Not analogous at all, in my opinion. If a government bill is rejected by the Commons, it means that the PM has lost the confidence of the House and either resigns or calls an election.
In the US, if the Congress overrides a veto, it has no effect on the President’s tenure of office. He just shrugs.
And overriding a veto never even comes up at all unless the President already disagrees with a majority of Congress over something. In a parliamentary system, if the PM disagrees with the majority of the legislature on something big, they cease to be the PM. In the US system, it’s Tuesday.
Unfortunately, the Founding Fathers couldn’t imagine that someone insane like, say, King George III could ever possibly rise to the position of President and ignore/subvert the other two branches. The Constitution just wasn’t set up for that possibility. Still it took damn near 250 years for Trump to be the exception rather than the rule, so we had a good run. If we get out of this, we need at least an amended constitution to deal with the modern political animals and their insane lust for power.
It could have happened in 2021 if Mitch McConnell had a spine. Pretty sure if he had supported conviction and disqualification then it would have happened. With his weasel-worded rationalization for voting no he allowed Trump to hang around. Between that and his Supreme Court machinations he is the proximate cause of our current predicament.
(Emphasis added.) The parliamentary loss of confidence is split into the veto override and the impeachment process in the American system. They are both analogous to (different parts of) a loss of confidence vote.
Wouldn’t a no-confidence vote be more of declaring the Speaker’s Chair vacant?
No, because it doesn’t trigger an election. That’s the most significant point of a non-confidence vote.
Umm … yes it does for a new Speaker.
Or do you mean it doesn’t trigger a nationwide vote?
I think that @Northern_Piper is referring to a nationwide vote.
In a Westminster parliament, a vote of non-confidence in the government generally triggers a nationwide vote. It doesn’t have to; there are a couple of other options that can be used. But typically, it does trigger a national election.
Yes, that’s what I mean. A vote of non-confidence means that the legislature is usually dissolved. All members of the lower house lose their seats, the executive led by the Prime Minister goes into caretaker mode, and everyone hits the hustings.
Neither a motion to remove the Speaker, nor impeachment and conviction, have any similar effect of a wholesale election. Overriding a veto is just part of the legislative process and doesn’t trigger any elections.
Think of the times that Speaker McCarthy got defeated on budget measures. In the US system, that just means, try again.
In Westminster systems, that would mean the entire house is dissolved and a general election, so everyone who voted for the budget measure, and everyone who voted against it, appeals to the people to decide the dispute.
There’s nothing like that in the US system.
Prime minister is not directly paralleled anywhere in the US system. Speaker of the house also exists in the Westminster system but is a very different animal to PM.
The important question about confidence is how the PM is accorded the right to form a government. The PM is appointed by the root of power, typically the monarch or monarch’s representative. In order to be so appointed they must demonstrate that they have the confidence of the parliament. This idea goes back before the time of entrenched party politics.
A PM can lose a vote of confidence, in which case they are bound to report to the monarch that they have lost the confidence of the parliament. The monarch, in principle, now decides what happens next. If someone else can demonstrate that they now have the confidence of the parliament, they may get invited to form a new government. If there isn’t anyone, an election for the house is called and parliament dissolved. An additional way a PM loses confidence is when his own party turns on him. Then there is no formal vote of confidence, rather it is assumed that if the majority party in the house have rolled their leader, a new party leader who does have the support of the party has the confidence of the parliament and can be invited to form government. So he trundles down the road to have chat with the monarch. This used to be almost unheard of, until the 80’s. Now it is more of a revolving door.
If a party is ruling as a minority government, typically with the support of a minor party or independent MPs, it is lot more fluid. In principle, those individuals that hold the balance of power could side with the other parties and force a loss of a confidence motion. That would almost certainly trigger an election. Although, in principle, it need not. (There is in principle some wiggle room for the monarch to be sensible in the face of parliamentary bad behaviour.) Such a vote is however something of a nuclear option, as those that swapped allegiance may find that they do not do well in the upcoming election. Given minor parties or independents are essentially unheard of actually holding down seats in the house in the US, the idea is likely even more foreign.
The Westminster system has a speaker who essentially controls the floor of the house in a superficial way. Mostly keeping order. (Such as the Westminster system ever has order in the house.) The speaker is expected to be independent of the government, although in practice they are usually appointed from within the winning party. That party loses the speaker’s vote at this point. Which can be important.
A Prime Minister has most of the authority of the US president. However the manner in which the executive is formed is vastly different, and therein lies the essence of the difference. The Westminster system generally appoints the executive out of the elected members. Whilst the PM does the choosing, the pool is very small and choices usually need to take into account all the usual internal party politics. Actual appointments are performed by the monarch on the PM’s recommendation. The PM has no authority to direct the executive. Indeed attempts to do so are often career limiting.
The idea of an explicit PM (or Premier) is something of a modern concept and a lot of how it works is convention, depending somewhat on the particular country or state. Some of how it operates comes down to the history of how power was devolved from the monarch to an elected parliament without actually doing away with the monarchy.
