In what way would a person running your simulation differ from a supernatural God? I feel like you’re dodging the question.
Because he’s made of atoms, and (presumably) evolved from earlier atom-built organisms. (Of course, I presume all of this because of what I’ve been ‘fed’ in his simulation, but that’s by the by.) Gods (ignoring the unhelpful linguistic legerdemain of deism, pantheism and panentheism) are not made of atoms.
I don’t see how I can be any more stark, but will endeavour to answer you clearly. Of course, I couldn’t tell whether the being before me was natural or supernatural any more than I could tell whether a perfect hologram had any mass just by looking at it. But there would still be a fact of the matter whether the object before me had mass or not, regardless of whether I personally could establish that fact. It merely seems more likely to me that an impressive being before me would be physical, since I could do some pretty impressive shit before a Neanderthal.
The person running our simulations is not necessarily made of atoms, and is CERTAINLY not made of atoms in the same sense that you and I are. He is certainly not physical in any way, with respect to our universe. He could almost certainly create physical avatars with which we could interact if we wanted, but the simulator-God himself would be no more physical to us than we are to Mario and Luigi.
Our atoms are Mario’s ones and zeros; we are not even remotely comparable, and a sentient Mario would have no way to accurately predict or understand our nature. We would have literally limitless power over a sentient Mario. In what way would we not be Mario’s God?
When I was younger, I believed in god as a friendly nonmaterial woman who was with me when I felt sad or happy, and felt sad or happy with me. She was someone I could talk to when I was confused about things, and she would listen and understand me. I never believed god was able to actually do anything, just listen and help me feel better. She also really wanted me to be nice to people, help people in developing countries and help my parents clear up after dinner, and if I didn’t do that enough, she would get a bit firm around Yom Kippur. A lot like my mother.
Now, I don’t believe in god as anything but a metaphor for the things that are confusing and beautiful about the world. I changed my mind because, as I grew up, I saw the world working around me and realized that people did bad and good things for many different reasons. I saw Haredi Jews being serious jerks to women and met some really nice Muslims, non-religious atheists, Christians, etc.
So, “Figuring out that the world is complicated” made me an atheist. 
Why so certain? Why couldn’t he be a mundane, evolved organism - even a future human plugging a port into the spinal column of me or Neo in the pod next door?
What?? Why not?
But Mario and Luigi are physical - they supervene on the computer circuitry just as “I” supervene on neurons, organs and whatnot.
I disagree. Our atoms are his atoms in the computer circuitry. Put him in a robot, able to probe and interact with us, and he could study us scientifically.
Because we’re physical, like him. Yes, we could convince him we were supernatural, but that would not change the fact of the (literal) matter that we are both made of bosons and fermions.
By not being supernatural, or omniscient or any of the other superlatives normally applied to God. We’d just be an example of what I pointed out upthread; that an entity with enough power over us could fake being God in such a way we’d never be able to disprove it.
Because that doesn’t mean he’s made of atoms. All it means is that you aren’t made of atoms, either.
Not enough evidence? :eek:
The only evidence for a Judeo-Christian God is the Bible.
Judaism accepts the Old Testament, but states that Jesus is not divine. Therefore at least one major religions is wrong.
If you read the Gospels, you will see several serious discrepancies in accounts of the Resurrection. Plus the Gospels were written decades after the event.
And that’s simply not good enough for me.
It’s not tricky at all.
Everyone on this planet believes in gravity. No exceptions. Total agreement.
I’m sure if an omnipotent Being existed, he could do as well.
Huh? I repeat, why couldn’t the simulation-builder be made of atoms? I accept the possibility that he isn’t just as I accept the possibility that God does actually exist (not that He could ever convince me of this without giving me an aneurysm or something). But I don’t understand Mosier’s certainty that the simulation-builder is not made of atoms in the sense that you and I are.
“I” may be a bunch of biological cells in the pod next to Neo, or a merely bunch of photons or electrons in a circuit with no biological component at all. But eithe way, the physical hardware on which the simulation is run is made of something, so “I” am ultimately made of something too - just not the same ‘stuff’ I thought I was. The same is true of whoever built that hardware, be he a robot, a hologram or a biological organism. At some level the buck must stop at physical entities, even if they’re only photons. (I’ll retract ‘atoms’ and replace with ‘bosons and fermions’ if it makes it clearer.)
There are still no supernatural entities in this scenario.
Because atoms are a simulated phenomenon.
But they could also be what the hardware running the simulation is made of, yes? One cannot be certain that what appears in the simulation is completely different to the ‘real’ world.
Again, the simulation hardware must be made of something, agreed?
I think I would have to have whatever arguments I have against it considerably beaten in my opinion. But i’m guessing; I don’t really know whether agreeing to something intellectually would inevitably lead to emotional belief. IT would probably have to be a mixture of that plus some convincing experience.
If whatever god you are talking about (all or mostly powerful) existed then he would know what he needs to do to get me to believe. I believe that mosquitos exist, they have made their presence perfectly clear. So far your god is less powerful than a mosquito and/or he purposely chooses for me to not believe in him.
To me, this depends heavily on what god’s supposed to be capable of. Could he, for instance, infallibly predict the outcome of quantum measurements? When given an atom of a radioactive substance, could he specify the point in time at which it will decay? Could he tell me exactly where an electron is located, and what its momentum is? Does he have knowledge about events not within his lightcone, or, if there’s no such thing for god since he isn’t located in spacetime, does he simultaneously have knowledge about two events not in each other’s lightcone? Can he construct the set of all sets, count the real numbers, create a formal system powerful enough to contain a theory of the natural numbers that is both complete and consistent, tell me reliably whether or not a given algorithm will terminate? If he granted me a truthful answer to any given yes/no question, and I posed, to him, the question: “Will you answer this question with ‘no’?” – could he keep his promise?
