# Ask the Creationist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 12, 2005, 1:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555 "2005-05-12T13:18:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 12
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 2:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/221 "2005-05-20T14:24:32Z")
> [@David Simmons](#): > > Philosophers haggle about reality doing nothing but arguing from postulates and never attempting to interact physically with the thing they are haggling about. Oh, I don’t know about that. Some of them surely walk about from time to time. But one thing’s for certain, they typically won’t get caught saying things like, “For me there is an objective universe…”. ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/222 "2005-05-20T15:38:02Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Oh, I don’t know about that. Some of them surely walk about from time to time. But one thing’s for certain, they typically won’t get caught saying things like, “For me there is an objective universe…” Maybe not but they do use words like “qua.” ---
**Author:** ![David\_Simmons](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/9de053/32.png) [@David\_Simmons](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/David_Simmons)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 3:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/223 "2005-05-20T15:52:11Z")
And what your cited quote means is that my probablility marker is close to one on there being an objective universe outside me. You can continue searching for the ultimate truth about everything without ever checking your findings against the operations an outside universe if you choose. I will continue to act as if there is such a universe and will trust the group consensus of those who also act on that assumption. I accept the view of British mathematician W.K. Clifford who wrote that truth is “not that which we can ideally contemplate without error. but that which we may act upon without fear.” ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 20, 2005, 5:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/224 "2005-05-20T17:27:53Z")
> [@David Simmons](#): > > And what your cited quote means is that my probablility marker is close to one on there being an objective universe outside me. You can continue searching for the ultimate truth about everything without ever checking your findings against the operations an outside universe if you choose. I will continue to act as if there is such a universe and will trust the group consensus of those who also act on that assumption. > > I accept the view of British mathematician W.K. Clifford who wrote that truth is “not that which we can ideally contemplate without error. but that which we may act upon without fear.” Sounds too fancy. I like Arthur Eddington better: “Something unknown is doing we don’t know what.” ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2005, 12:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/225 "2005-05-21T00:24:40Z")
Abe Correction: Above, I meant to say, One plus one cannot even equal two with **OUT** the benefit of five axioms. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2005, 1:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/226 "2005-05-21T13:30:50Z")
**Sentient** , **matt** , sorry for the late reply; I got slammed with a three-day/all-day work project this weekend and I’m literally posting on breaks. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Then our definitions, the categories by which we sort our language and memories, diverge. You use yours, I’ll use mine. I say computations can be random… **Sentient** , I’m trying to understand how a computation can be random… I truly don’t get it. When I multiply two numbers with my spreadsheet, or with a pencil and paper, is it random? What qualifies as a non-random computation? What qualifies as a random computation? (A thought occurs to me: are you saying that _every_ arrangement of particles is a computation?). > [@SentientMeat](#): > > …since I say that computations **are** the outputs of a computer. Here it _seems_ like you’re saying that what **makes** a computation a computation is that they’re the outputs of a computer. But that doesn’t answer the question, it just bumps it up a level: _what makes a computer a computer?_ > [@SentientMeat](#): > > And what makes them “marbles” as opposed to “non-marbles” is the arrangement of the calcium silicate molecules to form a transparent amorphous solid called “glass” which can be shaped into an arrangement called a “sphere”, “three” of which can be arranged into a “triangle”. If I gave you a few glass spheres and asked you to list their physical properties, you’d just rattle off the list. You wouldn’t respond by saying “Well, that depends. Will you be arranging these glass spheres to form a triangle or a square?” You seem to be conflating “arrangement” and “scale”. “Arrangement” (in this discussion) is an arrangement of particles. “Scale” is an _arrangement of arrangements_. All glass spheres have specific physical properties; that’s what makes them “glass spheres”. They also must be in _some_ kind of arrangement, but that arrangement is _non_-specific, it’s arbitrary. No matter how you arrange them, they’re still “glass spheres”. A particle’s physical properties include a specific mass, density, etc… not a specific “arrangement”. By the same token, an abacus is an abacus. Its physical properties remain the same regardless of how the beads are arranged. Sure, we can arbitrarily call one arrangement of beads a “calculation”, but that doesn’t change the physical properties of the abacus, any more than re-arranging those beads would change _their_ physical properties; it would merely change their _arrangement_. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > This is the point! They would **still be labels!** They would still be arbitrary bins into which memories and sensory input can be sorted: a brain is an **arbitrating _device_**. Would you elaborate this, flesh it out a bit? As it stands it seems like “memories”, “sensory”, and even “arbitrating device” are _also_ be arbitrary labels. **matt** , you raise some interesting points, and I’ll try to address them at my next break. ---
**Author:** ![Apos](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/838e76/32.png) [@Apos](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Apos)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2005, 5:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/227 "2005-05-21T17:03:57Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Abe > > Correction: > > Above, I meant to say, One plus one cannot even equal two with **OUT** the benefit of five axioms. Let me suggest a minor addition. One plus one equaling two is not made possible by axioms. It is made the single and exclusive answer by them. We don’t need axioms to allow a particular truth to be called true, we need them to prevent everything from being both true and false and whatever else willy-nilly. Without axioms, you cannot have any more grounds to deny that one plus one equals two than I would have to claim it does. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 21, 2005, 10:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/228 "2005-05-21T22:42:23Z")
> [@Apos](#): > > Let me suggest a minor addition. One plus one equaling two is not made possible by axioms. It is made the single and exclusive answer by them. We don’t need axioms to allow a particular truth to be called true, we need them to prevent everything from being both true and false and whatever else willy-nilly. Without axioms, you cannot have any more grounds to deny that one plus one equals two than I would have to claim it does. Actually, I think you’ve made a good point. Otherwise, we could say that you can reduce 16/64 by cancelling out the 6s. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2005, 2:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/229 "2005-05-22T14:30:51Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Sentient, I’m trying to understand how a computation can be random… I truly don’t get it. A random number generating program is a computation, yes? > [@](#): > > When I multiply two numbers with my spreadsheet, or with a pencil and paper, is it random? When I multiply two numbers with my spreadsheet, or with a pencil and paper, is it random? What qualifies as a non-random computation? What qualifies as a random computation? I’d say an _unpredictable_ output can be called a ‘random’ computation. > [@](#): > > (A thought occurs to me: are you saying that every arrangement of particles is a computation?). Hold on - you’re running way off down the path again. I’m genuinely trying to get you off the roundabout you have been stuck on for months here. Let us **start from particles** and see which forward steps we **both agree on**. But yes, insofar as a computation _is_ a temporal arrangement of particles, every temporal arrangement of particles could, I suppose, be characterised as a computation of a sort. Is a chemical reaction really so different from the trillions of flips of a chip as a program is run? > [@](#): > > Here it seems like you’re saying that what makes a computation a computation is that they’re the outputs of a computer. But that doesn’t answer the question, it just bumps it up a level: what makes a computer a computer? Again, I suggest you stop looking at the roundabout and _start looking for the exits_. You are arrowing straight back to linguistic referents here. > [@](#): > > If I gave you a few glass spheres and asked you to list their physical properties, you’d just rattle off the list. You wouldn’t respond by saying “Well, that depends. Will you be arranging these glass spheres to form a triangle or a square?” I see no fundamental difference here. I could list physical properties which _didn’t_ depend on their number and configuration, and could list others which _did_. > [@](#): > > You seem to be conflating “arrangement” and “scale”. “Arrangement” (in this discussion) is an arrangement of particles. “Scale” is an arrangement of arrangements. You may make this distinction if it makes you happy, of course. I consider it trivial. > [@](#): > > A particle’s physical properties include a specific mass, density, etc… not a specific “arrangement”. But those properties **depend upon** the arrangement of more fundamental particles. It is arbitrary to say that ‘glass’ or ‘spheres’ are _what they are_ but ‘a triangle of glass spheres’ is not. > [@](#): > > Its physical properties remain the same regardless of how the beads are arranged. Read this again, carefully. You are only considering certain physical properties and arbitrarily discounting others, such as its centre of gravity, which _do_ depend on the arrangement. > [@](#): > > Would you elaborate this, flesh it out a bit? As it stands it seems like “memories”, “sensory”, and even “arbitrating device” are also be arbitrary labels. If they are not arbitrary labels, how come other people call them other things (_ie._ other languages\*) or don’t call them anything at all (_eg._ foraging people or early hominids)? A brain is a labelling device, which did not exist for 13.7 billion years. _This_ is the roundabout exit you seek. