Atomic Bombings of Japan

[hansel]

@Mojo_Pin

But is this contradictory with the actual results of history (and the next part of your answer)? If it wasn’t demoralization, what convinced the Japanese in the end?.. But if 200,000 or so deaths was the tipping point for that situation, could conventional bombing runs achieved the same result? What reasons were there for the bomb to be atomic?

It does appear contradictory at first glance, but the fact of the matter is that Japan had suffered hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths from conventional bombing (the firestorm of Tokyo killed more than were killed at Hiroshima), and wasn’t about to surrender. It was the raw power of the atomic bombs that convinced the emperor and enough of the cabinet that they could not hope to bleed the allies enough to obtain a conditional surrender.

@Mojo_Pin

In light of such suspicions it’s hard to accept that America really had Japan’s best interests at heart.

They didn’t have Japan’s best interests at heart; but neither were they seeking to total destruction of Japan, nor looking to use them simply as a laboratory. They wanted an end to the war, and if that required 200,000 Japanese civilian deaths instead of 500,000 U.S. military deaths, that was considered acceptable.

@Mojo_Pin

Perhaps I do, but can you agree with my first point that the case of the man going to work after being bombed is no reason to think that the bombing was trivial?

No one’s saying that atomic bombings were trivial. The point was simply that they weren’t so shocking as to cause all human functioning to cease in Japan, thus preventing them from surrendering in a timely fashion after Hiroshima.

[Mojo_Pin]

It does appear contradictory at first glance, but the fact of the matter is that Japan had suffered hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths from conventional bombing (the firestorm of Tokyo killed more than were killed at Hiroshima), and wasn’t about to surrender. It was the raw power of the atomic bombs that convinced the emperor and enough of the cabinet that they could not hope to bleed the allies enough to obtain a conditional surrender.

But that’s only saying that they were demoralized, but not enough. A scarier bomb did the job. This still doesn’t jive with your statement: “The strategy of targeting civilians and cities was proven not to be particularly effective at ending the war or even changing its course much in general”

It was the raw power of the atomic bombs that convinced the emperor and enough of the cabinet that they could not hope to bleed the allies enough to obtain a conditional surrender.

I was actually about to ask about this quote from Mr Kobayashi’s post, which at first glance seemed to point out the redundancy of the bombs: “Emperor Hirohito’s viewing of the destroyed areas of Tokyo in March, 1945, is said to have been the beginning of his personal involvement in the peace process, culminating in Japan’s surrender five months later.” I take it that even though the Emperor began preparations for peace as early as March, he was pushing for more favorable terms, until the bombs dropped? What were the terms that he was asking for that the US had a problem with? (And vice versa?) Was a Japanese concession on those terms worth the casualties of the bombs in your opinion?

They didn’t have Japan’s best interests at heart; but neither were they seeking to total destruction of Japan, nor looking to use them simply as a laboratory. They wanted an end to the war, and if that required 200,000 Japanese civilian deaths instead of 500,000 U.S. military deaths, that was considered acceptable.
No one’s saying that atomic bombings were trivial. The point was simply that they weren’t so shocking as to cause all human functioning to cease in Japan, thus preventing them from surrendering in a timely fashion after Hiroshima.

Ok, I understand.

Thanks everyone who responded btw, it’s too much information for me to seriously understand and reply to everything, but I really appreciate the help.

[The_Other_Waldo_Pepper]

@gonzomax

Imperial Japan apparently thought it was just another weapon, since wiping out a city in a millisecond didn’t impress them enough. They needed to see a second city get wiped off the map before they realized that it constituted a threat worth surrender.

It sure is; Nagasaki fell because Imperial Japan saw the bomb that wiped out Hiroshima in a millisecond as just another weapon. Tragic, really.

Not impressed? You are making shit up. Everybody was impressed. They were horrified and shocked.Before they could even react and decide what to do we dropped another one.

