“I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do.
When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods,
you will understand why I dismiss yours.”
…Stephen F Roberts
CMC fnord!
Agreed.
I still have no reason to shift my needle. Even if there were a bias (and you could be lying, of course), I have zero information as to which way it’s biased, and so I still cannot say that <4 is any more or less likely than 4+. After a period of observation which provides extra relevant information, my needle might well waver.
What’s the difference, logically speaking?
I’m suggesting that weak atheism has no more to do with “not knowing” than strong theism. I’m merely asking, time and time again, how believing absence is not equivalent to disbelieving presence.
I acknowledge that: some people don’t have beliefs one way or another about some things, like me and your dice. But, yet again, how can someone who considers god’s existence just as likely as not be an atheist?
What? How can someone who considers god just as likely as no god be atheist? Surely they are just as much theists?
Yes. Calling them “atheists” means they’re oscillating between atheism and … what?
All of which I reject, incidentally. I don’t believe in “knowledge” except as shorthand for “very strong belief” since we might, just might, be wrong (ie. the belief is neither Justified nor True) about everything.
So it’s equivalent to very strong belief, yes? And evolution could still be wrong, yes? (Think MEB’s Hoaxmaster General god/Cartesian Daemon/Truman Show/Jacob’s Ladder/worldwide conspiracy etc.)
So the theist’s “I lack belief in evolution, and also lack belief in the absence of a Hoaxmaster god” is the default, yes? The point I’m making again and again is that any proposition can be cast in terms of “lack”, given binary exclusivity.
No, that’s sloppy terminology. There are alternative explanations for phenomena, and you (and me) choose the godless ones according to the principle of parsimony. Ockham’s Razor (OR) is a guiding principle, not an inviolate law, and people can reject it or interpret it differently. Your “evidence against god” assumes strict “natural-first OR”. If this is rejected or differently interpreted, there is no “evidence against god”, since any evidence could itself be considered by some to be evidence of god (eg. a Hoaxmaster).
Again, I simply cannot see why you assert this definition of “weak”.
Non sequitur: that’s why I kept saying any god. Either any god exists or no god exists – this is the binary exclusivity I clearly refer to. (Indeed, on past experience, you are so erudite and intellectually honest a debater that you probably knew this as you were typing it.)
In toto, less likely than their total absence, for an atheist. (Again, come on, you already appreciate this.)
But all atheists consider believe there’s no such thing as gods (of any kind), agreed?
Again, I ask you to consider a real-ilfe example:
Can you please, please show me how any of the bracketed statements are not logically equivalent to the original?
It’s my hypothetical. I’m telling you that the die is loaded, and I’m an absolutely trustworthy source. I’ll even provided evidence that it is loaded (but not for how it is loaded). You can’t believe that <4 is equally likely as 4+, because you know it to be false. And you’re right, you cannot say that <4 is any more or less likely than 4+. So you’re in no position to believe anything whatsoever on the matter. What’s the logical difference between having beliefs and not having beliefs? Well, in the first case, you have a belief, and in the second case, you don’t. I can’t fathom how this is such a mystery for you.
Well, as I said, I’m not much concerned about that. I’m merely trying to demonstrate the epistemic distinction in question.
And so say all untrustworthy sources.
Like what? Unless I’m actually allowed to make observations of the die in action myself, you’re not introducing any new information beyind “honestly I’m not lying”.
No, I don’t, given that I reject your premise that you are perfectly trustworthy.
I have already agreed to this.
It isn’t, and I’ve told you it isn’t. What I can’t fathom is the difference between believing (ie. considering it more likely than not) that a 3 or more will be thrown and not believing (ie. considering it less likely than not) that a 2 or less will be thrown.
So we agree that this not-belief/belief-not distinction doesn’t apply to atheists (of any “strength”), yes?
Incidentally, for anyone thinking I’m just being obtuse or awkward here, I genuinely consider this “weak atheists lack belief but don’t believe not” to be another canard that crops up in discussions of atheism, and I’d be very happy to see it commit memicide. (The original fallacy, of course, is that you can’t prove a negative.)
Theism. And I would not call this class of people atheists - I’m not sure what to call them, actually.
If you’ve ever had the dubious pleasure of arguing with extreme skeptics, practically every “fact” might be wrong. I suffered through a bunch of them in my class. Keynes’ solution to this problem, in his first book, was to basically consider knowledge certain belief as you approach the limit of certainty - which you can never obtain, of course. We must distinguish between strongly held belief and strongly justified belief. How strongly someone holds a belief has nothing to do with its truth value - strong justification does. So, evolution could be wrong. But it is so strongly justified that it has achieved, in my opinion, the status of fact. (That is that evolution happens - not that any particular history of a species or evolutionary mechanism is true.)
