# Columbia: Logistics of a Second Shuttle Staging a Rescue

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249>\
**Category:** Factual Questions\
**Created:** [February 2, 2003, 5:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249 "2003-02-02T05:13:16Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 4

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**Author:** ![minty\_green](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/f6c823/32.png) [@minty\_green](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/minty_green)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 1:48pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/61 "2003-02-03T13:48:39Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by tsunamisurfer \*  
> Best question: Say there’s a .5 percent chance that a high-resolution terrestrial telescope could have imaged large-scale damage on the orbiter . . . .

Sure, if you (a) exaggerate the capability of ground-based telescopes to resolve anything remotely useful about the shuttle and (b) exaggerate the amount of damage to “large scale” (“Houston to Columbia, you guys still got both wings up there? Thanks for checking.”) and © make up facts that would have given rise to suspicions of such large scale damage, then it becomes perfectly appropriate to do what you’re suggesting.

In real life, we’re talking about a handful of loose or missing tiles that are so small each one wouldn’t even resolve as a pixel under the best of circumstances.

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**Author:** ![robby](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/robby/32/11048_2.png) [@robby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/robby)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 2:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/62 "2003-02-03T14:43:07Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by minty green \*  
> \*\*Sure, if you (a) exaggerate the capability of ground-based telescopes to resolve anything remotely useful about the shuttle and (b) exaggerate the amount of damage to “large scale” (“Houston to Columbia, you guys still got both wings up there? Thanks for checking.”) and © make up facts that would have given rise to suspicions of such large scale damage, then it becomes perfectly appropriate to do what you’re suggesting.
> 
> In real life, we’re talking about a handful of loose or missing tiles that are so small each one wouldn’t even resolve as a pixel under the best of circumstances. \*\*

**Minty** , with your point ©, I believe you overstate your case. NASA was concerned enough about the impact on the left wing 80 seconds into launch that they took them several days before deciding that the damage was likely to be insignificant. And again, this was the agency’s final conclusion. I would be astonished to hear that there was 100% unanimous agreeement from the engineers involved.

Regarding the possibility of photographing the damage, as has been mentioned elsewhere, we have other assets that could _possibly_ have been employed, from the ISS to spy satellites.

I don’t know enough about their capabilities to state this definitively, though.

More convincing to me, however, is that NASA thought enough of the idea of ground-based photography to have tried it in the past. So it couldn’t have been that bad of an idea, and may not have deserved to be dismissed out of hand. It’s my understanding that photographic quality in the past varied greatly, and was utimately deemed not useful. Who knows what would have happened in this instance if they had tried?

Keep in mind, too, that the telescopes employed on spy satellites observing the ground are far smaller than telescopes on the ground looking up.

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**Author:** ![minty\_green](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/f6c823/32.png) [@minty\_green](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/minty_green)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 2:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/63 "2003-02-03T14:52:57Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> I don’t know enough about their capabilities to state this definitively, though.

That’s the rub, isn’t it? Some people invariably pop up in these threads to claim that spy satellites and telescopes and the like should be able to resolve, for instance, the American flag on the moon. And no matter how many times the people with real facts and data show up to demonstrate that no, you can’t get anywhere near that kind of resolution, people still chime in thinking such feats are possible.

If you wish to persist in this line of reasoning, perhaps you should first come up with the proof that it was technologically possible to inspect the shuttle for a handful of missing tiles, whether from the ground or from space? 'Cause every credible bit of evidence that has been produced tends to demonstrate exactly the opposite.

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**Author:** ![robby](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/robby/32/11048_2.png) [@robby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/robby)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 3:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/64 "2003-02-03T15:54:12Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by minty green \*  
> That’s the rub, isn’t it? Some people invariably pop up in these threads to claim that spy satellites and telescopes and the like should be able to resolve, for instance, the American flag on the moon. And no matter how many times the people with real facts and data show up to demonstrate that no, you can’t get anywhere near that kind of resolution, people still chime in thinking such feats are possible.

There’s a big difference between resolving an image in low Earth orbit (several hundred miles up), and resolving an image on the Moon (~250,000 miles away).

> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by minty green \*  
> If you wish to persist in this line of reasoning, perhaps you should first come up with the proof that it was technologically possible to inspect the shuttle for a handful of missing tiles, whether from the ground or from space? 'Cause every credible bit of evidence that has been produced tends to demonstrate exactly the opposite.