I’m not making anything up; they did react, and did decide. After, as you say, a “bomb that wipes out a city in millisecond”, the war council met and resolved to keep going. It’s not as if the bombing destroyed crucial lines of communication; it’s not that key government officials had a hard time reaching the capital to form a quorum, or that assorted decision-makers then refused to make up their minds. It’s that they reacted and decided rather like American decision-makers did after the attack on Pearl Harbor: let there be war.

Heck, let’s run with that parallel for a moment. Japan bombs Pearl Harbor, whereupon America promptly reacts and decides to fight back; it doesn’t take three days or two days, since it doesn’t even take one day for FDR to go before Congress and make the Date Which Will Live In Infamy speech; Congress, of course, promptly agrees to declare war. So now imagine that, some three days later, Japan bombs us a second time – whereupon America rethinks everything and says, whoa, hey, our mistake, we surrender, name your terms.

In that bizarre counterfactual, I’d have to say the first attack wasn’t impressive enough to make us surrender, sure as the second was enough. And I don’t see how the attack on Hiroshima fails to duplicate the attack on Pearl Harbor; Japan’s decision-makers don’t see anything worth surrendering over, just like we didn’t, and so opted to fight back just like we did. And so we hit them a second time, whereupon they took a vote and –

–well, even after Nagasaki the ministers deadlocked instead of lining up a slim majority either way. But (a) at least that’s progress, and (b) it set the stage for Hirohito to then step in and break the tie, which hadn’t been the case after Hiroshima.

The folks who were refusing to surrender after Hiroshima don’t seem to have been any more or less ‘in shock’ or ‘horrified’ than their counterparts who were arguing in favor of doing so; they all reacted and decided – with no indication that any of 'em were more ‘shocked’ or ‘horrified’ than America’s decision-makers had been on December 7th, and 8th, and 9th.

[hansel]

@Mojo_Pin

But that’s only saying that they were demoralized, but not enough. A scarier bomb did the job. This still doesn’t jive with your statement: “The strategy of targeting civilians and cities was proven not to be particularly effective at ending the war or even changing its course much in general”

The idea with conventional terror bombing was to demoralize the citizenry, perhaps causing a revolt, or a slowdown in civilian production of war materials, or civilian generated pressure on the leadership to end the war. That wasn’t effective in Germany or Japan (nor in the Luftwaffe’s attacks on England).

The atomic bombs didn’t change that–they were no more effective at demoralizing the citizenry than conventional bombing was. What the atomic bombs did was convince the Emperor and enough of the cabinet that their plan to fight and bleed the allies until they were offered sufficient terms, wasn’t going to work. With atomic bombs, the U.S. could flatten Japan with no risk to itself and at little expense, comparatively. In short, they saw that holding out was national suicide.

@Mojo_Pin

I take it that even though the Emperor began preparations for peace as early as March, he was pushing for more favorable terms, until the bombs dropped? What were the terms that he was asking for that the US had a problem with? (And vice versa?) Was a Japanese concession on those terms worth the casualties of the bombs in your opinion

The Japanese were basically hoping to get 1) the retention of the Emperor (meaning the retention of the Imperial system of government), 2) no foreign occupation of Japan, 3) Japan oversees her own disarmament and war crime trials. In orders words, they were saying “Let’s just roll back to 1935 and pretend this didn’t happen.”

[Mr.Kobayashi]

@Mojo_Pin

I was actually about to ask about this quote from Mr Kobayashi’s post, which at first glance seemed to point out the redundancy of the bombs: “Emperor Hirohito’s viewing of the destroyed areas of Tokyo in March, 1945, is said to have been the beginning of his personal involvement in the peace process, culminating in Japan’s surrender five months later.” I take it that even though the Emperor began preparations for peace as early as March, he was pushing for more favorable terms, until the bombs dropped? What were the terms that he was asking for that the US had a problem with? (And vice versa?) Was a Japanese concession on those terms worth the casualties of the bombs in your opinion?

