Since rental laws vary from one municipality to another, there isn’t one definitive cite that I can find in my short available time right now with regards to one unknown city in Washington state, but there are several cites from different cities out there, mostly in the form of question-and-answer type forums.
well, see, i guess that’s my point. yes, rent laws differ everywhere. what doesn’t differ, though, is that (to my knowledge) no one can become a tenant when no rent is paid, or there is no agreement (or claimed agreement*) about anything related to their staying at your place.
the “maybenow” link presupposes that he pays rent
the avvo link - i’m not going going to presume what this guy is talking about. he provides no analysis for his legal answer, which is in stark contrast to how lawyers normally go about their business (I have a beef to pick with AVVO, so I generally discount whatever shows up on that site, heavily, as a personal bias)
the tampa bay article… well, this one is similarly scant on legal analysis. What is obvious, however, is that the police department probably has a policy of not enforcing these kinds of rights, since most of these people live in these places under informal “agreements” that can blossom very quickly into suits against the city for improper use of force (or whatever variant you care to charge them under) if the facts are one way or another. simply put, it’s not worth the cops’ time to do anything about it. this is a puff piece that, at it’s core, is designed to agitate senses rather than provide legal opinion. " Because of liability concerns, you should not:" - they’re not telling you what the law actually is, they’re telling you how to CYA.
basically, none of these is what i would characterize as a proper cite that guests become tenants in your house with nothing else other than the fact that they’re a guest. yes, if a judge believes that there was an agreement, even though there wasn’t one in reality, then you’ll create a tenancy situation. lying about the facts of a situation - that’s not my point, though.
I don’t know why you singled me out to cite law to you when other posters have contended the same thing, but this site, from Kelso, Washington, indicates that in that state, a person with no lease or rent payment is still considered a “licensee” and still must be legally evicted.
I’m not singling you out - other than the fact that you were the one who made the assertion.
Let me posit you this one: When I walk into my local Target or Best Buy, I am not a tenant of the property, right? If I am anything, I am a licensee. (they’re probably an invitee in common law terms, but invitees generally have more rights than licensees) (“someone who entered and remained on the premises with permission” in the language of your link)
Do you really think for one second that the cops wouldn’t haul me out of there with handcuffs and a taser if I told the assistant manager “no, I’m not leaving!” ? No. These articles you are reading are misleading you as to why they are prescribing the courses of action they’re prescribing (not without good reason, though). It’s because the cops won’t get involved with grey area “tenancies that may not be tenancies” and it’s because people will get the entirely wrong idea when you tell them “you can self-help someone out the door if they stay past their welcome”
There comes a point in time where you are no longer considered a guest, I guess is the point that you’re missing. Being given the use of the property, after so many days, automatically means that you are living there. It does not matter if you’re on the lease, or paying rent. You have become a tenant. That period of time varies from state to state, possibly city to city? 30 days seems to be common. I’m sorry that there’s a lack of verifiable information about this online, so you can believe me or not, so be it.
yeah, i’m not going to believe it. like i said, wishing really hard that the law gave you some remedy just because “you’ve lived there long enough” isn’t enough to make it so.
How, in the OP’s hypothetical, is there no agreement concerning the non-owner living in the owner’s house? It seems pretty obvious to me that if a GF were to move in with me, we’ve made an agreement that she’s living in my place.
Rumor, are you moving the goalposts? Because it seems to me that you are. Let’s review what you’ve said.
Edit by me, to indicate what Rumor’s quote responded to.
Well, I provided you with one. But that apparently was not good enough for you; it had to be American, because Americans are special or unique or something. Here’s a hint, pal: people get married all over the world. They get divorced all over the world too. And they live together without benefit of marriage all over the world too. And I’m willing to bet that marriages solemnized in, oh, say, Albania, are recognized in Montana and Virginia, just as much as marriages in New Jersey and British Columbia are. Hey, guess what? A couple married in Canada (Oh no! That’s in a foreign country!) is recognized as married in Montana. And Virginia. And in the other 48 states. Tell me I’m wrong–I dare you.
Now, assuming that a jurisdiction allows an unmarried couple to divide their assets according to some sort of statutory or common law formula, what we’re dealing with is a family law matter. You may disagree, but in my research, the courts do not. And depending on the length of time in cohabitation, and the jurisdiction, a constructive trust in property can result. I posted a cite to that. I don’t care if you don’t think it is suitable because it is foreign; the fact remains that in a common law jurisdiction, (you know, like the US, Canada, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, etc.) it can be one. I would ask you to post an American cite stating that it cannot.
And no moving the goalposts. Post a cite stating that a single name on title can defeat an equitable claim of a common-law partner whose name is not on title. Caselaw only; no blogs or Wikipedia.
ETA: Appellate cases only please. If I can cite the Supreme Court of Canada, which (unlike the SCOTUS) has the jurisdiction to decide these matters, you ought to be able to cite a circuit court decision, or at least a state appellate court. No trial court decisions.
