[QUOTE=Klepto21]
Not to change the original question, but this is the perfect thread to ask something I’ve always wondered:
What would the war have been like if, instead of Japan going to Pearl Harbor, they attacked Russia?
Russia would have been fighting on two fronts and they were having a hard enough time with Germany as it was. In addition, the U.S. wouldn’t (necessarily) be involved! And seeing as how logically strategic this would be (to me, anyway), why didn’t Japan?
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As has been covered, there would’ve been little to no benefit for Japan and it would’ve distracted from their more necesary campaigns. But as a general, long term strategy for the axis it could’ve been viable.
Stalin’s reaction to a Japanese attack would’ve been out of proportion with the threat. He was pretty paranoid about Japanese attack and kept unnecesary forces in the east during the entire war. Actual attacks may have called for more resources.
But Japan wouldn’t have posed too much of a threat. The Japanese army was a joke compared to the Russian army. They were later difficult to fight over the Pacific for the Americans because they were fanatical and embraced asymetric warfare, but in terms of the actual open land battle in Siberia, low quality Russian reserve forces could’ve handled Japan’s best.
The war certainly wasn’t over when Germany invaded Russia. People lack perspective on how Germany had won previous victories, and that the context of the German operation was totally different from the total war it would later become.
Germany had not engaged in a total war with any of the countries it had battled prior to Barbarossa. In most cases it had out-manueverd and out-fought the premier army units of the countries, and ended up in a position of strategic advantage great enough that further resistance would be costly. A lot of the effect was psychological - the Germans would encircle or destroy quality front line units and threaten operational exploitation through the rear of relatively immobile units. Countries had the choice of putting up tooth-and-nail resistance at a strong diadvantage or simply surrendering under a relatively favorable agreement (death squads and such weren’t common knowledge at the time). But Germany never had to beat an opponent into submission - they put them so quickly into situations that were so unfavorable that surrender seemed the better option.
And that was the plan with Russia. They did not forsee a lengthy war, knew they weren’t equipped and organized for it, and therefore didn’t plan and equip for it. People often mock the Germans for foolishly not equipping their troops with winter clothing - but that’s missing the point. If the war had ever reached the point where winter clothing was needed, Germany would’ve failed in their aims.
What very few people understand is that Germany was VERY close to forcing a Russian surrender the same way it had forced other countries to surrender - by encircling or destroying large parts of the front line army, exploiting the operational rear, and putting the rest of the enemy’s forces at an operational and strategic disadvantage large enough to break the will to resist. Russia had lost large armies - captured men and a loss of equipment - repeatedly as Germany marched across Russia at a remarkable pace.
France, with a more modern and better organized army, had fallen in 6 weeks under these conditions, because they knew they were operationally screwed, and were so scared of a repeat of WW1 casualties that a negotiated surrender seemed the better option. France could’ve chosen to tough it out and extend the war dramatically, but it would’ve been disproportionately costly to the French.
Russia almost reached that point - Stalin locked himself in a room for hours or even days at a time, in a hysteria over his imminent loss. The Russian leadership was sufficiently demoralized that they were very near surrender. But where countries had previously surrended at that point, where it seemed bleakest, the Russians decided to slug it out. The Germans essentially failed at that point - they had a small professional army with a peace time economy (most people don’t know that the German economy didn’t reach war footing until mid/late 1942) and they needed the psychological shock of the efficiency of their early military victories to force surrender. They were not equipped or organized for a total war. In their previous victories, the psychological shock was enough to force surrender. In the case of Russia, it was very close, but not quite.
But Stalin and the Russian leadership were teetering so close to the edge - and a change in circumstances could’ve easily pushed them the other way. Japan makes more than a token attack into Siberia and Russia may collapse. Barbarossa starts on time, and they reach Moscow before the roads turn to mush, and that would probably do it. (Hitler spent early 1941 bailing Moussilini out in Greece, which critically delayed them. Had the operation started on time, Germany most likely would’ve been able to take Moscow before the fall flooding stopped the offensive). Perhaps even a better peace offer by Germany would’ve done it.
Germany was not really fighting a two front war. Britain posed no real threat to Germany in the window in which Barbarossa could succeed. If you work under the premise that expansion into the east is inevitable because of the Nazi philosophies, 1941 was the best time to do it. The Russian army was in doctrinal and organizational transitiion, fresh off the purges of most of their officers. They weren’t prepared for an attack because Stalin was still confident that the Germans wouldn’t come for them. Britain was reeling and barely staying afloat and posed no offensive threat. The US was mostly uninvolved in the war. It was generally a good plan for Germany (again, if you accept that this clash has to happen at some point), at a good time, and they came very close to pulling it off. The diversion in Greece throwing off the timetable was extremely costly, and I guess you can thank Mousillini’s incompetance for starting the road to the eventual German defeat.