Any of these would probably at least get me to entertain the hypothesis; and at least some would also do away with the idea that we’re living in a simulation, or at least in a simulation that runs on computers as we understand them, relying on hypercomputation to be doable.
If I may piggyback on this thread a little, I think an interesting question that would fit well with the OP’s inquiry would be what it would take for a believer in any given faith to convert to some other faith, one substantially different from their original one – what would make, for instance, a Christian convert to Hinduism, or a Moslem to Shintoism, or anything like that. When would you say, ‘OK, my religion is wrong, that other religion’s had it right all along, so I guess I’d better convert!’?
This expresses my position very well and concisely.
It really wouldn’t take all that much for some superpowerful entity to convince me of its existence. Any number of “parlor tricks” would suffice.
And if it succeeded in that, I could imagine being willing to accept that it created the universe as well. But it always struck me as curious that no being has shown any interest in revealing himself in any such manner.
There are a variety of things that would make me an instant convert. If a giant hand were to come out of the clouds, pluck up the combatants in a war-torn region, set them on mountaintops and say: “no more of that”, I’d be on board. Y’know, something utterly obvious and demonstrable.
How so? Surely any half decent simulation would just provide ‘appropriately divine’ responses, such as “yes, I can construct complete, consistent systems but you might have trouble understanding it” (followed by a dizzying montage of nonsense maths purporting to be a disproof of Godel), or simply smiling beatifically in answer to “Will you answer this question with ‘no’?” ?
Indeed, I’d like to be the guy in charge of precisely this element of the simulation …
*A kindly old man appears before you just as the news reports a divine voice booming out across the world, understood by everyone despite their diverse languages.
“Hello, I’m God” he says. “Let’s have a chat in your favourite childhood holiday destination.”
Suddenly you are there, watching yourself as a child doing something you have never told anyone you did. “Any questions to establish my divinity? Go ahead, I’ve heard them all”
“I’ll bet” you reply. “What’s your favourite?”
“That one” he replies.*
Well, in the latter case, he would not actually have kept his promise of answering the yes/no question (with ‘yes’ or ‘no’); in the former case, he wouldn’t have met my challenge of constructing such a system, he would merely claim to have done so.
Similarly, I’m having trouble envisioning a simulation, on a deterministic machine, that allows for the causality violation inherent in transferring information faster than light, or that can store hidden variables in the face of Bell tests and the Kochen-Specker theorem, but hell, there might be some clever way to fool me. But how about supertasks that manifestly need hypercomputation? How would you fake something like that? Have him decide whether or not an algorithm halts, and then, try it – there should also be a way to have him decide whether or not a number has some arithmetical property that is easily testable, once he has given his answer, but I’m right now not coming up with something. However, it just occurred to me, the causality violation because of FTL information transfer in principle allows for the creation of closed timelike loops, which could themselves be used to realize hypercomputation – something that’s impossible on any ordinary computer. I’m not certain that you could in every case make it seem ‘as if’ the problem had actually been solved – much as I’m not sure that you could in all cases make an unconscious entity behave indistinguishable from a conscious one.
Of course, we could be a simulation on some sort of hypercomputer – however, hypercomputers also have issues of undecidability, just at a higher level, which you could then in turn use as basis of your argument.
I guess, HMHW, that I’m just less confident than you in my ability to see through a very clever simulation, written by those who understand all the cleverest, most technical gotchas that a Sim could throw at them. I understand the Bell inequality and its experimental verification, but do I think I could spot the Simulators’ sleight-of-hand when they presented me with the actual sensory input which showed that, yes, they have gone and done something I thought impossible? Not really.
Especially since, if they fucked up, they could erase my memory and try, try again, a la Groundhog Day, until I finally became convinced. James P. Hogan said it well:
SentientMeat, a while back, you said that you don’t believe that the notion of a physical zombie is coherent. Would you retract this, based on the premise that we live in a simulation? For, within such a simulation, it should be easy to have a simulated being addressing the simulated you, with you actually being conscious while your conversation partner is not, in such a way that you could not detect the fakery – and if they fucked up, they could erase your memory and try again.
I’m simply saying that giving the appearance of a coherent world to a conscious being without the world actually being coherent – i.e. with such things as Bell tests and hypercomputation and causality violation being mere fakes – is a task that’s very similar, in kind and complexity, to faking consciousness; and while it might be that it’s possible, I think people generally rush to the conclusion that it’s easy a bit too eagerly. All that we have to abstract from are unconscious Sims in laughably simple worlds; I almost want to say that if anything from that simple toy model actually carries through to the case of simulating a full-blown, indistinguishable from reality world to a conscious being, it’s not much more than a coincidence.
It’s similar to how AI seemed deceptively simple at first, with new complexities emerging at every turn, keeping it always just around the corner – only that in the case of AI, I’m pretty sure that this corner will eventually be rounded (though this probably will require a paradigm shift, with the realization – to go out totally on a limb here – that truly universal intelligence necessitates consciousness), whereas I’m not so certain about convincing simulations that aim to appear coherent while actually allowing themselves leeway to cut certain corners and being, on the fundamental level, thus actually incoherent. It’s perhaps not much more than a gut feeling, but such simulations strike me as at least as impossible as simulating conscious behaviour in a being lacking conscious states. That doesn’t say anything about simulations that actually are coherent, though – but in those, I don’t think you could have the fakery necessary to, for instance, simulate an entity apparently capable of solving the halting problem.