# Ask the Creationist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 12, 2005, 1:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555 "2005-05-12T13:18:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 14
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 2:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/261 "2005-05-30T14:35:49Z")
> [@Sentient](#): > > There is no non-arbitrary philosophy. A brain is an arbitrating device. A part of it is, to be sure — expecially the frontal cortex. However, the objectivity obstacle that I raised in my post to Matt does not constrict non-physical entities, since subjectivity is a direct result of the nature of electromagnetism. In other words, a philosophy may be objective if it is ineffable. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 2:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/262 "2005-05-30T14:47:35Z")
> [@matt](#): > > I don’t really understand your question. All concepts are arrangements of matter in your skull, including the concept of “concept”, the concept of “arrangement”, the concept of “skull” etc. Where’s the problem? > > It’s like saying that the word “dictionary” can’t be in a dictionary. The definition of “dictionary” in a dictionary does not itself have to include all the words in a dictionary - that would indeed lead to an infinite regression. Not to speak for Other-wise, but I believe that I understand his question. Pursuing the dictionary analogy, both your dictionary and my dictionary must say exactly the same thing, with exactly the same arrangement of letters and spaces, each of which must have exactly the same meaning to both of us. It is possible that one dictionary could be in English and the other French (or even some proprietary language), but the two definitions of tree must evoke the identical essence. Otherwise, you and I will think of a tree as two different things. Of course, all analogies are flawed, and the dictionary analogy goes only so far. But in the brain, surely it is the case that the geometry, topology, and geography of our cells are not identical. When I conceive a tree, my neurons will not fire in the identical order as yours. And in fact, mine are not arranged exactly as yours are. Since there is a different arrangement of matter in my head and in yours, how is it that we do indeed recognize fundamentally the same essence that identifies a tree? If, as you have said, physical identity is the ordering of elements in a set, then the fact that there is no one to one correspondence among the cells in our brains means that a physical identity (e.g., of a tree) may exist despite, rather than because of, some ordinal property. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 4:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/263 "2005-05-30T16:03:11Z")
**matt** , **Lib** has presented my basic argument far more eloquently and succinctly than I ever could (and, no doubt, with a greater appreciation of its nuances than I currently have). There’s a chance that **Sentient** might just get his wish: Maybe I’m an “-ist” after all, specifically; an **essentialist**. **Lib** , two questions, if I may. First, can you recommend any good books on essentialism (or whatever the “philosophy” I’ve been spouting here is called)? Second, could you elaborate on this statement: > [@](#): > > … since subjectivity is a direct result of the nature of electromagnetism. I believe this mirrors some of what I’ve been trying to describe in my previous posts, but your phrasing is rather unusual, and I want to make sure I’m not missing anything. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 4:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/264 "2005-05-30T16:08:38Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > your dictionary and my dictionary must say exactly the same thing, with exactly the same arrangement of letters and spaces, each of which must have exactly the same meaning to both of us. There’s a little slack in languages for expressing the same thing in different ways, I believe! > [@Liberal](#): > > It is possible that one dictionary could be in English and the other French (or even some proprietary language), but the two definitions of tree must evoke the identical essence. Otherwise, you and I will think of a tree as two different things. And here we agree to an extent. Not necessary the _identical_ essence, but close enough that we can communicate fairly reliably. Lib, have you ever read [Godel, Escher, Bach](http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0140289208/qid=1117466724/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_10_1/202-6339119-4132609)? I think you’d like it. It devotes a chapter or so on the difficulties of language translation, and how remarkable it is that languages can be translated at all. There has to be enough overlap between the concepts in the two languages for translation to be possible. One interesting example is translations of the poem Jabberwocky into German and French. The point being of course that most of the words in Jabberwocky don’t _have_ any firm meaning, but on the other hand they aren’t random sounds. They are evocative of something, but what? If you’re translating _T’was brilig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe_ into French, substituting meaningless but evocative French words for meaningless but evocative English words, what are you actually doing? > [@Liberal](#): > > Since there is a different arrangement of matter in my head and in yours, how is it that we do indeed recognize fundamentally the same essence that identifies a tree? The Universe has taught us both