Ask the Creationist

[other-wise]

Well… I don’t know where to start.

For one thing, I must vehemently object to the following:

You will notice that you have ignored every single one of my questions…

So far, you have asked me exactly TWO non-rhetorical questions, and I have answered them both:

1) A random number generating program is a computation, yes?

The above question was ambiguous but I addressed each of the possible interpretations.

2) If they are not arbitrary labels, how come other people call them other things (ie. other languages*) or don’t call them anything at all (eg. foraging people or early hominids)?

On this one you had missed my point entirely, so I rephrased my original question and tried again.

I have responded to every direct question you have asked, unless, of course, you’re referring to the questions you asked at the bottom of Post #232, which I addressed in the very first line of Post #233 (bolding mine):

Sentient, I’m trying to keep our debate from sprouting even more tentacles, so before I respond to the rest of your post, I’d like a response from you on this

Sentient, I realize that from your perspective, I’m an evasive, pedantic, nit-picking weasel. But from my perspective, I’ve been unusually patient in re-directing the focus of my posts (at your request) toward establishing simple steps we could both agree on, in the hopes of finding common ground. When you made statements that struck me as cryptic

The computer comprising the abacus attached to the human brain is also made of atoms.

or contextually ambiguous

A random number generating program is a computation, yes?

I informed you of my confusion in a non-snarky way, while carefully offering tentative responses to what you seemed to be saying. I’ve asked for clarification of your views without characterizing you or jumping to the wrong conclusion, while being subjected to condescension, having my questions answered out of context, and being compared to Creationists, toddlers, and 19th Century vitalists.

I don’t know if continuing this debate is worth it. As I demonstrated in Posts #230 and 236, I’m perfectly willing to answer your questions directly, state my position, or agree/disagree with your statements. But I must be able to ask for clarification if I don’t understand what you’re saying, and I fear any future attempt at doing so will be taken as evasion or filibustering.

I feel frustrated and a little sad, Sentient … I simply don’t know why we have such a perpetual, unerring knack for talking past each other, but I’d rather call it quits now than start developing bad blood between us.

[SentientMeat]

Sorry for the delay, o-w, yesterday was a bit of a write-off.

So far, you have asked me exactly TWO non-rhetorical questions, and I have answered them both:

The points I was thinking of were these:

@SM

Is a chemical reaction really so different from the trillions of flips of a chip as a program is run? … I’m curious why you say the centre of gravity is fictional but, say, the density is not … Why must a process have mass, temperature or these other specifications in order to be considered physical? Surely the gravitational force between two rocks, the process of attraction, is as physical as the rocks themselves? Surely the life of a organism in a mindless universe is as physical as the cells it is made of? If so, is the computation, the temporal arrangement of the charges and switches, not as physical as the computer?

Your abacus scenario is useful enough in some ways, but it does not really help in others, since the brains of the users are essential elements of the system in toto.

You use the word ‘physical’ yourself. I am merely asking what you mean by it so that your position might become clearer to me. I am asking you how you differentiate yourself from Creationists or vitalists.

I don’t know if continuing this debate is worth it. As I demonstrated in Posts #230 and 236, I’m perfectly willing to answer your questions directly, state my position, or agree/disagree with your statements.

. OK, I apologise, and simlpy ask again. What is your position? Are you a dualist, or theist, or panpsychic, or what?

[other-wise]

@SentientMeat

You use the word ‘physical’ yourself. I am merely asking what you mean by it so that your position might become clearer to me. I am asking you how you differentiate yourself from Creationists or vitalists.

From Merriam-Webster: phys•i•cal: 1 a : having material existence : perceptible especially through the senses and subject to the laws of nature <everything physical is measurable by weight, motion, and resistance – Thomas De Quincey> b : of or relating to material things

ibid: ma•te•ri•al: 1 a (1) : relating to, derived from, or consisting of matter; especially : PHYSICAL <the material world>

ibid: mat•ter: 2 a : the substance of which a physical object is composed b : material substance that occupies space, has mass, and is composed predominantly of atoms consisting of protons, neutrons, and electrons, that constitutes the observable universe, and that is interconvertible with energy

With a little tweaking, the definitions above lead to my definition:
phys•i•cal: Any object(s) that are within the grasp of the senses (or instruments that act as extensions of the senses) which have measurable, inherent characteristics or properties existing in (or, perhaps, measured by) spacetime.

