Best Prop Fighter of WWII?

In My Humble Opinion
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My original interest is naval history, got into an interest in air war history in part because you can’t separate the two when it comes to WWII. :slight_smile:

I have a feeling your follow up will follow the logic of your first post, which again I don’t disagree with in forming the basic strategic setting of the opening phase of the Pacific War. The Allies didn’t have a fleet ready to fight a decisive fleet action with the Japanese to prevent their early conquests. This meant the Philippines in particular were doomed, since the Japanese could cut off resupply with a distant blockade regardless of the local air situation. And even without Pearl Harbor it’s questionable the USN would have immediately deployed for decisive fleet action in the western Pacific in time to relieve the PI, or that it would have been wise to try. Anyway the PH attack happened.

But within that basic setting, the Japanese advance would have much slower and therefore riskier if either a) they’d have had to limit the steps in their advance to the range at which ‘normal’ land based fighters could cover landing forces, or b) they’d have had to commit their main carrier force to directly support each landing.

You don’t have to look to special cites to establish either of those points, but a general knowledge of the early campaigns you already have. Start with the quick neutralization of USAAF power on Luzon from Formosa: a function of escorted raids by Japanese bombers way outside the range of any other fighter but the Zero. Without that again the US position in the PI would have been strangled over a longer time. And the follow on moves to southern PI and DEI while they were accomplished months before the Philippine/US land force finally surrendered in April/May 1942, could not have been as long as the USAAF force in Luzon was intact.

Then the move from southern PI to DEI, again a single step with fighter cover at range no other land based fighter could achieve.

If the Japanese hadn’t had a fighter of such range, they could have used carriers. In fact they planned to support the PI operation with light carriers, at least the fighters landing on them to refuel after staging from the land bases in Formosa. That idea was only changed some weeks before the actual operation. But it would have been riskier. Likewise the main carrier force or mobile force was mainly inactive and not at risk from the Hawaii operation to the Ceylon raid in April 1942, exceptions being portions of it supporting the Wake and Rabaul landings and the whole formation in the February Darwin raid. But all raids and invasions against token defensive forces, not the carriers sticking around where they might be hit by land based a/c, even the relatively weak and ineffective anti ship a/c formations the Allies had. At Ceylon British land based bombers penetrated the radar-less defense of the Japanese carriers, bomb splashes first revealed their presence. Fortunately for the IJN they all missed.

Again it’s not that the Zero won a campaign the Japanese couldn’t have won otherwise. Basically the unreadiness (USN)/unavailability(RN) of an Allied naval force able to fight a decisive action against the Japanese one meant the Japanese could continue advancing till they lost that clear naval superiority (as they did in June 1942). But they might have lost it before they could take all the places they did if forced to either advance in steps of say 200 miles under land based air cover (effective radius of most Allied fighters) instead of 500+ miles (effective radius of the Zero). Or if they’d had to keep risking their main carrier force to significant land based air power, which in the actual campaign they seldom did after PH.

I can’t think of a case where a fighter’s particular characteristics had more impact on an overall large campaign. IOW the refutation of my point would be to give such an example (the P-51 wrt USAAF strategic bombing campaign is No. 2 IMO, are their others?). It’s not a refutation of my point to say the Zero’s characteristics alone didn’t determine the early course of the Pac War, because that’s not what I’m saying.

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Sure, but the actual strategic plan from Arnold, Eaker, Doolittle, Spaatz, etc… was basically that when the 8th AF had longer ranged fighters (P-51 with drop tanks), they’d restart mounting very large scale bombing raids deep into Germany. The main goal of these raids wasn’t actually to put bombs on the ground, but rather to draw the Luftwaffe up to fend them off, and thereby destroy their fighter strength, essentially by killing German pilots. Bombing targets on the ground was useful, but not the actual goal during say… Big Week in February 1944.