what trees are via our sensory inputs. The fact that different low-level configurations of matter can have similar high-level effects isn’t especially remarkable. Weight-balance scales, spring-balance scales, hydraulic scales and electronic-transducer scales can all “recognise” a kilogram. > [@Liberal](#): > > If, as you have said, physical identity is the ordering of elements in a set, then the fact that there is no one to one correspondence among the cells in our brains means that a physical identity (e.g., of a tree) may exist despite, rather than because of, some ordinal property. You’ve lost me! When did I say physical identity is the _ordering_ of elements in a set? If anything, each physical identity is a set in itself, a set containing the pertinent attributes of the physical entity. A description of the _essence_ of that entity, if you like. The set of SPOONS contains objects that are spoonlike. Which is tautological because I’m using language for description, and language is tautalogical. But my sensory inputs have taught me what “spoonlike” is - I have visual and spacial concepts of a spoon that come from my life experience. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 4:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/265 "2005-05-30T16:36:58Z")
> [@Lib](#): > > Since there is a different arrangement of matter in my head and in yours, how is it that we do indeed recognize fundamentally the same essence that identifies a tree? In the same way that two computers can store the same image using different _coding protocols_ - the “Memory is a physical thing” thread was my attempt to propose how “essence” might be reduced to computational entities. > [@o-w](#): > > First, can you recommend any good books on essentialism (or whatever the “philosophy” I’ve been spouting here is called)? Again, I’m not sure you have been _presenting_ a philosophy here - rather, your refusal to take certain elementary steps is a kind of “dualism by default”. You seemed just about to agree that teporal arrangements were physical - it would be something of a shame if you gave up on this progression now. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 4:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/266 "2005-05-30T16:56:05Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > But I didn’t introduce element X (rocks) any more than I did Y (computers), Z (Napoleon Bonaparte) or the number seven. Forget rocks and the other irrelevances for now. Can you think of any element which **is** in the set “life” which is **outside** the set “physical”? I have your description of Set A (“physical”). Give me a description of Set B (“life”), and I’ll be able to answer that question. > [@](#): > > ## **temporal** physical characteristics like _rate_ and _duration_. > > **Temporal** arrangement, yes? If not, why not? Yes, a temporal arrangement… I said that in the part you quoted next. I’m not understanding why you are placing an emphasis on temporality or how temporality impacts my arguments. (wait a minute: Are you saying that _spacetime_ is physical?) > [@](#): > > Ah, we return to stuff somehow requiring to be incident on _your_ sensors to be physical? Again, I’d suggest solipsism beckons here. If the tree in the forest is physical, and the tree on the forest floor is physical, and the tree at every orientation therebetween is physical, and the falling tree has physical characteristics like acceleration and decibel level, the falling tree is physical **when nobody is around** , yes? The universe for 13.7Bn years was and is _physical_, yes? I think it’s somewhat ironic that you accuse me of solipsism when I’m using _your_ definition of “physical”. It doesn’t have to be _my_ sensors. As I said, it just needs to be my _type_ of sensors. For anything (even, say, an alien or suitable A.I.) that had something analogous to my sensors and cognitive apparatus, such that it would conceptualize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), the computer would be “physical”. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 5:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/267 "2005-05-30T17:53:00Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Give me a description of Set B (“life”), and I’ll be able to answer that question. The dictionary definition should suffice, on the understanding that there are inevitably some things like viruses (or even _fire_) which lie on the borderline. > [@](#): > > I’m not understanding why you are placing an emphasis on temporality or how temporality impacts my arguments. Because a temporal arrangement is a _process_, which you have previously said is _not_ physical for some reason I have never understood. > [@](#): > > (wait a minute: Are you saying that spacetime is physical?) Of course. That is surely the very bedrock of _physics_. > [@](#): > > I think it’s somewhat ironic that you accuse me of solipsism when I’m using your definition of “physical”. I’m not accusing you of it (yet!), I’m just warning that it beckons if we require a sensor somewhere for anything to be physical. > [@](#): > > For anything (even, say, an alien or suitable A.I.) that had something analogous to my sensors and cognitive apparatus, such that it would conceptualize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), the computer would be “physical”. So if thee _were no_ sensors, like (for the sake of argument) those billions of years after the Big Bang, those fundamental particles in spacetime \*are not phsyical[/]i? I don;t understand this at all. I’m not asking for what is necessary for “something to call something else physical”, I’m asking about the nature of the stuff _when there’s no “calling entities” around._ ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 9:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/268 "2005-05-30T21:41:26Z")
