This seems like it shouldn’t be happening. Haven’t these guys been through enough?
Having been involved with marine casualties for last three decades, I’m familiar with how these investigations work. It’s often possible from the preliminary report to determine (either directly or by reading between the lines) what went wrong but not so in this case.
Being on a vessel for seven weeks at a time is not actually unusual for seafarers – you just don’t normally hear about it. A standard international seafarers’ contract is for 6-12 months. It would not be at all unusual for them not to leave the vessel much or even at all for the entirety of that period.
However, the one point from that article that does stand out to me as an unusual hardship is the seafarers not having access to their phones. The one saving grace for 21st century seafarers (as shore leave has become harder to obtain) is the relative ease with which they can usually contact their family, at least when they are in port and within cellphone range.
Yeah, that’s pretty normal for them. They probably would have been stuck on the ship for that long anyway. Sailors do sometimes get stuck for extended periods though - some crewmen of the Yellow Fleet were stuck for years.
Is that really true? The ships themselves were stuck for eight years, but according to the Wikipedia article you cited,
In time, it was possible to reduce the number of crew members on board the ships, and in 1969 the ships were gathered into several groups to further reduce the number of crew necessary for their upkeep. Those crew that were left to maintain the vessels were rotated every three months. In 1972, the last crew members of the German ships were finally sent home, with the maintenance of the ships left to a Norwegian company.
It sounds like few or none of the crew actually remained there for the whole 8 years.
But someone had to be there to tend the ships during those 8 years, even if the crews were rotated out periodically.
Thanks for the cite. I haven’t read through the whole thing yet but it sound like the breakers were an earlier issue. I’ve had house breakers fail over time until they were just crap. Obviously that’s a simplified example but at what point are industrial breakers deemed faulty? In this case one of them was stressed from a privious event.
A cursory reading didn’t show anything remarkable. Basically what everyone guessed.
About 0125, the Dali was 0.6 miles—or three ship lengths—from the Key Bridge
when electrical breakers (HR1 and LR1) that fed most of the vessel’s equipment and
lighting unexpectedly opened (tripped) (see figure 7). This caused the first blackout
(loss of electrical power) to all shipboard lighting and most equipment, including the
main engine cooling water pumps (which controlled engine cooling water pressure)
and steering gear pumps.The main propulsion diesel engine was independent of the vessel’s four diesel-
driven electrical generators; however, the loss of electrical power to the pumps
required for its operation resulted in the main engine being automatically shut down,
and the vessel lost main propulsion, meaning its propeller stopped.The loss of electrical power stopped all three steering pumps, and, therefore,
the rudder was unable to be moved. At the time, the ship was on a heading of 141.7°,
a course over ground of 140.8°, and speed over ground of 9.0 knots, with the rudder
amidships (0°).< snip >
According to the crew, the emergency generator started and connected to the
emergency bus (its breaker would have closed) shortly after the vessel lost electrical
power. At this time, the NTSB is still investigating the exact time when the emergency
generator started and connected to the emergency bus. Typical for oceangoing
vessels, the Dali had an emergency diesel generator (in addition to the four
generators) that could be configured to automatically start and connect to the
emergency bus if normal electrical power and lighting were lost. When the
emergency bus was powered, emergency lighting, navigation and radio equipment,
alarms, and other emergency equipment would have been available, and the
designated emergency steering pump (no. 3) would have been available to turn the
rudder at its low-speed setting. (When operated alone using emergency electrical
power, steering pump no. 3 was designed to run at a lower speed, turning the rudder
at a slower rate than with all pumps.) However, without the propeller turning, the
rudder would have been less effective.
The question seems to be why did those electrical breakers tripped. The report mentions two power outtages while at dock but whether those tell us something or are unrelated they do not know yet.
On March 25, about 10 hours before leaving Baltimore, the Dali experienced a
blackout (loss of electrical power to the HV and LV buses) during in-port
maintenance.7 While working on the diesel engine exhaust scrubber system for the
diesel engine driving the only online generator (generator no. 2), a crewmember
mistakenly closed an inline engine exhaust damper. Closure of this damper
effectively blocked the engine’s cylinder exhaust gases from traveling up its stack and
out of the vessel, causing the engine to stall. When the system detected a loss of
power, generator no. 3 automatically started and connected to the HV bus.Vessel power was restored when crewmembers manually closed HR2 and LR2.