To which I would add: Physical object(s) can encode information (i.e., can act as a conveyance for a message). A physical object is something than can potentially be perceived as a representation, but representation is not an inherent characteristic.

(If this does not distinguish me sufficiently from Creationists and vitalists, let me know and I’ll address those directly)

OK, I apologise, and simlpy ask again. What is your position? Are you a dualist, or theist, or panpsychic, or what?

I think I’ve addressed this in a previous thread: I’m extremely leery of labeling myself any kind of “-ist”.

For one thing, I have yet to find a system of reasoning or Weltanschauung that I could embrace unreservedly. Also, in conversations of any depth or complexity, my experience has been that these labels tend to obfuscate rather than clarify; people associate all manner of unjustified assumptions to a given label, and it can be grueling work to disavow them of these assumptions and keep the discussion on track. As an example, Merriam-Webster’s definition of a theist is:

Belief in the existence of one God viewed as the creative source of man and the world who transcends yet is immanent in the world

By that standard Pat Robertson and Lib are both “theists”, yet I can hardly imagine a more disparate pair.

Perhaps there are specific things within the belief system of a “dualist”, or “theist”, or “panpsychic” that you’re wanting to know if I believe; if so, ask and I’ll try to answer. I think it would be a lot easier (and clearer) for me to address a question about a specific belief than one encompassing a whole philosophy.

[SentientMeat]

@o-w

Physical: b : of or relating to material things

(If this does not distinguish me sufficiently from Creationists and vitalists, let me know and I’ll address those directly)

OK, so life is physical, yes? Processes can be as physical as objects, yes? Vitalists would say that life was not physical, whereas every mainstream biologist would consider them rather backwards for saying so. Creationists might say that just because some entities were questionably “life” then life was not understood and explained as a physical process. If you refuse to distance yourself from either of these philosophies, I hope you’d understand that it would be a little like debating someone who refused to disagree with solipsism or the like. Useful debate requires us to accept premises.

I’m extremely leery of labeling myself any kind of “-ist”.

Well, as I say, I hope we can at least get ourselves off the starting blocks, since a debate in which one party refuses to accept any premises whatsoever is not a debate at all. And I note that you do not appear to invest any time in questioning Lib, Aeschines or Gyan about their Weltanschaaungs, only me: This at least suggests that physicalism has more interest to you than others.

Perhaps a good starting point would be these questions. Feel free to reply there.

[Bryan_Ekers]

Forgive me if this has been covered already, but since when is an abacus a computational device? It’s no more so than a bookmark is a reading device. The movement of beads simply act as placeholders while the abacus operator is performing the computations, much as making marks on paper with a pencil would.

[other-wise]

@SentientMeat

OK, so life is physical, yes?

Again, the wording here is contextually ambiguous, so I’ll give you a couple answers… pick the most appropriate. Since a rock meets the criteria we both specified earlier for something to be “physical”, and I don’t consider rocks to be biologically alive, then the answer is no, life is not physical. However, I think what you’re getting at is that everything that’s alive has measurable physical characteristics, and in that context, then, yes, life is physical.

Processes can be as physical as objects, yes?

No. I don’t see how they could be since our definitions of “physical” only describe what something is, not what it’s doing.

And I note that you do not appear to invest any time in questioning Lib, Aeschines or Gyan about their Weltanschaaungs, only me: This at least suggests that physicalism has more interest to you than others.

WTF?? Not only have I thoroughly questioned Lib’s Weltanschauung, but I’ve defended your Weltanschauung to Lib. As far as I can tell, Aeschines and Gyan have not posted in this thread, but others have, and I’ve questioned them, too.

[Liberal]

Indeed, I will testify that Other-wise has rejected what I consider to be iron-clad logic in our discussions, particularly about memory. That is not to say that Other-wise is unreasonable, but that he did not find my arguments compelling. I like to think that it was the distractions he endured at the time. Plus, the thread ended suddenly when someone started a spin-off. And I will say this as well: I have not enjoyed any discussion more than those I’ve had with him. He is razor sharp, and makes every possible effort to understand his opponent’s point of view.

