Control of U.S. Ports

Relating to the title of this thread, most sources stress that the Dubai Ports company is not going to be “controlling” or “running” these ports. Here:

Dubai Ports member says that the government does control the company. Not to mention the people who are running the company are Australian, American, etc.

There doesn’t seem to be much of any NEW security concern. The ports are badly protected, but this doesn’t seem to be any change.

Maybe I’m wrong, but I haven’t seen ANYTHING that makes me question this. Then again, I’m not up for election any time soon.

Scotty is reminding me more & more of Ron Ziegler.

Agreed…but this is a surprisingly huge political mistake. It’s like the Bushies have gone politically tone-deaf. Even though there’s been a background low-level feeling ever since 9/11 that our ports are not as secure as they could be – let’s sell 'em to the A-rabs. Nobody’ll care.

This must be the “political capital” that Bush was planning to spend – his overwhelming 52% mandate gave him the go-ahead to run roughshod over Congress and our civil liberties. I think it’s coming back to bite him in the ass.

No, Rumsfeld was not supposed to have approved this. Where do you get that from? The regulatory body in charge of this was the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which :

The only cabinet level department head who needs to approve this is Treasury.

That makes no sense since the “inspection” was done. You are claiming that the inspection was shoddy, but you have no basis on which you are making that claim. The only indication that something might have gone wrong is that this deal was not referred to the “45 day approval process”, but it’s unclear to me that that was a requirement in this case, since the operations in question were already owned by a foreign company.

The only cabinet level department head who needs to approve this is Treasury.

So the “Committee” as a whole is purely advisory to the Secretary of the Treasury? Didn’t know that. It’s also not supported by your cite.

At any rate, one of the senses in which Rumsfeld was “supposed to have approved this” was in the sense of “he was alleged to have approved this,” i.e. the Committee was supposed to have approved this unanimously. Except he knew nothing about it.

Since this is one of the major questions in this debate, a cite ought to accompany your assertion that allegedly resolves the question.

No. I am claiming we have no evidence of the nature of the alleged inspection. Since you’re claiming the inspection was done, that’s why I’m eager for a cite.

What does that have to do with anything? The British company wasn’t under the control of a foreign government. As the law says:

Unless you have information that the British concern that has been operating the ports either is owned or controlled by or is acting on behalf of the British government. Not that even that seems to matter; it doesn’t talk about whether “an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government” made the acquisition from an entity that wasn’t so controlled or acting.

In my previous post, “The only cabinet level department head who needs to approve this is Treasury” should have been in a quote box; it was said by John Mace.

Link to the statute.

Let’s see how many times I need to correct one post. :smack:

No. Rumsfeld does not sit on the committee. Treasury heads it, but the participants from other departments are sub-cabinet level. I suppose Rumsfeld could sit on the committee if he chose to do so, but it’s not required. Where are you getting this idea that Rumsfeld sits on the committee? Why is it so hard to undertand that the committee, headed by Treasury, voted unanimously to approve this deal?

I don’t understand. Do you dispute that the approval was given? If not, why would we assume that a review was not made? You’re the one claiming it wasn’t, so you’re the one who needs to give a cite.

You’re right, it does need to involve a foreign gov’t. But note that you quoted the regulation incorrectly. It’s not “or”, it’s “and”. So, the committee determined that the second part was not applicable (emphasis added):

Hmm… The CFIUIS cite I gave in that post does list the SecDef as being a member of the committee. I’m sure I read in an analysis of this in my local paper that only SecTres was on the committeee and that all other members were sub-cabinet level. Let me see if I can dig that up.

OK, an eleven-member committee of fairly high-ranking officials voted unanimously to approve this deal. Unless life works in weird ways in meetings of Cabinet and subCabinet officialdom, it’s pretty unlikely that the committee itself did whatever substantive review was done of this deal.

So, who did that review, in whatever form it may have taken?

Does that clarify what I’m claiming?

I C&P’d that quote directly from Cornell Law School’s U.S. Code webpages, and I don’t see how our cites disagree.

I suppose the Committee could have determined that the second part wasn’t applicable, but it would have had to fail to read the contract to do so, apparently:

Sounds like a security role to me.

Treasury Secretary Snow didn’t know about the deal either.

No, just that the Republican talking point of “We must approve the sale to build goodwill with the Middle East” is so much Texas cow patties.

I’m personally still of mixed minds on whether or not this deal is a security risk. I strongly suspect, though, that the driving motive is all about enriching Friends of George™ more than anything else. It’s interesting to note that the White House’s “secret agreement” for the deal featured this oddity:

I think someone more fiscally-minded than I am could point out the ways this loophole could be used for nefarious schemes…

Now, that is something that I find disturbing, or at least confusing since it contradicts the description of the CFIUS on its own web site. I supsect that in the next few days we’ll get a better education of what that committee is and how it works. Having been on interdepartmental committees like this at large corporations, I can see how department heads might delegate authority to deputies, but one would think that deals this big would at least cross the desk of the guy who’s dept is in charge.

