# Blockchain tech for votes

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [October 10, 2017, 1:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478 "2017-10-10T13:06:30Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 6

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![steronz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steronz/32/11765_2.png) [@steronz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/steronz)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/101 "2017-10-13T15:02:49Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Yes. That one failure point - distribution of keys - has to be watched in person by observers from all parties. Later voting doesn’t have to be done in person.  
> Can’t. It’s done in person. Physically. People come in and leave with the keys. And each is marked off as having received them. The keys they received are publicly, transparently, recorded in the blockchain at the time they are distributed. You can put as many keys as you want on the thumb drive, but if they are not recorded in the blockchain, they are useless. And you cannot add them to the blockchain later because it is tamper-proof.

Oh. Umm. OK, I didn’t realize you were envisioning some grueling in-person distribution of the keys. Key theft can also be a problem, but I guess this does temper some of the concerns about mass fraud.

That said, I’m going to shift here and agree with the other posters who are arguing that this is unnecessarily complicated.

Consider an alternate scenario. What we have now, where people walk in, get verified by non-partisan election officials, and sign a paper ballot, is not that different from what you’re describing with the key distribution except the paper ballots are “difficult” to count. And when I say difficult, I don’t actually think it’s that hard but it can’t be done by the public and the numbers do seem to fluctuate slightly during recounts. Let’s tweak this scenario slightly – the government creates a PKI root key and distributes digital signature tokens to each polling station. When someone walks in and gets verified to vote, instead of doing it on paper and physically signing it, they do it electronically and it gets digitally signed by the polling station’s key. This digitally-signed but now-anonymous ballot is then published publicly where anyone with access to the polling station’s public key can verify it and do their own count.

Does this not accomplish the same thing without having to generate thousands of private keys and worry about distributing them in person under the watchful eye of observers?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/102 "2017-10-13T15:03:38Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> A completely separate issue. If the keys are issued on paper, that’s the equivalent of “paper wallet” in cryptocurrency, and is not hackable (unless someone stealing the piece of paper is “hacking”).

Keys issues on paper?

How long are these keys going to be? You do realize that most of the time public/private keys are quite long sequences of essentially gibberish.

So, you are adding one more step in voting, transcribing a couple/few hundred digit key that is not necessarily going to be using all characters easily found on a keyboard.

Any mistake means that they have to start over.

Plus, as far as proving your vote, you have this piece of paper that you are going to need to hold onto. It is not likely that you are going to be able to commit it to memory.

So, when your friend/boss/spouse/bully/payor asks to see your vote, you are going to need to pull out your voting card, with your unique key on it. It’s going to be hard to memorize your own key, and you expect that people will memorize a separate key after they research to find a ballot that conforms to expectations?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/103 "2017-10-13T15:04:41Z")

</div>

> [@Czarcasm](#):
>
> If the voting isn’t done in person, what stops people from handing over keys to friends and/or family?

Nothing. What stops people from voting the way someone tells them to? What stops people from handing over mail-in ballots? The blockchain doesn’t solve that problem, but the problem exists in the current system as well.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Czarcasm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/czarcasm/32/4050_2.png) [@Czarcasm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Czarcasm)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/104 "2017-10-13T15:05:24Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> As I already pointed out, there needs to be some trust of government at some point or points in the process. The scheme I proposed minimizes the need for that trust to one point in the process (distribution of keys) and adds supervision and verification at that one point.

This scheme does not in any way minimize the need for trust people do not currently have for the government-it definitely increases it, because you are telling people to trust the government that they already do not trust because it is now using _science_(refer back to post #57).

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/105 "2017-10-13T15:08:48Z")

</div>

> [@steronz](#):
>
> Consider an alternate scenario. What we have now, where people walk in, get verified by non-partisan election officials, and sign a paper ballot, is not that different from what you’re describing with the key distribution except the paper ballots are “difficult” to count. And when I say difficult, I don’t actually think it’s that hard but it can’t be done by the public and the numbers do seem to fluctuate slightly during recounts. Let’s tweak this scenario slightly – the government creates a PKI root key and distributes digital signature tokens to each polling station. When someone walks in and gets verified to vote, instead of doing it on paper and physically signing it, they do it electronically and it gets digitally signed by the polling station’s key. This digitally-signed but now-anonymous ballot is then published publicly where anyone with access to the polling station’s public key can verify it and do their own count.

Doesn’t eliminate tampering after the fact, by the government. The beauty of blockchain is impossibility of tampering with it after it is recorded.

> [@](#):
>
> Does this not accomplish the same thing without having to generate thousands of private keys and worry about distributing them in person under the watchful eye of observers?

Your method requires watchful eye of observers as well. Otherwise digital stuffing of ballots can easily occur.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Czarcasm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/czarcasm/32/4050_2.png) [@Czarcasm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Czarcasm)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/106 "2017-10-13T15:09:23Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Nothing. What stops people from voting the way someone tells them to? What stops people from handing over mail-in ballots? The blockchain doesn’t solve that problem, but the problem exists in the current system as well.

Not the same at all, because no matter how much pressure is put on a person to vote one way, they can still vote any way they choose then lie about it. This option is taken away using your blockchain tech because the person holding the keys is doing the voting.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![steronz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steronz/32/11765_2.png) [@steronz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/steronz)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/107 "2017-10-13T15:11:22Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Doesn’t eliminate tampering after the fact, by the government. The beauty of blockchain is impossibility of tampering with it after it is recorded.