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2005, 1:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/230 "2005-05-23T13:12:33Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > A random number generating program is a computation, yes? **Sentient** , it’s phrases like this that make it very hard for me to understand what you’re trying to _say_, let alone what you _mean_. If you’re really asking whether or not a random-number generating program is a computation, then well, yes, of course: programs are computations, but they’re not _random_ computations; they execute their instructions precisely and predictably. If you’re implying that the _output_ of random-number generating programs are random, well, [apparently they’re not;](http://www.random.org/essay.html)_unless_ the computation can access an _outside source_ to supply an element of randomness. If the output is random, it’s not because the _computation_ is **inherently** random. Hence my problem with your claim that a random arrangement of particles can _also_ be a random calculation: How can an inherently random arrangement of particles be a computation when computations aren’t inherently random? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > I’d say an _unpredictable_ output can be called a ‘random’ computation. OK, you’d say that a random computation is an output that cannot be predicted by… _what_? An abacus expert? A 7-month old? A random arrangement of particles? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Hold on - you’re running way off down the path again. I’m genuinely trying to get you off the roundabout you have been stuck on for months here. Let us **start from particles** and see which forward steps we **both agree on**. Well… I thought I _was_ starting from particles. What exactly are you suggesting as a first step forward (so I can agree or disagree)? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > But yes, insofar as a computation _is_ a temporal arrangement of particles, every temporal arrangement of particles could, I suppose, be characterised as a computation of a sort. Is a chemical reaction really so different from the trillions of flips of a chip as a program is run? Can we nail this down? Your opinion is: Any and every given arrangement of particles is a computation. Is this correct? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Again, I suggest you stop looking at the roundabout and _start looking for the exits_. You are arrowing straight back to linguistic referents here. You stated that “…computations **are** the outputs of a computer”, which gives me exactly as much information as telling me that sedation is a result of taking sedatives. Yet when I ask directly for a clarification (_what makes a computer a computer?_), I’m chided for getting hung up on linguistic referents. How am I to debate with you if you won’t tell me what your words _mean_? > [@SentientMeat](#): > > But those properties **depend upon** the arrangement of more fundamental particles. Yes, but the _calculation_ does not. This is why I think you may be confusing an arrangement of _particles_ with an arrangement of _arrangements_. You could replace the wooden beads with glass beads, metal beads or old tires; it doesn’t matter. If you maneuver them into the same sequence of arrangements you end up with the _identical calculation_. Wooden beads have specific physical properties that are different than the properties of glass beads, which are different than the properties of tires, etc., but the calculation is the calculation _regardless_ of it’s physical medium; it _has no_ specific physical properties. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Read this again, carefully. You are only considering certain physical properties and arbitrarily discounting others, such as its centre of gravity, which _do_ depend on the arrangement. To quote one of your favorite authorities: > [@](#): > > “A center of gravity is _just_ an abstractum. It’s just a fictional object.” **Daniel Dennett** in _Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives_ I seriously doubt that the failure to include fictional objects in my list of physical properties significantly weakens my argument. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > If they are not arbitrary labels, how come other people call them other things (_ie._ other languages\*) or don’t call them anything at all (_eg._ foraging people or early hominids)? A brain is a labelling device, which did not exist for 13.7 billion years. _This_ is the roundabout exit you seek. Let me try again. Isn’t it arbitrary to label the brain a “labeling device”? ---