The key thing to remember is that peace is a whole lot different to surrender. As the last quote in my last post says, after the bomb dropped it became clear (for the Emperor at least) that they could no longer play this game of holding out for favourable terms.

The peace terms that the Japanese were after were not strictly defined, as before the bombs even the ‘peace camp’ was a minority. The only thing we know from communication with their Soviet ambassador is that they were not looking for anywhere like unconditional surrender - the interview with Admiral Soemu Toyoda on Nov 14th also showed that the Japanese viewed the terms of Cairo completely unrealistic, as did the majority of the cabinet - from Foreign Minister Togo’s writings they considered the Potsdam conditions ‘absurd’.

After Hiroshima these conditions became a little more concrete;

The military representatives, however, held out for proposing additional terms–specifically, that occupation of Japan should if possible be avoided or, if inescapable, should be on a small scale and should not include such points as Tokyo; that disarmament should be carried out on our responsibility; and that war criminals should be dealt with by Japan.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hando/togo.htm

[Mojo_Pin]

@hansel

The idea with conventional terror bombing was to demoralize the citizenry, perhaps causing a revolt, or a slowdown in civilian production of war materials, or civilian generated pressure on the leadership to end the war. That wasn’t effective in Germany or Japan (nor in the Luftwaffe’s attacks on England).

The atomic bombs didn’t change that–they were no more effective at demoralizing the citizenry than conventional bombing was. What the atomic bombs did was convince the Emperor and enough of the cabinet that their plan to fight and bleed the allies until they were offered sufficient terms, wasn’t going to work. With atomic bombs, the U.S. could flatten Japan with no risk to itself and at little expense, comparatively. In short, they saw that holding out was national suicide.

It seems the distinction you are making is between breaking the will of the leaders and the will of the people. Still, to achieve the former, “the strategy of targeting civilians and cities” proved effective. Although that makes me wonder how effective the a-bomb would have been if the US had used it to blow the top off of Mt. Fuji instead of killing civilians. Would that display of power have been enough? If not, the killing of innocents remains an integral part of the a-bomb strategy.

@Mr. Kobayashi

The key thing to remember is that peace is a whole lot different to surrender. As the last quote in my last post says, after the bomb dropped it became clear (for the Emperor at least) that they could no longer play this game of holding out for favourable terms.

The peace terms that the Japanese were after were not strictly defined, as before the bombs even the ‘peace camp’ was a minority. The only thing we know from communication with their Soviet ambassador is that they were not looking for anywhere like unconditional surrender - the interview with Admiral Soemu Toyoda on Nov 14th also showed that the Japanese viewed the terms of Cairo completely unrealistic, as did the majority of the cabinet - from Foreign Minister Togo’s writings they considered the Potsdam conditions ‘absurd’.

After Hiroshima these conditions became a little more concrete;

I think I’ll look through that really great Togo page and the wiki for a bit for some more info, specifically about when this “holding out for favorable terms” began, and the timelines for the various terms proposed on either side (and the reasons). For now, I’m going to have to duck out of this discussion, as it’s the start of a new day on this side of the world. Thanks everyone.

[hansel]

@Mojo_Pin

It seems the distinction you are making is between breaking the will of the leaders and the will of the people. Still, to achieve the former, “the strategy of targeting civilians and cities” proved effective.

That’s a good distinction to make in understanding it. But plainly, conventional bombing failed to break the will of the leaders in Germany, Japan, or England–and post war analysis of terror bombing’s impact on war production (read: almost none) makes clear why. It wasn’t the death toll and razed ground that broke their will, it was the display of power in a single bomb that did it in Japan’s case.

[ralph124c]

@The_Other_Waldo_Pepper

Imperial Japan apparently thought it was just another weapon, since wiping out a city in a millisecond didn’t impress them enough. They needed to see a second city get wiped off the map before they realized that it constituted a threat worth surrender.

It sure is; Nagasaki fell because Imperial Japan saw the bomb that wiped out Hiroshima in a millisecond as just another weapon. Tragic, really.