Other-wise: The short answer to your first question on where to read more about essentialist philosophy is everything prior to Sartre and half of everything since Plantinga. 😃 Essentialism, basically, is the opposite of existentialism, or more precisely, they make opposite implications. Essentialism -\> essence preceeds existence. Existentialism -\> existence preceeds essence. As Hartshorne has pointed out, a thing may have essence and not exist (such as a unicorn, for example). Therefore, the correct implication is made by essentialism. Regarding subjectivity and electromagnetism, the idea is this: owing to the nature of electromagnetic fields, no two physical entities can possibly occupy the same space at the same time. Therefore, no two physical entities have ever experienced the exact same perception of the exact same event at the exact same time in the exact same way. Even if you and I were to observe some event standing side by side, arm in arm, and pressing our heads together, our skulls prevent our eyeballs from merging together to see from the exact same angle of view. Hence, every observation is unique and therefore subjective. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 9:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/269 "2005-05-30T21:58:43Z")
> [@matt](#): > > There’s a little slack in languages for expressing the same thing in different ways, I believe! As you noted nextwardly, they won’t be identical. In fact, it is safe to say that identical words won’t make identical impressions on the two of us. That is why, for example, the term “fundie” has a different effect on me than it does on someone else. Or why, “She smells like a foot locker” might turn off one person and excite another. Or “cool mature chick” carries a very different connotation from its synonymous phrase, “frigid old hen.” > [@](#): > > And here we agree to an extent. Not necessary the _identical_ essence, but close enough that we can communicate fairly reliably. > > Lib, have you ever read [Godel, Escher, Bach](http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0140289208/qid=1117466724/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_10_1/202-6339119-4132609)? I think you’d like it. It devotes a chapter or so on the difficulties of language translation, and how remarkable it is that languages can be translated at all. There has to be enough overlap between the concepts in the two languages for translation to be possible. > > One interesting example is translations of the poem Jabberwocky into German and French. The point being of course that most of the words in Jabberwocky don’t _have_ any firm meaning, but on the other hand they aren’t random sounds. They are evocative of something, but what? If you’re translating _T’was brilig, and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe_ into French, substituting meaningless but evocative French words for meaningless but evocative English words, what are you actually doing? Yes, I have the book. And I’ve seen the various translations of Jabberwocky. All interesting stuff, to be sure! > [@](#): > > The Universe has taught us both what trees are via our sensory inputs. The fact that different low-level configurations of matter can have similar high-level effects isn’t especially remarkable. Weight-balance scales, spring-balance scales, hydraulic scales and electronic-transducer scales can all “recognise” a kilogram. But if our knowledge of the universe comes via our sensory inputs, then our knowledge is definitively subjective. And no object will ever weigh the same in two different trials for any number of reasons. Oh sure, it’ll be close, just like meaning will be close. But if we’re dealing with approximations, let’s not use analogies like Sentient’s computers that store _identical_ images. They do not reflect reality. > [@](#): > > You’ve lost me! When did I say physical identity is the _ordering_ of elements in a set? If anything, each physical identity is a set in itself, a set containing the pertinent attributes of the physical entity. A description of the _essence_ of that entity, if you like. I misinterpreted your statement, then. I apologize. > [@](#): > > The set of SPOONS contains objects that are spoonlike. Which is tautological because I’m using language for description, and language is tautalogical. But my sensory inputs have taught me what “spoonlike” is - I have visual and spacial concepts of a spoon that come from my life experience. Another tautology is empiricism. The universe (your senses) observe the universe. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 10:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/270 "2005-05-30T22:00:55Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > In the same way that two computers can store the same image using different _coding protocols_ - the “Memory is a physical thing” thread was my attempt to propose how “essence” might be reduced to computational entities. I don’t think that mirrors reality. People don’t store identical images. We don’t even store images at all, really, but just pieces of images, in much the same way that we don’t observe everything in our field of vision, but only the narrow point of our focus. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 30, 2005, 10:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/271 "2005-05-30T22:43:37Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > The dictionary definition should suffice, on the understanding that there are inevitably some things like viruses (or even _fire_) which lie on the borderline. I’ve used Merriam-Webster throughout this debate, so I’ll assume it’s o.k. to continue: **life** : **1 a** : the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body **b** : a principle or force that is considered to underlie the distinctive quality of animate beings. Since Set A is :“Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), and Set B is: a distinguishing quality, principle or force, by what rationale are you designating “B” as a sub-set of “A”? > [@](#): > > Because a temporal arrangement is a _process_, which you have previously said is _not_ physical for some reason I have never understood. Ibid: \*\* pro•cess\*\* 1 a : PROGRESS, ADVANCE \ b : something going on : PROCEEDING 2 a (1) : a natural phenomenon marked by gradual changes that lead toward a particular result. Definition 1a of “process” doesn’t tell us anything (“something going on”), and since your definition of “physical” doesn’t include or imply “leading to a particular result” (which demands the ability to _demarcate a process and it’s results_), I don’t see any reason to consider a “process” physical. > [@](#): > > Of course. That is surely the very bedrock of _physics_. Physical: “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). Spacetime is physical. Physical is in Physical? I don’t get it. If you meant “Comprising fundamental particles and spacetime”, I’d like to know what “fundamental particles” and “spacetime” have in common to justify them _both_ falling under the designation “Physical”. > [@](#): > > So if thee _were no_ sensors, like (for the sake of argument) those billions of years after the Big Bang, those fundamental particles in spacetime \*are not phsyical[/]i? I don;t understand this at all. I’m not asking for what is necessary for “something to call something else physical”, I’m asking about the nature of the stuff _when there’s no “calling entities” around._ We can probably concentrate any further effort in our debate on this point; it seems pivotal. You insist that when there are no “calling entities” around, there’s this “stuff”. And you’re absolutely adamant that this stuff is “physical”. So what exactly _is_ “physical”? It’s what you, a “calling entity” call the stuff. No entity, no “physical”. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 1:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/272 "2005-05-31T01:25:12Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Other-wise: > > The short answer to your first question on where to read more about essentialist philosophy is everything prior to Sartre and half of everything since Plantinga. 😃 Huh… good thing my library card is made of Kevlar. > [@](#): > > Regarding subjectivity and electromagnetism, the idea is this: owing to the nature of electromagnetic fields, no two physical entities can possibly occupy the same space at the same time. Therefore, no two physical entities have ever experienced the exact same perception of the exact same event at the exact same time in the exact same way. Even if you and I were to observe some event standing side by side, arm in arm, and pressing our heads together, our skulls prevent our eyeballs from merging together to see from the exact same angle of view. Hence, every observation is unique and therefore subjective. O.K., that makes sense; it bears some similarity to a “closed consciousness” argument I made in the “memory” thread, however, I’ve never closely considered the idea of subjectivity as a direct result of the nature of electromagnetic fields (I seem to recall something about the Pauli exclusion principle holding that no two particles can be in the same state at the same time, but I thought there _were_ exceptions. I’ll have to look it up). ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 8:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/273 "2005-05-31T08:20:52Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Agreed. My philosophy is as arbitrary qua useful as yours, and vice-versa. I’m not sure either of us really regard our philosophies as arbitary; why do we bother to defend our own and test the strength of each others? We are both making value judgements somewhere. I guess I’m a Physicalist partly because I find it aesthetic. It’s a tidy philosophy. It doesn’t multiply entities needlessly, to borrow from Ockham. From a Dualist point of view, Physicalism is lacking - a Dualist sees a need for extra entities, and we can debate the truth of that over and over. However, Dualism is unaesthetic to me. For a start it doesn’t really fill the gaps in Physicalism that it claims to - saying a mind is composed of spirit is no more helpful to me than saying it works by magic. I find it nebulous. Although **other-wise** probably finds the Physicalist concept of conciousness arising from a sufficiently complex configuration of matter equally nebulous, and in that he has my sympathy. Essentialism is a philosophy I cannot yet judge. I haven’t really digested all its implications. > [@Liberal](#): > > Isn’t every philosophy in the end an expression of subjective perception? Even a philosophy that aims at objectivity is a subjective expression of what objectivity is. In another thread, there was unanimous consent that reality is not contingent on language or interpretation. Agree completely. Subjective is all we can know about the Universe. > [@Liberal](#): > > To be objective, therefore, a philosophy must express nothing, just like the universe itself. Aaaaaarrrrrghhhh! What does that _mean?