**Author:** ![Wake\_up\_call](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/dec6dc/32.png) [@Wake\_up\_call](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Wake_up_call)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2005, 2:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/231 "2005-05-23T14:12:10Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Quite exceptional are men like Sentient who do not merely accept what they’ve heard that Bohr proved, or about Copenhagen interpretations, and such. He checks their math. He does not read books about books; he reads the books themselves. Most other men merely parrot what they have heard, and they believe for no reason other than they trust it to be true. Bible is a book. Could you give us your guess as to what % of believers and “men and women of faith” have actually read the book themselves, as opposed to the rest who merely parrot what they have heard. What % believe and “have faith” for no reason other than trusting in what their parents inculcated into the child’s brain – as we witness in the red states and the Bible Belt. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2005, 2:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/232 "2005-05-23T14:13:48Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > unless the computation can access an _outside source_ to supply an element of randomness. Like the random elements of the toddler’s brain. > [@](#): > > How can an inherently random arrangement of particles be a computation when computations aren’t inherently random? Some computations are, some aren’t. Hand me a computation, I’ll place it in one of my linguistic bins according to criteria we agree on, or ignore your disagreement and make up my own criteria. > [@](#): > > OK, you’d say that a random computation is an output that cannot be predicted by…… _what_? Me, say. Or you, or whoever we agree on. If we disagree, I’ll just use my own criterion for what constitutes a predictor. > [@](#): > > What exactly are you suggesting as a first step forward (so I can agree or disagree)? Computers are made of atoms. The computer comprising the abacus attached to the human brain is also made of atoms. > [@](#): > > Can we nail this down? Your opinion is: Any and every given arrangement of particles is a computation. Is this correct? Well, I said this was getting way ahead of ourselves, but I’ll retract so universal a declaration. A computation is characterised by “input” configurations and “output” configurations. A _static_ spatial object is one for which input=output. Is this a computation? I care little whether this trivial example falls in or out of my linguistic bin. Other temporal objects, such as a raincloud, have different input and output configurations. Is _this_ a “computation”? Again, I suppose it _could_ somehow be used as a computer, but I have no particular desire to shove _it_ in my linguistic bin either. Here I am using words to tell you what entities fall into my word bins. Question these words and I will put more words on a screen for you to read, for you to question again. After three such revolutions of the same roundabout, I’d probably feel a little sick and politely leave via an exit. > [@](#): > > How am I to debate with you if you won’’t tell me what your words mean? And how am I to debate _you_ if you don’t tell me what _your **position** is_? This Zeno-like “debate” of infinite regress in which I provide some words describing my bin-arbitration and you ask for more words describing the arbitration of _those_ words becomes tiresome very quickly, but I’ll persevere. > [@](#): > > Yes, but the _calculation_ does not. Calculations **do** depend on the configuration of the calculating device, be that gears and logic gates in a mechanical computer, charge densities in an electronic computer or neural states in a biological computer. Put simply, if there is no calculating _device_ (as there was not for 13.7 billion years), there **is no** calculation. > [@](#): > > Wooden beads have specific physical properties that are different than the properties of glass beads, which are different than the properties of tires, etc., but the calculation is the calculation regardless of it’s physical medium; it _has no_ specific physical properties. Well, now we’re switching the terms yet again back to that which resides in the _human_ computer when using the word “calculation”. The calculation carried out by the computer _without_ any human interaction **is** the temporal arrangement of gates (or marbles in some kind of _automatic_ abacus). That is _what it is_, just as the melting is not identical to the ice cube or the storm identical to the raincloud. > [@](#): > > I seriously doubt that the failure to include fictional objects in my list of physical properties significantly weakens my argument. Hmm, I’m not sure you’re _making_ an argument - rather you’re questioning _mine_. But I’m curious why you say the centre of gravity is fictional but, say, the density is not. The whole point of Dennett’s heterophenomenological method is that we treat all “mental” entities as fictions. > [@](#): > > Isn’t it arbitrary to label the brain a “labeling device”? **YES. ALL** linguistic referents are arbitrary. I could label it a “schmee” and you could ask what other entities I placed within that bin, and I could tell you, and you could say “that’s arbitrary”, and I would agree and ask you what _wasn’t_, and you could say “scmoodles”, and I could ask you what other entities you placed within that bin, and you would tell me and I would say “that’s arbitrary”. Eventually, we might realise that we were picking a semantic nit as trivial and insubstantial as our pronunciation of the