I don’t know that it was technically possible, and I’m not trying to prove anything. All I’ve asked was: for what reason was an attempt not made to photograph the orbiter from the ground or another space-based asset? Again, NASA thought it was a good enough idea to try in the past–why not in this case? Was it because it was indeed “not feasible,” or was it because they decided there was nothing they could do about it (should they find anything) anyway?

And **minty** , I’m well aware of the limitations of spy satellites and/or the ISS photographing the ground. Do these limitations extend to photographing an object in a lower orbit?

Secondly, can the limitations of a small space-based telescope photographing the ground be extended to assuming that a much larger ground-based telescope cannot get a useful image of an object in LEO? And please don’t start talking about photographing an object on the Moon. :rolleyes:

I’m more interested in _why_ NASA, having seen the need to visually inspect the shuttle in past missions, failed to ever address the inspection issue, as I stated in this [thread](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=160292) (which kind of got off topic from my rant of NASA Administrator O’Keefe spinning his interview on Sunday):

I said: “Actually, my larger question was why every mission was not provided with a safe means of inspecting the craft. I understand that, once up, this mission had few options.”

> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Brutus \*  
> Never looked at it from that point of view. Why not some small tethered camera with minimal maneuver jets, or a camera-only ‘robotic arm’. Or something. But I see your point. Why put up a billion+ dollar manned platform that doesn’t have the capability of performing the most basic of self-examination?

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**Author:** ![tsunamisurfer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/a698b9/32.png) [@tsunamisurfer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tsunamisurfer)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 4:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/65 "2003-02-03T16:20:59Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by minty green \*  
> \*\*That’s the rub, isn’t it? Some people invariably pop up in these threads to claim that spy satellites and telescopes and the like should be able to resolve, for instance, the American flag on the moon. And no matter how many times the people with real facts and data show up to demonstrate that no, you can’t get anywhere near that kind of resolution, people still chime in thinking such feats are possible.
> 
> If you wish to persist in this line of reasoning, perhaps you should first come up with the proof that it was technologically possible to inspect the shuttle for a handful of missing tiles, whether from the ground or from space? 'Cause every credible bit of evidence that has been produced tends to demonstrate exactly the opposite. \*\*

> **[MSNBC News - Breaking News and News Today | Latest News](https://www.msnbc.com/)**
>
> MSNBC breaking news and the latest news for today. Get daily news from local news reporters and world news updates with live audio & video from our team.

Two days before the Columbia disaster, a NASA engineering team sent an internal memo calculating a high probability that launch debris had caused a gash 7½ by 30 inches on the shuttle’s left wing, NBC’s Jay Barbree reported Monday. NASA engineers have talked of a heat spike and drag on the left wing, suggesting a potential problem with the thermal tiles there.

FROM NBC…

"Keyhole-class satellites are reputed to be able to see objects as small as 4 inches at a distance of 180 miles, Molczan said, and at a range of 70 miles, resolution would improve to about 1.5 inches.

```
   But Molczan warned that the satellite’s angular velocity — the rate at which it turns to maintain a path along its orbit — might have blurred the image. He also questioned whether the contrast between the shuttle tiles and the surface to which they are bonded would have hindered image quality.

   “If ... image quality was likely to have been poor, then I suppose it made sense not to request them,” Molczan noted. “On the other hand, it might be argued that if a sufficiently large defect existed on the shuttle, even a low-res image might have been worthwhile, if only to aid in diagnosis.”

```

Moreover, space historian William E. Burrows, in his book “Deep Black” reported that two ground imagery stations — “Teal Amber” in Malabar, Fla., and “Teal Blue” atop Mt. Haleakala in Hawaii — did take snapshots of the Columbia on that first mission. The cameras have long imaged satellites and orbital debris using sophisticated laser and electro-optical devices.

```
   “Teal Amber and Teal Blue are so good they were used to scan the Columbia on her maiden flight in April 1981 in an effort to determine the extent of tile damage,” Burrows said.
```

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![tsunamisurfer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/a698b9/32.png) [@tsunamisurfer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tsunamisurfer)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 4:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/66 "2003-02-03T16:22:38Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by minty green \*  
> \*\*If you wish to persist in this line of reasoning, perhaps you should first come up with the proof that it was technologically possible to inspect the shuttle for a handful of missing tiles, whether from the ground or from space? 'Cause every credible bit of evidence that has been produced tends to demonstrate exactly the opposite. \*\*

Next question?

