You’re missing something here. The question of whether Oprah’s magazine is “entitled” to use its name never comes up in the case. Oprah’s magazine is not asserting trademark rights of any kind, and it isn’t even clear exactly what trademark Oprah’s magazine would assert if it had.
The decision is not based on Oprah’s claim that it has any exclusive rights in the term O or O: The Oprah Magazine or something else. This kind of thing makes a huge difference in trademark law. So the court never says what Oprah is permitted to use and what it isn’t.
The entire decision addresses only the claims that the European magazine has asserted and it fails to make even the most basic claims to get it through the door of two kinds of claims (1) trademark infringement, and (2) trademark dilution.
And the most basic thing a plaintiff must assert for a prima facie case in either kind of claim is that it has rights in a protectable mark. The plaintiff here has failed to do that. That means the entirety of the rest of the decision is hypothetical. The plaintiff fails on both claims because it has not asserted a distinctive mark that can possibly protected under trademark law.
Now, it’s possible that this is entirely a failure of evidence. The European magazine might have protectable rights, but the point is that is has failed to come forth with enough evidence to establish it.
Again, this part of the decision was not necessary for the court to get into, but it went ahead and did so, probably to make things simpler for the litigants if they decided to try to pursue things further.
But regardless, this has nothing to do with Oprah Winfrey having a “better” magazine. It has to do with the nature of the claim that the plaintiff is setting forth. As I mentioned, the plaintiff made (at least) two claims. One is for trademark infringement, which requires a finding of likelihood of confusion. This claim failed because the plaintiff did not assert a protectable mark.
The second claim is for trademark dilution. This claim also failed because the plaintiff did not assert a valid mark.
But, even if it had asserted a valid mark, it still would not have been able to proceed with a trademark dilution claim because dilution law protects only “famous” marks. What marks are famous? It’s hard to say in advance. We know Coca-Cola and Xerox and Kodak are definitely famous marks, but we don’t know whether a European adult magazine with limited profile in the United States is famous.
The court notes that, assuming that the plaintiff had a protectable mark, it still had failed to establish that the mark was famous. Again, this might merely be a failure of evidence, but it is the plaintiff’s burden to meet.
Now, we’re finally getting to the part of the opinion that you seem to have objections to, but note that even before we get to this part of the opinion, the plaintiff has already lost, in about three different ways. This is deep, deep dicta we’re talking here.
The plaintiff has asserted a claim for trademark dilution. If you are making a claim for trademark dilution, you have to assert either dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.
We’ll skip over the dilution by blurring part here, since that doesn’t seem to worry you, but suffice to say, the plaintiff has failed to offer any sufficient basis for it to go forward with such a claim.
So now let’s get to the part about dilution by tarnishment. If the plaintiff is asserting a claim of dilution by tarnishment by Oprah Winfrey’s magazine, the plaintiff is asserting that even if there is no likelihood of confusion (because confusion is an issue for infringement, not dilution) that Oprah’s use of the term harms the reputation of its mark.
The portion you quote from the court is the court merely the court examining the plausibility (had the plaintiff not already lost its case two or three steps previously) of a claim that the use of the name O: The Oprah Magazine harms the reputation of the plaintiff’s mark.
You see what’s happening here? It’s the plaintiff saying to the court that Oprah is harming his reputation. Thus it’s the plaintiff who is inviting the court to make this examination into content that you’re objecting to here.
This is not a situation in which the government is stepping in and saying “We like Oprah better than porn, so we’re going to let Oprah get away with violating people’s rights because she’s wholesome and porn isn’t.” It’s the plaintiff saying, “Oprah is harming my reputation,” so the court is looking at whether it’s at all plausible that (had the plaintiff not already lost the case three ways to Sunday) that this use might harm his reputation.
That’s what he did – for the infringement claim, because confusion is the key to infringement. Or, rather, I should say that it is what he would have done if the plaintiff had been able to even get through the door of an infringement claim, but he failed to establish that he even had a protectable mark, so the question of likelihood of confusion never actually becomes an issue.
But again, the plaintiff did not assert only an infringement claim. He also asserted a dilution claim, which is a claim that Oprah’s use, though it may not be confusing, nevertheless harms his reputation.
To the extent that you have any misgivings about the content of the two magazines being compared, it’s because the plaintiff invited such a comparison by asserting a harm to his reputation.
There are plenty of cases in trademark law in which two parties are allowed to continue using similar marks. Trademark law does not award exclusivity in all cases when it’s not necessarily warranted.