This is true. The British were caught at a disadvantage in the early part of the war, had a very bad time of it, but they were by no means near defeat. At the time it was largely the English (along with N. Irish, Scots and Welsh) who were doing the fighting, but once the Commonwealth nations geared up for the fight the picture would have changed. Churchill said as much in his speech to Congress, but of course U.S. entry into the war made the job much easier, and undoubtedly shortened the war considerably.
As to why the U.S. was reluctant to enter the war, remember that America has always had a sizeable and active fascist element along with a fair degree of anti-semitism at the time. Couple that with the long-held antimonarchial sentiment and it’s somewhat easier to see why the public didn’t see the war as a cut-and-dried issue. German immigrants formed one of the largest ethnic blocs in America at the time, although this group was by no means nazi sympathizers, there was still a lot of nostolgic affection for the ancestral homeland.
Finally, the depression had done a lot to polarize the American public, with labor and capital very much at loggerheads. Roosevelt’s recovery measures, while they were ultimately deemed a success were not wildly popular, and there was a lot of hard feeling between the masses, which leaned left, and the wealthy classes who had become hard right.
By December 1941 the German plan to invade Britain was shelved. See Operation Sealion for details if you’re interested. And the Soviets had begun to roll back the Germans on the Eastern Front.
Historian Stephen Ambrose referred in D-Day to this decision as the “looniest” and “loneliest” of Hilter’s decisions – he didn’t have to do it, there was no perceivable advantage in doing it, he didn’t discuss it with his military, but just when ahead and announced it on December 11th, and the United States reciprocated.
I do not think the US merchant marine was involved in shipments to the UK before US entry into the war.
Both while the Neutrality Acts and Lend-Lease were in force the UK had to provide all the transport.
I do not believe the FDR administration was against entering the war, but popular opinion certainly was,
with large polling majorities opposed.
IIRC the US had declared a Uboat-free zone several 100s of miles into the Atlantic, and the Germans
didmade few if any any pre-war attacks there, although they may have patrolled the area.
Lend Lease was vital. Also, the UK got a small fleet of WW1 vintage US destroyers which were very helpful
despite their age. Also the US undertook to mount anti Uboat operations perhaps as far as half way across
the Atlantic, with one ship, the destroyer Rueben James, being sunk by a Uboat in an undeclared war.
A recent cite (in fact, I’m almost finished reading it right now) is Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, 2010, by Timothy Snyder. See pages 211-213. Snyder makes the point that:
“Even after the failure of Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon, Hitler wished for the Japanese to engage the United States rather than the Soviet Union”. [The emphasis is original]
This is in turn footnoted (footnote 51) to a 3 January meeting of Hitler and the Japanese ambassador, cited in Hauner, Axis Strategy, at 384.
I know about that. It was the campaign Zukov cut his teeth on.
Thank you for the citation, but I had in mind the period June 22 1941 to Dec. 6 1941.
Even so, if the January 3 meeting took place after the failure of Barbarossa and Typhoon, that is in 1942,
then both Germany and Japan had already been at war with the US for almost a month, and Hitler obviously
would not have wanted the Japanese to disengage.
That leaves open the question of whether he discouraged them from also engaging the USSR, and I still find
that hard to believe. Recall that as of 1/42 the German army was hanging on for dear life against the Soviet
counteroffensive which began apprx. 12/5/41. One footnote is not enough to persuade me that Germany
was discouraging Japan from taking action against the enemy who was posing the greatest peril by far.
I haven’t actually read the nested cite, so I do not know what exactly Hitler discussed with the Japanese ambassador. It is an interesting question, one which I’ll look into when I have a chance to review Hauner’s book.
The footnote also references another text - Lukacs, Last European War, at p. 143 - which I have also not read.
