Actually, I think it was in today’s philosophical landscape, but given that he was a 13th century monk his dualisms are hardly surprising. We shoudl be careful of attaching too much significance to what else was believed by a person who first set forth a powerful or useful theory or principle. After all, Newton was a Young Earth Creationist!
Granted. But that has hardly been the case in this debate. When you yourself suggested that our definitions of “computation” diverged, you offered your own definition as: “computations are the output of computers”, which, as I’ve stated, gives me exactly as much information as telling me that sedation is a result of taking sedatives. Nor was that an isolated occurrence; in your last post you said that for the time being, “computation” means “silicon computer shit”… but what does that tell me other than whatever “computation” is, it involves silicon? And when I had asked what it means, to you, for something to be physical, you told me to the only way to find out was to ask myself.
When it comes to asking for definitions, it feels less like I’m picking nits than I am pulling teeth.
Uh, yeah, I know. I took pains to specify exactly that in my post. Did you not read it?
Not yet, and here’s where I should probably address the following (from your previous post):
There’s still the unanswered question of what makes a computation a computation, or a process a process, or an arrangement an arrangement.
“Physical”, as you’ve described/defined it, is undifferentiated. It doesn’t tell me why ripples in spacetime is different than ripples of spacetime, why these spacetime ripples are different than those spacetime ripples, why this arrangement is a “molecule” and that arrangement is a “star”, in short, what demarcates anything from anything else.
To do so, it seems necessary to invoke something *extrinsic * to your definition of “physical”: a “point of view”, subjective experience, a “calling entity”.
A rain cloud could, in theory, be a computation. But what else would make it a computation other than that it functions as a computation from some point of view? (or for that matter, make it function as just a plain old rain cloud from some other point of view).
The way human “entities” designate function certainly appears arbitrary. Is alcohol an intoxicant, a fuel, or an antimicrobial? We differentiate between brain, nervous system, body and environment, yet they are a complex, interwoven mesh - the lines differentiating them are fluid at best.
Who’s to say how other entities, macro or micoscopic, draw their lines?
If an entity was listening to Bach’s “Toccata und Fuge D minor” but was only paying attention to the patterns of silence between the notes and ignoring the notes themselves, would it still be “music”?
Doesn’t it take a “point of view” to differentiate between signal and noise?
That’s why I balk at questions like: “But what do you call the stuff when there wasn’t any such entity?” With no entity to designate a star as a star, there’s just “Where shit happens and the shit that happens”, and even that is just a “point of view”.
Sentient, you said earlier that every good cognitive scientist must follow the principle of verificationism, i.e., meaning must be a result of links between language and experience. Your description of “Physical” accounts for the entity itself and everything the entity could experience… but not the experiencing.
I believe I furthered a more detailed definition of output configurations differeing from in put configurations via access to past configurations (ie. working memory).
Hang on, watch those sets again. I’m not saying that every computation involves silicon. I am asking you about that particular device under your desk, and whether we both agree that it is a physical device in which solely physical processes occur. I am not asking you, yet, about any other computer (silicon or otherwise) and its physicality (or not), just the one under your desk. Do we agree so?
Sorry, I should have made my agreement more clear: I was just reaffirming your point.
NOTHING MAKES ANYTHING ANYTHING. There is no objective way of choosing a word to label a memory (or ‘average’ of memories, if such is what a concept is). I am asking what word you choose.
I (an arbitrating device) call them different, based on arbitrary criteria, and ask whether you (a second arbitrating device) arbitrate similarly. There is NO objective, non-arbitrary way of arbitrarting things into categories.
Why can’t a “calling entity” be physical? Why can’t a computer process sensory input and arbitrate those inputs into bins it calls ‘categories’. Why can’t physical things have a Point of View or subjective experience?
NOTHING. It is whatever it is without anyone there. When someone encounters it, they arbitrarily call it something.
THEM, and they ask us if we AGREE.
I say yes, and will provide more arbitrary words on your screen describing my arbitrating process if you put arbitrary expressions of curiosity on mine. What do you say?
