Show me one that doesn’t.
Around here parents furnish “basic school supplies” and always have.
The Canadian military does have a severe funding problem. A few years ago my brother’s unit participated in a joint training effort with the Canadian army, and he was warned that his guys would have to pay to replace any “lost” equipment rather than expect reissue. Apparently, Canadian soldiers were buying gear from our guys (who would then claim it was lost) because they weren’t able to get it from their own army. Hot items were helmets and LBEs.
I read the title as “Canadian Navy Sub on Fire Island”.
I don’t know what the Canadian Navy’s views are, perhaps they are much more liberal than the USN, but I doubt they would take such a field trip. 
I think what canada is doing is foolish and potentially deadly. The fact is, a modern submarine is a complicated machine, and you can’t run one (or four) on a shoestring. If Canada wants to have a submarine fleet, then they should pay for it…staffing old British hand-me-downs with inexperienced sailors is an accident waiting to happen. I mean, think about that hatch gasket-what would have happened if that thing FAILED at 600 feet!
I just don’t understand politicians…somebody is going to pay a big price for this parsimony…and it will most likely be the crew of one of these leaky tubs! 
It could have been worse. It wasn’t a Thresher or Scorpion-type accident. Both of those submarines went down with all hands.
Old hand me downs? The Upholder/Victoria class was discontinued in 1993 and purchased by the Canadian governement in 1998/2002. As to crew inexperience I’d like a cite. The original plan was 6 crews for 4 boats using the current crop of submariners from the Oberon fleet. If we assume Canada only has threee crews of 68 (208 crew members including officers) for the Oberons and the new fleet is 6 crews of 40 then we’re short by 16 seamen. Since 4 boats didn’t simply materialize in Halifax harbour I’d guess the crews are trained.
With the accelerating meltdown of the polar icecap, the opening of an international waterway in an ecologically sensitive environment mandates a responsible oversight by a legitimate government. Seriously, I think the biggest threat may be future American tanker traffic, and we must do everything to show that we take our sovereignty over the region seriously. Just in case some of you Americans don’t realize it, from the international boundaries of Alaska to Greenland, we (Canadians) own all the way up to the North Pole.
And the RN paid off the Upholders not for decrepitude (they barely were in service between 4 and 1.5 years) but as part of cutbacks to cash in the post-Cold War “peace dividend” (that also saw many perfectly good US ships and aircraft get their production discontinued and part of those active be mothballed or sold off to second-line allies).
However, the class was “buggy” when placed in service in the RN c. 1990, not so much for the ship itself as for the systems plugged into it, that had trouble working together. This may have been influenced by how the yards had in fact gone since the time of the Oberons in the 60s w/o launching a non-nuke fleet sub.
History of the Upholders. Love the anecdote about the first CO of the Upholder and the ship’s emblem.
Having gotten mothballed while still probably still not fully debugged, it’s not surprising that they are not exactly spring-fresh upon reactivation – another thing that the RN had not done with subs in quite a while.
Canada needed to get new subs fast, lest it lose the valuable human and knowledge resources of its longstanding, if small, submarine fleet.
And you think that’s right, after they’ve paid taxes to supply schools?
Well, what type of school supplies are we talking about? Every public school I know of requires parents to buy basic stuff like pens, pencils, and notebooks for their kids. Taxes pay for the building, books, teachers, desks, computers, and stuff like that. Are there any public schools in the US or Canada that provide things like pencils to students?
Anyways, back to the Candanian military funding problems, Canada’s military spending is far below par for first world nations. According to the ever useful CIA World Factbook Canada’s military spending is only 1.1% of its GDP. Compare that to the 3.3% of the US, Australia’s 2.8%, South Korea’s 2.7%, France’s 2.6%, or the UK’s 2.4%. Two of my grandfather’s brothers crossed to border to join the RCAF during WWII, wanting to get a chance to strike the Nazis early; it saddens me to see how much the one-time 4th largest military power in the world has fallen.
From an internal newsgroup at work.
This article was sent out to members of the Toronto Naval Club.
Morning Shipmates,
Captain Allan Dunlop was our guest of honour at one of our Royal Naval Association Trafalgar Dinners and is currently a member of the Southern Ontario Branch. A very interesting speaker and who does not mince his words.
Dispelling myths about Canada’s subs
We got four excellent subs for what it cost the British to build one boat, says Allan Dunlop
There have been many complaints about the purchase of the Victoria (ex-Upholder) class submarines from the Royal Navy. The criticisms reached a crescendo after HMCS Chicoutimi caught fire in the Atlantic last week, resulting in the death of Navy Lt. Chris Saunders. I am amazed how people love to provide commentary with few facts at their disposal. I would like to provide some facts and to dispel a few myths.
Myth #1 - We got a raw deal.
Balderdash. We got an outstanding deal. We got four excellent submarines and the entire training infrastructure that goes with them for what it cost the British to build one boat. We would have trouble building one new boat in Canada with twice the amount we paid for the four Upholders.
