So the argument goes that the US has secret plans to charge Assange in the future and that once charged, with a non-political crime (since the extradition treaty with Sweden prohibits extraditing for political reasons), Sweden would more easily be able to cooperate than would the UK because Sweden allows “conditional release” while the UK courts take a while and public opinion is more favorable to Assange in the UK. And the UK’s permission to pass him on, that Sweden would need, would get past public opinion backlash easier than would sending him themselves. That conspiring with former sexual “partners”, the Swedish legal system, the Swedish executive system, and the UK government is considered easy while extraditing from a long time friend would be considered impossible, for crimes that he has not been charged with.
Yes, that claim is false, but not because of anything in your post, as you know if you’d read the whole thread.
The point is that provisions of treaties, even limited ones, can become binding on all states with the passage of time, based on state practice and other factors. First, they become customary law, meaning states abide by them even though they are not bound, and later they become peremptory norms, meaning states are bound by them regardless of whether they accept them.
Things which have unquestionably been accepted as customary law and later as peremptory norms are prohibitions against piracy, genocide, war crimes and the like. There are any number of states which are not signatories to the Geneva Conventions and other treaties which made those things illegal, but all states are bound by those prohibitions anyway.
I thought political asylum was one of those things, but it appears it probably isn’t.
I did:
All the argument that follows is because Terr doesn’t believe peremptory norms exist.
If that “ETA” was such an admission, then I apologize for not understanding it as such.
For the purpose of the op citing that the OAS passed a treaty so therefore the UK is bound is false. All agreed now.
Sure, a discussion regarding what “peremptory norms” and “bound by” means in the real world of behaviors by state actors and international reactions to such behaviors could be interesting on its own. And of course “bound by” is only meaningful to the degree that the consequences for ignoring the norm is greater than the state actor feels is the advantage to ignoring the norm. In that sense Terr’s point still seems valid. “Laws” with little or no teeth are more suggestions than laws.
i dont know why Peter Galbraith who wrote the article you have provided says those things but i simply dont believe him ( and maybe i dont trust him either) But I note he was a policy adviser and former United States diplomat.
i prefer to lean towards caution bearing in mind what David Adler, federal criminal defense attorney and former CIA officer said
"One of the major issues surrounding the Assange case is whether “we [the United States] can drag his ass over here.”
As I pointed out earlier, the OP asked a legal question. This is a philosophical point, not a legal one. As a general matter, states follow international law; the fact that they sometimes do not is no more evidence that international law is not law than the fact that people sometimes commit crimes.
As a general matter, states follow international law because they choose to do so, not because they’re “binding”. It is not a “philosophical” point, it is a reality point. That’s how it works.
And no, the OP didn’t just ask a “legal question”. The question was: “Can Ecuador legally get Assange out of London”. If UK doesn’t allow it, no matter how “binding” you find the relevant international laws, the answer is “No”.
“It’s hard to think how Assange could leave the embassy, escape arrest and get on a plane. Except as Ecuador’s new representative to the UN.”
What’s his thinking here ? The UN would be required to accept Assange’s accreditation, and that makes him an accredited diplomat and gives him safe passage thru (and out) of the UK ?
I don’t think it did. It said that it recommends that in some cases US decides that it is bound by those laws. That’s exactly my point. The country has to decide that it is bound by the law. If it doesn’t, it isn’t bound by it.
Oh, please. You should at least be familiar with the facts of the case before purporting to have insight on the matter. The US Navy captured some fishing vessels leaving Cuba. The fishermen sued and said that customary international law – not any treaty that the US had signed up for, but the expected practice of nations dating back to the Middle Ages – was violated in this case.
The Navy and the Executive Branch disagreed. The Supreme Court ruled that the fishermen were correct. The “country” didn’t decide to abide by international law, the Supreme Court had to dictate to the Executive Branch that international law is integral to the laws of the United States. In short, the courts forced the US Government to abide by international law.
I just wish you would please stop posting demonstrably incorrect information in this forum, especially when you cannot back up your opinions with factual citations from recognized authorities.
Yes. The courts decided that it was binding. If they decided it wasn’t binding, it wouldn’t be. Thus, the international law is only binding on a country if it decides that it is binding. Your point?
The court said that customary international law could not be disregarded at the convenience of the foreign policy goals of the Executive Branch, in the same way that the court decided that President Nixon could not disregard US law at his convenience.
Now, if you want to advance the argument that in the Nixon case, “the government” was free to disregard US law if “the government” wished to, but “the government” decided that it was better to abide by the law, I would say that’s a distorted way of looking at the issue. Same thing for interpreting the applicability of international law as being part of US law.
He’s pointing out that the Supreme Court does not have to say a provision of international law is binding on the US for it to be true. The Supreme Court heard the Paquete Habana case because it was brought in the US. It could as easily have been brought in a foreign court, or in an international one had they existed at the time.
The international court’s, obviously. That’s why - for example - the US won’t ratify the ICJ treaty. If it was a foreign state’s court, it depends on what sort of claim it was and whether the US had any assets within its jurisdiction.