This sounds very much like the old “Brisbane Line” myth which is based on a whole series number of worst case scenarios and fallback plans developed by the military at the time. Unfortunately, some of the spottier details of the plan got out to some idiotic reporters who decided to write fairy tales about it that live on to this day.
There was never a PLAN to deliberately give up territory.
There were many contingency plans made up by the military that involved:
If bad thing 1 happens and we get the crap kicked out of us we fall back here.
If bad thing 2 happens and we again get the crap kicked out of us we fall back here.
Rinse and repeat.
I really cannot understand why this so called “Brisbane Line” myth still survives.
If anyone even thinks about it for a second they should be able to see how utterly stupid and implausible it is.
Sorry to dredge this one back up, but I just reviewed, and felt a need to comment on this.
I do not, in any way shape or form, detract the fighting ability of the Soviet Union. Zhukov was a modern military man, and his use of armor showed that. The Soviet soldier, while maybe not the best equipped to start with, showed great fortitude and grit in their defence, then retaking of the Rodina.
The Soviets used their military like a club, smashing the Germans with uncountable numbers. Were D-Day to have failed, the Soviets would have marched all the way into Berlin on their own quite nicely, thank you very much.
That being said, to say that the harsh Russian winters and other weather factors didn’t matter is a gigantic mistake.
Hell, Napoleon beat the Russians! He started the winter in Moscow… which the Russians were willing to burn down around him.
Wiki has a listing of all of the equipment sent to the Soviets under Lend Lease
As you can see, it’s a lot of gear. At the same time, by 1944, the Russians were a gigantic juggernaut, and gear we sent by that point was in many cases I’m sure just gilding the lilly.
But it cannot be handwaved away that the Soviets would have done just fine without the equipment sent to them. The infrastructure of the Soviet Union was heavily dependant on rail services, and we supplied them with locomotives when all the existing factories in the Union had been converted over to military equipment. It is possible that without that critical piece of equipment, the Soviets may not have been able to move equipment out of Eastern Russia fast enough to prevent the captures of Moscow. This is, of course, speculation on my part.
tl;dr version: Maybe, but I just don’t know. You’ve sparked my interest though, and now I have a lot of reading to do…
Right. I’ve gotten to about that point: The Ford trucks, the Fordson tractors, the locomotives, the coal and oil…
We fed them a lot of stuff. I don’t know how to analyze it past there, but the people who say Russia could have done it without the US’s help are only analyzing the combat. If you really want to count out the US, you have to throw out Lend-Lease.
Just doing internet research, I am beginning to think that the Soviets really owed a HUGE debt to the US (which was later buried under political rhetoric.
This site lists specifics in much greater detail. From what I can tell, the only reason the Luftwaffe did not have total air supremacy on the Eastern Front was the incredible amount of aircraft being delivered via lend-lease.
From another article on the above linked page:
I am no student of the air-war, and I have very little knowledge at this time of how it played out between the Soviets and the Germans. But this would indicate to me that the Red Army Air Force was heavily dependant on Allied equipment.
I will continue researching, if folks are interested. This is an aspect of this particular side of the conflict I didn’t know much about, and I’m geeking out pretty heavily.
Smithsonian magazine had a good article awhile back on the massive logistical challenge the U.S. faced in demobilizing and getting rid of all that surplus equipment. A lot of it was donated to friendly governments or sold at home, but even more was simply destroyed. Too expensive to ship it back home, no immediate use for it anyway, and we didn’t want it to fall into enemy hands.
One anecdote I remember: USAAF aviators were told to turn in their leather jackets upon discharge. When the first few came back to barracks, appalled that the Quartermasters Corps guys were just cutting the jackets apart and putting them in the garbage, the rest reported their jackets lost, and smuggled them off-base as keepsakes.
Heh. Note that eventually, in calendar year 1944, the US turned out 90,000 aircraft.
Also, not responding to any specifc post, but as regards the quality of Soviet troops…if I recall, German Major General von Mellenthin said something to the effect of, and here I paraphrase from memory, “from the beginning, the Russians were first-class fighters…in time, they became first-class soldiers.”
As has been covered, there would’ve been little to no benefit for Japan and it would’ve distracted from their more necesary campaigns. But as a general, long term strategy for the axis it could’ve been viable.
Stalin’s reaction to a Japanese attack would’ve been out of proportion with the threat. He was pretty paranoid about Japanese attack and kept unnecesary forces in the east during the entire war. Actual attacks may have called for more resources.