There’s a long line of Irish cases – another common law jurisdiction – conferring equitable interests in a property which is a shared home on the basis of cohabitation over a period, involving a common life and shared finances, such as enables one of the couple to finance the acquisition of the shared home in his (or her) sole name. The reasoning is that the party on title couldn’t have bought the house without the contribution (which may be non-monetary) of the other party. The non-owning partner has contributed to the purchase of the house, and there is no presumption of advancement.
Obviously to succeed in such a claim you have to have been living together while the house was being paid for, and to build up a significant equitable interest you have to have been together for a while.
These cases mostly involve a house which is owned, not rented, and the argument is not about whether the non-title partner can stay in the house, but whether they can either force sale, or demand a share of sale proceeds. Usually, by the time such a case gets to court, the parties have already separated. But I think it’s a short step, once they find the existence of an equitable interest in the house on this basis, to go on and find that the equitable owner can’t simply be turned out.
Also, these cases mostly involved married couples, and the need for such litigation disappeared a good number of years ago when the powers of the courts on marriage breakdown were greatly increased. Thus there aren’t a lot of recent cases. But the principles hold good, and they are entirely equitable; they don’t depend on any statutory provisions.
I thoroughly enjoy how you’re confusing two separate comments made in response to two separate posts. to wit:
[QUOTE]
The modern trend in matrimonial property laws is that as between the spouses, the name on the title does not decide questions of possession of the matrimonial residence. If a couple is married and living in the house, the spouse on title normally can’t just evict the other spouse as if the other spouse were a tenant or guest. Both spouses have possession rights, regardless of the legalities of title.
this is response #1. And I take umbrage with it because if title is acquired prior to marriage, it is always going to be leaving the marriage in possession of the person who owned it prior to marriage. Because it’s not marital property. (yes, if there is significant “marital” contribution to the equity of the piece of property, you will get a larger share of marital assets in compensation, or if there isn’t enough of that, you will get a lien on the property, but you will never, ever receive title, even via a constructive trust, to it if it was owned by the other spouse prior to the marriage). That was my point in response to you. If you meant “matrimonial residence” to only mean a house acquired after a marriage, then my issue with your point is moot, but i’d question your use of the term “matrimonial residence”
But I enjoy how you totally mischaracterized my actual words!
then there’s this one:
and you, for some inexplicable reason, leap to the defense of this assertion with some irrelevant claptrap about constructive trusts based upon 2 people living as husband and wife and conducting their affairs for a decade under a relationship “tantamount to spousal”. At this point, so sorry, but what we’re not dealing with is a family law matter.
Oh, okay. I’ll do that for you. I’ll give you the relevant parts, only.
(750 ILCS 5/503) (from Ch. 40, par. 503)
Sec. 503. Disposition of property.
(a) For purposes of this Act, “marital property” means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is known as “non‑marital property”:
(6) property acquired before the marriage;
(7) the increase in value of property acquired by a method listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection, irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non‑marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this Section; and
(c) Commingled marital and non‑marital property shall be treated in the following manner, unless otherwise agreed by the spouses:
(2) When one estate of property makes a contribution to another estate of property, or when a spouse contributes personal effort to non‑marital property, the contributing estate shall be reimbursed from the estate receiving the contribution notwithstanding any transmutation; provided, that no such reimbursement shall be made with respect to a contribution which is not retraceable by clear and convincing evidence, or was a gift, or, in the case of a contribution of personal effort of a spouse to non‑marital property, unless the effort is significant and results in substantial appreciation of the non‑marital property. Personal effort of a spouse shall be deemed a contribution by the marital estate. The court may provide for reimbursement out of the marital property to be divided or by imposing a lien against the non‑marital property which received the contribution.
(d) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each spouse’s non‑marital property to that spouse. It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including:
Illinois’ marriage/divorce laws are basically copies of NCCUSL’s model acts, so it’s as generic a version of divorce laws as you’re going to find. Now, if you’re going to have me dig out a cite for the proposition that common-law folk are treated the same as a registered-married folk…
I am unaware of any rule (and this may now double back on the second post of Alice’s) that says a spouse, during the marriage, acquires a possessory interest in a non-marital piece of real estate.
Like I said in post #38, I’m not saying there can’t be, but it just doesn’t smack me as right.
Checking back in … (meant to come back a while ago, but that darn “real life” thing kept intervening)
Rumour Watkins, let me clarify a bit.
In post # 20, I was not addressing the situation in the OP’s question, which I agree by definition is not a marriage situation. I was responding to the comments by Alice the Goon and t-bonham@scc.net, which I quoted in that post. I understood them to be saying that marriage is irrelevant to questions of occupancy of property, and that all that matters is whose name is on title. My response to that proposition is that it is not correct: modern family law looks at the substance of the situation between the two spouses, not the question of whose name is on title. In some cases, upon the break-up of the marriage, the courts can order a distribution of the property as between the spouses, regardless which spouse’s name is on title. I agree that question is different from the question raised by the OP, but it seems to be an side-issue that has taken on some life in this thread, so I thought I would address it.