It is perfectly appropriate for a theist - or anyone - to start out with no belief in evolution. One should accept evolution through exposure to the evidence and arguments for it, not because some teacher or expert says it is true. I try never to say I believe in evolution for this very reason. So, if you are saying that one should start without belief in any proposition, I agree.
The evidence against god includes history and natural history showing a lack of divine intervention, the universal incorrectness of the creation myths of all human religions, etc., etc. The evidence does not add up to a certainty (in the sense I use above) that there is no god, but there is definitely evidence. That’s why strong atheism involves belief, not knowledge. The belief is not totally justified, but it is not totally unjustified either.
I accept that. It is a fairly standard definition, at least in the discussions I’ve been in among self-professed atheists.
Syntactically, you are correct. Operationally, there are so many definitions of god, that we can’t, even in principle, know if there is one or not. A deistic god sits on the other side of the Big Bang, and never interferes. The universe with that god is identical, as far as we can tell, to a universe without that god. Only a being with godlike knowledge would know the difference. It is the same as uncertainty - maybe a god could know the position and momentum of a particle, but we can’t. So, we can divide the set of gods into exists (a subset we both think is null) does not exist, and is impossible to tell.
That is an accurate description of a strong atheist - not a weak one.
Let’s take the example of your friendly neighborhood fundamentalist, who says that his god is the god of the inerrant Bible. In this particular case, not believing this god exists is the same as believing it does not exist, since this particular choice is binary. Ane we of course have ample evidence that this god does not exist. Your example is binary also. But say someone gave you the roster of the East Mongolian Football League, and asked you if you believed if each one would win the championship? Knowing nothing of any of these teams, could you say that you believe any particular one will win. But, in converse, if you must believe that each particular team will not win, then you wind up believing that no team will win the championship! The only solution to this paradox is to lack belief that any team will win, so the answer is “I don’t know.”
Let me restate this.
For all teams t in M, if ~ believe t win -> believe t ~win, then
for any t, believe t ~ win -> believe no team t wins.
But for any league you believe that one team will win (the team undetermined), so you have a paradox. Thus, ~ believe t win cannot imply believe t ~ win in all cases.
I meant contradiction, not paradox. If [bLib** were around he’d dope slap me for that one, so I’ll do it myself. :smack: That some team will win the league is a premise of the argument of course, but well supported assuming no strikes. (Safe, this being Mongolia. 
)
I guess I must be dense. I’ve been following this argument somewhat and I still don’t get it.
My understanding of a weak atheist is someone who may or may not have considered evidence and has decided “I have no belief concerning God” No evidence encountered by this person has moved them to believe , so they have a lack of belief.
This differs from an agnostic in that an agnostic is as yet undecided and may believe it is unknowable.
A strong atheist is someone who has considered certain evidence and does have a belief that no god or gods exist.
These may be subtle differences but still legitimate ones. Like shades of a color they may fall under the same general umbrella but there is a reason we differentiate between shades.
Ditto. That is precisely my understanding. And going back to the OP, if we can’t agree on somehting as fundemental as this, I see very little hope that “America” will accept atheists. I mean, it’s hard to accept what one cannot understand.
It’s a nice quote, but as you have no doubt read my posts in this thread, you know that it does not apply to my position. I like it all the same, as a challenge to religious belief.
Does cosmosdan’s use of the term “no belief concerning god” appeal to people more than the phrase “does not believe god exists?” I certainly agree with him, and will be happy to use his phrasing in the future.
That’s OK, neither do I. (I understand the different postions well enough, but I have not been able to figure out for the last five pages why half the posters are continuing an argument that does not seem to have a resolution other than to vainly persuade an other poster that they have misunderstood their position. (“Their” may use any preceding noun or pronoun as an antecedent.))
Still, it is keeping most of them out of the Pit, mostly, so I guess that is to the good.
Well, so long as it’s not atheists we agree entirely. Now, how can atheists be said to be anything other than believing that there’s no gods?
I agree that “fact” is convenient shorthand for “strongly justified belief” (but I’d note that what counts as justification is itself a belief which cannot be justified by the same mechanism.)
Ah, but you missed the second part: belief in an absence of, say, a Hoaxmaster. Should I start out without such a belief, or not? Again, any belief can be arbitrarily couched in terms of an absence of another option. Just as “you can’t prove a negative” is nonsense since any statement can be cast negatively, so is the case here.