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**Author:** ![hobbes730](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/97f17d/32.png) [@hobbes730](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/hobbes730)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 4:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/67 "2003-02-03T16:36:17Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> I’m more interested in why NASA, having seen the need to visually inspect the shuttle in past missions, failed to ever address the inspection issue, as I stated in this thread (which kind of got off topic from my rant of NASA Administrator O’Keefe spinning his interview on Sunday):
> 
> ## I said: “Actually, my larger question was why every mission was not provided with a safe means of inspecting the craft. I understand that, once up, this mission had few options.” quote:
> 
> ## Originally posted by Brutus Never looked at it from that point of view. Why not some small tethered camera with minimal maneuver jets, or a camera-only ‘robotic arm’. Or something. But I see your point. Why put up a billion+ dollar manned platform that doesn’t have the capability of performing the most basic of self-examination?

I’ve had the opportunity to work with the people developing such systems, but as with anything, it’s just a matter of time and money. I’m not sure if I’m at liberty to talk about exactly how they work, but rest assured they are in development.

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**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 4:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/68 "2003-02-03T16:36:43Z")

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Ah, the joys of second guessing technical decisions after the fact with no technical training, no insight to what was done, no information about the process that was used, and no understanding of the concepts involved.

**tsunamisurfer** asked:

> [@](#):
>
> IF, NASA had ordered the Columbia crew to remain in orbit and await a hail-Mary rescue, how quickly could NASA has accelerated the planned launch of this second shuttle? Since the crew is already trained, couldn’t the science pack/cargo pack be left behind, the shuttle (slowly) wheeled out to a launch pad, be carefully fueled, go through the (lengthy) checklist sequence, and then be launched?

Based upon my insight into the shuttle preparation process for flight, I’ll take a stab at an answer.

First, you kick off the crew except commander and pilot, to make room to return the other crew. You can squeeze another 7 in. You probably don’t want to unload much of the payload. Here’s why. Shuttle flight planning requires a complex calculation of the weight and balance of the orbiter and payload. Sometimes ballast is placed to keep the center of gravity (cg) in the optimal position. Orbital flight path calculations, launch windows, etc all require a solid understanding of the weight and cg calculations. I’m not certain how much effort it would take to recalculate all this. Also, it would take more time to unload large payload elements. You’re probably wanting to push as quickly as possible to the PAD for launch. There would have to be some serious number crunching. If the orbiter is essentially ready for rollout to the PAD, better not to change anything, except of course the minimal amount to fit the new parameters.

What about fuel for the correct orbital path? Probably okay, but check. Since the next mission was ISS visit, it’s at a higher inclination, which takes more fuel to reach, so that’s in your favor.

With everyone working full steam, and given that the status was pretty close to launch ready, it is in the realm of possibility they could have crunched all the numbers, gotten to the PAD, and moved up the launch for a rescue. Could they have done it in a week? Hard for me to say. Two weeks would be a more reasonable guess for pushing the limits and rushing. Again, this is heavy speculation on my part.

> [@](#):
>
> My understanding of NASA’s current policy is that, if a few _key_ shuttle tiles peel away from an orbiter, that orbiter and its crew is lost–and nothing can or will be done to save them. Why not build the possibility of rescue into this equation? Obviously, NASA doesn’t want to imperil a rescue crew in an attempt to save another, but why be so fatalistic?

This is difficult for laypeople to understand, but NASA operates under a principle of mitigated risk. You look closely at the risks and the ways of eliminating or reducing the risks. Some can be designed out. Others would either be too expensive or just plain impossible. (Example: you’re riding a rocket. You can’t remove the risk of riding a rocket and still get to space.) So there are evaluations of the likelihood of different problems occurring, then compare the likelihood and the resolution methods and come up with a balance between totally safe (i.e. safer than staying in bed all day) and breaking the bank (i.e. tripling the federal budget purely for NASA).

Once on orbit, there’s only one way home - back through the atmosphere. What could have been done differently? Emergency return capsules? A rescue vehicle on standby all the time? These types of solutions would require substantially more funding, and what is the amount of safety that you’re adding? Just how likely is the need to use them? NASA chose to make the system as robust as possible, to build in the best protection they could, and then accept some amount of risk that if damage occurred, there aren’t a lot of options. They did try to build a tile repair kit, but it didn’t really work, and the risk of creating more damage during the fix made that a simple decision.