Generator no. 3 continued to run for a short period, but insufficient fuel pressure caused its speed to decrease, and its breaker (DGR3) opened; a second blackout (another loss of electrical power to the HV and LV buses) occurred. In the meantime, the crew had reopened generator no. 2’s engine exhaust damper, and the generator automatically restarted and then connected to the HV bus when DGR2 closed.While recovering from this second blackout, the crew switched the bus configuration to use breakers HR1 and LR1 and the bus’s associated transformer (TR1) instead of breakers HR2 and LR2, which had been in use for several months. TR1 and its associated breakers, HR1 and LR1, were in use when the ship departed on March 26.
The first in-port blackout was caused by the mechanical blocking of the online
generator’s exhaust gas stack. The second blackout in port was related to insufficient
fuel pressure for the online generator. During both of these electrical power-loss
events, the online generators’ breakers (DGR2 and DGR3) to the HV bus opened
before the HR2 or LR2 breakers opened. During the recovery, the crew put TR1
online to feed the LV bus because TR2 had reportedly been in use for several months.
The first vessel blackout after departure on March 26 occurred when the HR1
and LR1 breakers opened unexpectedly.
I’m not sure if there will ever be a smoking gun on this. To what extent is a ship’s captain supposed to be suspicious of every mechanical event? If it’s working when the ship pulls out then where is the line drawn on looking for trouble?
It’s in my nature to be suspicious of prior mechanical issues but I’m not in charge of millions of dollars of freight being held back “looking for trouble”. That’s a lot of pressure that requires hard evidence something wrong. I wouldn’t want to flounder out in the Atlantic during a storm but again, there has to be hard evidence. I might think in terms of keeping the tugs a few minutes longer as a precaution because of the vulnerability of the bridge. That’s an added expense that can probably be absorbed.
Very glad for these updates. Thanks, all.
I didn’t note it in the post I made above but I think it is worth knowing that the main engine had automatic shutdown protocols when something else went wrong. In this case, the other things going wrong caused the engine to stop. It is not a simple thing to restart it. Out at sea, no biggie. Certainly not in the little time they had while heading towards the bridge.
The engine stopping made the rudder much less effective.
ETA: The crew was drug tested and everyone passed that test (no one was drunk or on drugs).
Which, it’s worth noting, is not a given among smaller and/or less scrupulous ship operators. It’s not uncommon (in my experience of reading ship accident reports) to find the officer of the watch (i.e. the main person with responsibility for avoiding collisions) has been drinking before or even on duty.
The worst one I’ve seen (albeit I don’t think it involved alcohol, though I can’t remember) was a larger ship colliding with a smaller barge in the straits between Sweden and Denmark, sinking the latter with the loss of 3 crew. The person in charge of steering the larger ship, who had been video calling (I suspect with naked ladies) which distracted him from keeping a proper watch, initially tried to cover things up (rather than immediately raising the alarm and turning his ship around to try and rescue the other ship’s crew) and it was only when the coastguard contacted the ship (having been alerted to the emergency beacon activating on the sunk barge) that it all came out. I hope they threw the book at him.
Good article on how the ship’s crew have been coping with the aftermath of the dietary disaster:
I didn’t notice any mention of a food fuck-up.
Maybe the captain decided to abruptly change course when he saw a McDonald’s drive-thru sign on shore.
They’re going to refloat the Dali on Monday 21-May at high tide (05:24L).
Do you mean Monday the 20th or Tuesday the 21st?
More of an autocorrect disaster, I guess. Sorry for the mayhem.
Refloating on Monday.
Sorry. I’m under the weather. Monday the 20th unless they hit something else.
One of the better links covering this:
Minorcan Mullet https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=minorcan+mullet+live
You will have to choose the most current video.
They will have to pump out some 2.5 million gallons of the ballast used to stabilize the ship. It’s contaminated so it can’t be directly released. The port anchor will have to be brought up or released. It’s 2.5 miles back to port and it will move at a speed of 1 knot utilizing 5 tugs.