Convince me you have Freewill

Great Debates
21

Well, brian, you’ve almost got it. The Fibonacci numbers do indeed depend on the previous calculation, which relies on the previous calculation, etc., etc. They are defined recursively.
The Lucas numbers is also recursively defined, however the original input is different.
Both of those, when considered as a sequence, approaches the golden ratio as a limit at infinity.

Consciousness-as-recursion comes into play in self-awareness. That is, when we are aware of ourself we aren’t aware of something seperate that is still a part of us. The unit that does the reflection is the same unit that does external considering. Every moment, in reflection, is based on previous moments based on previous reflection, etc etc. What do you think about free will? Well, I think that…because…because…because…because…etc etc. We bottom out at an “I don’t know why” or a “that’s how it is/self-evident truth” and so on, much like F[sub]n[/sub] bottoms out at the input numbers (namely, 1, 1).

There is no explicit formula available where one can predict what the nth fibonacci number is (so far as I know, though there may be…my number theory book is at home). There may well be no explicit “formula” to determine the nth reaction to a stimulus. But in neither case is anything mysterious going on: all data falls into a pattern and approaches a limit. In the case of F[sub]n[/sub], that limit is (1+sqrt5)/2. In the case of people, it is personality.

I find it wholly plausible, and well-nigh undefeated, that people have no free will, even though our “system” might be chaotic and/or uncalcuable. Hell, even if it is “random” (and I am not going to get into a debate about what randomness is!). But none of those things necessarily include, or even partially imply, a consciousness.

22

oops!

I should note, that the golden ratio as a limit for the F sequence was actually when we consider (F[sub]n+1[/sub])/(F[sub]n[/sub]).

Sorry!

23

ARL,

Ah, yes, the golden mean. But, if we define free-will as also will-to-freedom, with the willed ability to be free limited by knowledge, then is not will-to-knowledge also free-will? Specifically, self-knowledge? For example, a slave does not know he is necessarily self-enslaved if he assumes it is inevitable, but he still can know the value of freedom, ie, what it means to not have it. Likewise, a master experiences the scope of freedom, but does not understand its value, ie, what it means to not have it (master-slave dialectic). Is free-will then, perhaps not “determined” explicitly, but nontheless self-determined? A slave wants to be a master, but a master does not want to be a slave, but wants slaves, so then the slave might also want slaves, and he is enslaved by this logic. Either way, it is impossible to decide an event if we have decided not to decide, and if we decide to decide, then sometimes it is still undecidable. Hence, will-to-freedom determines free-will. In other words, determinism and limitations of nature or human nature, is undermined by self-determinism. So, will assumes freedom, and freedom assumes will. The validity of either can be questioned, but not disproven by terms. Perhaps an undecideable proposition as per Godel.

24

The idea of Free Will, like so many aspects of the multiverse is completely dependant on the Point-of-View of the observer. Considerthis: a person with a troubled past is harrassed in a confined setting, he/she does violence upon the instigator. From their PoV, it was a random act, with no premeditation, however, to a psychologist who is a student of the personality of the subject, it was an unavoidable event. Does that mean that the subject was predestined to cause violence, or just prone to it and therefore a safe bet for the psychologist? The only variable in the equation is PoV.
Looking at nature, imagine a rocky coastline, just a random collection of rocks and water and trash and whatever. However as your PoV pulls away from the image, the lines become more smooth. Eventually, you pull far enough away to observe the planet in it’s entirety, a sphere, one of many, all of them in predictable orbits. The idea of randomness has dulled as patterns evolve from the macro.
Free will is tied more closley to Chaos theory than people might think. Chaos is nullified if you know every variable, (which is impossible at the present time) in every situation. The idea of Free-Will evaporates if you know every aspect of the subjects mental and physical history and know how all of this information interacts with every other personality on the planet. The subject becomes completely predictable and so regardless of the situation, the observer’s PoV the will show a subject who appears to be an unthinking robot. But for this to occur the amount of information required is staggering, and to date, impossible to collect.
From the PoV of us puny mortals, we think that we have Free Will, the alternative is too disturbing. However from the PoV of the deity of your choice, perhaps we are just rats in a box maze looking for the treat and nothing more (see I told you it was disturbing).

25

That is, undoubtedly, one of the most interesting–and dare I say enlightening–things I’ve ever read on this board yet. I am not kidding. Well, not EXTRA enlightening to me but what you said there would have taken me three paragraphs and a quote to produce, and would largely be misunderstood since I would get nitpicked on all the little points. As good as dal_timgar’s short and sweet posts. Whew!