_ What’s the point of it? And why do we **need** an objective philosophy, when subjective is all we can know? What’s wrong with subjective-but-useful philosophies? > [@Liberal](#): > > Another tautology is empiricism. The universe (your senses) observe the universe. That’s food for thought. Thanks! I’m glad you’ve read GEB. If I only had one book to take to a desert island, that’d be the one. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 8:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/274 "2005-05-31T08:56:52Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > I’ve used Merriam-Webster throughout this debate, so I’ll assume it’s o.k. to continue: life: 1 a : the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body b : a principle or force that is considered to underlie the distinctive quality of animate beings. > > Since Set A is :“Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), and Set B is: a distinguishing quality, principle or force, by what rationale are you designating “B” as a sub-set of “A”? Ugh, what a horrible definition: it’s 19th Century vitalism through and through! OK, it seems like I must supply my own in order not to be done in by a dictionary which knows no biology. I will therefore turn to the [wikipage](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life) and suggest “An entity characterised by growth, metabolism, reproduction, motion and stimulus response”. All of these physical processes are understood biologically in terms of cellular cycles, reduction-division, DNA replication and the like, themselves reductible to chemical reactions, atoms and fundamental particles. There is no longer any need whatsoever to consider “life” as anything dualistic. Indeed, you would be hard pressed to find a vitalist these days in modern life science, _ie._ one who proposes a fundamental dualism between “life” and the temporal arrangement of cells in an organism. > [@](#): > > Definition 1a of “process” doesn’t tell us anything (“something going on”), and since your definition of “physical” doesn’t include or imply “leading to a particular result” (which demands the ability to demarcate a process and it’s results), I don’t see any reason to consider a “process” physical. If I may just say, dictionaries are not _bibles_, and continual flight thereto is not the way to debate constructively. However, in this case, definition 1a really _does_ say something: ADVANCE **in _time_**. The arrangement of fundamental particles in space **time** is _not static_. This definition definitely _does_ admit my definition of “physical”. Yet again I ask: If the tree in the forest and on the floor and at ever orientation therebetween is physical, which you admit, and this temporal arrangement has measurable characteristics like rate and decibel level, how on Earth can it be _un_physical? > [@](#): > > “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). A wave being a variation **of** spacetime, you understand. > [@](#): > > Spacetime is physical. Physical is in Physical? I don’t get it. Please, look _away from_ the roundabout. Spacetime is what the universe **is** - it is sometimes useful to consider mass and energy “in” spacetime and sometimes, in more fundamental physics, more useful to consider them as ‘ripples’ **of** spacetime. Change my definition of “physical” simply to “spacetime” if you wish, but we are getting _way_ off the point in discussing physics at this level. > [@](#): > > “Comprising fundamental particles and spacetime”, I’d like to know what “fundamental particles” and “spacetime” have in common to justify them both falling under the designation “Physical”. Then I give you [particle _physics_](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_physics). > [@](#): > > You insist that when there are no “calling entities” around, there’s this “stuff”. Do we _agree_ that there were no “calling entities” around for those billions of years? > [@](#): > > And you’re absolutely adamant that this stuff is “physical”. What word would **you** use to describe the universe of fundamental particles, stars, gas clouds, radiation and comets for those billions of years after the Big Bang? > [@](#): > > So what exactly is “physical”? It’s what you, a “calling entity” call the stuff. No entity, no “physical”. But what do _you_ call the stuff _when there **wasn’t** _ any such entity? What do _you_ call the world before you were born, or the tree falling in the forest with nobody around? This is _crucial_ to your exiting the roundabout, one way or the other. > [@Lib](#): > > We don’t even store images at all, really, but just pieces of images, in much the same way that we don’t observe everything in our field of vision, but only the narrow point of our focus. Yes, that which we biological computers commit to memory is the strongly filtered ‘bare bones’ compared to what a silicon computer stores. However, since we each have _similar filtering modules_, I would suggest that we each store an image which is **statistically** similar enough that, say, two people can give consistent testimony in court. I guess it comes down to whether or not one considers a picture with a single different pixel (or voxel, or geon, or whatever biological equivalent) is a _different_ image or _the same_ image in that it gives a correlation within a given threshold. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 8:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/275 "2005-05-31T08:58:42Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > it bears some similarity to a “closed consciousness” argument I made in the “memory” thread And I was wondering, could you dedicate a thread to this sometime? I could not see how it was not simply an _inaccessible memory_ argument. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2005, 10:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/276 "2005-05-31T22:18:25Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > If I may just say, dictionaries are not _bibles_, and continual flight thereto is not the way to debate constructively. Then why on earth do you direct me to them… > [@other-wise](#): > > Give me a description of Set B (“life”), and I’ll be able to answer that question. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > The dictionary definition should suffice… … instead of offering your own definitions when asked? > [@](#): > > Please, look _away from_ the roundabout. Spacetime is what the universe **is** - it is sometimes useful to consider mass and energy “in” spacetime and sometimes, in more fundamental physics, more useful to consider them as ‘ripples’ **of** spacetime. Change my definition of “physical” simply to “spacetime” if you wish, but we are getting _way_ off the point in discussing physics at this level. I don’t think so, because I finally have a much clearer idea of what you mean when you refer to something as “physical”. If I’m understanding you, your definition of physical boils down to: **Physical** : Where shit happens _and_ the shit that happens. That probably sounded snarky, but it was not intended to be; it was only intended to be succinct. Seriously, I think it’s a reasonable non-technical summation of your definition, and I’d like to know if you feel it’s unfair or think there’s a problem with it; if not, I’ll use it as my own personal working definition. (And in the summation above, “where”, of course, refers to locations both temporal and spatial.) By _that_ definition, then yes, “An entity characterized by growth, metabolism, reproduction, motion and stimulus response" is indeed a sub-set of “A”, and **life is physical**. > [@](#): > > Then I give you [particle _physics_](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_physics). I’d like your opinion on the following statement, taken directly from your link: > [@](#): > > Throughout the development of particle physics, there have been many objections to the extreme reductionist (or greedy reductionist) approach of attempting to explain everything in terms of elementary particles and their interaction. These objections have been raised by people from an wide array of fields, including many modern particle physicists, solid state physicists, chemists, biologists, and metaphysical holists. While the Standard Model itself is not challenged, it is contended that the properties of elementary particles are no more (or less) fundamental than the emergent properties of atoms and molecules, and especially statistically large ensembles of those. I’d like to wait a bit before answering the rest of your post. It covers some territory that I think is important enough to tackle separately, and I’d like your feedback on all the above before I do so. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 8:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/277 "2005-06-01T08:45:13Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Then why on earth do you direct me to them instead of offering your own definitions when asked? OK, I’ll rephrase: continually _asking for definitions_ is not the way to debate constructively. Again, linguistically bounding a set or category will _inevitably_ leave some elements on the borderline (Creationist: “What _is_ a fossil then, precisely?”) - we ought not as intelligent friends require each other to append each word we use with a bracketed sentence. In any case, I hope I have set forth to your satisfaction the elementary biological fact that life is a _mechanism_ comprising the _temporal arrangement_ of cells, each of which can be understood and explained (although _no_ science can yet be said to be _complete_!) by physical processes. > [@](#): > > Physical: Where shit happens _and_ the shit that happens. Like I say: a **temporal** , not _just_ a spatial, arrangement of “shit”. > [@](#): > > By that definition, then yes, “An entity characterized by growth, metabolism, reproduction, motion and stimulus response" is indeed a sub-set of “A”, and **life is physical**. **Excellent**. This is an important step, and thanks for following through with it. Now, can we agree that _computation_ (and, for the time being, I **only** mean “_silicon_ computer shit”) is also physical? If we do, we can from that point discuss whether _human minds_ are **life+computation** , noting that I myself am not _fully_ convinced on this point (whereas I am _as certain as one can be_ that life and computation are physical). > [@Wikipedia](#): > > it is contended that the properties of elementary particles are no more (or less) fundamental than the emergent properties of atoms and molecules, and especially statistically large ensembles of those. I agree: ‘fundamental’ is itself a rather arbitrary bin to tip this or that entity into. When can we say that something is **fully** explained and understood in terms of fundamental particles? Why, when there is _no more science to **do** _, that’s when! We live in an exciting, exhilirating time (temporal location!), when there are still all kinds of gaps between fundamental particles (whatever they are!) and _atoms_, let alone between molecules and life and human consciousness. Scientists the world over are continually throwing ropes across those gaps and devising ingenious experiments to test their strength. Some ropes snap, others hold, allowing _stronger_ supports to