“Bungling diplomacy” does not mean having failed to persuade France, Russia, and Germany. There are a number of reasons why those three specific countries may have refused to join the coalition or provide support in the U.N.
“Bungling diplomacy” notes that Bush could not get even a simple majority of members on the Security Council to actively support him (and had trouble twisting enough arms to get a majority to grudgingly vote with the U.S.). “Bungling diplomacy” notes that it took the administration over two months to get such mighty warriors nations as Eritrea, Iceland, and Palau (while lacking a lot of NATO countries) to come on board and got only four countries to send troops. “Bungling diplomacy” indicates that there was such resistance to his efforts, world-wide, that most of his Arab supporters (many of whom appear to have been coerced to begin with) could not publicly declare their support for fear of their own populations. “Bungling diplomacy” notes that they sent Powell into the U.N. with badly forged evidence. “Bungling diplomacy” reflects such idiotic comments as Rumsfeld cutting Blair off at the knees the week before the invasion saying that the U.S. would go in alone if Britain backed out. “Bungling diplomacy” notes that Bush was barely able to get a majority of his own citizens to agree to his “go it alone” stance while the appearance of actual international support would have raised that number to nearly three-quarters, prior to the invasion.