Anyway, back to the matter at hand.

IF we define free will as the will to freedom (smells like nihilism induced metaphysics!), and freedom is the application of knowledge, and knowledge is something that is gained… welllll. I can see that…

I would say so, almost entirely, except for the fact that the self-doing-the-determining is, in fact, incapable of choice.

Hmmm. Could you be implying that even if absolute free will existed that, because a person is a self and recursively definable, that choice itself is narrowed to the boundries of both self-understanding and abstract knowledge? (I know that’s not what you said, but think about that).

From a metaphysical view I can see that that is a strong case for weak determinism, conditional free will, whatever people want to call it. From a physical point of view I can’t say that, however, and reconciling the two ideas is terribly unsuccessful (at least, I’ve never seen them reconciled in a satisfactory way—satisfactory to whom? Why, me of course…but who decides what is satisfactory to me? Why…blah blah blah).

It has always been my “feeling” that free will collapses into determinism due to any number of causes. Personality, morality, physics, etc etc. The question “does free will exist?” has no actual support permanently, even if, at one instant, we can say we did.

But I think that I can be said to be pretty stubborn on that point, as well.

26

In my opinion, the presumption that all events are strictly determined has been destroyed by quantum physics. The syllogism that leads to determinism has been broken irrevocably.

Clinging to determinism in light of modern physics is somewhat like insisting that Einstein’s Special Relativity be couched in terms of ‘relativistic aether.’

27

DrMatrix said:

Yup.

Um. Wait. No! No! I didn’t have to!

28

I think there could be morality in a universe without free will: for example, one could meaningfully distinguish between good actions and bad actions, even if those actions were carried out by robots.

And there could still be a role for punishment or even moral condemnation, to discourage behavior that leads to collective suffering.

As for the OP, I’d feel more comfortable speculating about the possible characteristics of consciousness (eg free will) if I understood consciousness better. Alas, I have difficulty even defining it. For the present, the answer may very well be unknowable.

29

The problem some people have with the idea that we do not have ‘free will’ is that it means that if there is good and evil, then there are inherently good or evil people. It doesn’t mean people are born good or evil. The way I see it, life is like a big pachinko game, and people are a bunch of balls, made of different substances and in different sizes, dropped into the top. It may be too complicated for us to predict what path every ball will take or where they will end up, but the balls are not in control/

30

I would just like to point out that a lack of freewill does not preclude the possibility of personal responsibility, as some people have suggested. As any parent of a teenager can probably tell you, it is possible to be fully responsible for something which you have no control over.

31

Umm… sure knappy, now just point to the part of the brain that has the linear acceleration in it and the Mods can come in and close this thread. How is my brain being effected on some quantuum level, and even if it was – what makes you think there is any controlling authority involved. Randomness doesn’t undermine determinism – the chance of anything happening that has in fact already happened is 100%.

:confused: Since the robots would be unable to change their programming, whither comes the discouragement?

32

Wellllllll

That is if you are suggesting that we can never know that a particular thing happened.
Quantum physics has huge predictive power…are you suggesting that that theory is not deterministic just because it uses probability functions? Remember, as well, that any particle pair created out of the vaccuum is completely opposite its partner in terms of spin, charge, composition, etc etc.

In the thread I linked to above I got into this about quantum physics. We always know what happened. Take electron diffraction, causing interference problems. Did the electron go through one hole or the other? It went through both. aha! You don’t know! It is indeterminable and thus, determinism can’t be right!

I would have to disagree with that interpretation of quantum physics. We didn’t look to see if the electron went through one hole or the other, so why should we expect an answer? Our experiment wasn’t even set up to detect whther it went through one hole or another. Why would you say that that is non-deterministic?

Consider a card trick where your eyes are closed the entire time. Does the trick itself stop to become predictable just because you can’t see it? Yes. Is the trick still doing the same thing anyway? Yes.

We collapse the uncertainty by “observing” a quntum event which forces nature to make a choice. When that choice is forced, nature makes that choice. The past isn’t so fuzzy as the present, and definitely the future!

In the other thread I gave three conditions which, were any one of them to be violated, would cause determinism in the universe. Those are:

3 obviously brings up some questions, like, “Why does it seem to work if it is wrong?”
2 counteracts gravitational attraction, which, so far as any theory has yet explained, works at infinite distances.
1 is necessary to avoid a cause-and-effect chain as well, though on smaller distances than gravity. It relies on the application of the other three forces.

This doesn’t even bring consciousness into things. If consciousness is indeed immaterial then free will is obviously possible.