By very early 1944, this was possible- the US had the economic might to easily replace lost aircraft, and had a robust aircrew training pipeline as well, neither of which the Luftwaffe had.

After they’d effectively drawn the Luftwaffe up, and destroyed its ability to actually contest the Allies in the air, they set about destroying the German economy through the campaigns to destroy the German POL production and the German transportation infrastructure (which actually did the job, because it wrecked the coal distribution network).

Prior to early 1944, the USAAF top brass were laboring under some huge misconceptions- first, that unescorted bombers could make it deep into Germany and effectively bomb targets, and second, that they could successfully identify and bomb “choke point” industries, like ball bearings. They found out the hard way, with the Schweinfurt missions, that neither was the least bit true.

And yeah, most of the 8th AF losses were in bomber crews. But the notion that the P-51 was somehow the best, was erroneous. I’d say that it was good to very good as a fighter, but that the huge numbers it was employed in rendered it unbeatable.

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Not sure I’d say “just as maneuverable.” Truth is, airplanes perform differently under different conditions – altitude being a big one. The P-47’s mighty engine – and especially its powerful, advanced supercharger – gave it an edge at high altitudes, where other planes struggled in the thin air. The Jug was actually more nimble than anything else at very high altitudes. Not sure that holds for all speeds and heights, though. Even with the late-war “paddle prop” she was never a great climber.

I can’t dispute that but I am surprised to see it. I’d like to read more about the Corsair’s maneuverability, if you remember a source.

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‘Maneuverability’ of WWII fighters sometime amounts to a catch call as all aspects of combat performance besides speed and rate of climb.

But it wasn’t as complicated as modern fighter maneuverability. WWII fighters had a very low ability to sustain g’s in a turn at constant altitude compared to modern fighters. IOW sustained turn performance came down mainly to wing loading: whichever plane could sustain a lower 1g speed could sustain a tighter turn. So an a/c like the F4U could not match one like the Zero in sustained turn. And this is shown by the USN’s official evaluation of F4U-1D v captured ‘Zeke 52’: ‘the Zeke 52 was greatly superior to the F4U-1D in slow speed turns; it could gain one turn in 3-1/2 turns at 10,000 ft. At speeds around 205mph, however the F4U-1D could, by using flaps, stay with the Zero for one half turn, or until speed fell to 175mph’.

But this was typical. The transient turn capability of WWII fighters was generally similar, for the most part any of them could stay more or less with others as they both slowed down to the low g sustained turn (again much more complicated for modern fighters which can sustain turns of several g’s) where the a/c with bigger wings relative to its weight had the advantage, the Zero in that case, or against almost any of its common Allied opponents except possibly the Wildcat (the FM-2 version was judged almost equal in turn to the captured Zero Model 52 in those trials; the Zero Model 21, used in 1942 and which was lighter and had longer wings than the 52, could out turn the F4F, but not by a lot).

Another practical factor in turn performance of WWII fighters was roll rate to initiate a turn. Most Allied fighters had a better roll rate than the Zero at high speed, to get a head start in initiating a turn.

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That was a fun link, thanks. :cool:

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Lots of cites out there:

So other than manouvering at slow speed, the F4U was extremely deadly and severely punished the Zeros, with an overall kill ratio of 11:1. (Which, of course includes a fair number of tokkotai planes, which hardly count.)

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It also includes non suicide non-fighters, and moreover it’s only a claim. It can’t be directly compared to the number I quoted above for the F4F v Zero in 1942, 1:1, which is actual Zeroes shot down by F4F’s and vice versa. The F4F claimed kill ratio against all comers was 5.9:1 in 1942. Needless to say Zero unit records claim a favorable kill ratio v the F4F. The F6F’s claimed kill ratio for the whole war was 19:1, but probably had even more non-fighters than the F4U’s.

