Can you quote the thing in full that you’re talking about? I’m completely lost as to who is talking about what piece of legal language.
I didn’t cut anything out of anything, I was paraphrasing (literally none of the phrasing of what I wrote is exactly like anything that’s been quoted)–I was merely explaining what it was about the structure of the legal language which made me suspect that “commission of a crime” is supposed to be sufficient but not necessary after all (despite my initial reading, which continues to seem the most plausible to me, that says the condition is stated as necessary and not merely sufficient).
Okay, I missed upthread Darth Panda’s quotation from an ehow article:
“In the Florida Court of Appeals case “Ripley v. The State of Florida” (2005), it was made clear that the content of citizen’s arrest law is identical to an officer arresting someone outside of their normal jurisdiction.”
It appears I don’t have a way to find the actual text of the decision, but in any case, is this indeed the legal document you guys (Bricker, Rand Rover, Richard Parker, and Muffins I think is a lawyer too?) would refer to in order to answer the question “Is probable cause sufficient for a citizen arrest to be permissible in Florida?” In other words, does that decision say what the article says it says, and is it binding precedent in Florida?
I must have misspelled it. The decision is here. It says an arrest was illegitimate because it was made by officers outside their jurisdiction without probable cause. It also says that the officers were acting “under color of law,” undermining the defendant’s argument that they were executing a citizens arrest since they were not acting under color of law.
Those look like the only two relevant bits from the decision. Did I miss something? I don’t see how either or both taken together implies that probable cause is sufficient for a citizen’s arrest to be permissible. The bit about probable caues from the decision implies that probable cause is necessary, but does not imply that it is sufficient.
Here is a fact sheet authored by the Maryland Bar Association. This applies to citizen’s arrest in Maryland, of course, so we can’t assume the same is in effect in Florida. But make of it what you will until one of our esteemed lawyers supports their opinions with cites.
Yeah, the thread is 202 posts long, which is why I asked for the pointer to the laws in question. Moreover I was asking Bricker, specifically (and the Rand Rover when he interjected) what language they, in particular, believe can be found which establishes their point. A lot of language has been quoted–but I don’t know who considers what language to actually be applicable or binding or whatever.
You and ywtbuttf are having a problem understanding the “commits a felony” and “a felony having occurred” part. You seem to think it requires a finding by a judge that a felony has actually been committed. But it’s not saying that–it’s just saying that the citizen making the arrest believes the person they are arresting did something that would constitute a felony if it’s proven the person did that in court. That’s it. It’s getting only at the “doing something” part of a felony, not the “yep, the judge said you did it” part.
Thank you for that. The text says: “A private citizen may arrest a person who…X…” Can you tell me whether, in legal contexts, X here is to be interpreted as a necessary condition on the permissibility of the arrest, or instead a sufficient condition?
I do not think this at all. I think the commission of a felony is logically independent of a judge’s or jury’s finding that a felony has been committed. I have neither said nor implied otherwise, and have already corrected Bricker on this point as well.
But it says “a felony having occured, the person believes…” It doesn’t say “The person believes a felony has occured…”
I should note, though, that I’ve now realized that it doesn’t have to be the arrestee that committed the felony in order for the arrest to be permissible. A felony needs to have occured (as far as I can still tell, despite your explanation), but it need not be the arrestee who committed the felony, rather, it need only be that the arrester thinks it’s the arrestee who committed the felony that occured.
That’s silly. Others are very likely to know exactly where it is already, or barring that, know some keywords to ctrl-F. Much more efficient than reading through potentially 202 posts.
This seems like a problem to answer because of your inability to parse words correctly.
The two words - probable cause - do not, in fact, completely describe what a citizen needs to make an arrest.
The words refer to the level of proof in to citizen’s mind. So, for example, the citizen needs a mind. I didn’t mention that.
There must be a person to arrest – a person who is the target of the probable cause belief. So another thing that is needed is an arrestee. I did not specifically mention that.
There has to be a citizen who performs the arrest.
These things are all implied by saying, “Probable cause is what’s necessary to support a citizen’s arrest.”
But those are the sorts of things that are implied by saying that probable cause is the only thing needed. And in the hypothetical I proposed, they were all present.
In less than fifty words, explain how the necessary grounds for a citizens arrest differ from a police arrest. If you think the grounds are identical in the state of Florida, show that with a cite.
The fact pattern I laid out, in fact, was not complete imagination. It was inspired by the events on March 13, 1973, when one Robert John Pokorny, who was described rather un-politically-correctly in the court’s opinion as a “deaf mute,” entered First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Largo, Florida. He ultimately sued the bank for false arrest and malicious prosecution, but did not prevail.
Now, there were some distinctions to be had, because the teller did not arrest him. But this case is offered to show that, as the Dunanvant case does, the court’s determination of the existence of probable cause are not concerned with the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused but whether or not the affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief.
The case you described doesn’t seem to satisfy the condition of either of the two decisions you quote above. One says, “a felony having occured,” and the other says, “a felony has been committed.” These are given as conditions on the permissibility of the citizen’s arrest. It seems as though in the case you describe wherein the man didn’t commit a felony (or any other crime), a citizen’s arrest would not be supported by either of the two decisions.
Okay, that seems to introduce new information. Two of the decisions you’ve cited list commission of a crime as a condition on the permissibility of the arrest, but this third decision seems to be saying something incompatible with that, since it seems to be saying a citizen’s arrest would have been permissible in a case wherein a warrant was issued and the arrest was made pursuant to that warrant, even if a crime had not been committed.
I said “seems to be saying something incompatible” because I think it’s not actually incompatible. It looks like a complete statement encompassing what’s said in all three cases would be something like this:
A citizen may arrest someone if that person committed a crime in the presence of the citizen, or a crime was committed and the citizen has probable cause that that person committed that crime, or the citizen swears out a warrant for the person’s arrest (with all the conditions necessary for the swearing out of warrants) and arrests the person pursuant to that warrant.