The US also cannot allow him to gain access to The Necronomicon, and the dark supernatural powers therein contained. About as plausible.
Sure, he might recruit terrorists to sacrifice themselves for the greater glory of Saddam. Those muslims who believe that Saddam is directly connected to Allah, for instance, those who believe that dying for Saddam ensures direct admission to Paradise.
No matter what WMD’s Saddam may or may not get, in the near or distant future, the US can turn Iraq into a vast expanse of fused green glass at any moment it chooses. There is no deterrent to that much power. The US has been bitch-slapping Saddam bin Laden’s face now for 11 years and his retaliation has been entirely symbolic.
The ruling Saudi family may, indeed, be afraid of Saddam. They are more afraid of Saudi Arabians.
And how exactly do you know all of this, these inner thoughts of Saddam?
And while we’re at it, anybody care to take up the “containment” vs. “regime change” argument? It seemed we were heading there a coupla posts ago before this side-track.
References to H.P. Lovecraft are always welcome, even when the underlying argument is spurious.
As a keen observer on the previous page noted, “1) The International Institute for Strategic Studies issued a report indicating that Iraq could assemble a nuclear weapon within months if fissile material from foreign sources (read: Russia?) were obtained. Otherwise, the process could take several years.”
That’s setting aside biological weapons, which apparently are easier to make if we are to believe Robert Wright of Slate.
Why? “Inspections can only do one thing well: verify that a country’s declarations about a weapons program are honest and complete. It is feasible for inspectors to look at sites and equipment to see whether the official story about their use is accurate… It is a different proposition altogether to wander about a country looking for what has been deliberately concealed. That is a task with no end.”
Of course experts may differ on this subject. The Carnegie Foundation seems to believe it has come up with a plausible arrangement whereby arms inspectors are accompanied by soldiers (or sitting ducks for the Revolutionary Guard?).
Personally, I would advocate giving the arms inspection one last shot. I’m reluctant to send a military force to accompany them, though I would demand that certain Iraqi personnel and their families be permitted to be interviewed outside of Iraqi borders and placed in a witness protection program, if necessary.