33

jm:

One can imagine robots that like, um, jellybeans. Nice robots get 10 jellies; naughty ones get 5. And bad robots that steal jellybeans are punished (feed them brussels sprouts?) Presumably these robots run on some sort of optimizing software: I’m imagining that they are more sophisticated than a toy car or toy dog for that matter.

The real point though was that arguments against free will typically don’t deny the existence of incentives. Indeed, psychological determinists such as Skinner emphasize the importance of positive reinforcement.

34

First off, it is NOT my fault that so many clever and well thought out responses predate mine. There are things I can do at work, and they even include browsing SDMB as much as I wanna, but posting a response that requires that I not be interrupted for a little while? Nope, not in the contract.

So…you want me to convince you that I have free will. A different challenge, I daresay, than convincing you that YOU have free will, or convincing you that it is useful, necessary, or convenient for you to operate from the assumption that I have free will, at least at the onset.

Convince, you say. That would be an activity on my part. As your first respondent Zenster indicated, that activity could be a response on my part to the stimulus of your having posted this query, which hardly proves free will on my part. I may nevertheless respond without proving lack thereof.

Convince, you say. That would seem to indicate that (assuming it possible for the challenge to be fulfilled) there exists some set of stimuli, at least hypothetically, such that you, exposed to them, would respond by being convinced. Let’s consider that for a moment. Would the scenario in which you were indeed convinced, in and of itself, constitute proof that YOU were not in possession of free will? After all, you have been (in this hypothetical case) convinced BY something, by a stimulus of activity on my part. Not (I hasten to add) that the question of YOUR free will (or lack thereof) is necessarily relevant to the question of whether or not I possess free will. But it does enable me to toss up for your contemplation: have you (and by extension, me or anyone else) failed to evidence free will if it is true that your activities are a response to your situation or context?

Allow me, having placed that particular kettle upon the hot stove of our inquiry, to let it boil while I contemplate some possible attitudes on that exact question, to wit –

• Consider, if you will, Pavlov and his dogs. I submit that we tend to consider it evidence of the lack of free will to observe that salivation occurs at the ringing of a bell that no longer has any connection to the provision of food. Trained response. Ergo, the question of whether or not there is anything going on except layers of trained responses. But consider an especially and unusually clever poodle-mix that, after the 3rd consecutive ringing of the Pavlovian bell, learns to check the food dish and ascertain that is contains dog food before engaging in salivation – one could even yet say that conditioning has led (albeit somewhat quickly by doggie standards) to this response…

• Consider, instead, the absolute ascetic, proudly removed from the mundane affairs of this world, ensconced atop his pedestal. The ascetic blinks not when the bright sun shines; the ascetic eats not when the belly is empty; the asectic flinches not when you draw the sharpened edge of your filthy sword against foot-flesh, even as it is sliced to the bone and drips blood and infectious bits and pieces of your previous victim are introduced within; and the ascetic responds not when you ask “Yo, your spaciness, what is the secret to life?”; and, at some point, more likely than not sooner than would otherwise be the case if the ascetic had responded to some of these stimuli in appropriate manners, the ascetic dies.

Okay, that pot is definitely boiling now, I daresay:

Has an individual failed to evidence free will if it is true that the individual’s activities are a response to situation or context?

I submit, as my answer, that the question is in error. Free will is lacking whenever the response is dictated by a rigid and inflexible pattern insufficient to contend with the multitude of minute differences in possible stimuli. Free will exists when response to stimuli is highly specialized in its appropriateness to the stimuli provided.

None of which answers your original provocative challenge: that I should convince you that I have free will! I will have to confess that I am not up to meeting that challenge in the confines of this posting to this thread. I will have to suggest, as many esteemed others before me, such as Hastur, that it is your burden to demonstrate that I lack it.

Nevertheless, despite the scarcity of originality provided herein, I hope to have contributed something of value to your inquiry.

35

Well I don’t feel like going to work tomorrow. Society wants me to, but I’m going to call in sick anyway.

So does this prove I have free will because I choose to stay home from work?

Or does this prove there is no free will because I still have to call in and tell my boss I’m not coming?

Or is there no free will because my decision to stay home from work is the results of millions of previous inputs that have programmed my brain to decide to stay home tomorrow?

OR has fate predetermined my destiny is to skip work and watch reruns of Mash and The X-Files all day?

In any case, have fun at work tomorrow suckas!:slight_smile:

36

But you were talking about morality. If I, robot, hand out beans to another robot and everytime I give it 7 beans it acts in a way which causes my program to give it 4 beans, which causes me to give it 7 beans, which makes it act in a way which gives it 4…

I don’t see where the “morality” or “incentive” is there. Every action is the result of previous inputs.