However, given the fact that Hitler had without any doubt made an even more unbelievably moronic strategic move at much the same time in declaring war on the US without the slightest shred of reason, thus against all advice adding the world’s most powerful country to its list of enemies at a time when its attack on the Soviets was faltering, I fail to see why one would offhand disbelieve that he would make an (obviously foolish) decision to discourage the Japanese from attacking the Soviets.
Both are really of a piece - they show Hitler at his strategic worst, choosing without hesitation a position that suited his ideology rather than hard military reality. The Snyder cite goes on to state that the reason for Hitler to discourage the Japanese was that he still believed he could decsively defeat the Soviets with one more push and had no wish to share the wealth he anticipated receiving from conquest with the Japanese - by the end of 1941, this was bordering on delusional, as you know.
If you have a chance please let us know any more detail you can find on the issue. I have read more
about the Eastern Front than most other subjects of interest to me, and Hitler’s discouraging attitude
vis a vis a Japanese attack on the USSR is twist I have not run across before.
IMO war between Germany and the US was inevitable due to the fact that the US and UK were full-fledged allies
as of 12/7/41 even if only against Japan to begin with. Lend Lease would have been superceded by unrestrained
aid to the UK of all kind, and the already significant action against Uboats would have been ratcheted up several levels.
From the German standpoint war against the US allowed them to mount unrestrained naval operations of
their own, and in fact those operations came close to succeeding in 1942.
I am still a bit confused about the chronology here. If the passage above relates only to conditions before
the 12/41 USSR counteroffensive began it makes sense. However, it does not make sense after then
because the German army became embroiled in a battle for its very survival which was to last for months.
As you say, though, Hitler was at times irrational.
I don’t have a cite for this, and may be way off base, but I’ve read several times that the Allies were not too keen on helping any “assassinate Hitler” plots because they felt that Hitler was the Allies best weapon. And from some of his loony decisions this has the ring of truth about it.
Do others concur with Daylate’s POV? I find it hard to believe that the Allies wouldn’t support any attempt to stop Hitler in his tracks. I was taught that as the war raged on the German generals were looking for a way to negotiate some kind of peace. Whether the Allies would have accepted anything short of unconditional surrender seems unlikely to me.
I guess one way of approaching the issue is to turn it on its head: surely a sensible German plan would have been to enlist or encourage the Japanese to attack Stalin? Is there anything in the diplomatic correspondence which would indicate that Hitler wanted a Japanese attack from its Manchurian army on the Soviets? It would have been an obvious move - Hitler was certainly aware of the strains a two-front war could impose, and must have seen that imposing those strains on Stalin must have seemed like a good idea - but is there anything to suggest he mounted a serious effort to enlist the Japanese to attack?
I disagree. It is a matter of timing.
Before Pearl Harbor, certainly the Germans and US were on a collision course, with the US providing “all aid short of war” to the Brits - but Pearl changed that trajectory. The Japanese dad directly attacked the US. Unlike the case with Germany, there was no home-grown reluctance to fight the Japanese. The natural political result of the attack would have been to focus US attention on crushing Japan, to the exclusion of involvement in Europe; a sensible Hitlerian response would have been to encourage that … giving Hitler time to crush the Soviets and present any future Anglo-American alliance with an entire continent under Nazi rule. Then, he could sue for peace from a position of strength (his ambitions never extended to conquest of the Americas!).
The notion would be that it would take time for the Americans to crush Japan - time that the Nazis could put to good use.
Instead, with the Hitlerian declaration of war, the allies cooperated in a “Germany first” campaign - agreeing that the bulk of their mutual effort would go towards crushing Germany. It is not clear if this would have been political possible absent a German declaration of war on the US.
I’d say it would not make sense even before that - even if Hitler’s armies had managed to take Moscow in Typhoon, it was reasonably clear by that time that the fall of the capital would not have lead to the collapse of the state, and that tying down the far eastern Soviet Army was a vital necessity for the Germans (remembering that it was troops freed up from that army that formed the bulk of the Soviet counteroffensive).
Hitler must have known of the existence of these troops.