be moved into place. We are _building the bridge_ between mind and matter, and when it is “complete” is rather subjective judgement. Is it when a single reckless fool can just about traverse the entire span, sometimes via extremely rickety ropes? Or can we only say “complete” when it is _perfect_, as not even the theories of evolution or gravitation are yet? _Of course_ we cannot definitively _demonstrate_ that everything is physical yet, or _empirically_ reduce everything to fundamental particles: That is the challenge of this millennium and likely the next few. But surveying all the _options_, I see that physicalism is by far the _most parsimonious_, Ockhamly speaking, and the position which is _making progress_ year on year in everything from particle physics to cognitive science. I am waving to you, stuck on your roundabout, from an exit road with an exciting view. I cannot _compel_ you to join me. I can only keep waving. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 10:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/278 "2005-06-01T10:58:49Z")
> [@matt](#): > > I’m not sure either of us really regard our philosophies as arbitary; why do we bother to defend our own and test the strength of each others? We are both making value judgements somewhere. Agreed. I liken it to the atoms, which are not real, but merely comprise an amoral mis-en-scene for a moral play. Despite that the universe is not real, it is compelling all the same, and sufficiently complex that, just as with a great movie, it is easy to lose yourself, suspend disbelief, and behave as though it were real. > [@](#): > > I guess I’m a Physicalist partly because I find it aesthetic. It’s a tidy philosophy. It doesn’t multiply entities needlessly, to borrow from Ockham. But Ockham was a dualist (and conceptualist). He himself worried that his anti-formalism might be carried to an extreme by careless thinkers to the extent that faith always would point one way and reason another. Nevertheless, I believe that you adopt your philosophy for the right reason. Life is all about aesthetics, and God’s entire existence is on account of an aesthetic (goodness). > [@](#): > > From a Dualist point of view, Physicalism is lacking - a Dualist sees a need for extra entities, and we can debate the truth of that over and over. However, Dualism is unaesthetic to me. For a start it doesn’t really fill the gaps in Physicalism that it claims to - saying a mind is composed of spirit is no more helpful to me than saying it works by magic. I find it nebulous. Although **other-wise** probably finds the Physicalist concept of conciousness arising from a sufficiently complex configuration of matter equally nebulous, and in that he has my sympathy. I don’t think that a mind is composed of spirit; rather, the mind and the spirit are two different entities, one physical and one metaphysical. For me, dualism is necessary not to account for mind and spirit, but to account for objectivity and subjectivity (e.g., eternality and temporality, essence and existence, etc). But if nothing else, at least you do not judge dualism merely on the basis of two versus one, suggesting that one is less complex than two. > [@](#): > > Essentialism is a philosophy I cannot yet judge. I haven’t really digested all its implications. It bears heavily on what is being discussed here. For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is its ideal definition. We are talking about all sorts of undefined things here, from life to physical. Until these essences are identified, it is entirely possible that we are all talking about different things altogether. There might be a threshold of similarity, but who knows where that threshold lies without knowing what is essential? Is it sufficient that yellowness and sphericalness are common between a tennis ball and the sun that we can discuss something such that you have in mind the one and I the other? > [@](#): > > Aaaaaarrrrrghhhh! > What does that _mean?_ What’s the point of it? And why do we **need** an objective philosophy, when subjective is all we can know? What’s wrong with subjective-but-useful philosophies? Nothing at all. My interest in an objective philosophy is solely because of my interest in God. Clearly, She is the objective Being, privvy to all subjective frames. What She might find important, therefore, is definitively important and interests me. > [@](#): > > I’m glad you’ve read GEB. If I only had one book to take to a desert island, that’d be the one. I’d take [The Handyman’s Book](http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/1580082262/ref=sib_dp_pt/002-6835517-5768057#reader-link). ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 11:00am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/279 "2005-06-01T11:00:57Z")
I would also add reality and illusion to what is objective and subjective. I suppose it’s obvious that I’m not a typical dualist. But then, Ockham was not a typical terminist. ---
**Author:** ![matt](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/a6a055/32.png) [@matt](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/matt)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 1:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/280 "2005-06-01T13:33:19Z")
Sometimes whether an entity is necessary or not is debatable. I’m sure Ockham’s dualism was not in contradiction to his razor. I’m forced to bow out now, since I must get some real work done over the next couple of weeks. But I’ve enjoyed this one **Lib** - many thanks! [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=13) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=15)