37

Sorry for the lengthy post:
OK jm, I’ll confess. In my original post I intended to make 2 separate points:

Point 2 was not intended to refer to point 1. You’re right, I wasn’t clear.

Now then: The robots I had in mind were more sophisticated than, say, vending machines. But no matter. One can imagine calling robots-behaving-according-to-their-function as “good”. And those behaving otherwise as “evil”. But I suspect that this really isn’t a particular illuminating point.

Giving a (admittedly tiresome) example of my main point: Say a culture wants to discourage stealing. Say that throwing thieves in prison deters crime. Say we live in a deterministic universe and that people/(robots?) like stereos but they hate prison. Enforce laws more rigorously and crime declines. Now, a person might claim, “I shouldn’t go to jail: the combination of my genes, upbringing, the fact that the guard was looking the other way and I was sort of hungry because I skipped breakfast made me do it.” The answer might be, “Fellow automaton, that is indeed unfortunate. But if we allowed you to go scot free, that would encourage other potential wrongdoers, even those who had not skipped breakfast, to steal stereo equipment”.

Although the above characters lack free will (perhaps) a judicial system would still be appropriate and residents could still label stealing as immoral.

38

Geez, flowbark – you seem to keep missing the point. You keep using verbiage which has no place in a deterministic universe.

Actually, no you couldn’t. Whether or not you distinguished anything would be pre-determined by your programming. Hence, not really meaningful.

Yes, but whether or not the punishment was carried out and whether or not the input of the punishment back into the loop resulted in any change in behavior is also pre-determined.

But, all robots would obey their programming at all times, so they would all be “good” robots. It would be impossible for a robot not to obey it’s programming because that would imply the robot had a choice about the matter.

Yes, but, again, whether or not a robot committed an action which resulted in another robot punishing it would all be automatic. There’s no question of what residents “could” do – since you are again implying they have some sort of choice in the matter. They don’t. They will label it whatever their programming has determined they will label it.

39

jm:
Whenever I pursue a philosophical question at anything but a cursory level, I invariably end up more confused than when I started. Such is the case here.

I'm going to try a point-by-point response, though I doubt whether it will settle matters. Then, in the next post, I'll try to sketch a better argument, without robots. Quotes are from _An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis_ by Hospers (1967!). I apologize in advance for reworking your words.

< jm contention: There is no place for distinguishing anything in a deterministic universe.>
False, I believe. Definition: “Determinism is the doctrine of universal causation: it says only that every event has a cause.” It does not imply that agents can’t experience emotions or thoughts or make distinctions. (Apparently, determinism is distinguished from fatalism, which denies that humans have a power to change events. The latter is characterized as empirically false, at least without substantial qualification and revision.)

< jm contention: Whether punishment or any action occurs is pre-determined, given determinism.>
True. But the causes can be internal as well as external to the agent.

[I’m dropping my working robot/broken robot distinction: it is uninteresting, confused and distracting.]

Restatement of flowbark’s words:
Although the deterministic thieves and enforcers lack free will, a judicial system would still be appropriate and if a cop said that stealing was immoral, such a statement would be meaningful.

40

Some background:
Before looking at Hospers (1967!), I had assumed that the doctrine of universal causation was necessarily in conflict with free will. On the contrary, some apparently argue that determinism is necessary for freedom, a point that becomes a little clearer if we allow for internal as well as external causes. Others respond that if an individual’s internal volitions are pre-determined, then she can hardly be free. I follow this for about 10 pages, and then skip pages 337-45 entirely, where the argument is joined in earnest.

As an aside, if we don't believe in the doctrine of universal causation, the problem becomes trickier.

Still, even if I assume a deterministic world, I am capable of dividing acts into those that for example advance suffering and those that reduce suffering. I'll call the latter good and the former immoral. Whether my thoughts, or the thoughts of the saints and perpetrators are inevitable does not remove the distinction.

This does not imply that I find a deterministic world with only illusory freedom to be attractive. I’m only saying that it could support a judicial system and perhaps even some types of moral condemnation.
Postscript: Flowbark came upon an unlatched newspaper box today. The decision was made to take a paper and insert the correct change anyway. Now perhaps that choice was inevitable, given internal and external factors. But to say that a decision is inevitable neither denies the existence of the decision-process nor does it imply anything about the appropriateness of that decision.

PPS: Open questions: In what sense is internal freedom necessary for human dignity? If determinism and free will are at odds, which concept is indicted?