What about docking with another shuttle? Well, that assumes you can get another shuttle up there. Logistics make that impractical. One could complain about how the Shuttle never lived up to the original promise of speed of turnaround, about the shortsitedness of the politicians pulling the purse strings, but what would be the point? Given the hardware system we have, processing logistics just doesn’t make it smart to keep a shuttle perpetually on standby whenever there’s a shuttle up.

In fact, though, that was part of ISS consideration. Since the shuttle can’t be ready for quick response, they incorporated plans for an emergency crew return vehicle into the ISS plan. Currently that role is fulfilled by the Soyuz craft. At one time there were plans for a stand alone, full time on station, 7 person capable return craft, but that got hammered by budget problems.

> [@](#):
>
> Also, how might a rescue crew transfer the crew from a distressed shuttle? Robotic arm? Having two shuttle craft 50 feet from one another in orbit, at 17,500 mph, is indeed an unpleasant proposition, but couldn’t it be pulled off, if necessary?

Assuming you had a second shuttle available, it wouldn’t be a problem to rendezvous. That now happens regularly with ISS. Flying two shuttles at once? I think at one time that was an issue, but when ISS came along they upgraded the systems so it is a possibility. How about the actual method of transfer? Columbia didn’t have the robotic arm, but the rescue vehicle could. If there’s a grapple fixture somewhere in the payload bay, you can grab ahold. The transfer itself would be more problematic. Can they get out the hatch with Spacehab installed? I don’t remember. I think so - there are contingency EVAs to close the payload bay doors, fasten latches, reel in the S-band antenna if it jams, etc. They want to keep those as possibilities, so I think there’s a way.

I would imagine the scenario would be to have someone drag a couple of space suits over from the rescue vehicle, and then ferry the people across, reusing the suits. You do have sizing problems, but for emergency use I would think if you can squeeze into the suit, you could be dragged by the other person. They would want to develop some procedure, involving use of safety tethers and maybe the RMS rope reel to create a temporary handrail between the two. The RMS is pretty difficult to hold onto and crawl along, so you wouldn’t really be able to use it to crawl back and forth, but with the two bays facing each other and a relatively small gap between them, it shouldn’t be too difficult to run the rope from one to the other, tied off to handrails on the forward bulkheads of each, and pull along the rope to cross across.

Okay, did that answer your questions?

I’m going to post this and continue below.

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**Author:** ![Cliffy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/59ef9b/32.png) [@Cliffy](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Cliffy)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 4:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/69 "2003-02-03T16:40:18Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by robby \*  
> **More convincing to me, however, is that NASA thought enough of the idea of ground-based photography to have tried it in the past. So it couldn’t have been that bad of an idea, and may not have deserved to be dismissed out of hand.**

There’s the rub – NASA has thought in the past that ground-based photography might be useful. So they tried it in the past, and discovered that it delivers no useful data on the scale required. The very fact that they’ve used it before is why they didn’t use it this time – they had a firsthand understanding of the capabilities of ground-based telescopic photography, and it’s simply not good enough.

–Cliffy

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**Author:** ![Tuckerfan](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/eada6e/32.png) [@Tuckerfan](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tuckerfan)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 5:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/70 "2003-02-03T17:11:14Z")

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Suppose NASA figured out that there was a fatal problem while the shuttle was in orbit? Suppose that NASA also knew there was nothing they could do to rescue the astronauts? What good would it do to tell them? The possiblity of losing a crew on re-entry has come up before on John Glenn’s Mercury flight and on Apollo 13. In both cases NASA elected not to tell the astronauts about it.

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**Author:** ![Irishman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/b487fb/32.png) [@Irishman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Irishman)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 6:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/71 "2003-02-03T18:22:00Z")

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**Ficer67** said:

> [@](#):
>
> But, we could engineer the risk down to nearly nothing if we wanted to. If we do the numbers, we see that there are lots of cars on the road, but comparitivley few wrecks. There are also many planes in the air, but very few plane disasters. We could, if we wanted to, make very safe space shuttles, with extra provisions, ejection capsules, and more safety measures; while maintaining cargo capacity, range, capability etc.
> 
> It’s the new millenium, we can engineer the risk down now.

I would hope there are ways to reduce risk and improve capability on the next generation of space vehicle. But I don’t think we can make the major types of changes being suggested for shuttle and still have a vehicle with any capability, and the costs would skyrocket.

And actually, the shuttles are pretty safe. Sounds odd in the face of a disaster, but it’s true.