Accepting a deal from rebel German generals would have been politically difficult or impossible, because of Stalin. He very naturally feared that the western allies would strike a deal with the Germans and join them against him (it was what the German generals wanted above all else - and it was what Stalin would have done in the place of the western allies!)
Unlike in the totalitarian states, in the West war-weariness and democratic traditions made it politically impossible to re-format a war in this manner - to, as in Orwell’s 1984, change the Germans from the hated enemy into a beloved ally overnight (and the Soviets from comrades-in-arms to enemy at the same time). This transformation of course did happen eventually, but it took the German defeat and some time to accomplish.
However, Stalin believed otherwise, and saw a sudden turn-about and betrayal as a serious possibility. To keep Stalin from going apeshit, the western allies had to agree not to accept peace feelers from german generals.
[This same topic comes up in a related question, that is, why the west betrayed Poland so very comprehensively to Stalin - the answer being that the alternative was war with the Soviets, which the West most emphatically did not want following the terrible trauma of WW2 they had just undergone).
I would think enough of the German diplomats and archives survived
to provide a definitive answer.
The only reference to the question I have ever seen occurred in a novel,
namely Winds of War by Herman Wouk. The novel implies without directly
saying so that Germany did encourage Japan to attack Soviet Far East,
but that the Japanese dumurred. Now, I am not going to use a novel for
citation. However, in my experience modern historical novelists are scrupulously
accurate when it comes to known historical detail.
Yes, as I said it made the US and UK full-fledged allies.
BTW Lend Lease had been extended to the USSR in 11/41, adding greatly
to deterioration of already very poor German-US relations.
Let me interject here that there was no more reluctance to fight Germany
than to fight Japan, the German-American Bund (ca. 6000 members),
Charles A. Lindbergh, and another SDMB member’s tendentious comments
notwithstanding. Before 12/7/41 sizeable US majorities were opposed to
fighting anyone.
This does not address my observations concerning the entirely new status
of alliance in US-UK relations. The US would have flooded its new ally the UK
with all manner of provisions. Hitler had no good options: either let the US
get away with giving a bank check to his two enemies, or try to stop it.
He chose to try to stop it.
I do not think the UK would ever have acceded to a Nazi domination
of the continent, once in the war I do not believe the US would have either.
Right- even now many things are still unclear and cannot be known for sure.
I am not sure what you are getting at here, but German intelligence had
no idea that there were 1 million or so Soviet troops available in Siberia
and the USSR Far East around the time of Typhoon. In fact they had no
idea what they were facing at the atart of Barbarossa. They thought the
USSR had only apprx. 200 divisions, but in a month or two they identified
over 300.
I suspect that if a serious effort had been made to enlist Japanese aid, more evidence of it would be extant.
There is no question that US “neutrality” was anything but, and the Germans knew it. However, it was far superior to outright US war against Germany.
I disagree. Those in the US had far different feelings towards the Japanese as opposed to the Germans, for many reasons.
First, there was the lengthy history of pro-China sentiment, the special relationship that Americans felt existed with China. Japanese aggression towards China, including such measures as the ‘Rape of Nanking’ (well publicised pre-war in newsreels), seriously inflamed Amercan attitudes towards the Japanese, to an extent that Hitler’s enormities (still mostly unknown in the US) did not. There were several incidents, pre-war, in which Japanese 'accidentally" attacked Americans in China.
Second, American general racism towards the Japanese made fighting them more palatable than fighting Germans - many prominent Americans in public life were themselves of German descent, of course.
Third, and most important, the Japanese had attacked the US in what was widely seen as a sneaky, underhanded attack - completely in line with previous American conceptions of Japanese gov’t behaviour (point 1) and American prejudices concerning the Japanese character (point 2).
All of this undermined American isolationism when it came to the Japanese.
The US was already flooding the UK with provisions. What the changed status meant was that the US would now be involved in a war of its very own - diverting attention from the European war; which ought to have suited Hitler just fine.