[II_Gyan_II]

[Off-topic]
SM, I’ve been busy the past few days, so I haven’t replied to your earlier consciousness thread. Aeschines, probably, hasn’t seen it, at all. You might want to bump it. I’ll get to it, soon.[/offtopic]

[SentientMeat]

@o-w

Since a rock meets the criteria we both specified earlier for something to be “physical”, and I don’t consider rocks to be biologically alive, then the answer is no, life is not physical.

Ah, I think I see the problem. When I ask you whether set B (“life”) resides in the set A (“physical”), you point to an element X (“rock”) which resides in set A but not set B. You then, for some reason, suggest that this shows that set B is not part of set A. In fact, I think logical fallacies like this have formed the basis for many of your other objections but I didn’t spot them at the time. I didn’t ask you whether rocks were alive, I asked you whether life was physical.

However, I think what you’re getting at is that everything that’s alive has measurable physical characteristics, and in that context, then, yes, life is physical.

OK, so in order for something to be physical to you, it must have measurable physical characteristics? Again, I’m not sure quite why you demand this, but I’ll try and work with it: Just as mass or temperature are physical characteristics, so are acceleration, rate or interaction time, yes?

No. I don’t see how they could be since our definitions of “physical” only describe what something is, not what it’s doing.

Our definition was, IIRC, “of or relating to material things”. You have said that I’m unlike other physicalists you’ve engaged. Perhaps the reason for that is that every other physicalist simply assumes that you make the elementary step that eg. “melting is a physical process” and spends no more time on it. I (and probably they), simply cannot understand the distinction you insist on making here. If the tree is physical, how on Earth can the tree falling not be? What is it about time that you consider fundamentally different to space in this regard, given that modern physics has shown so definitively how the two are linked, and even equivalent?

WTF??

OK, I apologise - I admit that I’m trying to work out some kind of position, however tentative, that you might be coming from, and the absence of any kind of argument for, say, the existence of God suggests that you marginally lean away from theism. Statistically speaking, I’m trying to gauge what you argue against less.

As far as I can tell, Aeschines and Gyan have not posted in this thread, but others have, and I’ve questioned them, too.

OK, and thank you for submitting to a little questioning yourself. Again, your responses to those 12 propositions in the other thread would further be useful in this regard.

[other-wise]

@Bryan Ekers

Forgive me if this has been covered already, but since when is an abacus a computational device? It’s no more so than a bookmark is a reading device. The movement of beads simply act as placeholders while the abacus operator is performing the computations, much as making marks on paper with a pencil would.

Frankly, an abacus was the first, simplest metaphor I could think of that might get my point across. Using an abacus is what Andy Clark refers to as “extended cognition”: it’s an epistemic action, altering the world in ways that serve to augment a cognitive process (as opposed to pragmatic actions, like filling a pothole with cement). So in that sense, at least, an abacus can be considered a computational device. However, an abacus-as-a-physical-object is not inherently a computational device, which was (partly) my point.

[SentientMeat]

@o-w

Frankly, an abacus was the first, simplest metaphor I could think of that might get my point across.

If I may interject, how about just the computer you’re currently sitting at when you’re out of the room? I’d suggest that all of the confusion in the abacus scenario comes from the necessity of a human brain to be “attached” to it in order to “perform computations”. The compute with you out of the room has no such complication, and we can explore whether it is physical (be it switched on or off).

[other-wise]

@SentientMeat

Ah, I think I see the problem. When I ask you whether set B (“life”) resides in the set A (“physical”), you point to an element X (“rock”) which resides in set A but not set B. You then, for some reason, suggest that this shows that set B is not part of set A. In fact, I think logical fallacies like this have formed the basis for many of your other objections but I didn’t spot them at the time. I didn’t ask you whether rocks were alive, I asked you whether life was physical.

I’m not seeing the logical fallacy here (not that there isn’t one; I’m just not seeing it). Your description of set “A” was: “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate life from a rock).

OK, so in order for something to be physical to you, it must have measurable physical characteristics? Again, I’m not sure quite why you demand this, but I’ll try and work with it: Just as mass or temperature are physical characteristics, so are acceleration, rate or interaction time, yes?

