# Ask the Creationist **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 12, 2005, 1:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555 "2005-05-12T13:18:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 15
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2005, 1:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/281 "2005-06-01T13:57:12Z")
> [@](#): > > I’m sure Ockham’s dualism was not in contradiction to his razor. Actually, I think it _was_ in today’s philosophical landscape, but given that he was a 13th century monk his dualisms are hardly surprising. We shoudl be careful of attaching too much significance to what _else_ was believed by a person who first set forth a powerful or useful theory or principle. After all, Newton was a Young Earth Creationist! ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 2:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/282 "2005-06-02T02:21:10Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > OK, I’ll rephrase: continually _asking for definitions_ is not the way to debate constructively. Again, linguistically bounding a set or category will _inevitably_ leave some elements on the borderline (Creationist: “What _is_ a fossil then, precisely?”) - we ought not as intelligent friends require each other to append each word we use with a bracketed sentence. Granted. But that has hardly been the case in this debate. When you yourself suggested that our definitions of “computation” diverged, you offered your own definition as: “computations are the output of computers”, which, as I’ve stated, gives me exactly as much information as telling me that sedation is a result of taking sedatives. Nor was that an isolated occurrence; in your last post you said that for the time being, “computation” means “silicon computer shit”… but what does that tell me other than whatever “computation” is, it involves silicon? And when I had asked what it means, to you, for something to be physical, you told me to the only way to find out was _to ask myself_. When it comes to asking for definitions, it feels less like I’m picking nits than I am pulling teeth. > [@](#): > > Like I say: a **temporal** , not _just_ a spatial, arrangement of “shit”. 😕 Uh, yeah, I know. I took pains to specify exactly that in my post. Did you not read it? > [@](#): > > **Excellent**. This is an important step, and thanks for following through with it. Now, can we agree that _computation_ (and, for the time being, I **only** mean “_silicon_ computer shit”) is also physical? If we do, we can from that point discuss whether _human minds_ are **life+computation** , noting that I myself am not _fully_ convinced on this point (whereas I am _as certain as one can be_ that life and computation are physical). Not yet, and here’s where I should probably address the following (from your previous post): > [@SentientMeat](#): > > Do we _agree_ that there were no “calling entities” around for those billions of years? > > * * * > > What word would **you** use to describe the universe of fundamental particles, stars, gas clouds, radiation and comets for those billions of years after the Big Bang? > > * * * > > But what do _you_ call the stuff _when there **wasn’t** _ any such entity? What do _you_ call the world before you were born, or the tree falling in the forest with nobody around? This is _crucial_ to your exiting the roundabout, one way or the other. There’s still the unanswered question of what makes a computation a computation, or a process a process, or an arrangement an arrangement. “Physical”, as you’ve described/defined it, is _undifferentiated_. It doesn’t tell me why ripples _in_ spacetime is different than ripples _of_ spacetime, why _these_ spacetime ripples are different than _those_ spacetime ripples, why this arrangement is a “molecule” and that arrangement is a “star”, in short, what demarcates anything from anything else. To do so, it seems necessary to invoke something \*extrinsic \* to your definition of “physical”: a “point of view”, subjective experience, a “calling entity”. A rain cloud could, in theory, be a computation. But what else would _make_ it a computation other than that it functions as a computation _from some point of view_? (or for that matter, make it function as just a plain old rain cloud from some other point of view). The way _human_ “entities” designate function certainly appears arbitrary. Is alcohol an intoxicant, a fuel, or an antimicrobial? We differentiate between brain, nervous system, body and environment, yet they are a complex, interwoven mesh - the lines differentiating them are fluid at best. Who’s to say how other entities, macro or micoscopic, draw _their_ lines? If an entity was listening to Bach’s “Toccata und Fuge D minor” but was only paying attention to the patterns of silence _between_ the notes and ignoring the notes themselves, would it still be “music”? Doesn’t it take a “point of view” to differentiate between _signal_ and _noise_? That’s why I balk at questions like: “But what do _you_ call the stuff _when there **wasn’t** _ any such entity?” With no entity to designate a star _as_ a star, there’s just “Where shit happens _and_ the shit that happens”, and even that is just a “point of view”. **Sentient** , you said earlier that every good cognitive scientist must follow the principle of verificationism, i.e., meaning must be