US support for the UK, while galling, was something that Hitler had been prepared to tolerate prior to the Japanese attack. This was undoubtedly the correct strategic move - because the alternative, outright war with the US, was undeniably worse.
Hitler was in no position to do much more against the US than extend the U-Boat campaign against them - which, while racking up some impressive tonnage-sunk figures initially against an unprepared US, had the effect of pitting an already-straining U-Boat fleet against the might of American manufacture and navy - not a good trade.
Perhaps, but Hitler never really understood the depth of UK resolve, or thought it was genuine. He had good reason for this - the pusilanimous behaviour of the UK gov’t prior to the war, the support for some sort of appeasement in UK upper class circles even after, the fact that the UK generally lacked military victories against the germans, etc. Hitler could be forgiven for thinking that if he crushed Stalin and united Eurasia under his rule, the UK would cut a deal. Going it alone, they had no chance of defeating a Hitler who was ruler of Eurasia.
If the US never got involved in the war in the first place, of course, they would have no choice but to agree to abide by a German conquest.
I’m not saying Hitler knew with any precision how many troops were stationed in the far east, but he surely had to know that some were, and that absent a two-front confrontation they would be available to fight him.
I suspect that if a serious effort had been made to enlist Japanese aid, more evidence of it would be extant.
[/QUOTE]
And I suspect effort was present from the start.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
There is no question that US “neutrality” was anything but, and the Germans knew it. However, it was far superior to outright US war against Germany.
[/QUOTE]
It was close enough to make Churchill himself say only the submarine
campaign ever made him doubt victory was inevitable, and that was
with the US fully committed. Without the US involvement the UK would
certainly have suffered mass starvation.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
I disagree. Those in the US had far different feelings towards the Japanese as opposed to the Germans, for many reasons.
[/QUOTE]
Both countries were correctly viewed as wanton aggressors.
Germany was viewed as the most dangerous by the most people,
and it was not close: see this poll result:
(from link):
Question (12/23/41): Which country is the greater threat to America’s future- Germany or Japan?
Answer: Germany 64% Japan 15%
Question (12/10/41): Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany was well as Japan?
Answer: Yes 90% No 10% (Nb Germany declared war on the US 12/11)
Since your point of departure is falsified by these poll results there is
no need for further rebuttal on this point, but I have some comments
to make anyway.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
First, there was the lengthy history of pro-China sentiment, the special relationship that Americans felt existed with China. Japanese aggression towards China, including such measures as the ‘Rape of Nanking’ (well publicised pre-war in newsreels), seriously inflamed Amercan attitudes towards the Japanese, to an extent that Hitler’s enormities (still mostly unknown in the US) did not.
[/QUOTE]
Hitler was universally known to have committed enormity after enormity
by invasion without declaration of war of nine countries 1939-41.
Those enormities weighed more on American consciousness than
anything Japan had done.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
There were several incidents, pre-war, in which Japanese 'accidentally" attacked Americans in China.
[/QUOTE]
This is an incidental point, and in any case Panay and other occasions
were no larger in the public mind than Reuben James.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Second, American general racism towards the Japanese made fighting them more palatable than fighting Germans - many prominent Americans in public life were themselves of German descent, of course.
[/QUOTE]
I sorry, but this is nonsense. American men and women of German
descent from Eisenhower on down were as wholeheartedly committed
against Germany as against Japan. What anti-Japanese racism that
did exist did not affect any aspect of the US war effort and morale except
perhaps in the case of a few (very few) cases of overconfidence soon
dispelled by the obvious prowess of Japanese arms.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Third, and most important, the Japanese had attacked the US in what was widely seen as a sneaky, underhanded attack - completely in line with previous American conceptions of Japanese gov’t behaviour (point 1) and American prejudices concerning the Japanese character (point 2).
All of this undermined American isolationism when it came to the Japanese.