**k2dave** , I don’t think the Soyuz has enough fuel to go from the ISS orbit to the orbit Columbia was in. And if it did, there’s no way to dock. And there were only two space suits. And the Soyuz can only carry 3 people. If you managed to get there once, ferrying back and forth would definitely be out from fuel standpoint.

**tsunamisurfer** said:

> [@](#):
>
> First, NASA apparently chose _not_ to inspect the orbiter from a ground-based telescope. It has been done before and, though such inspection might not have yielded good data, it should have been attempted. I mean, what the hell is the downside of getting more information so as to make the most informed decision possible?

Past flight experience has shown that the data wouldn’t have been useful. The picture resolution just wouldn’t have been able to pick up the individual tiles. And even if a swath were damaged, it wouldn’t show how badly - how deep. Plus, debris has fallen off and hit the shuttle tiles before. Experience and calculations and evaluation by the best technical experts said the damage should be minimal. Were they concerned? Certainly. Safety is a big deal at NASA. You may not believe it, but I’ve been there, I can tell you from inside the amount of scrutiny that goes into safety. If they felt there was something to be concerned about and that the pictures would have been helpful, they would have used them. In fact, they have used them before - and that is why they didn’t think they would be useful this time. Experience and knowing the resolution wasn’t fine enough to give any more information.

> [@](#):
>
> NASA’s default position, according to NASA officials who have been interview so far, is that the senior technical people chose not to inspect the orbiter telescopically because (a) they had no assurances that doing so would yield good info and (b) there was no way to rescue the shuttle crew.
> 
> This is ridiculous. Making life-and-death decisions based on willfully incomplete evidence–when vital information might have been obtained through telescope–is bad science and bad policy. Apparently, the ground crew, much like during the Challenger disaster, made some critical calculations based on very incomplete data and then arrived at a bad decision. Basically, they were guessing and that guess can’t be said to be educated because they lacked the needed information.

And just what are your qualifications to state that? It’s very easy to second guess their decisions now, when you don’t know who was involved, and what they actually did do, and why and how they reached the decision they did. You assert that they might have obtained useful information from telescopes. Justify that. Show some telescopes that have high enough resolution to be useful.

> [@](#):
>
> Why not risk a (dangerous) EVA to inspect the orbiter? Why not inspect the orbiter by telescope? Why not delay their landing and simultaneously accelerate the second shuttle’s liftoff–sans experiements?

An EVA would be dangerous as you state, and would likely (not possibly, but likely) cause more damage to the tiles. So what if you have a marginal case and you go to look and thereby cause enough damage that now you know you can’t come home. That’s smart.

The point is the experts looked at what they could see on launch, evaluated the numbers, considered the past experience with similar situations, considered what options they had to deal with it, and decided it was okay.

And I’m sure the investigation team will be heavily scrutizing that process, to determine if that played a role, if there was anything that should/could have been done differently, and if there was anyway they should have known differently. Let’s let them evaluate the actual evidence instead of speculating wildly.

> [@](#):
>
> Can one reasonably conclude NASA had a sufficiently large sample size of similar accidents (re: foam/tiles) to make an intelligent decision re: damage in this particular case? Why not obtain data from other sources?

Why is your immediate assumption that they didn’t have that information? Why is it your immediate assumption that they didn’t consult other sources? So they didn’t use telescopes to view the damage directly. Is that the only way you can think to evaluate what happened?

> [@](#):
>
> If you’re going to rely on one set of long-distance photos to base your decision, why rule out another set?

There’s a vast difference between long range ground viewing during take off, and trying to view on orbit.

**Icerigger** , that bubble thing was probably just a concept, because I’ve never heard of it. And I’ve looked through the EVA Tool Catalog, the list of all EVA tools ever flown by NASA.

**yojimboguy** said:

> [@](#):
>
> I believe that’s wrong. Within an hour or two of the breakup, they were showing video of whatever it was that came loose during launch. And whatever it was, it was BIG.

And whatever it was… Do you know what it was? The insulation from the bipod (liquid fuel lines from ET to orbiter) separated, bounced off the bottom, and then was burned up by the exhaust. The big flash you see by the wing is the insulation being vaporized. That’s why it looks so big.

> [@](#):
>
> This indicates a few things to me. Some people inside NASA knew there was a real potential problem there. There was a decision not to investigate further, not because they didn’t think it was a potential problem, but because they were helpless to fix it if it were. I hate to say this, but they were thinking of the hardware, not the people.