a result of links between language and experience. Your description of “Physical” accounts for the entity itself and everything the entity could experience… _but not the experiencing_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 8:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/283 "2005-06-02T08:48:37Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > When you yourself suggested that our definitions of “computation” diverged, you offered your own definition as: “computations are the output of computers”, which, as I’ve stated, gives me exactly as much information as telling me that sedation is a result of taking sedatives. Nor was that an isolated occurrence; in your last post you said that for the time being, “computation” means “silicon computer shit” I believe I furthered a more detailed definition of output configurations differeing from in put configurations via access to _past_ configurations (_ie._ working memory). > [@](#): > > … but what does that tell me other than whatever “computation” is, it involves silicon? Hang on, watch those sets again. I’m not saying that every computation involves silicon. I am asking you about that particular device under your desk, and whether we both agree that _it_ is a physical device in which **solely** physical processes occur. I am not asking you, yet, about any other computer (silicon or otherwise) and its physicality (or not), _just_ the one under your desk. Do we agree so? > [@](#): > > Uh, yeah, I know. I took pains to specify exactly that in my post. Did you not read it? Sorry, I should have made my agreement more clear: I was just reaffirming your point. > [@](#): > > There’s still the unanswered question of what makes a computation a computation, or a process a process, or an arrangement an arrangement. **NOTHING MAKES ANYTHING _ANYTHING_**. There is no _objective_ way of choosing a word to label a memory (or ‘average’ of memories, if such is what a _concept_ is). I am asking what word _you_ choose. > [@](#): > > It doesn’t tell me why ripples in spacetime is different than ripples of spacetime, why these spacetime ripples are different than those spacetime ripples, why this arrangement is a “molecule” and that arrangement is a “star”, in short, what demarcates anything from anything else. _I_ (an arbitrating device) call them different, based on **arbitrary criteria** , and ask whether you (a second arbitrating device) **arbitrate similarly**. There is **NO objective, non-arbitrary way of arbitrarting things into categories**. > [@](#): > > To do so, it seems necessary to invoke something extrinsic to your definition of “physical”: a “point of view”, subjective experience, a “calling entity”. Why can’t a “calling entity” be physical? Why can’t a computer process sensory input and arbitrate those inputs into bins it calls ‘categories’. Why can’t physical things have a Point of View or subjective experience? > [@](#): > > But what else would make it a computation other than that it functions as a computation from some point of view? (or for that matter, make it function as just a plain old rain cloud from some other point of view). **NOTHING**. It is _whatever it is without anyone there_. When someone _encounters it_, they **arbitrarily call it something**. > [@](#): > > The way human “entities” designate function certainly appears arbitrary. Is alcohol an intoxicant, a fuel, or an antimicrobial? We differentiate between brain, nervous system, body and environment, yet they are a complex, interwoven mesh - the lines differentiating them are fluid at best. > > Who’s to say how other entities, macro or micoscopic, draw their lines? **THEM** , and they ask us if we **AGREE**. > [@](#): > > If an entity was listening to Bach’s “Toccata und Fuge D minor” but was only paying attention to the patterns of silence between the notes and ignoring the notes themselves, would it still be “music”? I say yes, and will provide more arbitrary words on your screen describing my arbitrating process if you put arbitrary expressions of curiosity on mine. What do **you** say? > [@](#): > > Doesn’t it take a “point of view” to differentiate between signal and noise? OF COURSE. That’s arguably what a Point of View **is** : a _signal processor_. > [@](#): > > With no entity to designate a star as a star, there’s just “Where shit happens and the shit that happens”, and even that is just a “point of view”. AGREED. So it is **your** point of view that the universe before your birth was physical, yes? _Yes?_ Come on son, I’m right here to catch you, but I know you can do it! > [@](#): > > Your description of “Physical” accounts for the entity itself and everything the entity could experience… _but not the experiencing._ Whoa, son! Come back! We’re not yet at the point where we can discuss “experiencing” as sensory input processed by working memory. You’ve made an important step that _life_ is physical, but not yet that _computation_ is physical. We cannot yet consider whether human experiencers are _living computers_. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 3:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/284 "2005-06-02T15:22:28Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > I am asking you about that particular device under your desk, and whether we both agree that _it_ is a physical device in which **solely** physical processes occur. I am not asking you, yet, about any other computer (silicon or otherwise) and its physicality (or not), _just_ the one under your desk. Do we agree so? Only if we agree that its identity as physical, and the demarcations that determine “device” and “process” depend on a subjective “point of view”. If so, then, yes, it’s physical. > [@](#): > > **NOTHING MAKES ANYTHING _ANYTHING_**. There is no _objective_ way of choosing a word to label a memory (or ‘average’ of memories, if such is what a _concept_ is). I am asking what word _you_ choose. Just to clarify: I’m not asking about arbitrarily choosing labels, I’m asking about arbitrarily _assigning function_. I’m under the impression that your stance is that if something functions as a computation, then it’s a computation; that’s what _makes_ it a computation, not whether it’s labeled with the (arbitrary) word “computation”. > [@](#): > > There is **NO objective, non-arbitrary way of arbitrarting things into categories**. Agreed. > [@](#): > > Why can’t a “calling entity” be physical? Because you need a calling entity in order to _call_ a calling entity “physical”. > [@](#): > > Why can’t a computer process sensory input and arbitrate those inputs into bins it calls ‘categories’. I see no reason why it couldn’t. > [@](#): > > Why can’t physical things have a Point of View or subjective experience? Because a Point of View or subjective experience is necessary for a physical thing to **be** a physical thing, as you acknowledge later in your post when you agree that “physical” is just a “Point of View”. (quick check: The only other way I could interpret your agreement is if you’re suggesting that “physical” and “Point of View” are _synonymous_ terms. You’re not saying that, are you?) > [@](#): > > **NOTHING**. It is _whatever it is without anyone there_. Agreed. > [@](#): > > AGREED. So it is **your** point of view that the universe before your birth was physical, yes? _Yes?_ Come on son, I’m right here to catch you, but I know you can do it! If there was an (“entity”, “subjectivity”, whatever) around from whose point of view the universe was “physical”, then yes, the universe was physical. However, you’re asking about _my_ point of view, and my point of view does not encompass anything about the universe before I was born. How could it? I wasn’t born yet. > [@](#): > > Whoa, son! Come back! We’re not yet at the point where we can discuss “experiencing” as sensory input processed by working memory. I never suggested that “experiencing” was “sensory input processed by working memory”, only that it was _subjective_. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 3:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/285 "2005-06-02T15:51:04Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Only if we agree that its identity as physical, and the demarcations that determine “device” and “process” depend on a subjective “point of view”. If so, then, yes, it’s physical. **Excellent** , again, another very important step which I’m gald we’ve finally made together. We now agree that both life and _those_ computations are physical. > [@](#): > > I’m under the impression that your stance is that if something functions as a computation, then it’s a computation; that’s what makes it a computation, not whether it’s labeled with the (arbitrary) word “computation”. Hmm, I’m parsing that while looking for future pitfalls … OK, I’ll just _agree_ to it for now. All kinds of things can “carry out computations” - it is the _function_ that is most important (bearing in mind that small differences in the actual apparatus _can_ have important effects on that function). > [@](#): > > Because you need a calling entity in order to call a calling entity “physical”. So what? This is a non sequitur to the question I asked. _Of course_ computations need some _apparatus_. I am asking why that apparatus cannot be made out of particles in spacetime, just like the trees and rocks _before_ computers. > [@](#): > > I see no reason why it couldn’t. So a computer \*could be a “calling entity”, yes? > [@](#): > > Because a Point of View or subjective experience is necessary for a physical thing to be a physical thing, as you acknowledge later in your post when you agree that “physical” is just a “Point of View”. What? Back up. There were physical things like trees and rocks before there were any calling entities around, _agreed_? Calling entities having opinions and Points of View were not necessary for those bunches of atoms to exist: The atoms did not require Democritus to label them “atoms” in order to **be there** , agreed? > [@](#): > > quick check: The only other way I could interpret your agreement is if you’re suggesting that “physical” and “Point of View” are synonymous terms. You’re not saying that, are you?) Ah, “there’s just shit…and even that’s a point of view”? I meant that labelling stars and shit as “physical” is just an _opinion_, and _arbitrary convention_. In that case, no, I disagree: physical things _don’t need_ a Point of View somewhere in order to exist. They just do the shit they used to do when no Points of View were about. > [@](#): > > If there was an (“entity”, “subjectivity”, whatever) around from whose point of view the universe was “physical”, then yes, the universe was physical. However, you’re asking about my point of view, and my point of view does not encompass anything about the universe before I was born. How could it? I wasn’t born yet. Nearly there! You specified **yourself** in the second half, and yet you are _not a solipsist_, by your own admission. Now, think about this question carefully: If **you** are still _not_ there, why do you need **someone else** to be there to call it something? I repeat, **you** are still not there _regardless_ of who, **or what** , _is_. > [@](#): > > I never suggested that “experiencing” was “sensory input processed by working memory”, only that it was subjective. I know - that’s the step _I’'l_ be suggesting next. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 4:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/286 "2005-06-02T16:03:39Z")