[/QUOTE]
Addressed by the poll citations. Relative antagonism toward Japan
would if anything have been worse due to Pearl Harbor, yet 90%
of the country favored war against Germany even before Germany
settled the matter by its own declaration of war.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
The US was already flooding the UK with provisions. What the changed status meant was that the US would now be involved in a war of its very own - diverting attention from the European war; which ought to have suited Hitler just fine. US support for the UK, while galling, was something that Hitler had been prepared to tolerate prior to the Japanese attack. This was undoubtedly the correct strategic move - because the alternative, outright war with the US, was undeniably worse. Hitler was in no position to do much more against the US than extend the U-Boat campaign against them - which, while racking up some impressive tonnage-sunk figures initially against an unprepared US, had the effect of pitting an already-straining U-Boat fleet against the might of American manufacture and navy - not a good trade.
[/QUOTE]
Surely you will not contest that US supply to allies increased by several
factors of 10 post-PH? Again: the UK would have starved if provisions had
been left at pre-PH levels, and I do not think the US would have allowed
that to happen to an ally, even if it meant adopting shoot-on-sight
antisubmarine tactics far beyond the earlier limits.
As for the Uboat fleet 312 were built 1935-41 and 841 were built 1942-45.
See link:
I think Hitler understood UK resolution well enough by the end of 1940.
Regardless of his feelings England and then the UK gone to war and
stayed at war against all potential continental hegemons going to QE2.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
If the US never got involved in the war in the first place, of course, they would have no choice but to agree to abide by a German conquest.
[/QUOTE]
With US assistance they could still be fighting today.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
I’m not saying Hitler knew with any precision how many troops were stationed in the far east, but he surely had to know that some were, and that absent a two-front confrontation they would be available to fight him.
[/QUOTE]
Even Hitler would have had 2nd thoughts about Typhoon if he had had
any idea a million fresh troops awaited.
Perhaps - but there is no proof of it, whereas there is proof of the contrary.
You are arguing against your point here. Presumably, without US direct involvement in the war against Germany, the U-Boat campaign may have succeeded.
But my point is not “falsified” by these poll results. If you will recall, my point was that Americans in general felt differently towards Japan and Germany. These poll questions do not addresss that point.
Americans were quite correct to view Germany as the greater threat - it was, as all aknowledged, a more powerful nation.
I recommend you read pages 4-5 of the online text you cited - which states, as its thesis, that the reason Americans were overwhelmingly in favour of war with Germany is that they were convinced that the Germans were behind the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In short, it was nothing that the Germans did which convinced Americans - it was that they were associated in American minds with the Japanese. It was this “puppetmaster” thesis - born out of a serious under-estimation of Japan’s own military resolve - which amply accounts for the polling. Americans simply could not believe that the Japanese - considered racially and culturally inferior - could dare to mount such an attack on them all on their own. Ergo, it must have really been the Germans behind it.
See p. 9, from your cite:
“Historians have argued that both the puppetmaster thesis and the coconspirator thesis were so widely accepted after Pearl Harbor because these thesis best explained the humiliating US defeat at the hands of the Japanese, a nation that most Americans regarded as backwards and inferior”
I disagree. See your cite above.
Again, I do not think this is responsive to the point. It is not a question of being “wholeheartedly committed to the war” - this is not an accusation of ‘dual loyalty’ or anything of that sort. Certainly, once the war was on, Americans of all backgrounds were wholehearted in support against both enemies - but before the war was declared, there was a much greater reluctance to get involved against the Germans.
Again, I direct your attention to the text of the book from which those polls were drawn. The reason for these poll numbers is explained therein - Germany was blamed for the Japanese attack. In short, the Americans were so antagonized by the Japanese attack, the Germans were tarred by the same brush!
How much the US would have been willing to support the UK if it got involved in an entirely different war is open to question.
Most likely if they did, it would be a “war” that resembles the continual “war” between North and South Korea.
