, other than your own bias, establishes the alleged objectivity of atheism? It certainly is news to me (and to most people in the world) that your experience is objective while ours is subjective. Perhaps we can say that your view as well as mine derives from our own perceptions, and that neither is objective a priori. > [@](#): > > OK, so you are absolutely certain of this and of the companion question, you have not a single doubt? Yes, of course. Why should I doubt it? > [@](#): > > I understand where you are coming from, BUT: have you never dreamed of going to the mailbox or watering your plants, and thought until presented with evidence to the contrary (letters in the mailbox or parched plants) that you had carried out these actions the next waking day? I am not a zombie. I know dreams from wakeful activities. > [@](#): > > Well, I suspect this is the fundamental difference between our epistemologies. I **can** and do entertain the notion that you have seen Him. Or, rather, I entertain two possibilities: one, that you saw _something_ and assumed it was God; two, that you in fact saw God. It is, after all, impossible to prove an unrestricted negative, and I do not intend to try with the claim that there is no God. Weak atheism is open to the possibility that God exists, as am I; it is merely considered a highly improbable occurrence and one for which (strictly speaking) more rigorous evidence than anecdotes are required. First, what is an “unrestricted negative”? Second, prove that it is impossible to prove one. > [@](#): > > Are faith and trust the same? I do not think they are. At any rate, the beauty of science is that you do not have to take anything on faith and/or trust. You are free to check all the facts right down to the finest resolution and propose as many refinements or corrections as you like to any level of the system. Of course, most people invest a degree of trust in textbooks, but there is no restriction on anyone who wants to test the textbooks. The Greek word for faith, [symbol]pistuo[/symbol], may be translated as faith, trust, or reliance. > [@](#): > > I think you are conflating the limitations of specific items in certain systems with the capabilities of the greater systems. Can you falsify the number 0? Numbers, and formal logic, are abstractions, but we should not make the mistake of thinking they are not real simply because they do not always apply to the real world. Likewise, simply because I cannot claim that p v ~p is falsifiable, we should not conclude that such exceptions are the rule. Exceptions? What? What we should conclude is that these are not within the purview of science. They aren’t any sort of “exception” just because they are not testable. > [@](#): > > A system is _internally_ valid if it follow its own rules. It must be applied externally to test for a greater range of validity, must it not? I can think of just a very few examples, such as certain exercises in mathematics – which, however, are based on externally applicable tenets. I don’t understand what you’re saying. > [@](#): > > And the greatest moments for Einstein’s theories were when they were successfully tested. The neutrino was not detected until 25 years after its postulation. Without such tests a theory may be as elegant and consistent as you want, but remains hypothetical. God is a fascinating concept, IMO, but still a hypothetical one supported only by largely negligible materials (holy books, dogma, doctrine, etc.) and anecodtes. That was my thrust, largely in response to what I perceived as a projection on your part of unwavering objective theological certitude – something on which I may have been wrong, I freely admit. The greatest moments? And you call me arbitrary? Incidentally, as I pause to look at the title of this thread, I don’t believe I can recall a thread that has ever gone quite so far afield, in multiple directions no less, from its topic. 😃 ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 19, 2005, 6:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/217 "2005-05-19T18:53:26Z")
> [@](#): > > computations are decidedly _not_ random. Then our definitions, the categories by which we sort our language and memories, diverge. You use yours, I’ll use mine. I say computations can be random, since I say that computations **are** the outputs of a computer. > [@](#): > > With the abacuses, however, the arrangement of beads at 12:00 is identical to the arrangement of beads at 12:15…What physical difference does the temporal difference make? But there were changes in between, just as melting and subsequent refreezing might occur. That array of spatial arrangements _is_ the physicality of the process. > [@](#): > > Marbles are marbles regardless of how I arrange them. And what makes them “marbles” as opposed to “non-marbles” is the arrangement of the calcium silicate molecules to form a transparent amorphous solid called “glass” which can be shaped into an arrangement called a “sphere”, “three” of which can be arranged into a “triangle”. > [@](#): > > To me, an “arrangement” isn’t physical, it’s conceptual And I seek to convince you that the computational process of _conceptualisation_ is **as** physical **as** the objects themselves. > [@](#): > > perhaps there are more precise labels we could use than “arrangement” or “process”; This is the point! They would **still be labels!** They would still be arbitrary bins into which memories and sensory input can be sorted: a brain is an **arbitrating _device_**. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 7:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/218 "2005-05-20T07:50:47Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > Several hundred years later, a piece of ceiling plaster falls on the lever of your machine, setting it in motion. That’s a _damned_ well-constructed machine! > [@other-wise](#): > > Eventually the machine stops at a particular arrangement of beads. Is the arrangement a calculation? With nothing to recognize the arrangement of beads _as_ a calculation, I don’t see how it could _be_ a calculation, unless “calculation” itself has some mysto platonic ethereal existence. Okay, I was missing your point, and I get your drift. I say that the final arrangement of beads _is_ a calculation, because its conjunction with the calculating device makes it so. The relationship of the calculating machine’s parts with one another and the beads _make_ it a calculation. Look at it this way. I have a “concept” of a “tree” in my mind, that allows me to distinguish trees from bushes and ferns and pylons and celery etc. I believe, though I cannot prove, that my mind is a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull, and the “concept” of the tree is also a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull. Now, to consider your apocalyptic scenario - after all sentient beings are gone, are there still trees? The physical trees, the arrangements of matter that were catagorised as “trees” by the sentient beings, are still around. The “concept” of the tree, the arrangment of matter in the skulls of the sentient beings, is gone. When a newly-formed sentient being pops up and wanders all over the landscape, learning from her sensory inputs, she might well re-create the “concept” of the tree from the physical trees. And, happening upon the well-crafted calculating machine, she could examine the linkages and connections and work out what the machine does, and re-create the “concept” of the calculation from the physical calculating machine. So for me, the “calculation” can exist in a real, physical sense. But then for me, the “concept” of the calculation also exists in a real, physical sense. ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 1:34pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/219 "2005-05-20T13:34:29Z")
> [@matt](#): > > When a newly-formed sentient being pops up and wanders all over the landscape, learning from her sensory inputs, she might well re-create the “concept” of the tree from the physical trees. And, happening upon the well-crafted calculating machine, she could examine the linkages and connections and work out what the machine does, and re-create the “concept” of the calculation from the physical calculating machine. So for me, the “calculation” can exist in a real, physical sense. But then for me, the “concept” of the calculation also exists in a real, physical sense. Second the notion. For me there is an objective universe that exists whether or not anyone is around to observe it. I think those planets that have been newly discovered light years away and previously unobserved were not _created_ by our observation but were _discovered_ because they were there before we detected them. I simply repeat my previous claim. Discussions abour whether or not there is an objective reality outside our senses have been going on since 6-600 BC (that we know of) among philosphers and those discussions have not advanced the argument one bit. But those who postulate an objective universe have learned a lot about it and different people using different equipment have made measurements on it and those different measurements are in agreement as to the effects of that outside universe on the measuring equipment. Philosophers haggle about reality doing nothing but arguing from postulates and never attempting to interact physically with the thing they are haggling about. As a result we get philosophical wild guesses from Heidigger, Foucault, Derrida, _et al_. And some university proffessors get a lifetime sinecure teaching their stuff to incoming high school kids. ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 1:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/220 "2005-05-20T13:41:52Z")
And I’ll bet those university guys also know how to spell “professor.” [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=10) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=12)