And to condense the question as best I can: **other-wise** , _you_ are the calling entity, the Point of View who can, by simple calling labels (called language!) reach across _time and space_, to places you have never been, and aeons you didn’t exist in. What do **you** call those atoms and life and computers which existed before your birth? F…f…ph…phy…phys… ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 5:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/287 "2005-06-02T17:56:40Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > **Excellent** , again, another very important step which I’m gald we’ve finally made together. We now agree that both life and _those_ computations are physical. Slight change for clarification: We now agree that both life and _those_ computations are physical, and that their physicality depends on a subjective point of view. > [@](#): > > So what? This is a non sequitur to the question I asked. I don’t think so. How is it a non sequitur? > [@](#): > > _Of course_ computations need some _apparatus_. I am asking why that apparatus cannot be made out of particles in spacetime, just like the trees and rocks _before_ computers. This pretty much highlights why my previous statement wasn’t a non sequitur. If a computational apparatus can be made of particles in spacetime, on what grounds do you claim there was a time _before_ computers? > [@](#): > > So a computer \*could be a “calling entity”, yes? AFAIK, yes. > [@](#): > > What? Back up. There were physical things like trees and rocks before there were any calling entities around, _agreed_? Calling entities having opinions and Points of View were not necessary for those bunches of atoms to exist: The atoms did not require Democritus to label them “atoms” in order to **be there** , agreed? Absolutely, utterly disagree. You’ve already acknowledged that labels are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view, and you’ve acknowledged that functions are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view. What’s left besides labels and functions? Essence? > [@](#): > > \ Now, think about this question carefully: If **you** are still _not_ there, why do you need **someone else** to be there to call it something? Because if I’m not there, I can’t call it something, so if it is to be called something (let’s call it, oh, say, “physical”), then _something else_ must do the calling. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 6:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/288 "2005-06-02T18:06:30Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > **other-wise** , _you_ are the calling entity, the Point of View who can, by simple calling labels (called language!) reach across _time and space_, to places you have never been, and aeons you didn’t exist in. O.K., let me reach into the future, a hundred years from now, and see what I experience from my own, personal Point of View… Hmm. Not much, except that this thread is a lot longer. ---
**Author:** ![Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/58956e/32.png) [@Hoodoo\_Ulove](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hoodoo_Ulove)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 6:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/289 "2005-06-02T18:17:05Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > Because if I’m not there, I can’t call it something, so if it is to be called something (let’s call it, oh, say, “physical”), then _something else_ must do the calling. Well, you’re not most places, in fact you’re not all places but one. Let us be clear. Are you saying that all you call physical is what’s where you are? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2005, 6:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/290 "2005-06-02T18:40:15Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Slight change for clarification: We now agree that both life and those computations are physical, and that their physicality depends on a subjective point of view. Yep. Yours! > [@](#): > > If a computational apparatus can be made of particles in spacetime, on what grounds do you claim there was a time before computers? The sensory input into **my** working memory comprising _evidence_ for such. > [@](#): > > You’ve already acknowledged that labels are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view, and you’ve acknowledged that functions are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view. _ie._ the _labels_ need a labeller, and the labels of the _functions_ need a labeller, but _not the things or the functions themselves_. > [@](#): > > Because if I’m