So, yeah, as it happens, we don’t know how to compute the fine-structure constant; at least, not the same way we know how to compute, say, sqrt(2) or π. But sure… perhaps the fine-structure constant is computable, even though we don’t realize it. Hell, perhaps, after the millionth digit, it’s all 0s. Or maybe it isn’t. I don’t know how to prove that either way. But the truth of the matter needn’t be tied to our ability to prove it.
Anyway, maybe, it turns out that, on a certain computability-based account of what “randomness” is, the fine structure constant is “random”. Definitely, by a certain “is it describable from the physical laws of our universe?” based account, we would not call the fine structure constant “random”. By other definitions, we still would, and by yet other definitions, we would say it is meaningless to speak of the randomness of a particular number, and would only speak of randomness of probability distributions. Formalizations don’t have to be one-size-fits-all; the word “random” isn’t used in just one way.
And, yes, many formalizations of “randomness” will naturally be context-sensitive, in the sense that they will be relative to a particular language of description or knowledge base or what have you. (E.g., one natural notion of “randomness” of particular objects is taking “X is random” to mean “X satisfies every property which provably has probability 100% [in a certain proof system, modelling a certain probability distribution, using a certain language of description of properties]”. In this case, what is random depends highly on what proof system we are looking at. A very relative notion, yes, and yet still a useful one with clear ties to the intuitive concept of randomness (for example, in typical systems, we will end up being able to say things like “Every random real in [0, 1] is irrational, any random pair of such reals consists of two inequal random reals, any random sequence of coin flips has a 50-50 split of heads and tails in the long run, etc.”.)