The fact is Marshal Hata (the japanese COS) thought that Hiroshima was destoted by an incindiary bomb. He recommended that resistance be continued. did he give a damn about the civilian deaths? Not at all.

[Kent_Clark]

@Mojo_Pin

Although that makes me wonder how effective the a-bomb would have been if the US had used it to blow the top off of Mt. Fuji instead of killing civilians. Would that display of power have been enough? If not, the killing of innocents remains an integral part of the a-bomb strategy.

It’s not as if Mt. Fuji is in the middle of nowhere. How many civilians would have been killed? 1,000? 10,000? 100,000? Let’s imagine the debate that we’d be having if the U.S. dropped a bomb on a place with religious and historical significance but no military value whatsoever.

[gonzomax]

@kunilou

It’s not as if Mt. Fuji is in the middle of nowhere. How many civilians would have been killed? 1,000? 10,000? 100,000? Let’s imagine the debate that we’d be having if the U.S. dropped a bomb on a place with religious and historical significance but no military value whatsoever.

Like Hiroshima? No military significance except it was left pristine for the experiment.

[gonzomax]

@hansel

That’s a good distinction to make in understanding it. But plainly, conventional bombing failed to break the will of the leaders in Germany, Japan, or England–and post war analysis of terror bombing’s impact on war production (read: almost none) makes clear why. It wasn’t the death toll and razed ground that broke their will, it was the display of power in a single bomb that did it in Japan’s case.

England was not already defeated when they continued to fight during bombing. America was just getting in and hope was still there. We leveled Germany and in case you have not notice, they surrendered without getting A bombed. Italy was not A bombed either. Are we still at war with them?
Japan was defeated and they were only discussing terms. Surrender had already been conceded. That is why they were trying to get Russia to broker better terms. What is wrong with trying to get better terms?

[Mr.Kobayashi]

@gonzomax

England was not already defeated when they continued to fight during bombing. America was just getting in and hope was still there. We leveled Germany and in case you have not notice, they surrendered without getting A bombed. Italy was not A bombed either. Are we still at war with them?
Japan was defeated and they were only discussing terms. Surrender had already been conceded. That is why they were trying to get Russia to broker better terms. What is wrong with trying to get better terms?

Germany surrendered after the Wehrmacht and the country in general had been dissected by the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent the western Allies), culminating in this.

Italy surrendered after we invaded Sicily, the the Italian mainland - costing us around 310,000 casualties.

You realise you’re arguing against your point?

The problem with getting ‘better terms’ is that the terms were completely unacceptable. We could broker no deal whereby the regime still held any power whatsoever, let alone military power or responsibility.

[hansel]

@gonzomax

We leveled Germany and in case you have not notice, they surrendered without getting A bombed.

They surrendered after the battle of Berlin in which 600,000 Germans died. They surrendered when they were utterly and totally destroyed, when Russians were literally on top of the Fuhrerbunker. They surrendered when they literally had nothing left–no army, no territory, nothing. That’s not surrender, that’s acknowledging reality.

The Japanese had almost a million people in uniform on Honshu. The situations are not remotely comparable.

@gonzomax

Italy was not A bombed either. Are we still at war with them?

I don’t even know what you mean by this. They were knocked out of the war as an entity when the populace hung Mussolini, long before the bomb existed.

@gonzomax

Japan was defeated and they were only discussing terms. Surrender had already been conceded. That is why they were trying to get Russia to broker better terms. What is wrong with trying to get better terms?

You can repeat this as often as you like; it’ll still be wrong, devoid of any connection to the reality that everyone here keeps providing cites for.

They had not conceded surrender, they had conceded that they couldn’t win. They believed they could keep fighting to achieve a conditional peace that was essentially a rollback to 1935, with the country unoccupied, the Imperial government still in place, and the Japanese overseeing their own disarmament. Would you have accepted those terms to end the war rather than drop the a-bomb?

