# Can libertarian free agency be distinct from deterministic, random, and semi-random causation?

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [April 21, 2021, 7:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472 "2021-04-21T19:07:36Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 2

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**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 9:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/21 "2021-04-25T09:27:57Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> There are practical examples of deterministic predictions, for example in newtonian physics or classical thermodynamics.

Yes, obviously. It’s safe to assume everyone, including you, would agree that we can predict the behavior of some systems. Otherwise science, perhaps even intelligence, becomes completely useless.

However, the point was you were _defining Determinism_ in terms of prediction, which implies we’re talking about the entire state of the universe.

However, predicting the future state of the universe is not merely a _practical_ impossibility, due to limits on what we can know.

It’s explicitly ruled out on logical grounds that I’ll next explain.

> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> I’m not sure why you bring up recursion.

Let’s say the universe is at time t1, and we want to predict the state of the universe at t2.  
To do that, we’re going to perform some set of calculations, Cn.

The question simply is, _when_ are we going to perform Cn?  
If it’s inbetween t1 and t2, then those events need to themselves be part of the calculation: a subset of our calculations is…the entire set of our calculations.

After t2 is ok, but then we’re (uselessly) making a prediction of a past event.

And let’s not get twisted here: the issue is not that the _result_ of our calculations needs to be input into our calculations; that would be potentially tractable, because we could just “guess” a result, and then see if it makes a self consistent prediction. The issue is the _calculations themselves_ need to somehow be a subset of themselves.

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**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 9:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/22 "2021-04-25T09:31:46Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> If you were to somehow go through the same decision event twice, it is _not_ implied that the outcome will be the same.

Again that’s just you asserting your position again.

I’m asking how can it be different? Why would I make a different chess move when my brain (and/or soul) has been reset back to the former ignorant state?

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**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 9:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/23 "2021-04-25T09:36:45Z")

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> [@GreenWyvern](#):
>
> If that mental substance is contained within the physical universe, then you are correct, but the assumption is that it is not - it is nonphysical.

I was trying to use “universe” to just mean “everything” here: the set of “physical universe, plus anything else that exists”.  
If there’s a more appropriate word, let me know.

I don’t want to put the non physical in some separate bucket that we are not allowed to scrutinize.  
Because, I maintain that when we actually ask the question of how the soul supposedly impacts our decision making, we realize either the concept itself makes no sense, or, at the least, that there is no reason it grants an escape to the “problem” of our actions being determined.

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**Author:** ![GreenWyvern](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/greenwyvern/32/2834_2.png) [@GreenWyvern](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/GreenWyvern)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 10:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/24 "2021-04-25T10:43:57Z")

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You’re still looking at the whole question using the paradigm of consciousness being an epiphenomenon of matter, and therefore subject to the constraints of matter.

If, on the other hand, matter is an epiphenomenon of consciousness, then universal consciousness is not subject to the constraints of matter created virtually within itself, although _individual_ consciousness - being the non-individualized consciousness ‘reflected’ and limited through matter - may be to a large extent be subject to those constraints.

That’s an attempt at a very condensed summary of a far larger and more complex argument.

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**Author:** ![Crane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/crane/32/3495_2.png) [@Crane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Crane)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 12:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/25 "2021-04-25T12:18:36Z")

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> [@GreenWyvern](#):
>
> matter is an epiphenomenon of consciousness,

Then is individual ego-consciousness free-will?

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**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 2:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/26 "2021-04-25T14:51:12Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> If you were to somehow go through the same decision event twice, it is _not_ implied that the outcome will be the same.

Are you saying that there is randomness involved? That running the same scenario twice will have different results because not _all_ the variables are the same?

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 5:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/27 "2021-04-25T17:06:20Z")

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> [@Mijin](#):
>
> However, the point was you were _defining Determinism_ in terms of prediction, which implies we’re talking about the entire state of the universe.
> 
> However, predicting the future state of the universe is not merely a _practical_ impossibility, due to limits on what we can know.

I defined deterministic _event causation_. At no point do I claim the entire universe may be predicted given enough physical knowledge - in fact I asked you to assume that is impossible in the second sentence of the OP:

> > [@Max\_S](#):
> >
> > I ask you to presuppose that the physical world is indeterministic,

~Max

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**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 6:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/28 "2021-04-25T18:04:30Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> I defined deterministic _event causation_ . At no point do I claim the entire universe may be predicted given enough physical knowledge

The point is, you defined Determinism in terms of prediction, and that’s what I am objecting to.  
Determinism is defined in terms of the state of the universe being determined by a past state, that’s all.

Saying that what you meant is just that _some_ events are predictable is a complete red herring since everybody, regardless of philosophical position, believes some events are predictable.

> [@](#):
>
> I ask you to presuppose that the physical world is indeterministic,

This is nothing to do with the point that is being put to you. I am disputing your definition of Determinism.

Anyway, your _argument_ relies several times on defining Determinism as being predictable, so it’s beside the point whether the initial _scenario_ you describe is Deterministic or not.

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 6:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/29 "2021-04-25T18:42:16Z")

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> [@Mijin](#):
>
> I’m asking _how can it be_ different? Why would I make a different chess move when my brain (and/or soul) has been reset back to the former ignorant state?