The actual kill ratio v Japanese fighters of the later US fighters can’t be calculated comprehensively. The F4F was mainly an important fighter in 1942, when its fighter opponents were almost all land plane Zeroes (it had one sided success v Type 2 Float Fighters, aka float Zeroes, and in a few encounters with Type 96 Fighters), and the IJN fighter unit records are virtually complete (they are online actually, images of the handwritten originals)

They are increasingly incomplete in 1943 and quite incomplete by 1944-45 in the heyday of the F6F and F4U, which also often met Japanese Army fighters, whose records are very incomplete. Also the sheer scale of operations by 1944 makes it difficult to determine which units met which and whether data is complete in any given action.

But as far as F6F v F4U, the document ‘Naval Aviation Combat Statistics’ gave basically the same claimed kill ratio for both, ~15:1, in the period September 1 1944-end of war, v Japanese fighter types only. It’s still polluted by fighter types acting as suicide a/c, and surely overstated, though how much overstated can only be guessed. But the two had comparable success in fighter combat against ostensibly similar opposition in that period.

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The Spitfire kept the war from being lost. The Mustang won it.

Who’s to say which is the best? Not me.

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Overall “best” is debatable. The P-51 may well lay claim to that crown due to sheer versatility.

“best sounding” is not an easy choice either as that can be hung on anything running a RR merlin.

“most beautiful”…well, surely that is not even an argument worth having. Has to be the Spitfire yes?

Incidentally, last Friday my children were treated to a fly-over and aerobatics display by a Spitfire out of Biggin Hill. The ex-headmaster of their junior school was a Spitfire pilot in the war and even after retiring he’d come into the school and tell them stories on a regular basis. They all loved him and he passed away recently aged 96. Friday was his funeral but one of his requests was to arrange for the children to see a fly-past. My wife and I were out in the garden when I heard the utterly unmistakable burble of the merlin. We are about a mile from the school as the spitfire flies so had a visual and aural treat as well
Bear in mind this was the east coast of Kent, in the height of summer, a hot day, gin-clear blue sky studded with fluffy white clouds. A classic Battle of Britain canvas only needing the main subject of the piece. It was poignant to say the least.
My wife is a soppy sod and was blubbing away. Myself? I suffer from hay fever and it was particularly bad on Friday which is why my eyes were gritty and watering.

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Which propeller aircraft were used in the Korean War besides the P-51 and the Corsair?

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The Twin Mustang, I think. The Skyraider for sure. The b29, maybe the a26.

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huh. I always thought the Spitfire was very plain looking. P-51, P-38 or F4U Corsair for me, and a handful of others over the Spit. :shrug:

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Fighters: besides F-82 as already mentioned, F7F Tigercat, Seafire, Firefly, Sea Fury, Yak-9, La-9, La-11. Other combat a/c: RB/SB-17, B-26 (A-26 Invader of WWII, not B-26 Marauder), B-29, RB-36, RB-50, PBM Mariner, PB4Y Privateer, P2V Neptune, AD Skyraider, Il-10, Tu-2, Yak-11 advanced trainers used as day strike a/c in the first days of the war and later as night raiders, Yak-18 and Po-2 primary trainers used as night raiders; A-20 (one Soviet Lend Lease example shot down by USN near Korea during the war).

UN air crews sometimes reported Communist P-39/63 types, and enemy P-51’s (the PLAAF did still have some), a/c believed to have been Pe-2’s were sighted at night (again PLAAF had them), but these could all have been ID mistakes. The early P-39 sightings were Yak-9’s for example, that’s clear from captured NK documents. F-80’s once strayed into the USSR and strafed real P-63’s at a Soviet base, if that counts as the P-63 participating in the war.

I noted in looking around that no single website is complete on this (though not 100% sure this list is either, and doesn’t include non-combat types).

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Thanks, Corry El.

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PS, you could also include ROKAF AT-6 advanced trainers used as ad hoc strike a/c in the first days of the war, even if you don’t judge their use by USAF as Forward Air Control a/c to make them a combat type.