In point of fact, the U.S. did give them better terms than unconditional surrender: They were allowed to keep the Emperor as a figurehead.

[The_Other_Waldo_Pepper]

@ralph124c

The fact is Marshal Hata (the japanese COS) thought that Hiroshima was destoted by an incindiary bomb. He recommended that resistance be continued. did he give a damn about the civilian deaths? Not at all.

After all, does it really matter? Look at the body count from, say, the fire-bombing of Tokyo, or the fire-bombing of Dresden; if we announce that it’s an atomic bombing this time rather than an incendiary one, whether Hata refused to believe us about the weapon doesn’t change whether he believed that Hiroshima was destroyed. Plenty of other Japanese decision-makers believed Truman when he kept patiently explaining the truth; what makes Hata special?

[Bryan_Ekers]

@gonzomax

We leveled Germany and in case you have not notice, they surrendered without getting A bombed. Italy was not A bombed either. Are we still at war with them?

Those countries were defeated (at considerable cost) before the A-bomb was finished.
So, Okinawa… were there mass suicides and banzai charges there? If you don’t answer, I’ll just have to assume it’s because you can’t without undermining your argument, such as it is.

[gonzomax]

@hansel

They surrendered after the battle of Berlin in which 600,000 Germans died. They surrendered when they were utterly and totally destroyed, when Russians were literally on top of the Fuhrerbunker. They surrendered when they literally had nothing left–no army, no territory, nothing. That’s not surrender, that’s acknowledging reality.

The Japanese had almost a million people in uniform on Honshu. The situations are not remotely comparable.I don’t even know what you mean by this. They were knocked out of the war as an entity when the populace hung Mussolini, long before the bomb existed.
You can repeat this as often as you like; it’ll still be wrong, devoid of any connection to the reality that everyone here keeps providing cites for.

They had not conceded surrender, they had conceded that they couldn’t win. They believed they could keep fighting to achieve a conditional peace that was essentially a rollback to 1935, with the country unoccupied, the Imperial government still in place, and the Japanese overseeing their own disarmament. Would you have accepted those terms to end the war rather than drop the a-bomb?

In point of fact, the U.S. did give them better terms than unconditional surrender: They were allowed to keep the Emperor as a figurehead.

That is a cross argument. If we had allowed them to have the emperor they would have surrendered before the Hiroshima bomb. We blew off 2 of them and then gave them the terms they asked the Russians to broker. We could have saved the bombs.We did not have to A bomb them. I agree.

[hansel]

@gonzomax

That is a cross argument. If we had allowed them to have the emperor they would have surrendered before the Hiroshima bomb. We blew off 2 of them and then gave them the terms they asked the Russians to broker. We could have saved the bombs.We did not have to A bomb them. I agree.

Once again, you’re repeating claims already demonstrated to be wrong. The Japanese didn’t want to retain the Emperor as a figurehead. They wanted to retain the Imperial regime that started the war in the first place, and handle their own war crimes trials.

Alllowing them to keep the Emperor was a face saving gesture allowed by the U.S. The war cabinet wasn’t looking to save face, they were looking to stay in power. When they said “keep the emperor”, they meant “keep themselves in charge.”

[Mr.Kobayashi]

@gonzomax

That is a cross argument. If we had allowed them to have the emperor they would have surrendered before the Hiroshima bomb. We blew off 2 of them and then gave them the terms they asked the Russians to broker. We could have saved the bombs.We did not have to A bomb them. I agree.

You realise they only consented to Potsdam + Emperor after Nagasaki, right?

[gonzomax]

@Mr.Kobayashi

You realise they only consented to Potsdam + Emperor after Nagasaki, right?

You realize they asked Russia to broker that before Hiroshima, don’t you?

[Mr.Kobayashi]

@gonzomax

You realize they asked Russia to broker that before Hiroshima, don’t you?

No, because they didn’t. In fact, they didn’t know what they were attempting to broker with Russia. You are being wilfully ignorant of cited sources concerning this.