With that general comment in mind, I’ll respond to your request for a cite:
So that’s the general principle, but as the LII notes, the courts cannot divide a particular piece of property as between the spouses unless the legislature of the particular jurisdiction has authorised the courts to do so. That’s why I mentioned in my post that this is an area where there can be considerable variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
(Since this post is getting long, I’ll continue in another post.)
Now, turning to specific examples to illustrate it a bit further, here’s what appear to be the relevant statutory provisions from D.C., New York and California. I’ve looked at them because the OP spoke of D.C., and New York and California, being two of the largest states, tend to be very influential in social and legal trends. Based on a quick read, it looks like all three give the the courts the power to divide property between the spouses based on fairness and equity, not by whose name is on title.
For example, here’s the D.C. provision: DC ST § 16-910 (I can’t link to it directly since it’s a Westlaw product, but you can get to it by going through the LII site for D.C.):
(my underlining). So it certainly looks from this provision that the courts of DC can use equitable principles to over-ride the legal title, as between the two spouses.
And in California, a community property state, the Family Code provides:
So, these three statutes show that the courts can be given the authority to divide up property as between the spouses, based on principles of fairness and equity. Whose name is on title does not decide the issue, as between the spouses, which is the point I originally made in post #20.
As always, none of this is intended to be legal advice, but simply to comment on a matter of public interest. Anyone who needs advice about their rights to property and divorce law should consult a lawyer who practices in their jurisdiction.
I think people are getting hung up on the fact that one had title and the other does not. Even though there’s no written agreement, it may be that a court could infer from the shared expenses and conduct of the parties that there is an agreement of some sort, which might put the non-title person into a status of a tenant. Parties can form contracts without necessarily putting them in writing. Whether or not there is a contract would depend heavily on the facts of the particular case. And, to respond to Rumour Watkins’s questions in posts # 38 and 50, I’m not suggesting that would create a constructive equitable interest in the property - I’m just suggesting that the parties may have an unwritten agreement that could amount to a tenancy, as a matter of contract law.
Again, not meant as legal advice, but just speculation as to the effect of contract law. As I suggested back in post # 20, and as Spoons has also suggested, if the OP really wants to settle this bet, he should talk to a lawyer familiar with the residential tenancies law of D.C.
There’s two aspects to marriage law: the substantive law, which deals with who can get married, and the procedural law, which deals with what ceremonies and legal formalities are needed to have a valid marriage performed.
The substantive law is concerned with capacity: how old do you have to be before you can get married? are you allowed to marry close relatives? can you marry a person of the same-sex? In Canada, only the federal Parliament can pass laws governing those issues. So, for example, same-sex marriage is governed by the Civil Marriage Act of 2005, passed by Parliament. The Provinces cannot determine questions of substantive capacity.
The provinces instead have jurisdiction over the formalities of marriage - do you need a licence? who issues licences? who is authorised to perform marriage ceremonies? are religious ceremonies recognized as valid? is there a particular form of ceremony required? what paperwork needs to be filed? Those matters are all governed by provincial law, not by federal laws. Parliament cannot legislate in those areas.
Depends on the jurisdiction. Under the Family Law Act in Ontario s.19(1), married spouses’ possessory rights to the matrimonial home trump the rights that come with being registered on title: Law Document English View | Ontario.ca
What Spoons says. BTW, Spoons, have a look at the difference positions taken by McLachlin (majority) and Cory (minority) in Peter v. Beblow (SCC 1993) http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1993/1993canlii126/1993canlii126.html . Cory seems to be trying to differentiate between family and commercial applications of constructive trust.
Post a cite stating that a single name on title can defeat an equitable claim of a common-law partner whose name is not on title.
Rumor, your cite deals only with married spouses. It does not deal with unmarried spouses. I expect that when Spoons said common-law spouses, he was referring to unmarried spouses.
Unfortunately, most folks, and a great many judges, use the term “common law” to refer to spouses who are in a marriage-like relationship but who are not married under either statute law or common-law. Since true common-law marriages are extremely rare these days, I think that you will find that when most people say common-law, they are not referring to marriage under common-law, but instead are referring to coulpes who are not married at all.
The 6 month business has no grounding at all in Canadian law.
As far as three years goes for Ontario, that only applies to spousal support, there are several exceptions, and most importantly, it has nothing at all to do with property. I leave it to you to correct your statements concerning the other jurisdictions that you cited.
Sort of. Yes, s.91 gives power over marriage and divorce to the feds, and s.92 gives power over solemnization to the provinces, but that does not mean that the provinces can not make substantive law concerning capacity. Rather, it means that the feds would trump if the the feds and the provinces come into conflict over a substantive element of a provincial law that was otherwise was dealing with the mechanics of getting married. For example, the provinces have laws (e.g. Ontario’s Marriage Act) that set out the ages at which a person can marry.
On the separation and divorce side of things, there is some overlap as well. As it stands, the federal divorce act and various provincial family law acts all cover support. Sometimes it can get a bit messy when they come in conflict.