not there, I can’t call it something, so if it is to be called something (let’s call it, oh, say, “physical”), then something else must do the calling … O.K., let me reach into the future, a hundred years from now, and see what I experience from my own, personal Point of View…Hmm. Not much, except that this thread is a lot longer. And yet, as **Hoodo** points out, you can, do , _and already have in these threads_, label things willy nilly which you are **not in a position to label** according to your criteria. You have said in the past that you have never been to Australia. How can you label it “Australia”? You talked about “the computer when you’re out of the room”, yet by being out of the room you’re not in a position to call it _anything_! You have _used the label_ “the universe before I was born”, despite you not being there to label it thus! We’re very, very close to you coming off the roundabout. All you need to do is drop this absurd solipsistic criterion that you can only label things you are having _direct experience of right now_ and realise that **you** can be the calling entity which the labels “life” (\*even of life in the Amazon you’ve never seen!), “computation” (_even of the computer under **my** desk!_), or “physical” (_even of **falling trees with nobody around** , even in the Jurassic_!) depend upon. Come on, son! One last effort! I’m waving like mad! ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 2:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/291 "2005-06-03T02:15:41Z")
> [@Hoodoo Ulove](#): > > Are you saying that all you call physical is what’s where you are? I’m not sure I understood that question. Let me try it this way: 13.7 billion years ago, _something_ was there (at least, that’s my belief), but because whatever was there had no inherent frame of reference, no inherent name, no inherent assignment of function, it was _undifferentiated_. To differentiate it, to label it as “physical” and describe its “physical functions” requires a point of view. But I wasn’t there to do any of that. Now, I can _imagine_ what it would have been like 13.7 billion years ago, based on current and past experience – I can imagine myself floating in space and looking at all the purty stars (“stars” being a label I assign with implied assigned functions). That _imaginary_ experience is taking place right here, right now. As far as I can tell, my point of view is very limited. But since it _is_ a point of view, I can label and assign function to _my experience_ to my hearts content. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 2:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/292 "2005-06-03T02:21:02Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > The sensory input into **my** working memory comprising _evidence_ for such. Woosh. If an apparatus made out of particles in spacetime performs computations, why do you say there were rocks and trees _before_ computers? Weren’t there particles in spacetime before there were rocks and trees? > [@](#): > > … _the things or the functions themselves_. What is a thing _itself_? What is a function _itself_? What do you _mean_ here? Also, you didn’t answer my question: In terms of its physicality, what is there to “_a thing_” besides its labels and functions? > [@](#): > > All you need to do is drop this absurd solipsistic criterion that you can only label things you are having _direct experience of right now_ Jeez. All that’s missing is Dorothy, the tin man and the cowardly lion. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 8:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/293 "2005-06-03T08:37:57Z")
We’re close! > [@o-w](#): > > If an apparatus made out of particles in spacetime performs computations, why do you say there were rocks and trees before computers? The evidence comprising the sensory input to _my_ working memory is that apparatus characterised ( **by me! how about _you_?** ) by working memory emerged from apparatus _not_ characterised ( **by me!** ) by working memory, such as rocks and trees. > [@](#): > > What is a thing itself? What is a function itself? What do you mean here? Whatever exists when I’m not directly experiencing it,. Hold this line! > [@](#): > > Also, you didn’t answer my question: In terms of its physicality, what is there to “a thing” besides its labels and functions? In **my** mind, only its _memory_, to which a label is arbitrarily tagged. _Without_ my mind, it is whatever it is: its “physicality” requires a calling entity (namely, me!) to label it so, but it is still _there_ when I’m not, and I can **label it “physical” despite not directly experiencing it right now** , just as you label all sorts of things you are not directly experiencing right now. > [@](#): > > Jeez. All that’s missing is Dorothy, the tin man and the cowardly lion. Now it is you who are avoiding _my_ direct questions: [ul][li]How can you label “Australia”? How could you ever even _speak_ of “drinking beer in Australia” or “a falling tree in an Australian forest”?[/li][li]How can you even _call_ it “the computer when I’m out of the room” or “the universe before I was born”, since you weren’t there to do so? How do you even use terms like “Ancient Greek”, if you are in no position to label those humans “Ancient” _or_ “Greek” since you _weren’t born_?[/li][li]If life can be physical if there’s a calling entity able to do so (and there is: you!) _even though you are not experiencing **all** life right now_, and computers and their computations can be physical if there’s a calling entity able to do so (and there is: you!) _even though you are not experiencing **all** computers right now_, can _you_ (the ultimate calling entity!) call things like rocks, trees and the universe for 13.7 billion years “physical”?[/ul][/li] _Please_, as my _friend_, can you? _Will_ you? _Do_ you? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/294 "2005-06-03T16:09:18Z")
