# Ask the Creationist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 12, 2005, 1:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555 "2005-05-12T13:18:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 13
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 25, 2005, 11:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/241 "2005-05-25T23:59:38Z")
Well… I don’t know where to start. For one thing, I must vehemently object to the following: > [@](#): > > You will notice that you have **ignored** _every single one_ of **my** questions… So far, you have asked me exactly TWO non-rhetorical questions, _and I have answered them both_: > [@](#): > > **1)** A random number generating program is a computation, yes? The above question was ambiguous but I addressed _each_ of the possible interpretations. > [@](#): > > **2)** If they are not arbitrary labels, how come other people call them other things (ie. other languages\*) or don’t call them anything at all (eg. foraging people or early hominids)? On this one you had missed my point entirely, so I rephrased my original question and tried again. I have responded to every direct question you have asked, unless, of course, you’re referring to the questions you asked at the bottom of Post #232, which I addressed _in the very first line_ of Post #233 (bolding mine): > [@](#): > > Sentient, I’m trying to keep our debate from sprouting even more tentacles, **so before I respond to the rest of your post** , I’d like a response from you on this **Sentient** , I realize that from your perspective, I’m an evasive, pedantic, nit-picking weasel. But from _my_ perspective, I’ve been unusually patient in re-directing the focus of my posts (at _your_ request) toward establishing simple steps we could both agree on, in the hopes of finding common ground. When you made statements that struck me as cryptic > [@](#): > > The computer comprising the abacus attached to the human brain is also made of atoms. or contextually ambiguous > [@](#): > > A random number generating program is a computation, yes? I informed you of my confusion in a non-snarky way, while carefully offering tentative responses to what you _seemed_ to be saying. I’ve asked for clarification of your views without characterizing you or jumping to the wrong conclusion, while being subjected to condescension, having my questions answered out of context, and being compared to Creationists, toddlers, and 19th Century vitalists. I don’t know if continuing this debate is worth it. As I demonstrated in Posts #230 and 236, I’m perfectly willing to answer your questions directly, state my position, or agree/disagree with your statements. But I must be able to ask for clarification if I don’t understand what you’re saying, and I fear any future attempt at doing so will be taken as evasion or filibustering. I feel frustrated and a little sad, **Sentient** … I simply don’t know why we have such a perpetual, unerring knack for talking past each other, but I’d rather call it quits now than start developing bad blood between us. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 27, 2005, 8:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/242 "2005-05-27T08:45:27Z")
Sorry for the delay, **o-w** , yesterday was a bit of a [write-off](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=6202276&postcount=719). > [@](#): > > So far, you have asked me exactly TWO non-rhetorical questions, and I have answered them both: The points I was thinking of were these: > [@SM](#): > > Is a chemical reaction really so different from the trillions of flips of a chip as a program is run? … I’m curious why you say the centre of gravity is fictional but, say, the density is not … Why must a _process_ have mass, temperature or these other specifications in order to be considered physical? Surely the gravitational force between two rocks, the process of attraction, is **as** physical **as** the rocks themselves? Surely the life of a organism in a mindless universe is as physical as the cells it is made of? If so, is the computation, the temporal arrangement of the charges and switches, not as physical as the computer? Your abacus scenario is useful enough in some ways, but it does not really help in others, since the **brains of the users** are _essential_ elements of the system in toto. You use the word ‘physical’ yourself. I am merely asking what _you_ mean by it so that _your_ position might become clearer to _me_. I am asking you how _you_ differentiate _yourself_ from Creationists or vitalists. > [@](#): > > I don’t know if continuing this debate is worth it. As I demonstrated in Posts #230 and 236, I’m perfectly willing to answer your questions directly, state my position, or agree/disagree with your statements. . OK, I apologise, and simlpy ask again. What is _your position_? _Are you_ a dualist, or theist, or panpsychic, or what? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 27, 2005, 11:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/243 "2005-05-27T23:28:24Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > You use the word ‘physical’ yourself. I am merely asking what _you_ mean by it so that _your_ position might become clearer to _me_. I am asking you how _you_ differentiate _yourself_ from Creationists or vitalists. From Merriam-Webster: **phys•i•cal** : **1 a** : having **material** existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature \<_everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance_ – Thomas De Quincey\> **b** : of or relating to material things ibid: **ma•te•ri•al** : **1 a** (1) : relating to, derived from, or consisting of **matter** ; _especially_ : **PHYSICAL** \ ibid: **mat•ter** : **2 a** : the substance of which a physical object is composed **b** : material substance that occupies space, has mass, and is composed predominantly of atoms consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons, that constitutes the observable universe, and that is interconvertible with energy With a little tweaking, the definitions above lead to _my_ definition: **phys•i•ca** l: Any object(s) that are within the grasp of the senses (or instruments that act as extensions of the senses) which have measurable, inherent characteristics or properties existing in (or, perhaps, measured by) spacetime. To which I would add: Physical object(s) can encode information (i.e., can act as a conveyance for a message). A physical object is something than can potentially be perceived as a representation, but representation is not an inherent characteristic. (If this does not distinguish me sufficiently from Creationists and vitalists, let me know and I’ll address those directly) > [@](#): > > OK, I apologise, and simlpy ask again. What is _your position_? _Are you_ a dualist, or theist, or panpsychic, or what? I think I’ve addressed this in a previous thread: I’m extremely leery of labeling myself _any_ kind of “-ist”. For one thing, I have yet to find a system of reasoning or Weltanschauung that I could embrace unreservedly. Also, in conversations of any depth or complexity, my experience has been that these labels tend to obfuscate rather than clarify; people associate all manner of unjustified assumptions to a given label, and it can be grueling work to disavow them of these assumptions and keep the discussion on track. As an example, Merriam-Webster’s definition of a theist is: > [@](#): > > Belief in the existence of one God viewed as the creative source of man and the world who transcends yet is immanent in the world By that standard Pat Robertson and **Lib** are both “theists”, yet I can hardly imagine a more disparate pair. Perhaps there are specific things within the belief system of a “dualist”, or “theist”, or “panpsychic” that you’re wanting to know if _I_ believe; if so, ask and I’ll try to answer. I think it would be a lot easier (and clearer) for me to address a question about a specific belief than one encompassing a whole philosophy. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 28, 2005, 6:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/244 "2005-05-28T18:35:29Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > **Physical** : **b** : of or relating to material things > > (If this does not distinguish me sufficiently from Creationists and vitalists, let me know and I’ll address those directly) OK, so _life_ is physical, yes? _Processes_ can be **as** physical **as** objects, yes? Vitalists would say that life was _not_ physical, whereas every mainstream biologist would consider them rather backwards for saying so. Creationists might say that just because some entities were questionably “life” then life was not _understood and explained_ as a physical process. If you refuse to _distance_ yourself from either of these philosophies, I hope you’d understand that it would be a little like debating someone who refused to disagree with solipsism or the like. Useful debate requires us to _accept premises_. > [@](#): > > I’m extremely leery of labeling myself any kind of “-ist”. Well, as I say, I hope we can at least get ourselves off the starting blocks, since a debate in which one party refuses to accept _any premises whatsoever_ is not a debate at all. And I note that you do not appear to invest any time in questioning Lib, Aeschines or Gyan about _their_ Weltanschaaungs, only _me_: This at least suggests that physicalism has _more_ interest to you than others. Perhaps a good starting point would be [these questions](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=315717). Feel free to reply there. ---
**Author:** ![Bryan\_Ekers](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bryan_ekers/32/183_2.png) [@Bryan\_Ekers](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bryan_Ekers)\ **Post date:** [May 28, 2005, 7:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/245 "2005-05-28T19:11:28Z")
Forgive me if this has been covered already, but since when is an abacus a computational device? It’s no more so than a bookmark is a reading device. The movement of beads simply act as placeholders while the abacus operator is performing the computations, much as making marks on paper with a pencil would. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 1:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/246 "2005-05-29T01:43:34Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > OK, so _life_ is physical, yes? Again, the wording here is contextually ambiguous, so I’ll give you a couple answers… pick the most appropriate. Since a rock meets the criteria we _both_ specified earlier for something to be “physical”, and I don’t consider rocks to be biologically alive, then the answer is **no** , life is not physical. However, I think what you’re getting at is that everything that’s alive has measurable physical characteristics, and in _that_ context, then, **yes** , life is physical. > [@](#): > > _Processes_ can be **as** physical **as** objects, yes? No. I don’t see how they could be since our definitions of “physical” only describe what something _is_, not what it’s _doing_. > [@](#): > > And I note that you do not appear to invest any time in questioning Lib, Aeschines or Gyan about _their_ Weltanschaaungs, only _me_: This at least suggests that physicalism has _more_ interest to you than others. 😕 WTF?? Not only have I thoroughly questioned **Lib** ’s Weltanschauung, but I’ve [_defended your Weltanschauung to **Lib** _](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?p=5886850#post5886850). As far as I can tell, Aeschines and Gyan have not posted in this thread, but others have, and I’ve questioned them, too. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 8:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/247 "2005-05-29T08:16:24Z")
Indeed, I will testify that Other-wise has rejected what I consider to be iron-clad logic in our discussions, particularly about memory. That is not to say that Other-wise is unreasonable, but that he did not find my arguments compelling. I like to think that it was the distractions he endured at the time. Plus, the thread ended suddenly when someone started a spin-off. And I will say this as well: I have not enjoyed any discussion more than those I’ve had with him. He is razor sharp, and makes every possible effort to understand his opponent’s point of view. ---
**Author:** ![II\_Gyan\_II](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/bbe5ce/32.png) [@II\_Gyan\_II](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/II_Gyan_II)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 8:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/248 "2005-05-29T08:51:02Z")
[Off-topic] SM, I’ve been busy the past few days, so I haven’t replied to your earlier consciousness thread. Aeschines, probably, hasn’t seen it, at all. You might want to bump it. I’ll get to it, soon.[/offtopic] ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 11:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/249 "2005-05-29T11:06:48Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Since a rock meets the criteria we both specified earlier for something to be “physical”, and I don’t consider rocks to be biologically alive, then the answer is **no** , life is not physical. Ah, I think I see the problem. When I ask you whether set B (“life”) resides in the set A (“physical”), you point to an element X (“rock”) which resides in set A but not set B. You then, for some reason, suggest that this shows that set B is not part of set A. In fact, I think logical fallacies like this have formed the basis for many of your other objections but I didn’t spot them at the time. I didn’t ask you whether rocks were alive, I asked you whether life was physical. > [@](#): > > However, I think what you’re getting at is that everything that’s alive has measurable physical characteristics, and in that context, then, **yes** , life is physical. OK, so in order for something to be physical to you, it must have measurable physical characteristics? Again, I’m not sure quite why you demand this, but I’ll try and work with it: Just as _mass_ or _temperature_ are physical characteristics, so are _acceleration_, _rate_ or _interaction time_, yes? > [@](#): > > No. I don’t see how they could be since our definitions of “physical” only describe what something _is_, not what it’s _doing_. Our definition was, IIRC, “of or relating to material things”. You have said that I’m unlike other physicalists you’ve engaged. Perhaps the reason for that is that every other physicalist simply _assumes_ that you make the elementary step that _eg._ “melting is a physical process” and spends no more time on it. I (and probably they), simply _cannot understand_ the distinction you insist on making here. If the tree is physical, how on Earth can the tree _falling_ **not** be? What is it about _time_ that you consider fundamentally different to _space_ in this regard, given that modern physics has shown so definitively how the two are linked, and even equivalent? > [@](#): > > WTF?? OK, I apologise - I admit that I’m trying to work out _some_ kind of position, however tentative, that you might be coming from, and the absence of any kind of argument _for_, say, the existence of God suggests that you _marginally lean away from_ theism. Statistically speaking, I’m trying to gauge what you argue _against less_. > [@](#): > > As far as I can tell, Aeschines and Gyan have not posted in this thread, but others have, and I’ve questioned them, too. OK, and thank you for submitting to a little questioning yourself. Again, your responses to those 12 propositions in the other thread would further be useful in this regard. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 11:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/250 "2005-05-29T11:34:04Z")