But there is documentary evidence of divine intervention: it’s one of the oldest documents known. You’re just saying you believe that’s false. And, to employ your own petard, those myths are just descriptions from some gods (and the Hoaxmaster could still be accurately described thus).
Only given natural-first OR, a premise which many theists reject. Again, they might just as well point to what you point to as evidence for gods.
And “you can’t prove a negative” is a similarly common fallacy in such discussions.
Well, they’re all impossible to tell with certainty, even if they performed Matrixy miracles, so I don;t know why you introduce that at all.
Only under the fallacy that belief-not!=not-belief for atheists. For the Nth time, how can an atheist not profess to considering an absence of gods more likely than a presence, and still be an atheist?
OK, stop there! I promise I’ll address the Mongolians in a moment, but do we agree that in that example, the bracketed and original statements are logically equivalent? Yet again, please don;t just say they’re not. Show me how one could possibly be true while the others are false given binary exclusivity.
With no further information, I would ascribe a winning probability of 1/N to each team. Thus, I could not say that any one team was more likely to win than not,
ie. I do not believe that a given specific team will win.
ie. I believe that a given specific team will not win.
(AGREED THAT THESE STATEMENS ARE LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT??)
But, (just as god must either exist or not), one of those teams must win. Thus, if you presented me with N/2 +1 teams, I’d say yes, I believe that the winners will be amongst those N/2 +1 teams (and therefore that I believe not, = not believe, that the other N - N/2 teams will count the winner amongst their number. At no point am I saying that I don’t believe there will be a winner.
Which is equivalent to believing that any team will not win equally much, given the definition of belief as “considering truth more likely than falsity”. Of course <50% probabilities can add up to one.
No, because I believe t1 or t2 or t3 … will win, but not t1 will win outright given the definition of belief we agreed on earlier.
And I have admitted that in the case where one considers options equally likely, not-belief is distinct from belief-not. But that is not the case with (weak or strong or whatever) atheists, agreed?
And so how can they be called an a theist?
I don’t understand the answers to this question I’ve been given here - that’s all. I think this definition of “weak atheist” is as fallacious as “you can’t prove a negative” - that’s all.
I think they describe two slightly different things, but yes, I am of the opinion that “no belief concerning god” is much easier for most people to accept (theists of various stripes) than “does not believe god exists”.
The question biols down to what I thought cosmosdan put very well, which uses 4 categories (strong atheist, weak atheist, agnostic, theist), and what SentiantMeat may be suggesting below, which moves weak atheism into agnosticism.
So, are you saying that the weak atheist, as described by cosmosdan should be classified as an agnostic? Which would mean:
Atheist: There is no god(s).
Theist: There is a god(s)
Agnostic: There might be a god(s). I don’t know.
I think that would certainly simplify things. But it negates the two strains of athesim that people were adamant about in a previous thread. But as far as the OP goes, this clarity would, I think, be helpful.
Why would I have any belief at all about a Hoaxmaster? If lots of people believed in one, I might decide that the lack of justification for a Hoaxmaster to be hoaxing would lead to belief he does not exist. Right now, knowing nothing about what such a beast would be like, he doesn’t raise to the level of being worth believing in non-existence.
Proving a negative only works when ~(~a)) -> a. I’m saying this does not hold for statements of belief, so I don’t see how this is relevant. The problem with proving an existential negative is that proving the nonexistence of x in a finite number of places does not prove the nonexistence of x in other places not considered.
Cerrtainly there is. I never said there was no evidence for even this God’s existence. I can say all this evidence is unreliable and can be demonstrated to be faulty, or made up at a later date. Not all evidence is true evidence.
Plus, the possibility of a trickster god is why this evidence can’t be said to lead to knowledge - only, in some cases, to belief.
No one has committed this fallacy around here for years. Enough of us correct them if they try. Some atheists believe that no gods exist so strongly that they say that no amount of evidence would convince them otherwise. I don’t say that - I can construct scenarios where the existence of a god would become very convincing - no, not 100%, but close enough. So, that argument doesn’t work for me.
I can say that I think a 7 is more likely to come up than any other number when I roll two fair dice without believing a 7 will come up.
I said that I agreed before I came up with my example - and I should have changed my answer. There is a difference between the statement “Liverpool will either win or not win the championship” which is a binary statement and the statement “I believe Liverpool will win the championship” which is a ternary statement - I believe they will win, I believe they will not win, I don’t know.