After what fact? If it’s published immediately where anyone can see it… when is the time for tampering? The number of votes received by each polling station is public and can be verified.

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Your method requires watchful eye of observers as well. Otherwise digital stuffing of ballots can easily occur.

Sure. Personally I don’t think it’s necessary but the current system already allows for plenty of distrust if you don’t trust that the government is maintaining accurate voter roles and correctly using them to verify voters.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/108 "2017-10-13T15:12:14Z")

</div>

> [@k9bfriender](#):
>
> So, when your friend/boss/spouse/bully/payor asks to see your vote, you are going to need to pull out your voting card, with your unique key on it. It’s going to be hard to memorize your own key, and you expect that people will memorize a separate key after they research to find a ballot that conforms to expectations?

The “research” takes exactly 10 seconds on any web site that can examine the votes - unless it is some really fringe candidate, but then I am sure there will be searches built into those sites that will bring up all the keys that were transferred to any candidate. Just pick one.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/109 "2017-10-13T15:14:58Z")

</div>

> [@Czarcasm](#):
>
> Not the same at all, because no matter how much pressure is put on a person to vote one way, they can still vote any way they choose then lie about it. This option is taken away using your blockchain tech because the person holding the keys is doing the voting.

1. Not if it is a mail-in ballot. The whole state of Oregon does it that way, today.

2. After you vote, discard your private key (you don’t need it anymore). And hide your public key and substitute another that voted the way someone pressured you to vote.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/110 "2017-10-13T15:16:09Z")

</div>

> [@steronz](#):
>
> After what fact? If it’s published immediately where anyone can see it… when is the time for tampering? The number of votes received by each polling station is public and can be verified.

The number - yes. The content - no. That can be tampered with unless it is made tamper-proof - like blockchain does.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Czarcasm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/czarcasm/32/4050_2.png) [@Czarcasm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Czarcasm)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/111 "2017-10-13T15:16:46Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Doesn’t eliminate tampering after the fact, by the government. The beauty of blockchain is impossibility of tampering with it after it is recorded.  
> Your method requires watchful eye of observers as well. Otherwise digital stuffing of ballots can easily occur.

If the actual voting isn’t done in person, then where are you putting these observers? You can’t track where the keys go after they are handed out, so having observers during the distribution is less than useless. Like ticket scalping, where people that have no intention of attending an event pick up tickets to hand to a scalper, blockchain tech will create “keyscalpers”.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/112 "2017-10-13T15:20:04Z")

</div>

> [@Czarcasm](#):
>
> If the actual voting isn’t done in person, then where are you putting these observers? You can’t track where the keys go after they are handed out, so having observers during the distribution is less than useless.

Again, just like you can’t track where the ballots go after you mail them out.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Czarcasm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/czarcasm/32/4050_2.png) [@Czarcasm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Czarcasm)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/113 "2017-10-13T15:27:58Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Again, just like you can’t track where the ballots go after you mail them out.

So on that account, blockchain is no worse,_and no better_ than mail in ballots?

1. With blockchain tech, is a personal signature required for the vote to count, like it is with the current mail in ballots?
2. What is the estimated cost to gt this up and running?
3. Would the institute operating this technology be government owned and run, or private?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![DPRK](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/4491bb/32.png) [@DPRK](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DPRK)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/114 "2017-10-13T15:30:06Z")

</div>

What is the ultimate goal here? To enable an election to proceed from start to finish without anyone ever setting foot in a polling place?

Because if voters have to show up somewhere in person, they may as well use the equipment there.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![steronz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steronz/32/11765_2.png) [@steronz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/steronz)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/115 "2017-10-13T15:32:23Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> The number - yes. The content - no. That can be tampered with unless it is made tamper-proof - like blockchain does.

Or a PKI digital signature…

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/116 "2017-10-13T15:35:22Z")

</div>

> [@Czarcasm](#):
>
> So on that account, blockchain is no worse,_and no better_ than mail in ballots?

In that respect, correct. In other respects, a lot better. As I already outlined, several times.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Okrahoma](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/90db22/32.png) [@Okrahoma](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Okrahoma)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/117 "2017-10-13T15:37:20Z")

</div>

> [@steronz](#):
>
> Or a PKI digital signature…

Except later, more ballots can be signed with that same signature and stuffed into the ledger.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![steronz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steronz/32/11765_2.png) [@steronz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/steronz)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/118 "2017-10-13T15:37:40Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> In that respect, correct. In other respects, a lot better. As I already outlined, several times.

And in even other respects, you must admit, it’s a lot worse.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![steronz](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/steronz/32/11765_2.png) [@steronz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/steronz)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/119 "2017-10-13T15:38:41Z")

</div>

> [@Okrahoma](#):
>
> Except later, more ballots can be signed with that same signature and stuffed into the ledger.

Then the counts will be off, and people who have been observing the ballots as they’re posted publicly will see the difference.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Czarcasm](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/czarcasm/32/4050_2.png) [@Czarcasm](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Czarcasm)\
**Post date:** [October 13, 2017, 3:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478/120 "2017-10-13T15:39:39Z")

</div>

What actual and existing problem does this tec prevent?

[Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478.md?page=5)

[Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/blockchain-tech-for-votes/798478.md?page=7)
