The argument is that those seeking religious based solace should not be advantaged by the law over and above those seeking other forms of solace. Because to so advantage that particular form of solace seeking is, according to many, an establishment of religion.
If what you are describing is forcibly stamping out religious spirituality, then religious spirituality is pretty weak. If it cannot survive without special government protection, and if it is dependent on the ability to confess raping children without fear of state consequences, then that is a pretty major indictment of organized religion.
Ummm…you also have to actually read that caselaw, Bricker, and I note that in some cases you apparently don’t, which leads to embarrassing situations where you have to stonewall to avoid admitting you are wrong because you have proffered dicta as “the state of the law.”
But yes you appear to be correct, there is an exception…shall we nitpick everything you say for such a detail and then claim you’re a poor researcher?
This is all beside the point that I was looking for an overview of the entire nation’s state statutes. I’m not gonna research the caselaw from every state so I can list which ones have exceptions in their caselaw or statutory law. Now if you wanna do so go ahead. I think the post would be way too long.
I suppose you failed to note that I mentioned Washington merely because it came out on top with google, and not because Washington’s laws have particularly any more weight on the matter.
I’m still pretty uncertain about the status of current laws regarding this. So far in this thread we’ve talked about a few different categories of people who could receive information about a crime:
Attorneys
Licensed counselors
Clergy
Shlubs
Also, there are different situations that could apply to all of these people:
A. Telling authorities of a past violent crime that the recipient has learned of.
B. Telling authorities of a threat, or a likelihood, that a violent crime is to be committed.
C. Whether the recipient is allowed to reveal the information (will an attorney be in trouble for revealing his client’s crime?).
D. Whether the recipient is mandated to come forward with the information.
E. Whether the recipient can be mandated in a courtroom setting to reveal it.
I’d appreciate a little clarification in filling in this matrix. As I said earlier, I think the law should treat clergy exactly the same as shlubs. To do otherwise is endorsing the tenets of that religion, and the state should be neutral w/ respect to religion.
Never claimed they were. We have had this discussion before, and I accept that it isn’t the current interpretation of the first amendment. But to each time make this argument, when I never made the claim it was the interpretation currently imposed by the courts is a little bit pointless, don’t you think?
But you are making the claim that removing a special privilege granted to religion is akin to an attempt to stamp out religious spirituality. You are the one who brought the concept of stamping something out. I would dispute that it is any attempt to stamp out religious spirituality at all - any more than, for example, an attempt to place same sex marriage on the same legal basis as heterosexual marriage is an attempt to stamp out opposite sex marriage.
And if someone were to describe moves to SSM in the same fashion, I would similarly argue they had a pretty low view of strength of opposite sex marriage.
You could say the same about your “research” that holds dicta to be the state of the law.
No matter how your personal digs at me have no bearing on any of these threads, and your illusion of personal detachment as a legal authority is suffering because of it.
You’re a terrible hypocrite, Bricker, unless you can claim that your posts always cover all relevant details.
When you run into a problem with your analysis this is what you do–turn to the ad hominems and well poisoning, and you even carry it over more than one thread. Give it a break, Bricker and stick to the facts.
As it is, you’re inspiring me to criticize you every single time you leave a loose end. I’m not that kind of person to demand ultimate perfection.
My point was about statutory law, and you still act as though I meant to eliminate caselaw.
Now I have a question for you–you won’t like it–
Do the authorities in Washington view child abuse in an ongoing manner? As in, evidence of abuse means a likelihood of an ongoing problem, that it will continue into the future?
Because you will note that I said therapists may report ongoing crimes and plans to commit future crimes, and that would mean–gasp–I was right.
It has been well established in this thread that this is not a “special privilege.” The ordinary public do not have to report crimes either.
Bricker did not claim this broad stamping out of religious spirituality. He specifically claimed that this would eliminate penitent priest confidentiality, and that has been clear.
Learn how to read. And then learn how to understand what you read.
When settled decisional law exists, and is contradicted by some piece of dictum, then I agree that it’s worthless. When the law is not settled, then dicta can have a persuasive effect and is properly cited in support of an argument. You advanced an inane theory about the installation of a GPS being a taking or a seizure because of the microliters of additional gas that the monitored car would consume hauling around a six-ounce weight for a month. And then you tried to claim that the lack of contrary case law meant that you were right. I properly cited dicta to contradict that insane claim, because it would be unlikely to find a non-insane attorney to seriously raise that as a claim, and seriously raising it as a claim would be a necessary predicate to having it appear anywhere other than dicta.
You are a sloppy researcher, and seem to believe that if it’s not on Google, it doesn’t exist.
No. I brought nothing from any other thread here. You offered a legal conclusion in this thread, and I properly debunked it. I didn’t mention a single thing from any other thread – it was you that raised the spectre of comments from other threads.