We are talking about savings in the vicinity of $3 billion, and the money we spent was spent wisely. Submariners were excited. These submarines were no stranger to us. Canadians on exchange had sailed in them and spoke highly of their capabilities. We couldn’t wait to get our hands on them.
Myth #2 - The RN wanted to dump a lemon.
Many people wonder why the British would sell these boats if they are so fantastic. It’s very simple: Money. In the early 1980s, the Royal Navy was looking for a new diesel-electric submarine to replace the Oberon class that was nearing the end of its life expectancy. The Upholder class, a very bold and forward-thinking design, was created and 12 hulls were ordered. Partway through the building program, the Royal Navy decided it could no longer afford to support both nuclear and diesel-electric submarines, and, like the United States, adopted a purely nuclear sub-surface fleet.
The Upholder building program was halted after the first four hulls were completed. They were mothballed in the hope a buyer could be found.
Myth #3 - We bought damaged goods
What nonsense. Defects get a lot of attention and so they should, but there always will be defects. Submarines are technically extremely complex - things break. So, fix them. The process of identifying and rectifying defects is far more important than the fact they exist. The purchase process for the Victoria class subs left responsibility with the Royal Navy for ensuring that these boats met all the original technical specifications of the class. Canadian observers were present at all times and each technical trial required Canadian approval.
The British workers and Canadian observers were supported by technical and legal advisers to guarantee that each item was dealt with. There are still some issues being resolved, but resolved they will be. The defects people keep talking about - welding, rust, a dent, air purification, a leaky fuel tank - are all things that have happened before. They go with the territory.
Myth #4 - They’re overdue, something must be seriously wrong
Of course, people get impatient. They want to know why it has taken so long to bring these submarines into service. They jump to the conclusion that something is terribly wrong. It is not.
It has taken longer than hoped for, but people were dealing with a lot of unknowns. Nobody had ever mothballed and recommissioned submarines before, so when it came time to recommission the four boats, delivery estimates were made with no empirical data and they were too optimistic. The British had to spend more time recommissioning and Canadians had to be patient; if it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing well.
Myth #5 - They’re not safe
On the contrary, the submarines are very safe. They are technically sound. Engineering teams have examined every detail with painstaking care. Safety has never been compromised. Crews are well trained to respond to a wide variety of emergencies, something that is practiced every day at sea. Accidents can still happen and tragedies like the fire in HMCS Chicoutimi have a salutary effect, but such accidents are rare. We must deal with them and learn from them. Somebody asked me recently if our sailors would continue to have confidence in the Victoria class submarines. The answer is a resounding Yes. Our sailors are tough and resilient and they love their new boats.
Allan Dunlop is a retired captain who spent 33 years in the navy and commanded two submarines, a destroyer and the First Canadian Submarine Squadron. He retired in 1997. He was part of the lead group that launched negotiations for the purchase of four Victoria class submarines from Britain.
Captain Dunlop’s comments can essentially be boiled down to “Never mind, nothing to see here. Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.”
to return to the final statement of the OP:
You might have noticed – the Canadian Navy is having some difficulties maintaining diesel engines and wet cell batteries. I think they should demonstrate a mastery of 19th century technology before they take on the 20th.
Umm… true both those sub went down with all hands, but - the situations aren’t really comparable.
Thresher sank because of two factors: A flaw in the thinking about reactor safety/protection compounded by humidity in the compressed air lines. Both of which were discovered at test depth during shipyard acceptance trials. So, basically, they found out that one of the automatic routines w/regards to the reactor was a bad idea at the worst possible time - when they had the absolute least amount of time to override it.
Then they had a critical failure in the ballast tank blow system: Where compressed air is used to pump water out of the ballast tanks, making the sub positively bouyant, taking it to the surface. Unless the compressed air is completely, 100% moisture free as it expands the water vapor will freeze. (Those concerned with the whys of this should look up the phrase adiabatic cooling.) The air on Thresher was not dry, and when they needed it most, a plug of ice formed in the air lines, making their emergency blow system inoperative.
Since then, all submarines in US service have been built and maintained to a QC standard high above normal QC: SubSafe, to prevent any kind of material problems of that nature.
Which still hasn’t prevented subs from going to 60 feet with the main hatch open; the Bonefish fire of 1989(I think) or similar problems.
As for Scorpion, the theory I’ve heard about what happened there was an ordinance flaw: apparantly the model torpedo being used at the time had a tendency to start running in the tubes. There is some evidence that the sub tried to turn 180 degrees to turn off the fuse (a safety feature to keep torpedos from turning around and sinking the sub/ship that fired 'em) and they ran out of time. In many regards, similar to the Kursk disaster of a few years ago - known poor ordinance was loaded anyways…
Shipboard fires, OTOH, are a fact of life. And complicated on subs because the primary fire-fighting agent, sea water, produces toxic gases when it comes in contact with the batteries.