Your conspiracy-mongering conclusion-jumping skills are finely honed, now how about your patience, reasonableness, and sense? You have no insight into what they were thinking, and to make that statement is pathetic.

> [@](#):
>
> Is there any defintive info available on how long the crew could have survived had they stayed in orbit and gone onto a mimimum consumtion mode.

Water’s no problem. They could have stretched their food a few days, and starvation is long anyway. But oxygen and carbon dioxide scrubbing would be the limiting factors. I don’t know what their starting resources were, but there’s typically a couple days contingency supplies beyond the nominal timeline, so I’m guessing maybe they could stretch an extra week.

> [@](#):
>
> BTW, a Soyuz launched TODAY to deliver supplies to the ISS. That Soyuz could have been launched to rendevous and provide supplies to the Shuttle.

Perhaps it could have been reoutfitted and launched to reach Columbia. But there’s no way to have docked with Columbia, and no RMS to capture the Progress Module (it was a Progress resupply module, not a Soyuz). I’m pretty sure they could get two crew members EVA, and then attempt capture by hand. I don’t know if they could get it opened.

**k2dave** said:

> [@](#):
>
> 1 - tiles fall off and that’s OK as the shuttle landed safely w/o them  
> 2 - a patch job of fitting a too small tile into an empty space (missing tile space) up in space should be better then not having that tile.

1 is yes, but 2 is more troublesome. Yes, filling a hole with gaps around it is better than not filling the hole at all. But the bigger problem is attaching the tiles, getting them to stick. The tile repair kit that was tested was, IIRC, some epoxy type resin that would be spread over nicks in the tile. There was a lot of question that the epoxy would be abraded during reentry and come off.

**Dragonblink** said:

> [@](#):
>
> IANAA, but I think there’s a huge difference between the pressure suits they wear for launch – the orange ones, right? – and the huge bubbly white thingummies they use for spacewalks. I don’t think the orange suits could protect the astronauts from open space, just from lack of air. There would still be the problems of radiation, et cetera.

The launch/reentry suits are the orange suits. They are not space suits. They are like aircraft pressure suits. The radiation risk is minimal, and in an extreme contingency not an issue. Thermally, they would be exposed for too short a time (crawling between two vehicles) to worry about. Micrometeoroid risk is small for such a short exposure. But they aren’t built for space vacuum. I don’t think they’d work.

About telescopes: aperature (diameter) is not magnification/resolution. Aperature is light gathering ability. Magnification occurs in the optics - the grind of the mirror, the lenses attached. Also, atmosphere is inherently blurring of the image, caused by pockets of various temperatures, air currents, etc. Astronomers term this _seeing_. Only recently have some large telescopes been built with adaptive optics that can adjust to work around bad seeing.

**tsunamisurfer** , you still haven’t proven that any of the ground based telescopes could have seen anything. That “Teal Amber” and “Teal Blue” were used to view the orbiter before does not prove that the images were useful.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![tsunamisurfer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/a698b9/32.png) [@tsunamisurfer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tsunamisurfer)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 7:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/72 "2003-02-03T19:03:42Z")

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[QUOTE]  
\*Originally posted by Irishman \*  
Ah, the joys of second guessing technical decisions after the fact with no technical training, no insight to what was done, no information about the process that was used, and no understanding of the concepts involved.

**Based upon my insight** into the shuttle preparation process for flight, I’ll take a stab at an answer.

[snip]

**Again, this is heavy speculation on my part.**

[snip]

**Once on orbit, there’s only one way home - back through the atmosphere. What could have been done differently? Emergency return capsules? What about docking with another shuttle? Well, that assumes you can get another shuttle up there. Logistics make that impractical.**

Irishman, you are writing when you should be reading. Check the previous 50 posts. Check the scheduled March 1 liftoff of the next shuttle.

Have you read that there was considerable dissent within NASA about the extent of the damage?

Can anyone here prove the telescopes cited above could NOT resolve the damage? What is the downside of doing so?

**I would imagine the scenario would be to have someone drag a couple of space suits over from the rescue vehicle, and then ferry the people across, reusing the suits. You do have sizing problems.**

see above re: extra suits

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![rsa](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/839c29/32.png) [@rsa](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rsa)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/73 "2003-02-03T19:38:12Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by tsunamisurfer \*  
> Have you read that there was considerable dissent within NASA about the extent of the damage?

I have read and heard quite the oppposite. Do you have a cite for your assertion?