But Japan wouldn’t have posed too much of a threat. The Japanese army was a joke compared to the Russian army. They were later difficult to fight over the Pacific for the Americans because they were fanatical and embraced asymetric warfare, but in terms of the actual open land battle in Siberia, low quality Russian reserve forces could’ve handled Japan’s best.
The war certainly wasn’t over when Germany invaded Russia. People lack perspective on how Germany had won previous victories, and that the context of the German operation was totally different from the total war it would later become.
Germany had not engaged in a total war with any of the countries it had battled prior to Barbarossa. In most cases it had out-manueverd and out-fought the premier army units of the countries, and ended up in a position of strategic advantage great enough that further resistance would be costly. A lot of the effect was psychological - the Germans would encircle or destroy quality front line units and threaten operational exploitation through the rear of relatively immobile units. Countries had the choice of putting up tooth-and-nail resistance at a strong diadvantage or simply surrendering under a relatively favorable agreement (death squads and such weren’t common knowledge at the time). But Germany never had to beat an opponent into submission - they put them so quickly into situations that were so unfavorable that surrender seemed the better option.
And that was the plan with Russia. They did not forsee a lengthy war, knew they weren’t equipped and organized for it, and therefore didn’t plan and equip for it. People often mock the Germans for foolishly not equipping their troops with winter clothing - but that’s missing the point. If the war had ever reached the point where winter clothing was needed, Germany would’ve failed in their aims.
What very few people understand is that Germany was VERY close to forcing a Russian surrender the same way it had forced other countries to surrender - by encircling or destroying large parts of the front line army, exploiting the operational rear, and putting the rest of the enemy’s forces at an operational and strategic disadvantage large enough to break the will to resist. Russia had lost large armies - captured men and a loss of equipment - repeatedly as Germany marched across Russia at a remarkable pace.
France, with a more modern and better organized army, had fallen in 6 weeks under these conditions, because they knew they were operationally screwed, and were so scared of a repeat of WW1 casualties that a negotiated surrender seemed the better option. France could’ve chosen to tough it out and extend the war dramatically, but it would’ve been disproportionately costly to the French.
Russia almost reached that point - Stalin locked himself in a room for hours or even days at a time, in a hysteria over his imminent loss. The Russian leadership was sufficiently demoralized that they were very near surrender. But where countries had previously surrended at that point, where it seemed bleakest, the Russians decided to slug it out. The Germans essentially failed at that point - they had a small professional army with a peace time economy (most people don’t know that the German economy didn’t reach war footing until mid/late 1942) and they needed the psychological shock of the efficiency of their early military victories to force surrender. They were not equipped or organized for a total war. In their previous victories, the psychological shock was enough to force surrender. In the case of Russia, it was very close, but not quite.
But Stalin and the Russian leadership were teetering so close to the edge - and a change in circumstances could’ve easily pushed them the other way. Japan makes more than a token attack into Siberia and Russia may collapse. Barbarossa starts on time, and they reach Moscow before the roads turn to mush, and that would probably do it. (Hitler spent early 1941 bailing Moussilini out in Greece, which critically delayed them. Had the operation started on time, Germany most likely would’ve been able to take Moscow before the fall flooding stopped the offensive). Perhaps even a better peace offer by Germany would’ve done it.
Germany was not really fighting a two front war. Britain posed no real threat to Germany in the window in which Barbarossa could succeed. If you work under the premise that expansion into the east is inevitable because of the Nazi philosophies, 1941 was the best time to do it. The Russian army was in doctrinal and organizational transitiion, fresh off the purges of most of their officers. They weren’t prepared for an attack because Stalin was still confident that the Germans wouldn’t come for them. Britain was reeling and barely staying afloat and posed no offensive threat. The US was mostly uninvolved in the war. It was generally a good plan for Germany (again, if you accept that this clash has to happen at some point), at a good time, and they came very close to pulling it off. The diversion in Greece throwing off the timetable was extremely costly, and I guess you can thank Mousillini’s incompetance for starting the road to the eventual German defeat.
Good analysis…I’ve always wondered why Hitler let 11 crack divisions (Gen. Von Leeb’s Army Group North) sit around, instead of adding them to Army Group Center-with this extra support, Moscow would have fallen
Oh, that’s certainly true. However, the presence of Britain as an actively combatant nation did that many more troops, planes etc. were required in Western Europe and the Mediterranean/North Africa theatre, which didn’t help matters.