He must have known that the Soviets had troops in the far east. The exact number, perhaps not.
I have no cite but I seem to recall that Hitler made the stupid decision to declare war on the U.S. hoping that the the Japanese would reciprocate by declaring war on the Russians.
As posted upthread, the mere knowledge that Japan had no intention of declaring war
( gained by a German spying for the Russians in the German diplomatic mission in Tokyo, would it be Richard Sorge ?)
allowed the Russians to withdraw large forces from the East and throw them against the Germans in the Western Soviet Union.
The mere presence of of Japanese troops even facing without advancing Russians in the East would have been a god send to the Wermacht.
But the Japanese had received several bloody noses from the Russians in previous skirmishes and failed to make a declaration of war against the S.U.
Am working from memory here so apologies for any inaccuracies,though I’m pretty sure that there aren’t any.
If the Americans thought that the Germans were behind the attack on Pearl Harbour, it seems like they would be more likely to support a war against them rather than less. We have poll data that suggests that following Pearl Harbour the American public thought that the Germans were a bigger threat than Japan and that President should have declared war on Germany too (which he hadn’t at that point). Your response to this poll data seems to be essentially: “The American public wouldn’t support going to war with Germany because they thought the Germans represented a bigger threat”.
I don’t really have a horse in this race, so to speak, but based on what has been presented here I’m inclined to think that following Pearl Harbour the US public was at least favourably inclined towards war with Germany.
Perhaps - but there is no proof of it, whereas there is proof of the contrary.
[/QUOTE]
More eyewitness and archival evidence is needed here.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
You are arguing against your point here. Presumably, without US direct involvement in the war against Germany, the U-Boat campaign may have succeeded.
[/QUOTE]
No I am not. The point I am trying to get across is that
to keep the UK afloat the US would have had to go far
beyond its already provocative pre-PH breach of neutrality.
Hitler declared war before the US actually went further.
However, no German government would have tolerated
the greater lengths the US was bound to go to.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
I recommend you read pages 4-5 of the online text you cited - which states, as its thesis, that the reason Americans were overwhelmingly in favour of war with Germany is that they were convinced that the Germans were behind the attack on Pearl Harbor.
[/QUOTE]
The source is useful only for the poll results in its index.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
But my point is not “falsified” by these poll results. If you will recall, my point was that Americans in general felt differently towards Japan and Germany. These poll questions do not address that point.
Americans were quite correct to view Germany as the greater threat - it was, as all acknowledged, a more powerful nation.
[/QUOTE]
Your point was that Americans were more hostile toward
Japan both before and after PH, and that isolationist
sentiments were weaker in the case of Japan.
So yes, the point is falsified, unless you insist on going to
the extreme of (A) denying precise correlation between
perception of a greatest threat and feelings of greatest
hostility, and (B) denying that wanting to declare war signifies
total absence of isolationist sentiment.
I stand by my evaluation of polling data already cited, and
I submit the following additional polling examples:
It will not do to object on the basis of the lower polling standards
of the time because Gallup was only 3-5% off on Presidential
elections 1936-48 (3% in 1940).
(from link):
If Japan was the menace the US public mind that you have
depicted then Japan would have been the least liked country
in the poll cited above rather than 4th least at worst, and Germany
would not have been the selection of eight times as many people
as Japan.
Keep in mind that Germany at the time of this poll had not
yet begun its 9/1/39ff complete and utter rampage, whereas
Japan had already been at war with China for two years continuously,
and eight years if you count its aggression in Manchuria.
You will agree, I hope, that willingness to “risk war” is exactly
correlated with hostility, and uncorrelated with isolationism.
The following polling evidence of 1941 attests to no significant
difference in US hostility toward Japan and toward Germany,
with 40-70% in favor of risking war with Japan and 60-70% in
favor of risking war with Germany.