> [@](#):
>
> Can anyone here prove the telescopes cited above could NOT resolve the damage? What is the downside of doing so?

Since you seem to be the only person still asserting that they could, how about you prove **your** claim.

The downside? How about interrupting ongoing science, wasting fuel to orient space based telescopes, and so on.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bernse](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/a9a28c/32.png) [@bernse](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bernse)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 8:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/74 "2003-02-03T20:04:30Z")

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Reviving an earlier post:

> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Santos L Halper \*  
> \*\*I’m pretty sure it was able to fly missions to the ISS, if it carried a smaller cargo load (around 1/2 to 2/3 the payload weight, iirc). Since the main reason for the shuttles to go to the ISS is to add modules and carry large amounts of supplies, that made it undesirable to use Columbia.  
> Eric \*\*

Maybe, maybe not…

From [http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/launches/ov102\_010712.html](http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/launches/ov102_010712.html)

> [@](#):
>
> **NASA Considers Mothballing Shuttle Columbia**
> 
> \<snip\>
> 
> The veteran orbiter, however, is the only NASA shuttle that is not equipped to dock with the International Space Station. In fact, the 90-ton shuttle is too hefty to carry heavy cargoes up to the station as part of the ongoing $60 billion outpost construction project.

It does’t say if Columbia _could have been made_ to be able to dock one way or another though (even with a light load), but it gives me the impression that it couldn’t.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![bernse](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/a9a28c/32.png) [@bernse](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/bernse)\
**Post date:** [February 3, 2003, 8:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/75 "2003-02-03T20:10:42Z")

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It looks like Columbia indeed could have been able to dock with the ISS.  
From:[http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/fl\_iss\_030102.html](http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/fl_iss_030102.html)

> [@](#):
>
> In addition to Ramon, another V.I.P. is scheduled to launch later this year. Former Idaho teacher Barbara Morgan will lift off on shuttle Columbia in November. She will serve as a mission specialist astronaut on another construction mission to the space station.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![tsunamisurfer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/a698b9/32.png) [@tsunamisurfer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tsunamisurfer)\
**Post date:** [February 4, 2003, 2:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/76 "2003-02-04T02:07:41Z")

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**WHERE TSUNAMISURFER PLAYS THE HEALER…**  
In the final analysis, we all are grieving over the tragic deaths of the Columbia 7 and perhaps I am grasping at straws. What I do know, if I were mission director and one of you adversarial SOBs (just kidding) were on the orbiter, I would exhaust every damn option conceivable to save lives–including asking DoD to train their latest optics, even if a desperation stab, to detect tile damage–and then consider sending up the next shuttle ASAP.

The problem, of course, with the “abandon Columbia for a rescue shuttle because of the significant tile damage” is later convincing the American public that it was necessary to jettison Columbia into the Pacific–all $2.1 billion of her–over the possibility she couldn’t make it home safely. The uproar would be deafening.

That said, I think we’re going to learn some mighty interesting details in months to come–details NASA officials have as yet not been forthcoming in disclosing.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![NinjaChick](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/71c47a/32.png) [@NinjaChick](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/NinjaChick)\
**Post date:** [February 4, 2003, 3:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/77 "2003-02-04T03:31:50Z")

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I don’t know much about telescoping imaging, so I’m not even going to touch that. But with regards to launching a rescue mission: IANAA, but I don’t think that you can just push a launch forward like that. Parly due to the logistics that **Irishman** outlined, but another huge factor is weather. Wind and/or rain and/or low visibility = no launch; as I understand it, that’s one of those things that’s simply not negotiable. Additionally, launch windows. There must be certain conditions at at least some of the abort sites, and rendezvous missions always have very small windows, because you’re trying to get two very fast-moving objects very close to each other.

With regards to docking with the ISS, I don’t know if that would have been possible, nor if the life-support systems (temp systems, air filtration, etc) of the ISS could suddenly support 7 extra bodies, regardless of whether or not the Columbia could have even gotten there.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![hobbes730](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/97f17d/32.png) [@hobbes730](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/hobbes730)\
**Post date:** [February 4, 2003, 4:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/78 "2003-02-04T04:04:50Z")

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Remember, there are certain parts of the launch process that simply cannot be sped up, no matter how much money or effort you throw at them. It _will_ take almost a day just to get the shuttle situated on the crawler and ready for transport. The crawler _will_ take half a day just to get the shuttle from the VAB to the launch pad. It _will_ take a solid day just to fill the external tank with the necessary LOX and LH. And this is all assuming that the fuel is already on-hand and all the equipment is basically RTF. Just focusing on a very narrow part of the entire shuttle rollout process, it becomes obvious how hard it would be to push up a launch that much, even working around the clock.