Bull. Your point was about what the law requires as far as reporting requirements, and in fact you announced that another poster was wrong, even though he correctly stated the law, and you did not.
I can’t find a single scrap of evidence to suggest that the authorities in Washington take that position. Nor does that make you right, since this discussion began after you summarily declared another poster wrong… when he was in fact correct.
But I’ll play. If you have some evidence that authorities in Washington view child abuse in an ongoing manner, such that past child abuse is per se evidence of a future crime, let’s hear it. I don’t see nay such law, rule, opinion, or regulation anywhere. But I’m willing to be educated.
Granted, I know you know it. And you know that I know you know it, and so forth.
But if we were speaking only to each other, we could conduct this debate by e-mail. When I comment on or rebut a point you make, I am speaking to the silent reader as well as to you. And the silent reader may not be familiar with our history of rehashing this point, and without contradiction from me may reason that because you’re an excellent writer and analyst, clearly a lawyer or at least highly familiar with the law, you’re probably announcing a well-known point of First Amendment law.
So no, not pointless at all.
From Jack Batty, a poster who denies that there is even such a thing as religious spirituality, calling it instead a shared delusion? No, I stand by my “attempt to stamp out” comment, acknowledging at the same time that the attempt is futile. But it’s there.
Thanks for the info. I’m afraid I really don’t know much about Catholic doctrine. If, as I understand it, the point of confession is the seeking of absolution via sincere regret and a desire to change the sinful behaviour, would the priest deciding (for whatever reason) that the person in question is not worthy of absolution be an indication of lack of that sincerity or strength of desire to change such that it is an equivalent to an intent, or at least not strong enough intent otherwise, to continue the sinful behaviour? That is to say, could we assume that a person who is not granted absolution is unrepentant enough that a repeat sin is likely?
Then perhaps let’s change the scenario. What if it is an authority asking? I would assume that the answer does not change if it is merely an authority asking merely in their role as congregation member, not job - so a Chief of Police asking whether the confessor would be appropriate to run the Committee treasury makes no difference. What if an authority is asking as part of their job, however - perhaps seeking a character reference for a responsible or authority position in and of itself?
Which is fine, if the method is to argue that it’s a delusion. If the method is to say that because I am convinced it’s a delusion, the entirety of society should treat it as such and strip from it any legal status… not so much.
If the person is unrepentant enough to refuse to come forward, that’s sufficient reason to deny absolution. I suspect that an attempt to craft a per se rule that this also means a future offense is likely would be unavailing.
Well, the rule is that the priest may not, directly or indirectly, reveal what he has learned in confession. That does not translate to a positive obligation to recommend the individual; like a lawyer faced with a lying client who insists on testifying, the priest can refuse to, or dodge, supplying a positive reference while still not revealing any confidences – walking a careful line between competing obligations.
And unfortunetly I suppose a rule allowing priests to break their silence in cases where they believe the confessor will never publically admit a crime would also stop those who genuinely would like to repent and come forwards publically from seeking their priest’s (or equivalent) aid too. I find myself wondering if it would be worth it - I guess there’s no statistics to know, though.
But faced with such a direct question (even if the answer is not expected, should the priest break the confessional seal), I don’t see how refusal to or dodging of an answer so knowingly wouldn’t count as covering up a crime.
Just as a general opinion, to dodge or refuse seems unworkable to me (granted, i’m not a priest). Given that a priest is able to give a response if the problem is not something arising from confession (if they’re just bad with money, for example), then anything other than a straight answer and reason would be suspicious. Even if a priest went the whole hog and gave out no recommendations whatsoever, I don’t know that I would credit many priests (or people; I don’t single out priests in this way) as thinking that far ahead or being that careful.
Because covering up a crime requires taking affirmative steps, not merely remaining silent.
Let’s imagine my brother is a notorious criminal, guilty of mopery and dopery. I know that when Dad died, he left a cabin up in the woods that both he and I have used on occasion. And I know that he sent me an e-mail, saying not to come up to the cabin for a while because he’ll be using it.
The cops come to question me, asking me if I know where my brother is, or if I can think of anywhere he might be hiding. I remain silent.
Then the cops say, “We have some wiretap conversations in which he mentions ‘hiding out at the cabin.’ Does that mean anything to you?” I remain silent.
That’s not “covering up the crime” in any criminally liable sense. I have no obligation to report my knowledge or my suppositions.
Now, the moment I tell the police, “A cabin? We’ve never had a cabin in this family!” THEN I have misled investigators and could be convicted.
And of course, if subpoened by a grand jury, I would have to answer questions. Failing to do so there would subject me to contempt charges; lying at that point would be perjury.
While I supose someone might draw some kind of a negative inference from the lack of a positive recommendation, that’s attenuated enough from the confession that would not likely violate the stricture of even indirect breach of the seal of the confessional.