Quesions 7a-a-b are garbled, but reported affirmative replies
are only 1% different.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
In short, it was nothing that the Germans did which convinced Americans - it was that they were associated in American minds with the Japanese.
[/QUOTE]
Even the least informed Americans could not have
failed to notice German serial aggression against
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece and the USSR.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
It was this “puppetmaster” thesis - born out of a serious under-estimation of Japan’s own military resolve - which amply accounts for the polling. Americans simply could not believe that the Japanese - considered racially and culturally inferior - could dare to mount such an attack on them all on their own. Ergo, it must have really been the Germans behind it.
[/QUOTE]
Ergo you are trying to have it both ways.
Americans were more hostile and less isolationist toward
Japan even though Japan was Germany’s mere puppet, and
furthermore Americans knew it!
American isolationism against Germany could not have been
promoted relative to Japan by the view that incompetent Japan
was a significant threat only if directed by the German “puppetmaster”.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Third, and most important, the Japanese had attacked the US in what was widely seen as a sneaky, underhanded attack - completely in line with previous American conceptions of Japanese gov’t behaviour (point 1) and American prejudices concerning the Japanese character (point 2).
All of this undermined American isolationism when it came to the Japanese.
[/QUOTE]
Addressed by polling citation above.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
See p. 9, from your cite:
“Historians have argued that both the puppetmaster thesis and the coconspirator thesis were so widely accepted after Pearl Harbor because these thesis best explained the humiliating US defeat at the hands of the Japanese, a nation that most Americans regarded as backwards and inferior”
[/QUOTE]
This does nothin to support your contention that America
was more hostile and less isolationist toward Japan.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
I disagree. See your cite above.
[/QUOTE]
My cite documenting that 64% polled identified Germany
as the most dangerous enemy? My cite documenting that
90% thought we should have declared war on Germany
before Germany declared war on us?
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Again, I do not think this is responsive to the point. It is not a question of being “wholeheartedly committed to the war” - this is not an accusation of ‘dual loyalty’ or anything of that sort.
[/QUOTE]
If you do not question German Americans’ commitment then
there was no need to mention them to begin with.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Certainly, once the war was on, Americans of all backgrounds were wholehearted in support against both enemies - but before the war was declared, there was a much greater reluctance to get involved against the Germans.
[/QUOTE]
Addressed by polling citation above.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Again, I direct your attention to the text of the book from which those polls were drawn. The reason for these poll numbers is explained therein - Germany was blamed for the Japanese attack. In short, the Americans were so antagonized by the Japanese attack, the Germans were tarred by the same brush!
[/QUOTE]
Addressed by polling citation above.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
How much the US would have been willing to support the UK if it got involved in an entirely different war is open to question.
[/QUOTE]
Decisively contradicted by the fact that 90% of the country
wanted to declare war on Germany EVEN BEFORE Germany
declared war on us.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
Most likely if they did, it would be a “war” that resembles the continual “war” between North and South Korea.
[/QUOTE]
The hypothetical was meant only to illustrate UK commitment.
In actual history Allies’ possessed overwhelming superiority.
[QUOTE=Malthus]
He must have known that the Soviets had troops in the far east. The exact number, perhaps not.
[/QUOTE]
I have already related that German pre-war estimates were nowhere
close to being accurate. Warfare could not have led to any improvement.
Look at WWI. Isolationists and anti-war activists became “unhung traitors” in the eye of the public. Once you’re in, you’re in. But before that? It’s was a fair debate in a pre-Cold War world.
While FDR clearly saw the approaching political ramifications of German-dominated Europe, the threat of Communism didn’t take hold until post-WWII. If you recall, no one wanted to go to war, Great Britain included. That’s why Hitler got as far as he did.
When citizens feel threatened, they are likely to support war. There simply wasn’t a perceived threat. After Pearl Harbor, it all changed.
raise eyebrow
In case you haven’t noticed, the U.S. never seemed to be fond of fighting people who look like themselves.