word “tomato”. Again, all I can ask you to do is **imagine** that mindless (and, I’ll be prepared to admit, _computationless_ if we restrict “computations” to those processes characterised by a [working memory](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?p=5931395&postcount=403)) universe, with all its **physical processes** such as “life” and “weather” which don’t have those physical _properties_ you are restricting the discussion to for some reason. Why must a _process_ have mass, temperature or these other specifications in order to be considered physical? Surely the _gravitational force_ between two rocks, the _process of attraction_, is **as** physical **as** the rocks themselves? Surely the _life_ of a organism in a mindless universe is **as** physical **as** the cells it is made of? If so, is the _computation_, the temporal arrangement of the charges and switches, not **as** physical **as** the computer? Also, dragging this thread back to some vestige of relevance to the OP, some biologists disagree on precisely which entities enter the bin called “life”. This is **entirely expected** (and even _inevitable_), but is trivially irrelevant to our _understanding and explanation_ of life. To suggest otherwise, no pun intended, is rather a _Creationist_ trick. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 12:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/233 "2005-05-24T00:41:11Z")
**Sentient** , I’m trying to keep our debate from sprouting even **more** tentacles, so before I respond to the rest of your post, I’d like a response from you on _this_: > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Like the random elements of the toddler’s brain. Now I feel like I’m on a roundabout: you’ve brought us full circle. While I think your statement is more than a little speculative, it’s not so speculative that I can’t work with it. Let me start by quickly recapping the scenario: I ask grandpa to multiply two large numbers on his abacus. He scoots the beads into different arrangements and when they reach a _particular_ arrangement, he stops and tells me the correct answer. He then walks over and hands the abacus to his 7-month old grandson, who starts playing with the beads and, through sheer coincidence, scoots the beads back and forth through the same arrangements, then simply looks bored and hands the abacus back to Grandpa. You’re suggesting that as the toddler plays, a part of the toddler’s brain could be running a non-random program that accesses random elements from other parts of the toddler’s brain to output (via the tot’s motor pathways) truly random arrangements of beads on the abacus. I can accept this. But to the toddler’s brain, that arrangement is _not_ the computed result of multiplying two large numbers. For the toddler’s brain, the arrangements, the _output_ has nothing to do with numbers or multiplying: the output is random. However, to the programs in the _grandfather’s_ brain the toddler’s output is a computation multiplying two large numbers. I’ll willingly agree that _in both cases, the arrangements are the result of a computation_. Would _you_ agree that for the tot’s brain, grandpa’s arrangement is random (and so is the tot’s), and for grandpa’s brain the tot’s arrangement is _not_ random (and neither is the grandpa’s)? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 8:47am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/234 "2005-05-24T08:47:03Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > However, to the programs in the grandfather’s brain the toddler’s output _is_ a computation multiplying two large numbers. Yes - like I said in the first response to your scenario: > [@SM](#): > > The 7 year old’s is a random arrangement (ie. a random computation, like a dice roll), the Grandfather’s is a computation based on **prior** arrangements of abacuses. That **memory** element of the grandfather’s computation is, I think, the crucial distinction you want to hear me make: I hereby do so. Memory, the _replication_ of configurations, is how _nonrandom_ computations emerge from random ones, how output configurations can be different from input configurations in a way which human computers can _predict_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 10:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/235 "2005-05-24T10:45:39Z")
And, to probe the deeper meaning of the scenario: the toddler’s “calculation” and the grandfater’s calculation are **functionally equivalent**. The fundamental difference, I’d suggest, is only apparent when we ask the two to perform a similar calculation _again and again_. Grandfather’s consistent outputs would stand in stark contrast to junior’s unpredictable outputs, demonstrating that the computer comprising (grandfather + abacus) can be characterised by _memory access_, whereas the computer comprising (junior + abacus), like the raincloud, cannot. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 2:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/236 "2005-05-24T14:46:33Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > That **memory** element of the grandfather’s computation is, I think, the crucial distinction you want to hear me make: I hereby do so. Memory, the _replication_ of configurations, is how _nonrandom_ computations emerge from random ones, how output configurations can be different from input configurations in a way which human computers can _predict_. Yes. Excellent. That’s the piece that was missing for me. I didn’t understand what you were saying in that first post, but I do now. While I noodle on my newfound understanding, let’s see if we can put in place a “forward step we can both agree on”. You’re a card-carrying physicalist, yet some of your views seem subtly different than other physicalists I’ve spoken with. This tends to trip me up, so I’d like to get a clear understanding of what it means, for you, for something to be _physical_ (i.e., If I’m wondering whether or not something is physical, how can I find out? What is the test/criteria?). Also, you had suggested “Computers are made of atoms” and “The computer comprising the abacus attached to the human brain is also made of atoms” as things we might agree on. I can agree with the first statement, although I’d greatly prefer a less ambiguous wording (with the current wording, I can wonder if you also mean “An individual atom computes” or “Molecules cannot be computers”, etc.). _My_ version of that first statement would be “Matter is necessary for computation”, but that may not be acceptable to you… can we find a compromise? The second statement I simply don’t understand. I keep picturing attaching things with thumbtacks. Could you say that statement a different way? Also, also: > [@SentientMeat](#): > > And, to probe the deeper meaning of the scenario: the toddler’s “calculation” and the grandfater’s calculation are **functionally equivalent**. The fundamental difference, I’d suggest, is only apparent when we ask the two to perform a similar calculation _again and again_. Grandfather’s consistent outputs would stand in stark contrast to junior’s unpredictable outputs, demonstrating that the computer comprising (grandfather + abacus) can be characterised by _memory access_, whereas the computer comprising (junior + abacus), like the raincloud, cannot. In the tot/abacus system the computation functions as a random number generator, but in the grandpa/abacus system, the computation does _not_ function as a random number generator. I’m not getting how they’re **functionally equivalent**. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/237 "2005-05-24T19:38:40Z")
> [@](#): > > If I’m wondering whether or not something is physical, how can I find out? What is the test/criteria?). I’m afraid the only way to do so is to _ask yourself_. If you suffer from an utter lack of imagination, you might answer ‘no’, just as those Creationists who could not see that _life_ is physical answered. > [@](#): > > My version of that first statement would be “Matter is necessary for computation” That is acceptable to me, as would the statement “Matter is necessary for life”. > [@](#): > > The second statement I simply don’t understand. I keep picturing attaching things with thumbtacks. Could you say that statement a different way? Just as an _arrangement_ of matter is **all** that is necessary for life, so an arrangement of matter (be it silicon or carbon based) is \*\*all[b/] that is necessary for computation. > [@](#): > > In the tot/abacus system the computation functions as a random number generator, but in the grandpa/abacus system, the computation does not function as a random number generator. How do you know, if you only consider the single ‘throw’? You only get to find out that the tot is random but the grandfather isn’t with _multiple_ throws. For a single one, they are **not different at all**. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 24, 2005, 10:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/238 "2005-05-24T22:22:36Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I’m afraid the only way to do so is to _ask yourself_. If you suffer from an utter lack of imagination, you might answer ‘no’, just as those Creationists who could not see that _life_ is physical answered. **Sentient** , the context for that question could not have been clearer. I’m asking about _your_ test/criteria. I need to understand what it means, to you, for something to be _physical_. You’ve repeatedly asked me to take a position, either agree or disagree with your physicalist stance, but to do that I’ll need to know what I’m agreeing or disagreeing _with_. > [@](#): > > That is acceptable to me, as would the statement “Matter is necessary for life”. Well, damn. Our first press release. SM and OW agree that: 1. Matter is necessary for computation. > [@](#): > > Just as an _arrangement_ of matter is **all** that is necessary for life, so an arrangement of matter (be it silicon or carbon based) is \*\*all[b/] that is necessary for computation. Hey, I thought you said baby steps. I can neither agree nor disagree with this statement. I can (obviously) agree that an arrangement of matter is necessary for computation, but stating that it’s both necessary _and sufficient_ has yet to be established (although that might very well be the case). > [@other-wise](#): > > In the tot/abacus system the computation functions as a random number generator, but in the grandpa/abacus system, the computation does not function as a random number generator. > [@](#): > > Response by SentientMeat > How do you know, if you only consider the single ‘throw’? You only get to find out that the tot is random but the grandfather isn’t with _multiple_ throws. For a single one, they are **not different at all**. I don’t know with a single throw, but then, I’m _outside_ the system. Even if the grandfather had never performed that particular calculation before, he doesn’t have to perform multiple throws to know his computation was non-random. Are you saying that the litmus test for functionality must always be outside the system? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 25, 2005, 9:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/239 "2005-05-25T09:40:17Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > I’m asking about your test/criteria. I need to understand what it means, to you, for something to be _physical_. “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). > [@](#): > > You’ve repeatedly asked me to take a position, either agree or disagree with your physicalist stance, but to do that I’ll need to know what I’m agreeing or disagreeing _with_. We **start** by agreeing that there are _some_ physical things, which I have never once heard you deny. We then see which steps we can make from there. I am utterly bemused by your inability to leave the roundabout by declaring that , yes, gravity is **as** physical **as** rocks and the whole host of similar statements I keep asking for your comment on but receiving only questions about definitions in return. That is not _debating_, that is _mithering_, like a “why?”-repeating toddler. > [@](#): > > I can neither agree nor disagree with this statement. About life? You cling to an _elan vital_ which is separate from the mere temproal arrangement of cells comprising an organism? Then you transport yourself back to the 19th century and I am not sure we can usefully converse much longer. > [@](#): > > I can (obviously) agree that an arrangement of matter is necessary for computation, but stating that it’s both necessary and sufficient has yet to be established (although that might very well be the case). OK. Think of the silicon computer, whirring away with no humans around. It is **only** switches, gates and charges, yes? Those switches, gates and charges are what the computer **is** , yes? > [@](#): > > Even if the grandfather had never performed that particular calculation before, he doesn’t have to perform multiple throws to know his computation was non-random. Please, you have now moved onto the epistemology of “how the grandfather knows things”, which is yet another separate issue entirely (and _yet again_ I would point to memory elements which **comprise** ‘knowledge’). > [@](#): > > Are you saying that the litmus test for functionality must always be outside the system? We are **different** computers to grandfather. If we were inside the computer called grandfather, we would _be_ grandfather. All we _can_ receive is the outputs which the grandfather computer, somehow, directs at us (which themselves are _fictional accounts_). This is the very heart of [verificationism](http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/language/verificationism.html), which every good cognitive scientist must follow. Read through this thread again, **other-wise**. You will see me desperately trying to provide answers to _every single one_ of your questions, while occasionally throwing in some of my own. You will notice that you have **ignored** _every single one_ of **my** questions and instead continued to fire more at me about your pet scenario. Would it be possible for us to take a timeout in which _I_ put some questions to _you_, do you think? (And if all of your answers are “I don’t know” or “I have no opinion” or some such, could you understand my reticence in ever _engaging_ you again?) ---
**Author:** ![monavis](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/e0b2c6/32.png) [@monavis](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/monavis)\ **Post date:** [May 25, 2005, 10:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/240 "2005-05-25T10:51:39Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > The part that I’ve highlighted is the problem. Unless there are morality particles, or unless there is some gestalt mechanism, how can it be that your edification of someone else edifies you? If you feed someone else, you do not benefit from the nourishment. If you save someone else’s life, it might even mean risking your own. If you allow a gay man (or straight woman, whichever is more inappropriate for you) to touch you in a manner that he (or she) would find edifying, you yourself risk damage to your psyche. Before you attribute any of this to evolution’s guiding hand, I would caution you against anthropomorphising a process that has no goals or design of purpose. There may be times when one loses his or her life in saving that of another, but in so doing we are not hurting the species,we call those people heros because they did what they could for the betterment of others.(saving the species). Some one touching me does not damage my psyche, If another harms me it diminishes them. I may be hurt physically but I am not diminished. If I feed some one else (and I have), it helps them to understand kindness, anf If I save their life with the food,they can live to do good for others, and in my experiance they have helped me out at times when I have needed it No one in their right mind would find touching some one un appropriately edifying. I doubt that even the most hardened rapist feels edified by harming anyone. Monavis [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=11) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=13)