OF COURSE. That’s arguably what a Point of View is: a signal processor.
AGREED. So it is your point of view that the universe before your birth was physical, yes? Yes? Come on son, I’m right here to catch you, but I know you can do it!
Whoa, son! Come back! We’re not yet at the point where we can discuss “experiencing” as sensory input processed by working memory. You’ve made an important step that life is physical, but not yet that computation is physical. We cannot yet consider whether human experiencers are living computers.
Only if we agree that its identity as physical, and the demarcations that determine “device” and “process” depend on a subjective “point of view”. If so, then, yes, it’s physical.
Just to clarify: I’m not asking about arbitrarily choosing labels, I’m asking about arbitrarily assigning function. I’m under the impression that your stance is that if something functions as a computation, then it’s a computation; that’s what makes it a computation, not whether it’s labeled with the (arbitrary) word “computation”.
Agreed.
Because you need a calling entity in order to call a calling entity “physical”.
I see no reason why it couldn’t.
Because a Point of View or subjective experience is necessary for a physical thing to be a physical thing, as you acknowledge later in your post when you agree that “physical” is just a “Point of View”. (quick check: The only other way I could interpret your agreement is if you’re suggesting that “physical” and “Point of View” are synonymous terms. You’re not saying that, are you?)
Agreed.
If there was an (“entity”, “subjectivity”, whatever) around from whose point of view the universe was “physical”, then yes, the universe was physical. However, you’re asking about my point of view, and my point of view does not encompass anything about the universe before I was born. How could it? I wasn’t born yet.
I never suggested that “experiencing” was “sensory input processed by working memory”, only that it was subjective.
Excellent, again, another very important step which I’m gald we’ve finally made together. We now agree that both life and those computations are physical.
Hmm, I’m parsing that while looking for future pitfalls … OK, I’ll just agree to it for now. All kinds of things can “carry out computations” - it is the function that is most important (bearing in mind that small differences in the actual apparatus can have important effects on that function).
So what? This is a non sequitur to the question I asked. Of course computations need some apparatus. I am asking why that apparatus cannot be made out of particles in spacetime, just like the trees and rocks before computers.
So a computer *could be a “calling entity”, yes?
What? Back up. There were physical things like trees and rocks before there were any calling entities around, agreed? Calling entities having opinions and Points of View were not necessary for those bunches of atoms to exist: The atoms did not require Democritus to label them “atoms” in order to be there, agreed?
Ah, “there’s just shit…and even that’s a point of view”? I meant that labelling stars and shit as “physical” is just an opinion, and arbitrary convention. In that case, no, I disagree: physical things don’t need a Point of View somewhere in order to exist. They just do the shit they used to do when no Points of View were about.
Nearly there! You specified yourself in the second half, and yet you are not a solipsist, by your own admission. Now, think about this question carefully: If you are still not there, why do you need someone else to be there to call it something? I repeat, you are still not there regardless of who, or what, is.
I know - that’s the step I’'l be suggesting next.
And to condense the question as best I can:
other-wise, you are the calling entity, the Point of View who can, by simple calling labels (called language!) reach across time and space, to places you have never been, and aeons you didn’t exist in.
What do you call those atoms and life and computers which existed before your birth? F…f…ph…phy…phys…
Slight change for clarification: We now agree that both life and those computations are physical, and that their physicality depends on a subjective point of view.
I don’t think so. How is it a non sequitur?
This pretty much highlights why my previous statement wasn’t a non sequitur. If a computational apparatus can be made of particles in spacetime, on what grounds do you claim there was a time before computers?
AFAIK, yes.
Absolutely, utterly disagree. You’ve already acknowledged that labels are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view, and you’ve acknowledged that functions are arbitrary and dependent on a point of view. What’s left besides labels and functions? Essence?
Because if I’m not there, I can’t call it something, so if it is to be called something (let’s call it, oh, say, “physical”), then something else must do the calling.
O.K., let me reach into the future, a hundred years from now, and see what I experience from my own, personal Point of View…
Hmm. Not much, except that this thread is a lot longer.
