We can’t map genes to neurology at this time (except for very crude things, like certain neurological pathologies). We’re way below the level of understanding where we could answer such a question, or even know if that question has a straightforward answer or is open-ended.
And note even where people have the same genes (i.e. identical twins), the visual cortex is wired uniquely, so we don’t know whether they see colours the same.
I’m at a loss as to which of the sigla at the right to choose. OK, let’s just use 
:.
Not only insulting, but directly insulting? Dems fightin woids, and it’s not cricket to hurl them at another poster without due consideration. Re-read my offending post. I went out of my way to deflect your misprision, telling you I was aware of what I wrote, and to contribute something perhaps of interest to the thread. The last sentences are quite profound, actually. Perhaps I should’ve simply posted “Whoosh.”
As long as the subject of accurate spelling and sounding is up, I propose a gaspel truce, sent out over the caeseine coatings of our monitors.*
*I’m still on a CRT monitor, an inkonoscope, as it were, with a bairdboard bombardment screen, which tends to teleframe and step up to the charge of a light barricade. Down the photoslope in syncopanc pulses, with the bitts bugtwug their teffs, the missledhropes, glitteraglatteraglutt, borne by their carnier walve. Spraygun rakes and splits them from a double focus, and the scanning firespot of the sgunners traverses the rutilanced illustred sunksundered lines.
Lovely bit there (any EEs or historians of technology want to work on it?). The word “bitts” is a choice entrant in the Joycehead’s game of proving that the Wake has knowledge of the future.
ETA: More fun, or further proof of the scriptomancy of the book: I now see that I glommed the excerpts from the iBbook publication of Capercaillie Books.
I have changed my plans, although to serving serve guinea hen terrine. The farce stays.
I guess that was the first question I should have asked. I assumed that our DNA determined pretty much everything about us biologically.
Thinking of the white spots on a fawn’s reddish-brown hair, if a predator saw pink spots on blue hair through white leaves, would the camouflage be just as effective?
My dad was rejected by the air force in WWII because he had trouble distinguishing blue from green, which possibly saved his life. And made for some confusion at home: “Hand me the blue screwdriver.” “Where is it?” “Right in front of you, can’t you see?” “That’s green.” “Whatever. Just give it to me.”
There are a wide variety of types of stimuli that we could compare responses to and determine that people were responding consistently to them. This means that the qualia experienced by the different subjects preserved all the information necessary to discriminate between them equally.
It tells us little about the subjective properties of qualia that are not objectively testable, such as the redness of our perception of red.
It’s common to hear that it’s possible that one person’s qualia for red might be like another person’s qualia for green. (If this doesn’t actually work due to the mental color model, then pick another color that does substitute – and actually, I think it might not.) But it’s easy to imagine that another person might substitute different internal symbols – different experiences, qualia – for the same stimuli.
But let’s take it a step further. Some pigeons have 5 different kinds of cones, compared to our 3. They would clearly have more qualia for color than we do. They would have colors that they see that do not map to any of our colors. Clearly, the set of qualia isn’t limited to what any one individual experiences. Is it possible that for one individual, what they see as red is not only what I see as red or green or blue or any other color I know, but something entirely different? Maybe similar to something a pigeon sees?
Frankly, I think that argument tends to reinforce the notion that the question misses the point, and doesn’t even make sense. (From a behaviorist standpoint, it does not.) It’s similar, in my mind, to the question of whether it’s still “you” after you teleport: it depends on how you define things, but regardless of how you define them, it’s an untestable hypothesis. So, from at least some point of view, the question makes no sense. A logical positivist wouldn’t be interested in the answer, for example.
I’ll be interested to read njtt’s link above, about this possibility. I have to admit that while I’m of the persuasion that the transporter question asks an unanswerable question (and thus I’d use the teleporter without a moment’s hesitation), I hadn’t extended the concept to qualia. I find myself resistant to it intuitively, but I suspect my intuition is wrong.
Or just the difference between reddish-brown and brownish-red. In other words, any human differences that are physiological percepts are minor in most cases. But that doesn’t mean that the Predator can’t see through our camouflage because he has different vision (well technology, really). As far as qualia goes, it doesn’t matter what color we see. Color is our interpretation of EM waves anyway.
Some of this (maybe not your dad) is people just. not. getting. it. I ask the clerk for the green wotsit. They grab the bluish green one. Or the blue one!? I don’t think it’s color naming issues. So I preemptively use “That one. No, the one over there.”
Which IMO only reinforces the notion that Behaviourism misses the point.
It’s always a bad sign when we’re identifying that a phenomenon exists, and consider it a victory that our model has no predictive power over that phenomenon, and basically say “oh, that doesn’t matter”.
The notion that colours have meaning (red fruit is ripe, etc) is just something we learn - regardless of how our brain actually experiences the sensation of seeing a red fruit - it only requires consistency from one example to the next - so we can learn what it means.
Likewise with camouflage - camouflage works (in general - assuming we’re talking about the blending kind) because it presents the viewer with sensations that are not striking - a peppered moth is camouflaged because it’s the same colour and pattern as its background of tree bark. If I internally perceive those colours as (what you would call) orange and purple, it’s still blending in, because I will be accustomed to seeing tree bark that looks like that - that’s my ‘normal’.
But can that happen through the process of evolution where one initial trait is passed on to subsequent generations?
But again, wouldn’t the passing on of traits mean that the qualia of subsequent generations would be pretty much the same?
Mutations, for one, and I’m sure there’s other factors. Color blindness still exists because it is not a large detriment to survival, now or in the past. But the tendency is towards “mostly” the same.
Not necessarily. It might be like spoken language for example, where the ability to speak a language is an inherited trait, but a specific language is not.
It could be that at some early point in development the brain maps the input it gets from the eyes to qualia, and it doesn’t particularly matter what it chooses (as long as they are distinct).
And of course, even if we knew that colour qualia are inherited, it doesn’t necessarily follow there is only one set of them in the population. They could be like blood groups. Or indeed there could be continuous variation.
It is well established that people hear sounds differently than other people. See the Wiki on equal-loudness contours. The contours are calculated by averaging individual perceptions of loudness to pure tones.
Also, our pinna (the big flaps on the side of your head) are all shaped very differently, and sounds reach our inner ear different from someone else. But our brain learns the kind of corrections to make it sound consistently good. If your ear changed shape, without damaging its collection ability, things might sound weird for awhile but will adjust to normal.
That settles it, then.
Might be, might not be. We don’t know.
But I’m a little wiser about it now, thanks to this thread and you guys and/or gals. It’s been enlightening.
Not sure. Our perceptual machinery is certainly inherited and has evolved, but the way our brains use it may not be. As I understand it, we do need to *learn *to perceive the world - people who have their sight restored after being blind from birth supposedly have great difficulty making sense of visual stimuli (cite- although I’d be happier if it gave more modern examples of this) - however, that seems to talk more about spatial and object perception than colour.
As perception is an emergent property of the mind, I don’t think it can be solidly concluded that it always emerges in the same form.
That seems to be the conclusion, as unsatisfactory as it is for the sake of curiosity. The Wikipedia page you linked to is an eye-opener (heh!). The more I find out about the brain, or rather the more I find out what we don’t know about it, the more I think the brain is the last frontier.