Anyway, I think Irishman already covered this topic the best. The answer, IMO, is a definitive NO. They might be able to bump it up a few days, a week at most with favorable conditions, but to cut it from four weeks to one? Impossible. Period.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jojo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ecd19e/32.png) [@Jojo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jojo)\
**Post date:** [February 4, 2003, 4:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/79 "2003-02-04T04:56:44Z")

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**Ranchoth** said:

> [@](#):
>
> …I don’t believe the answer to the OP has been tackled yet. That is, if it had been definately known that Columbia couldn’t return to Earth safely (and don’t ask me if it was even possible for anyone to have found out for sure beforehand)…
> 
> 1. How much longer could Columbia have stayed in orbit, and
> 2. Could the launch schedule for the next shuttle (Atlantis, on March 1st, FYI) have been pushed up, and the ship redirected to rendevous with Columbia?

The answer to both questions is about a week according to [this article](http://www.globeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/front/RTGAM/20030202/wcolum22a/Front/homeBN/breakingnews) from the Globe and Mail matt\_mcl posted earlier:

> [@](#):
>
> Could NASA have sent another shuttle to rescue Columbia’s five men and two women?
> 
> In theory, yes.
> 
> Normally, it takes four months to prepare a shuttle for launch. But in a crisis, shuttle managers say they might be able to put together a launch in less than a week if all testing were thrown out the window and a shuttle were already on the pad.
> 
> Columbia had enough fuel and supplies to remain in orbit until Wednesday, and the astronauts could have scrimped to stay up another few days beyond that. With shuttle Atlantis ready to be moved to its pad, it theoretically could have been rushed into service, and Columbia’s astronauts could have climbed aboard in a series of spacewalks. If Atlantis flew with the minimum crew of two, it could have accommodated seven more astronauts.

But then, with the data they had they thought they were ok, they weren’t gonna send up another shuttle just in case. So the send up another shuttle argument only works if NASA _knew_ the shuttle had lost too many tiles to survive re-entry.

Unfortunately they didn’t know how much damage had been done to the tiles so they didn’t know whether it was worth sending up another shuttle. Exactly how much tile damage does there have to be to justify an unprecedented, dangerous, ad hoc 2nd shuttle rescue mission?

Presumably the boffins at NASA have a pretty good idea how much tile damage will cause irretrievable break-up. But how could they know that the tile damage had passed critical point?

However, I still think it was worth photographing. Not from Earth but from spy satellites and the ISS. According to the thread Minty Green linked to earlier, spy satellites are pretty good these days (maybe 10 cm square to a pixel) and thats photographing the Earth through the atmosphere, a space-on-space photo will be much clearer. This link was posted earlier, if you scroll half-way down, you can see a [satellite photo](http://satobs.org/telescope.html) of the shuttle.

And they don’t just take one photo, they can take hundreds from different angles using conventional and inra-red. All this info can be processed by computers and then enhanced.

According to the article linked to above, the ISS passed within a couple of hundred kilometres of it several times.

They should have at least tried to photograph the damage. It wouldn’t have helped the crew of Columbia but it may be useful for future expeditions. But I think minature, manouverable cameras strategically placed around the ship are the way to go.

And they might as well give them a few spare tiles while they’re up there. If I was an astronaut, I’d prefer a risky do-or-die spacewalk with a few tiles and a pot of glue than certain death. There’s always rope after all to tie me to the ship.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![tsunamisurfer](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/a698b9/32.png) [@tsunamisurfer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tsunamisurfer)\
**Post date:** [February 5, 2003, 12:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/columbia-logistics-of-a-second-shuttle-staging-a-rescue/152249/80 "2003-02-05T00:37:47Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by Jojo \*  
> They should have at least tried to photograph the damage. It wouldn’t have helped the crew of Columbia but it may be useful for future expeditions. But I think minature, manouverable cameras strategically placed around the ship are the way to go.  
> \*\*

One of the principal investigators of the Challenger disaster, an individual technical command of space flight surpasses every poster in this thread combined, expressed his shock today that NASA did not bother trying to telescopically image the orbiter.

He added that a second shuttle might have been able to rescue the crew, in a hail Mary operation.

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