Bolding mine, I’m not sure what you mean by this? In Canada, The PM delivers to each Minister a mandate letter which lays out the PM’s plan for that Ministry. If the Minister fails to deliver they will find themselves on the receiving end of a cabinet shuffle which ends up with the former Minister returned to the back benches.
That’s pretty interesting. Here in Oz we have seen some interesting counterpoints. A previous PM appointed himself as a second minister on one portfolio - without the knowledge of the substantive minister - with the express reason so that he could direct certain activities.
On reflection, I was being a bit glib with the wording. The nature of the position of PM and ministers is interesting. The ministers have the power to direct the ministries. The PM directs the ministers. So indeed, as the ministers comprise the executive, the PM may direct them.
Mea culpa.
Presumably, should a president be charged (after impeachment and removal) for what he did in office, part of the trial would be to decide whether what he did fell under the category of “presidential duties”. (Obviously serious enough it would get up to SCOTUS) Ordering Seal Team 6 to shoot someone would be a presidential duty, he’s commander in chief. (Not sure how the “unlawful order” aspect of military law plays out in that -up to the court to decide.) POTUS taking a pistol and going out on Fith Avenue himself might not fall under “presidential duties”.
IIRC in the Jean Carol case (second time) they tried to argue that press conferences were a presidential duty so he should not be liable for slander. Similarly, Mark Meadows in the Georgia case tried to argue his participation in the phone call fell under the category of duties of a Chief of Staff. Ultimately, that didn’t work.
The prorogue incident several years ago in Canada illustrated an interesting point. Harper was about to lose a confidence vote to a coalition of opposition, and so suspended (“prorogued”) parliament for 3 months. Three months later, the coalition fell apart and the danger was passed. The unproven unestablished consensus was that perhaps at 6 months after an election, it was too soon for another election, and the Governor General on behalf of the Queen had the option to ask the next biggest group to form a government if they had the confidence of parliament (they would have). At 9 months, it was felt that was long enough, the Governor general did not have discretion and should do as asked by the prime minister.
In reality, the monarch/GG has absolute discretion and can dissolve parliament and call an election. However, that’s a nuclear option to go against the wishes of the elected government. (It happened once in Australia, when parliament and senate were deadlocked.) The GG does what tradition says they should do.
Doesn’t matter for impeachment. The standard is ‘High Crimes or Misdemeanors’. That traditionally means abuse of power and according to the constitution means whatever the congress wants it to mean.
I was refering to after the POTUS has departed office, whether by impeachment or by term ending. he is still accountable if his actions are deemed a crime by the next administration (or more, up to statute of limitations). The court ultimately decides what actions fell within his duties, and hence unprosecutable as POTUS, or not.
Oh yes. 1975. I remember it well.
Trouble was, there was no precedent. That the GG had been a member of the currently elected party and appointed by the current PM made the actual action taken particularly galling for many. He dismissed the government, called an election, and installed the opposition party as caretaker. The last one was peculiar in some ways. But the critical aspect of the situation was that the opposition party controlled the senate, and they had blocked supply. So the government could not govern. The US seems to lurch from one crisis to another with appropriation. But here no deal was on the table.
So with the opposition now in control, albeit only in caretaker mode, government could operate.
The “constitutional crisis” isn’t wildly different to possible problems that might arise elsewhere. Could a senate very hostile to POTUS shut down the government to the point some form of nuclear option was forced? One assumes SCOTUS would become involved, which is the option we didn’t have in Oz. But if SCOTUS sides with the senate?
I get what you were saying now, I misread the first line of your post.
Naturally, the obvious question is whether he can pardon himself, and whether he can pardon himself (and others) secretly. “I did pardon them, I just didn’t announce it or write it down anywhere. They were pardoned in my heart -in pectore.” That too is ultimately a decision for SCOTUS to make as to what works and what does not, pardon-wise.
Did the framers of the constitution leave any musings about the pardon power? I can’t imagine they intended to allow the president to pardon himself, but absent any documentation, that line of originality is not proven.
I assume we’ve seen this - when the house and/or senate refuse to allow the necessary financing, the government shuts down. Only essential services can operate.
I assume the president gets to define “essential”, but anyone (with standing) can contest that in the courts. I don;t think SCOTUS has ruled on the definition of “essentail” because nobody has stretched that definition to the point of ludicrous in the few previous shutdowns.
But regardless, it still comes down to whether 67 senators will impeach. Otherwise, there’s no change in the status quo. The shutdowns typically revolve around borrowing authority (I think, it’s an odd situation) and there was always the suggestion that the mint could create a “trillion-dollar coin” thus defining enough cash the government could keep going, as suggested when Biden was close to a shutdown. Whether that works, depends on the views of SCOTUS like much about the government.
I know in Canada, the government can govern with orders-in-council if there is no budget and parliament is not sitting. When Clark defeated Trudeau in 1979 and then was defeated (on the budget vote) so Pierre Trudeau returned, it was around 2 years from one budget to the other.
I’m not sure what happens in the USA if there is no budget passed to authorize spending.