> [@Bryan Ekers](#): > > Forgive me if this has been covered already, but since when is an abacus a computational device? It’s no more so than a bookmark is a reading device. The movement of beads simply act as placeholders while the abacus operator is performing the computations, much as making marks on paper with a pencil would. Frankly, an abacus was the first, simplest metaphor I could think of that might get my point across. Using an abacus is what [Andy Clark](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262531569/qid=1117365800/sr=2-1/ref=pd_bbs_b_2_1/103-5340169-5089431) refers to as “extended cognition”: it’s an _epistemic_ action, altering the world in ways that serve to augment a cognitive process (as opposed to _pragmatic_ actions, like filling a pothole with cement). So in that sense, at least, an abacus can be considered a computational device. However, an abacus-as-a-physical-object is not _inherently_ a computational device, which was (partly) my point. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 12:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/251 "2005-05-29T12:19:35Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Frankly, an abacus was the first, simplest metaphor I could think of that might get my point across. If I may interject, how about just the computer you’re currently sitting at _when you’re out of the room_? I’d suggest that all of the confusion in the abacus scenario comes from the necessity of a human brain to be “attached” to it in order to “perform computations”. The compute with you out of the room has no such complication, and we can explore whether _it_ is physical (be it switched on or off). ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 29, 2005, 3:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/252 "2005-05-29T15:04:45Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Ah, I think I see the problem. When I ask you whether set B (“life”) resides in the set A (“physical”), you point to an element X (“rock”) which resides in set A but not set B. You then, for some reason, suggest that this shows that set B is not part of set A. In fact, I think logical fallacies like this have formed the basis for many of your other objections but I didn’t spot them at the time. I didn’t ask you whether rocks were alive, I asked you whether life was physical. I’m not seeing the logical fallacy here (not that there isn’t one; I’m just not seeing it). Your description of set “A” was: “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate _life_ from a _rock_). > [@](#): > > ## OK, so in order for something to be physical to you, it must have measurable physical characteristics? Again, I’m not sure quite why you demand this, but I’ll try and work with it: Just as _mass_ or _temperature_ are physical characteristics, so are _acceleration_, _rate_ or _interaction time_, yes? > > Our definition was, IIRC, “of or relating to material things”. You have said that I’m unlike other physicalists you’ve engaged. Perhaps the reason for that is that every other physicalist simply _assumes_ that you make the elementary step that _eg._ “melting is a physical process” and spends no more time on it. I (and probably they), simply _cannot understand_ the distinction you insist on making here. If the tree is physical, how on Earth can the tree _falling_ **not** be? What is it about _time_ that you consider fundamentally different to _space_ in this regard, given that modern physics has shown so definitively how the two are linked, and even equivalent? I’ve lumped these two together because there’s something in here that’s a sticking point for us. I’m no physicist; I just liked to watch “Mr.Wizard” on TV when I was a kid. But I have gotten the impression that physicists identify, classify, and measure physical objects _as_ physical objects in terms of their _physical characteristics_ (mass, density, etc). I always vaguely assumed that there was some relatively short, more-or-less canonical list of measurable physical characteristics that physicists used as their standard working vocabulary. So basically we’ve got “stuff” that’s characterized as “physical” because it matches a pre-defined checklist of physical characteristics. But that’s _all_ we’ve got; “physical stuff” in some sort of arrangement. To further characterize a given arrangement (or temporal series of arrangements) as a computation seems to go way over and above what’s given in it’s physical description; it implies a function, a value, a _usefulness_ that’s not present in it’s physical characterization. > [@](#): > > OK, I apologise - I admit that I’m trying to work out _some_ kind of position, however tentative, that you might be coming from, and the absence of any kind of argument _for_, say, the existence of God suggests that you _marginally lean away from_ theism. Statistically speaking, I’m trying to gauge what you argue _against less_. No problem… and I truly wish I _did_ have an “-ist” position to claim; it would give us _both_ something solid to put our feet on. > [@](#): > > OK, and thank you for submitting to a little questioning yourself. Again, your responses to those 12 propositions in the other thread would further be useful in this regard. That’s a highly-complex series of propositions you’ve got there, and I was hoping we’d keep to the “start-with-something-simple” adgenda. But I’ll see what I can come up with. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 7:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/253 "2005-05-30T07:28:21Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate **life** from a **rock** ). There isn’t anything. That’s the underpinning point behind physicalism, that all things are physical. Within set A, things are differentiated from each other by their configuration. Their arrangement. Their pattern. A spoon is different from a fork. Water is different from a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen gas. Magnetised iron is different from non-magnetised iron. Life is different from a rock. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 9:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/254 "2005-05-30T09:29:20Z")
> [@matt](#): > > There isn’t anything. That’s the underpinning point behind physicalism, that all things are physical. > > Within set A, things are differentiated from each other by their configuration. Their arrangement. Their pattern. A spoon is different from a fork. Water is different from a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen gas. Magnetised iron is different from non-magnetised iron. Life is different from a rock. But those differences are entirely arbitrary, making the philosophy that discerns them arbitary, right? I mean, a snake is a sentient being, but does it know the difference between a tree and the ground as it slithers toward is prey? Doesn’t it just move seamlessly from one object (the tree) to the other (the ground) without recognizing any difference between them? Isn’t it all just one surface under its belly? Perhaps it recognizes the change in slope (or not), but surely it does not recognize the elements of set A. And if the perception of a snake differs from the perception of a human, allowing that a future evolved creature might discern differences (or similarities) we ourselves do not discern — doesn’t that mean that our discernment is neither definitive nor standard? So maybe life is not different from a rock after all. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 10:44am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/255 "2005-05-30T10:44:39Z")
Sure. Catagories are arbitrary. The catagories we use have arisen because they draw distinctions we find useful. The distinction between “ground” and “tree” may be meaningless to a snake, but the reptilian snake may have a whole set of catagories of temperature that are meaningless to us mammals. I don’t think the philosophy discerning the differences is _totally_ arbitrary - it is judged by its utility. Ants may not bother to distinguish between spoons and forks, but ants don’t eat soup. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 11:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/256 "2005-05-30T11:12:46Z")
First off, **matt** , let me apologize. Earlier, I said that I would address your one of your posts, and I did not. Since it’s germane to your latest post, let me address part of that earlier post now. > [@matt](#): > > Look at it this way. I have a “concept” of a “tree” in my mind, that allows me to distinguish trees from bushes and ferns and pylons and celery etc. I believe, though I cannot prove, that my mind is a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull, and the “concept” of the tree is also a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull Part of what’s bothering me about physicalism is that a given physical system is seemingly always dependent on a non-specific, outside source to delineate its properties and identity. If the"concept" of “_tree_” is a result of the arrangement of matter in your skull, what is the “concept” “_arrangement of matter in my skull_” the result of? _Another_ arrangement of matter in your skull? Something outside your skull entirely? It seems to me like it leads to an infinite regress. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 11:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/257 "2005-05-30T11:34:45Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > If I may interject, how about just the computer you’re currently sitting at _when you’re out of the room_? I’d suggest that all of the confusion in the abacus scenario comes from the necessity of a human brain to be “attached” to it in order to “perform computations”. The compute with you out of the room has no such complication, and we can explore whether _it_ is physical (be it switched on or off). If I were _not_ in the room, then there would be nothing with my type of sensory and cognitive apparatus to characterize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), so no, it would not be “physical”. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 11:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/258 "2005-05-30T11:41:16Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > Part of what’s bothering me about physicalism is that a given physical system is seemingly always dependent on a non-specific, outside source to delineate its properties and identity. If the"concept" of “_tree_” is a result of the arrangement of matter in your skull, what is the “concept” “_arrangement of matter in my skull_” the result of? _Another_ arrangement of matter in your skull? Something outside your skull entirely? It seems to me like it leads to an infinite regress. No worries, discussions go where they go, it’s part of what makes them fun! I don’t really understand your question. All concepts are arrangements of matter in your skull, including the concept of “concept”, the concept of “arrangement”, the concept of “skull” etc. Where’s the problem? It’s like saying that the word “dictionary” can’t be in a dictionary. The definition of “dictionary” in a dictionary does not itself have to include all the words in a dictionary - that would indeed lead to an infinite regression. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 12:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/259 "2005-05-30T12:03:00Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Your description of set “A” was: “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate life from a rock). But I didn’t introduce element X (rocks) any more than I did Y (computers), Z (Napoleon Bonaparte) or the number seven. Forget rocks and the other irrelevances for now. Can you think of any element which **is** in the set “life” which is **outside** the set “physical”? > [@](#): > > I always vaguely assumed that there was some relatively short, more-or-less canonical list of measurable physical characteristics that physicists used as their standard working vocabulary. I suppose there is, but the list also comprises **temporal** physical characteristics like _rate_ and _duration_. > [@](#): > > But that’s _all_ we’ve got; “physical stuff” in some sort of _arrangement_. **Temporal** arrangement, yes? If not, why not? > [@](#): > > To further characterize a given arrangement (or temporal series of arrangements) as a computation seems to go way over and above what’s given in it’s physical description Halt! I’m not making this step yet - again you’re flicking to other sets before we’re done with the first. I am **not** asking whether _every_ temporal arrangement is a “computation” (that step was what you rather hurried me into before I understood what direction you were coming from - now that I do, I’d suggest that only temporal arrangements characterised by _working memory_ count as "computations). I **am** asking whether temporal arrangements are **physical**. You seem to be just on the verge of agreeing so, which would be a significant step forward. We could then explore whether that _subset_ of temporal arrangements called “switched on computers with nobody around” were physical. Finally, we might explore whether _human brains_ were switched on computers. > [@](#): > > If I were not in the room, then there would be nothing with my type of sensory and cognitive apparatus to characterize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), so no, it would not be “physical”. Ah, we return to stuff somehow requiring to be incident on _your_ sensors to be physical? Again, I’d suggest solipsism beckons here. If the tree in the forest is physical, and the tree on the forest floor is physical, and the tree at every orientation therebetween is physical, and the falling tree has physical characteristics like acceleration and decibel level, the falling tree is physical **when nobody is around** , yes? The universe for 13.7Bn years was and is _physical_, yes? > [@Lib](#): > > But those differences are entirely arbitrary, making the philosophy that discerns them arbitary, right? There is no non-arbitrary philosophy. A brain is an _arbitrating device_. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 2:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/260 "2005-05-30T14:30:00Z")
> [@matt](#): > > Sure. Catagories are arbitrary. > > The catagories we use have arisen because they draw distinctions we find useful. The distinction between “ground” and “tree” may be meaningless to a snake, but the reptilian snake may have a whole set of catagories of temperature that are meaningless to us mammals. > > I don’t think the philosophy discerning the differences is _totally_ arbitrary - it is judged by its utility. Ants may not bother to distinguish between spoons and forks, but ants don’t eat soup. Agreed. My philosophy is as arbitrary qua useful as yours, and vice-versa. Isn’t every philosophy in the end an expression of subjective perception? Even a philosophy that aims at objectivity is a subjective expression of what objectivity is. In another thread, there was unanimous consent that reality is not contingent on language or interpretation. To be objective, therefore, a philosophy must express nothing, just like the universe itself. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=12) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=14)