While I agree with his general assessment that it’s the professionals who are going to do the legwork and make the recomendations, he should at least be aware of what’s going on, if for no other reason than to forestall the type of political firestorm we’re seeing now.

This White House Fact Sheet on the CFIUS process and the DP World transaction might interest you, me, and everyone else here.

Might as well just copy the whole thing, since it’s a governmental press release, hence doubly exempt from fair-use restrictions:

Tone deaf? Understatement of the year

And you thought Kerry’s call for global approval of US Foreign policy was a poor choice of words…

Daniel

Because the Usual Suspects automatically, reflexively, unthinkingly attack anything and everything Bush does.

Regards,
Shodan

You agree, I presume, that the Usual Suspects automatically, reflexively, unthinkingly defend anything and everything that Bush does as well? Or is this just a content-free drive-by?

Daniel

Needless to say, I’ve got a couple of concerns relating to this press release:

  1. The use of words like ‘manage’, ‘in charge’, ‘sets the standards’.

“[DPW] will not manage port security. The security of our ports will continue to be managed by the Coast Guard and Customs.”

“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Is Always In Charge Of The Nation’s Port Security, Not The Private Company That Operates Facilities Within The Ports. Nothing will change with this transaction. DHS, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and other Federal agencies, sets the standards for port security and ensures that all port facility owners and operators comply with these standards.”

“DP World will not manage port security”.

A manager doesn’t do; s/he supervises, delegates, etc. So what I’m reading here is that the Coast Guard, Customs, and DHS will tell DPW what to do and how to do it vis-a-vis port security, but DPW will actually carry out the port security operations.

This is backed up by language in the Fact Sheet such as “DP World has signed a letter of assurances making commitments to meet and maintain security standards for the port terminals that they will own and operate in the United States.” It wouldn’t have to maintain such standards if it didn’t have a role to play in security.

  1. The changing of the standard.

As previously noted, the law says a 45-day investigation is mandatory in any instance where (a) “an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any merger, acquisition, or takeover” which (b) “could result in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the United States.”

The fact sheet says “The review process allows any agency that sees a potential credible threat to the national security to raise those concerns.”

Similarly, “Twelve Federal agencies and the government’s counterterrorism experts closely and carefully reviewed the transaction to make certain it posed no threat to national security.”

To me, at least, the phrase “threat to national security” is much stronger, hence a more stringent test to meet, than the legal phrase “affect national security.”

In a header, the White House goes even further: “The Administration, As Required By Law, Has Reviewed The Transaction To Make Certain That It Does Not In Any Way Jeopardize National Security.”

  1. The continued lack of any specific locus of responsibility for review:

“In reviewing a foreign transaction, CFIUS brings together 12 Federal agencies with diverse expertise to consider transactions from a variety of perspectives and identify and analyze all national security issues.”

Did CFIUS as a committee spend a lot of time on this, or was it a 5-minute agenda item at their meeting? It’s impossible to say whether they conducted a substantive review as a group, although it would seem unlikely to this bureaucrat that they did. At any rate, two of the members of CFIUS who unanimously approved it, didn’t find out they had until afterwards.

“During the initial 30-day review, each CFIUS member agency conducts its own internal analysis of the national security implications of the transaction under review.” Those agencies are mostly pretty big places. I’d feel better if one deputy assistant undersecretary stepped forward and said, “My shop vetted this deal.”

The problem with ‘responsibility’ that’s spread over a large group is, nobody in particular has to stand up and take responsibility for anything. I’m not saying it’s happening, but finding a responsible person has the potential to be a serious three-card monte game, only with a hell of a lot more than three cards.

Compared to these concerns, the White House’s conflation of investments in businesses with a connection to protecting our national security, and investments in the United States generally, is a mere irritant - just the usual day-to-day White House untruth. (“Preventing this transaction by a reputable company to go forward after careful review would send a terrible signal to friends and allies that investments in the United States from certain parts of the world are not welcome.”) If they want to buy the Target chain of stores, or the Holiday Inns, nobody’s going to care; hell, if Qaddafi wants to buy 'em, and has the money, I frankly don’t give a flip. But port security is a whole 'nother ballgame.

Really??!! Woohoo! The war is over! Dismantle the DHS and revoke the Patriot Act! Yay!

I intend immediately to proced to 42nd and Broadway and kiss a girl for the magazine cover–We’ll be the next Nick and Jessica…

not always. sometimes its the things he **doesn’t **do, like informing himself (either via reading the business pages once in the week, in which ca.se the sale of P & O would have stuck in his tiny tiny brain) or paying attention to the government that he’s supposed to be running