How very strange. After two pages of debate, our opinions _do_ seem to be remarkably similar, after all. Let’s see if we can find out precisely where we agree and where we differ. > [@SentientMeat](#): > > The evidence comprising the sensory input to _my_ working memory is that apparatus characterised ( **by me! how about _you_?** ) by working memory emerged from apparatus _not_ characterised ( **by me!** ) by working memory, such as rocks and trees. That sentence was a little difficult to parse, but if I’m getting the gist of it, the only question I have is about the “emergence”. Did your characterization cause the emergence of the apparatus, or did the apparatus emerge, and then you characterized it? (or is “emergence” something else completely?) > [@](#): > > In **my** mind, only its _memory_, to which a label is arbitrarily tagged. Again, just so I understand: you said that in terms of its physicality, what there is to “a thing” (besides its labels and functions) is its memory. Its memory of…? That is, is it a memory of its labels and functions or of something else? (I understand that the _term_ “memory” is an arbitrary tag, but I’m trying to find out if _what is remembered_ is more than labels and functions). > [@](#): > > _Without_ my mind, it is whatever it is: its “physicality” requires a calling entity (namely, me!) to label it so, but it is still _there_ when I’m not, and I can **label it “physical” despite not directly experiencing it right now** , just as you label all sorts of things you are not directly experiencing right now. Odd. I completely agree with this statement, yet I get the uneasy feeling that this is exactly why we’re arguing. > [@](#): > > Now it is you who are avoiding _my_ direct questions My apologies. I thought my post to **Hoodoo** addressed that sufficently; let me expand. O.K., all we have to work with is our awareness of our (current and past) experiences, right? What _feeds_ into that awareness is sensory input. When it comes to Australia (or an Australian computer), I’ve never seen it, smelled it, heard it, etc. However, I have seen certain pictures and maps. I’ve heard tales about Australia, and I’ve seen my own computer. I can use these things that I _have_ experienced to _imagine_ Australia, complete with dingoes, kangaroos and computers, but I’m _making it up_. Based on all my previous experiences, I have full confidence that Australia exists, just as I’m fully confident that when I pull out a chair, it won’t suddenly disappear as my ass makes its descent. I’m also confident that when I get to Australia, it _won’t_ be as I imagined it. Close, maybe, but not the same, just as wife’s experience, standing by my side in Australia, will not be the same as _my_ experience. Since I have (or am) a point of view, I can label my experiences. I can make up stuff _based_ on my experiences and label that, too. A term like “Ancient Greek” is a little different, however. I can go to Australia, but no one can go to ancient Greece. We can extrapolate from our experiences, imagine ancient Greece , and agree on labels to talk about what we make up. But I can’t have a point of view on ancient Greece, I can only have a point of view on what we’re _imagining_ about ancient Greece, right here, right now. Based on my experiences, I can label the universe 13.7 billion years ago as “physical” but I can’t go there to check it out. Because awareness only occurs in the present, I don’t even have a “point of view” on today’s breakfast: I’m not aware of breakfast, I’m only aware of a _memory_ of breakfast. But when it comes to the universe 13.7 billion years ago, I don’t even have a memory to draw on; I have to rely on imagination and extrapolation enough to cover _13.7 billion years worth of the entire universe_. While “physical” might be a label that’s useful to us for many applications, I have a hard time seeing just how useful it would be as an accurate description of whatever it was that was going on back then. I hope that the above puts the whole “labeling” thing to bed. I’d like to get back to my original point/question. What started our whole discussion is that you said that computation emerged from a physical process. I still don’t see how computation can be considered _entirely_ physical, since both computation and physical processes are underpinned by (i.e., dependent on), a subjective point of view. Is subjectivity physical? How so? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 4:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/295 "2005-06-03T16:27:03Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > Did your characterization cause the emergence of the apparatus, or did the apparatus emerge, and then you characterized it? The latter (with me characterising it _billions of years_ later). > [@](#): > > you said that in terms of its physicality, what there is to “a thing” (besides its labels and functions) is its memory. Its memory of…? Not the memory which _the thing_ possesses, the memory which I posses _of **it** _. > [@](#): > > I understand that the term “memory” is an arbitrary tag, but I’m trying to find out if what is remembered is more than labels and functions). What is remembered depends on which sensory apparatus forms the memory. For , say, visual memories, the strongly filtered signal from the reflected photons on the retina. > [@](#): > > Odd. I completely agree with this statement, yet I get the uneasy feeling that this is exactly why we’re arguing. Like I said, we’re _so close_ to the roundabout exit! > [@](#): > > Based on my experiences, I can label the universe 13.7 billion years ago as “physical” but I can’t go there to check it out. _Do you??_ > [@](#): > > While “physical” might be a label that’s useful to us for many applications, I have a hard time seeing just how useful it would be as an accurate description of whatever it was that was going on back then. Because we could **come off the roundabout** and discuss whether anything **non** -physical ever **emerged** from that solely physical universe! > [@](#): > > I still don’t see how computation can be considered entirely physical, since both computation and physical processes are underpinned by (i.e., dependent on), a subjective point of view. Why can’t calling entities call _themselves and their subjective labelling processes_, physical? Just for my peace of mind, can I yet say that “ **other-wise** calls life, computation and the universe for billions of years after the Big Bang physical”? ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2005, 11:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/296 "2005-06-03T23:04:08Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > The latter (with me characterising it _billions of years_ later). What, if anything, caused the apparatus to emerge? (i.e., what is it that makes the apparatus an apparatus?) > [@](#): > > What is remembered depends on which sensory apparatus forms the memory. For , say, visual memories, the strongly filtered signal from the reflected photons on the retina. “_signals from the reflected photons on the retina_”… IOW, labels and functions, right? If you’ve no objection, can we agree that _physically_ (i.e., when charactering something as physical), there is no more to a thing than its labels and functions? * * * Actually, I’ve written a whole lot more, but before I post it, let me get your response to the above so I don’t go barking up the wrong tree. ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 8:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/297 "2005-06-04T08:53:28Z")
> [@o-w](#): > > What, if anything, caused the apparatus to emerge? Evolution. > [@](#): > > (i.e., what is it that makes the apparatus an apparatus?) The labelling capacity of the apparatus. > [@](#): > > “signals from the reflected photons on the retina”… IOW, labels and functions, right? No, signals and functions which _are labelled_ as such by me, the labeller. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 11:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/298 "2005-06-04T11:06:32Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Evolution. … of the Universe as whole (not just earth), right? > [@other-wise](#): > > what is it that makes the apparatus an apparatus? and > [@](#): > > The labelling capacity of the apparatus. A clarification: Are you saying it’s the capacity of the apparatus to _label itself_ an apparatus, or the capacity to be labeled an apparatus by _something else_? > [@](#): > > No, signals and functions which _are labelled_ as such by me, the labeller. Again, a clarification, plesae: they’re signals and functions _to the labeller_; that is, there’s nothing that’s _inherently_ a signal or a function, right? ---
**Author:** ![SentientMeat](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/43a26b/32.png) [@SentientMeat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/SentientMeat)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 11:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/299 "2005-06-04T11:29:43Z")
> [@](#): > > … of the Universe as whole (not just earth), right? No, of the living computers who are the labelling devices/calling entities. > [@](#): > > Are you saying it’s the capacity of the apparatus to label itself an apparatus, or the capacity to be labeled an apparatus by something else? The former. > [@](#): > > Again, a clarification, plesae: they’re signals and functions to the labeller; that is, there’s nothing that’s inherently a signal or a function, right? Everything is inherently everything: it is _whatever it is_. (You could rephrase this as _nothing_ is inherently _anything_.) There is, and was, _stuff_, and we labelling devices label it. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2005, 12:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555/300 "2005-06-04T12:20:28Z")
> [@SentientMeat](#): > > Everything is inherently everything: it is _whatever it is_. (You could rephrase this as _nothing_ is inherently _anything_.) Then nothing is inherently physical? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=14) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ask-the-creationist/303555.md?page=16)