Actually, this comes up when you do logic design. A signal inside a chip is either a 1 or a 0 (actually there is a Z value, but we can neglect that.) When you simulate a chip, it turns out that simulating only 1s and 0s leads to inaccurate results, since you must choose a 1 or a 0 when you actually don’t have any idea of what the value is. The value of a flip flop when the circuit gets powered on is an example. Therefore, logic simulators have an X value, which means unknown. Those who have done Karnaugh maps for logic minimizations should be aware this is different from a don’t care, which means either choice gives the right answer.
So, the third value is important even in practical situations. I’m saying belief is for, against, or X.
Actually this says that every time is more likely to not win than to win, but the chance of each team winning is the same. From the sequel, this seems to be what you actually mean.
No. But let’s say they are, and see where it takes us.
But, (just as god must either exist or not), one of those teams must win. Thus, if you presented me with N/2 +1 teams, I’d say yes, I believe that the winners will be amongst those N/2 +1 teams (and therefore that I believe not, = not believe, that the other N - N/2 teams will count the winner amongst their number. At no point am I saying that I don’t believe there will be a winner.
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Of course not, since you accept the very reasonable premise that some team will win.
Okay, I’ll go through all the teams with you. I ask “Is the statement - I believe ti will not win” for i = 1 to n true? You say yes. I ask is the statement “I believe ti will win” false for i = 1, n. Again, you agree. So,
I agree T1 will win || I agree T2 will win || … || I agree Tn will win
false || false || … || false = true? 
That’s exactly the contradiction. Thanks for helping express it more clearly than I did.
This also shows the weakness of the 50% rule. We can group teams, so a grouping of m such that m / n < .5 means you still think believe no team in that group will win. But what happens when we hit m = m/2? Does a team in one side or another suddenly become one of the winners when nothing has changed with regard to your knowledge of the teams? How about if m/n becomes .75? This is exactly the sort of problem I mentioned before.
Whoops. Does this mean you agree with my point about the Mongolian football league? If so, it is for the wrong reason. As I hope I just demonstrated, saying that the teams have an equal chance to win, and believing based on that leads to problems. (since we can construct subsets where the chance are not equal.) So a weak atheist might say that he has no idea of the odds. but choose to not believe as the default.
Now, even if I say this is a logically consistent position, I don’t have to agree with it since we do have knowledge of a set of god claims, and the evidence for and against them. But that is a totally different matter. I used to be a weak atheist since I assumed the alternative was professing knowledge that god did not exist, until someone pointed out it was belief, not knowledge. that was under discussion. Then I changed my label. But that’s a matter of how individuals view the evidence.
The crucial distinction, which cosmosdan expressed very well, is between someone who is undecided, and who may think the answer is unknowable (the agnostic) and the person who has not beliefs about god (the weak atheist.) And I see the distinction now - this phrasing in one swoop distinguishes the weak atheist from the strong atheist. Neither has a belief that any god exists, but only the strong has any belief at all. A very nice distinction.
Now, the usual definition of agnostic is one who considers the answer unknowable, but this leaves the undecided person in an uncertain state, hanging between atheism and theism. He may be either depending on the day of the week. If there are any such people around, we can ask if agnostic is a good label. Since agnosticism is usually considered less heinous than atheism, to get back to the original topic of this thread, I bet they would.
I think all 8 pages are worth it for cosmosdan’s definition. And tomndebb, if you don’t keep a civil tongue in your head I might just have to post a proof. 
The reason I used that term is that here on the SDMB when someone claims atheism is a belief then they are almost always corrected and told it is a lack of belief and not an actual belief.
“does not believe god exists” has a certain ring to it that hints at “I believe their is no god[s]” even though it doesn’t always mean that. It’s like the shades of color I mentioned.
Both light red and dark red fall under the description of red. When you qualify it a little people have a clearer understanding of what you mean.
I think “does not believe god exists” might require a little clarification as to whether it’s strong or weak since both are true in that phrase. “no belief concerning god” seems to describe only weak atheists {although I’d prefer the term mild to weak} and needs no further explanation.
realistically to the masses who don’t have a clue about the degrees of atheism it probably doesn’t matter until they get a little education on the subject.
I’m not sure how magellan01 relates this to America trusting atheists unless its a matter of education. The trust was specifically related to " sharing their vision of America" not just trust in general. Perhaps Americans need to understand that atheists can and do value honor, justice, civil liberties just as much as any believer.
Because by having a lack of belief then it can be truly said that this person does not believe in god. Is that not an atheist?