Our definition was, IIRC, “of or relating to material things”. You have said that I’m unlike other physicalists you’ve engaged. Perhaps the reason for that is that every other physicalist simply assumes that you make the elementary step that eg. “melting is a physical process” and spends no more time on it. I (and probably they), simply cannot understand the distinction you insist on making here. If the tree is physical, how on Earth can the tree falling not be? What is it about time that you consider fundamentally different to space in this regard, given that modern physics has shown so definitively how the two are linked, and even equivalent?

I’ve lumped these two together because there’s something in here that’s a sticking point for us. I’m no physicist; I just liked to watch “Mr.Wizard” on TV when I was a kid. But I have gotten the impression that physicists identify, classify, and measure physical objects as physical objects in terms of their physical characteristics (mass, density, etc). I always vaguely assumed that there was some relatively short, more-or-less canonical list of measurable physical characteristics that physicists used as their standard working vocabulary.

So basically we’ve got “stuff” that’s characterized as “physical” because it matches a pre-defined checklist of physical characteristics. But that’s all we’ve got; “physical stuff” in some sort of arrangement. To further characterize a given arrangement (or temporal series of arrangements) as a computation seems to go way over and above what’s given in it’s physical description; it implies a function, a value, a usefulness that’s not present in it’s physical characterization.

OK, I apologise - I admit that I’m trying to work out some kind of position, however tentative, that you might be coming from, and the absence of any kind of argument for, say, the existence of God suggests that you marginally lean away from theism. Statistically speaking, I’m trying to gauge what you argue against less.

No problem… and I truly wish I did have an “-ist” position to claim; it would give us both something solid to put our feet on.

OK, and thank you for submitting to a little questioning yourself. Again, your responses to those 12 propositions in the other thread would further be useful in this regard.

That’s a highly-complex series of propositions you’ve got there, and I was hoping we’d keep to the “start-with-something-simple” adgenda. But I’ll see what I can come up with.

[matt]

@other-wise

I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate life from a rock).

There isn’t anything. That’s the underpinning point behind physicalism, that all things are physical.

Within set A, things are differentiated from each other by their configuration. Their arrangement. Their pattern. A spoon is different from a fork. Water is different from a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen gas. Magnetised iron is different from non-magnetised iron. Life is different from a rock.

[Liberal]

@matt

There isn’t anything. That’s the underpinning point behind physicalism, that all things are physical.

Within set A, things are differentiated from each other by their configuration. Their arrangement. Their pattern. A spoon is different from a fork. Water is different from a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen gas. Magnetised iron is different from non-magnetised iron. Life is different from a rock.

But those differences are entirely arbitrary, making the philosophy that discerns them arbitary, right? I mean, a snake is a sentient being, but does it know the difference between a tree and the ground as it slithers toward is prey? Doesn’t it just move seamlessly from one object (the tree) to the other (the ground) without recognizing any difference between them? Isn’t it all just one surface under its belly? Perhaps it recognizes the change in slope (or not), but surely it does not recognize the elements of set A. And if the perception of a snake differs from the perception of a human, allowing that a future evolved creature might discern differences (or similarities) we ourselves do not discern — doesn’t that mean that our discernment is neither definitive nor standard? So maybe life is not different from a rock after all.

[matt]

Sure. Catagories are arbitrary.

The catagories we use have arisen because they draw distinctions we find useful. The distinction between “ground” and “tree” may be meaningless to a snake, but the reptilian snake may have a whole set of catagories of temperature that are meaningless to us mammals.

I don’t think the philosophy discerning the differences is totally arbitrary - it is judged by its utility. Ants may not bother to distinguish between spoons and forks, but ants don’t eat soup.

[other-wise]

First off, matt, let me apologize. Earlier, I said that I would address your one of your posts, and I did not. Since it’s germane to your latest post, let me address part of that earlier post now.

@matt

Look at it this way. I have a “concept” of a “tree” in my mind, that allows me to distinguish trees from bushes and ferns and pylons and celery etc. I believe, though I cannot prove, that my mind is a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull, and the “concept” of the tree is also a result of the arrangement of matter in my skull

Part of what’s bothering me about physicalism is that a given physical system is seemingly always dependent on a non-specific, outside source to delineate its properties and identity. If the"concept" of “tree” is a result of the arrangement of matter in your skull, what is the “concept” “arrangement of matter in my skull” the result of? Another arrangement of matter in your skull? Something outside your skull entirely? It seems to me like it leads to an infinite regress.

