Bush and Nukes

[jshore]

*Originally posted by Sam Stone *
This defense policy review is also nothing new. These studies are done every few years, to reasses the threats that the government faces and to adjust battle plans accordingly…In short, you’re making much out of nothing.

[Sorry to be joining this debate a bit late; I’ve been a bit slow to get around to this issue.]

Well, I’m not so sure, Sam. Here is a link to an opinion piece in the L.A. Times by William Arkin, who has a variety of credentials including senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, an adjunct professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies (which you ought to like), and a regular contributor to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (which admittedly you won’t like too much): http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-arkinmar10.story

Here are some relevant quotes:

Nevertheless, the Bush administration plan reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort. It also redefines nuclear requirements in hurried post-Sept. 11 terms.

They seek a host of new weapons and support systems, including conventional military and cyber warfare capabilities integrated with nuclear warfare. The end product is a now-familiar post-Afghanistan model–with nuclear capability added. It combines precision weapons, long-range strikes, and special and covert operations.

But the NPR’s call for development of new nuclear weapons that reduce “collateral damage” myopically ignores the political, moral and military implications–short-term and long–of crossing the nuclear threshold.

Under what circumstances might nuclear weapons be used under the new posture? The NPR says they “could be employed against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack,” or in retaliation for the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or “in the event of surprising military developments.”

Along the lines of the idea of employing nuclear weapons against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack, there is an op-ed piece in the LA Times (March 17) by three scientists, Sidney Drell, Raymond Jeanloz, and Bob Peurifoy, that discusses this. Unfortunately, I can’t find a link to it without folks having to pay the LA Times archives fee to access it, but I’ll give you a few relevant quotations (basically the first two and the last paragraph of the piece) which gives their basic thesis:

A myth is emerging that we can develop low-yield nuclear weapons that will destroy hardened, deeply buried targets of military interest without contaminating the atmosphere with deadly radioactivity. Such weapons, delivered by bombers, must penetrate below the Earth’s surface before detonating in order to create the maximum destructive ground shock.

There are problems with this myth: Its validity is doubtful and its consequences are dangerous. Low-yield nuclear weapons have limited effectiveness against buried targets and they would disperse significant amounts of radioactivity. Perhaps more important, however, the deployment of such weapons would likely have an extremely harmful effect on ongoing efforts to slow–if not prevent–the proliferation of nuclear weapons…

Attaching false hopes to low-yield nuclear weapons for destroying buried targets is no reason to undermine the so-far-successful efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And resumption of underground nuclear explosions in the quest for these so-called “more usable” nuclear weapons would harm the nonproliferation treaty and, thus, ournational security.

By the way, those who want to read leaked sections of the Nuclear Posture Review (and I must admit that I haven’t yet) can do so here: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm

[Sam_Stone]

I don’t argue that there has been a doctrinal shift, but that has more to do with the end of the cold war than anything else. The U.S. did have plans to use nuclear weapons for theater defense, and even built a number of battlefield nuclear weapons such as the W-54 “Davey Crockett”.

All I can add is that the Russians have stated that they see this as no big deal at all.

[evilhanz]

The power of our nuclear weapons is not their explosive yield or the radioactivity they might unleash, but the fear they instill in those who might threaten the interests of the US or its allies. That fear has largely disappeared with the fall of the USSR. Prior NPR’s assume superpower conflicts across continents which are no longer realistic. This policy shift represents a credible threat to those rogue states and terrorist organizations who might sneak under the radar screen with regional offensives or terrorism using WMD. This is a perfectly rational position and reflects well on our current leadership. The NPR is not a computer program “if A>1 then launch all missiles”, but strategic planning to prepare our forces for the kind of conflicts they can expect to face in the years ahead and ensure they have the tools to do the job effectively. The possible scenarios described merely illustrate why a policy change is necessary and how the revised policy would prepare us to face that threat. When a conflict arises, NPR or not, the decision to use nuclear weapons still lies with the President.

When our defense policies change, don’t listen to columnists with an agenda. Listen to the Russians. This is a responsible and reasonable policy.

[SuaSponte]

::Sigh:: I’m sure that, somewhere deep in Pentagon files, there is a contingency plan for fending off an attack by hostile aliens. Hell, I’m sure that somewhere there is a contingency plan for a nuclear attack on Canada.

It doesn’t mean that it’s going to happen.

Sua