Well, you’re not most places, in fact you’re not all places but one. Let us be clear. Are you saying that all you call physical is what’s where you are?
Yep. Yours!
The sensory input into my working memory comprising evidence for such.
ie. the labels need a labeller, and the labels of the functions need a labeller, but not the things or the functions themselves.
And yet, as Hoodo points out, you can, do , and already have in these threads, label things willy nilly which you are not in a position to label according to your criteria. You have said in the past that you have never been to Australia. How can you label it “Australia”? You talked about “the computer when you’re out of the room”, yet by being out of the room you’re not in a position to call it anything! You have used the label “the universe before I was born”, despite you not being there to label it thus!
We’re very, very close to you coming off the roundabout. All you need to do is drop this absurd solipsistic criterion that you can only label things you are having direct experience of right now and realise that you can be the calling entity which the labels “life” (*even of life in the Amazon you’ve never seen!), “computation” (even of the computer under my desk!), or “physical” (even of falling trees with nobody around, even in the Jurassic!) depend upon.
Come on, son! One last effort! I’m waving like mad!
I’m not sure I understood that question. Let me try it this way: 13.7 billion years ago, something was there (at least, that’s my belief), but because whatever was there had no inherent frame of reference, no inherent name, no inherent assignment of function, it was undifferentiated. To differentiate it, to label it as “physical” and describe its “physical functions” requires a point of view. But I wasn’t there to do any of that. Now, I can imagine what it would have been like 13.7 billion years ago, based on current and past experience – I can imagine myself floating in space and looking at all the purty stars (“stars” being a label I assign with implied assigned functions). That imaginary experience is taking place right here, right now.
As far as I can tell, my point of view is very limited. But since it is a point of view, I can label and assign function to my experience to my hearts content.
Woosh. If an apparatus made out of particles in spacetime performs computations, why do you say there were rocks and trees before computers? Weren’t there particles in spacetime before there were rocks and trees?
What is a thing itself? What is a function itself? What do you mean here?
Also, you didn’t answer my question: In terms of its physicality, what is there to “a thing” besides its labels and functions?
Jeez. All that’s missing is Dorothy, the tin man and the cowardly lion.
We’re close!
The evidence comprising the sensory input to my working memory is that apparatus characterised (by me! how about you?) by working memory emerged from apparatus not characterised (by me!) by working memory, such as rocks and trees.
Whatever exists when I’m not directly experiencing it,. Hold this line!
In my mind, only its memory, to which a label is arbitrarily tagged. Without my mind, it is whatever it is: its “physicality” requires a calling entity (namely, me!) to label it so, but it is still there when I’m not, and I can label it “physical” despite not directly experiencing it right now, just as you label all sorts of things you are not directly experiencing right now.
Now it is you who are avoiding my direct questions:
[ul][li]How can you label “Australia”? How could you ever even speak of “drinking beer in Australia” or “a falling tree in an Australian forest”?[/li][li]How can you even call it “the computer when I’m out of the room” or “the universe before I was born”, since you weren’t there to do so? How do you even use terms like “Ancient Greek”, if you are in no position to label those humans “Ancient” or “Greek” since you weren’t born?[/li][li]If life can be physical if there’s a calling entity able to do so (and there is: you!) even though you are not experiencing all life right now, and computers and their computations can be physical if there’s a calling entity able to do so (and there is: you!) even though you are not experiencing all computers right now, can you (the ultimate calling entity!) call things like rocks, trees and the universe for 13.7 billion years “physical”?[/ul][/li]
Please, as my friend, can you? Will you? Do you?
How very strange. After two pages of debate, our opinions do seem to be remarkably similar, after all. Let’s see if we can find out precisely where we agree and where we differ.
That sentence was a little difficult to parse, but if I’m getting the gist of it, the only question I have is about the “emergence”. Did your characterization cause the emergence of the apparatus, or did the apparatus emerge, and then you characterized it? (or is “emergence” something else completely?)
Again, just so I understand: you said that in terms of its physicality, what there is to “a thing” (besides its labels and functions) is its memory. Its memory of…? That is, is it a memory of its labels and functions or of something else? (I understand that the term “memory” is an arbitrary tag, but I’m trying to find out if what is remembered is more than labels and functions).