[other-wise]

@SentientMeat

If I may interject, how about just the computer you’re currently sitting at when you’re out of the room? I’d suggest that all of the confusion in the abacus scenario comes from the necessity of a human brain to be “attached” to it in order to “perform computations”. The compute with you out of the room has no such complication, and we can explore whether it is physical (be it switched on or off).

If I were not in the room, then there would be nothing with my type of sensory and cognitive apparatus to characterize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), so no, it would not be “physical”.

[matt]

@other-wise

Part of what’s bothering me about physicalism is that a given physical system is seemingly always dependent on a non-specific, outside source to delineate its properties and identity. If the"concept" of “tree” is a result of the arrangement of matter in your skull, what is the “concept” “arrangement of matter in my skull” the result of? Another arrangement of matter in your skull? Something outside your skull entirely? It seems to me like it leads to an infinite regress.

No worries, discussions go where they go, it’s part of what makes them fun!

I don’t really understand your question. All concepts are arrangements of matter in your skull, including the concept of “concept”, the concept of “arrangement”, the concept of “skull” etc. Where’s the problem?

It’s like saying that the word “dictionary” can’t be in a dictionary. The definition of “dictionary” in a dictionary does not itself have to include all the words in a dictionary - that would indeed lead to an infinite regression.

[SentientMeat]

@o-w

Your description of set “A” was: “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces). I couldn’t identify anything in that description which would differentiate Set “B” from Element “X” (i.e., differentiate life from a rock).

But I didn’t introduce element X (rocks) any more than I did Y (computers), Z (Napoleon Bonaparte) or the number seven. Forget rocks and the other irrelevances for now. Can you think of any element which is in the set “life” which is outside the set “physical”?

I always vaguely assumed that there was some relatively short, more-or-less canonical list of measurable physical characteristics that physicists used as their standard working vocabulary.

I suppose there is, but the list also comprises temporal physical characteristics like rate and duration.

But that’s all we’ve got; “physical stuff” in some sort of arrangement.

Temporal arrangement, yes? If not, why not?

To further characterize a given arrangement (or temporal series of arrangements) as a computation seems to go way over and above what’s given in it’s physical description

Halt! I’m not making this step yet - again you’re flicking to other sets before we’re done with the first. I am not asking whether every temporal arrangement is a “computation” (that step was what you rather hurried me into before I understood what direction you were coming from - now that I do, I’d suggest that only temporal arrangements characterised by working memory count as "computations). I am asking whether temporal arrangements are physical. You seem to be just on the verge of agreeing so, which would be a significant step forward. We could then explore whether that subset of temporal arrangements called “switched on computers with nobody around” were physical. Finally, we might explore whether human brains were switched on computers.

If I were not in the room, then there would be nothing with my type of sensory and cognitive apparatus to characterize the computer as “Comprising fundamental particles in spacetime” (including equivalent waves and forces), so no, it would not be “physical”.

Ah, we return to stuff somehow requiring to be incident on your sensors to be physical? Again, I’d suggest solipsism beckons here. If the tree in the forest is physical, and the tree on the forest floor is physical, and the tree at every orientation therebetween is physical, and the falling tree has physical characteristics like acceleration and decibel level, the falling tree is physical when nobody is around, yes? The universe for 13.7Bn years was and is physical, yes?

@Lib

But those differences are entirely arbitrary, making the philosophy that discerns them arbitary, right?

There is no non-arbitrary philosophy. A brain is an arbitrating device.

[Liberal]

@matt

Sure. Catagories are arbitrary.

The catagories we use have arisen because they draw distinctions we find useful. The distinction between “ground” and “tree” may be meaningless to a snake, but the reptilian snake may have a whole set of catagories of temperature that are meaningless to us mammals.

I don’t think the philosophy discerning the differences is totally arbitrary - it is judged by its utility. Ants may not bother to distinguish between spoons and forks, but ants don’t eat soup.

Agreed. My philosophy is as arbitrary qua useful as yours, and vice-versa. Isn’t every philosophy in the end an expression of subjective perception? Even a philosophy that aims at objectivity is a subjective expression of what objectivity is. In another thread, there was unanimous consent that reality is not contingent on language or interpretation. To be objective, therefore, a philosophy must express nothing, just like the universe itself.