Not _would_, _could_. How _could_ you make a different choice? The answer is because you are not guaranteed to make the same choice - at least, making the same choice in exactly the same situation is not a logical implication. If you are not guaranteed to make the same choice, you can choose differently. If you can choose differently, it can be different. QED.

~Max

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 6:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/30 "2021-04-25T18:45:12Z")

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I am _not_ saying there is randomness involved. I defined random event causation in post #1 and I attempted to differentiate free agency in post #2.

~Max

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 6:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/31 "2021-04-25T18:47:36Z")

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I did not define capital-D “Determinism” in this topic and I see no need to do so. Here I asked you to assume the physical world is indeterministic, there’s no reason to argue about the pitfalls of universal Determinism. (Perhaps you are confusing this topic with another one?)

~Max

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**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 6:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/32 "2021-04-25T18:51:36Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> Not _would_ , _could_ .

No, you’ve done enough dodging.

You have asserted dozens of times in this thread, and in dozens of other threads that you believe that we “could have chosen differently”. I’m very aware of your position.

The question is, how so? We can see a physical universe, and a brain, and it appears that the brain is responsible for our thoughts, desires and decisions.  
Personally, this doesn’t bother me at all, because I am aware that whatever mechanism by which I think (e.g. if we include a soul), ultimately my decisions are always going to come down to a function of my predispositions and the environment in which I find myself.

Now, if you wish to believe otherwise, that’s swell.  
But how then, do you suppose decision-making works? How is a free decision made?

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**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/33 "2021-04-25T19:05:48Z")

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Then why would an event work out differently, if the scenario is exactly the same?

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/34 "2021-04-25T19:22:51Z")

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> [@Mijin](#):
>
> No, you’ve done enough dodging. […] But how then, do you suppose decision-making works? How is a free decision made?

I’m sorry to disappoint, but I don’t think ‘how free agency works’ is knowable. My categorization of it as a separate category of event causation is based on the mechanism or process being unknowable.

> > [@Max\_S](#):
> >
> > And so, finally, could event D be some other category of event causation? I think it could be, if instead of _assuming_ the outcome is bound by deterministic or random processes, I _admit_ that even with perfect knowledge of the physical world, _A1_ is a black box, the actual mental process is unknowable, and the actual probability of each outcome is _undefined_ .

~Max

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/35 "2021-04-25T19:23:30Z")

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See above.

~Max

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/36 "2021-04-25T19:45:45Z")

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So, it _is_ just random. Someone doesn’t make a chess move because at the time, based on the information and training that they have, it is the best move they can see, but that they just randomly move pieces about the board, since the mechanism of their decision making is unknowable.

I think you just falsified your entire premise.

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**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/37 "2021-04-25T19:47:21Z")

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> [@k9bfriender](#):
>
> they just randomly move pieces about the board, since the mechanism of their decision making is unknowable

Logically speaking this is not a complete argument. You are missing a premise.

~Max

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**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/38 "2021-04-25T19:50:37Z")

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Well, yes, but that is because I was restating _your_ argument, which is what is missing _something_. And that something is what makes your entire house of cards fall.

Is the decision making of what chess piece to move knowable, or unknowable? If it is knowable, then everything that you have said is incorrect. If is is unknowable, then that doesn’t reflect the reality that _I_ live in.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Max\_S](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/46a35a/32.png) [@Max\_S](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Max_S)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 7:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/39 "2021-04-25T19:58:15Z")

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> [@k9bfriender](#):
>
> Well, yes, but that is because I was restating _your_ argument, which is what is missing _something_ .

You would have to enlighten me, I can’t find the fault. Certainly I do not argue that free agency is a form of random event causation. ☹

> [@k9bfriender](#):
>
> If is is unknowable, then that doesn’t reflect the reality that _I_ live in.

Are you rejecting the possibility that the probabilities of outcomes to an event are unknowable, or…?

I can admit the possibility that my _own_ decision making process is knowable to _me_, but not that I can predict it or anyone else’s with absolute certainty or even find a most accurate probability distribution.

~Max

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**Author:** ![k9bfriender](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/k9bfriender/32/3283_2.png) [@k9bfriender](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/k9bfriender)\
**Post date:** [April 25, 2021, 9:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/can-libertarian-free-agency-be-distinct-from-deterministic-random-and-semi-random-causation/940472/40 "2021-04-25T21:07:41Z")

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> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> You would have to enlighten me, I can’t find the fault.

You just claimed to see it when I restated your argument.

> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> Certainly I do not argue that free agency is a form of random event causation.

But you do seem to be claiming that free agency means that someone can make a different choice when in the identical scenario.

> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> Are you rejecting the possibility that the probabilities of outcomes to an event are unknowable

No, I am rejecting that they _cannot_ ever be known.

> [@Max\_S](#):
>
> I can admit the possibility that my _own_ decision making process is knowable to _me_ , but not that I can predict it or anyone else’s with absolute certainty or even find a most accurate probability distribution.

I take it that you’ve never played chess then? The whole point of that is predicting what someone else will do, given a certain scenario.

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