Odd. I completely agree with this statement, yet I get the uneasy feeling that this is exactly why we’re arguing.
My apologies. I thought my post to Hoodoo addressed that sufficently; let me expand.
O.K., all we have to work with is our awareness of our (current and past) experiences, right? What feeds into that awareness is sensory input. When it comes to Australia (or an Australian computer), I’ve never seen it, smelled it, heard it, etc. However, I have seen certain pictures and maps. I’ve heard tales about Australia, and I’ve seen my own computer. I can use these things that I have experienced to imagine Australia, complete with dingoes, kangaroos and computers, but I’m making it up. Based on all my previous experiences, I have full confidence that Australia exists, just as I’m fully confident that when I pull out a chair, it won’t suddenly disappear as my ass makes its descent. I’m also confident that when I get to Australia, it won’t be as I imagined it. Close, maybe, but not the same, just as wife’s experience, standing by my side in Australia, will not be the same as my experience.
Since I have (or am) a point of view, I can label my experiences. I can make up stuff based on my experiences and label that, too.
A term like “Ancient Greek” is a little different, however. I can go to Australia, but no one can go to ancient Greece. We can extrapolate from our experiences, imagine ancient Greece , and agree on labels to talk about what we make up. But I can’t have a point of view on ancient Greece, I can only have a point of view on what we’re imagining about ancient Greece, right here, right now.
Based on my experiences, I can label the universe 13.7 billion years ago as “physical” but I can’t go there to check it out.
Because awareness only occurs in the present, I don’t even have a “point of view” on today’s breakfast: I’m not aware of breakfast, I’m only aware of a memory of breakfast. But when it comes to the universe 13.7 billion years ago, I don’t even have a memory to draw on; I have to rely on imagination and extrapolation enough to cover 13.7 billion years worth of the entire universe. While “physical” might be a label that’s useful to us for many applications, I have a hard time seeing just how useful it would be as an accurate description of whatever it was that was going on back then.
I hope that the above puts the whole “labeling” thing to bed. I’d like to get back to my original point/question. What started our whole discussion is that you said that computation emerged from a physical process. I still don’t see how computation can be considered entirely physical, since both computation and physical processes are underpinned by (i.e., dependent on), a subjective point of view. Is subjectivity physical? How so?
The latter (with me characterising it billions of years later).
Not the memory which the thing possesses, the memory which I posses of it.
What is remembered depends on which sensory apparatus forms the memory. For , say, visual memories, the strongly filtered signal from the reflected photons on the retina.
Like I said, we’re so close to the roundabout exit!
Do you??
Because we could come off the roundabout and discuss whether anything non-physical ever emerged from that solely physical universe!
Why can’t calling entities call themselves and their subjective labelling processes, physical?
Just for my peace of mind, can I yet say that “other-wise calls life, computation and the universe for billions of years after the Big Bang physical”?
What, if anything, caused the apparatus to emerge? (i.e., what is it that makes the apparatus an apparatus?)
“signals from the reflected photons on the retina”… IOW, labels and functions, right? If you’ve no objection, can we agree that physically (i.e., when charactering something as physical), there is no more to a thing than its labels and functions?
Actually, I’ve written a whole lot more, but before I post it, let me get your response to the above so I don’t go barking up the wrong tree.
Evolution.
The labelling capacity of the apparatus.
No, signals and functions which are labelled as such by me, the labeller.
… of the Universe as whole (not just earth), right?
and
A clarification: Are you saying it’s the capacity of the apparatus to label itself an apparatus, or the capacity to be labeled an apparatus by something else?
Again, a clarification, plesae: they’re signals and functions to the labeller; that is, there’s nothing that’s inherently a signal or a function, right?
No, of the living computers who are the labelling devices/calling entities.
The former.
Everything is inherently everything: it is whatever it is. (You could rephrase this as nothing is inherently anything.) There is, and was, stuff, and we labelling devices label it.
Then nothing is inherently physical?