This is the kind of prisonner’s dilemma that you see a lot in multiplayer strategy games - each player wants to see the top dog or most aggressive player taken down a peg, but each player also wants someone *else *to do the heavy lifting the better to swoop in later and reap all of the rewards while spending none of the effort (or at least want to see every neighbour busy spending resources like crazy in their wars against the threats while themselves build up in peace and prosperity)
It never ceases to be infuriating.
Not really. The point is that we have hindsight. No one has posted that the air commands were fools; we are simply considering whether a different set of tactics would have worked better. (And there are many stupid decisions that the air commands did make–often documented in reports such as the Strategic Bombing Survey, so it is not as though there was no internal criticism of all the choices made.)
B-29s flew missions on 1076 days of the 1106 day Korean War. In fact, it was the one combat plane that was used throughout the entire war.
On the other hand, these figures are also a bit misleading in that the Fairey Battle was already obsolete at the time and Blenheims were never really intended for that sort of operation. In addition, the Luftwaffe had the sort of control of the air that the Allies established later and were able to attack the bombers without serious (read “any”) threat from accompanying British fighters.
In contrast, later in the war a Thunderbolt or a Typhoon raid would often have its own CAP and those planes could each jettison a bomb load and make a fairly effect defense as a fighter if jumped.
Thank you. That’s the first thing that came to my mind. The bombers could go to places fighters couldn’t reach–for a long time. And the bomber crews paid the price…
Perhaps I should have said not anywhere near the norm on loss rates rather than not near the norm on loss rates; it was intended as a counterpoint to the idea that strategic bombing suffered higher losses and tactical bombing was harder to defend against because they spend less time over hostile territory. Another example would be the Ju-87 in the Battle of Britain where loss rates got so bad that they were withdrawn from action after August having lost 20% of their numbers. Again, not the norm on losses but an example of tactical bombing not suffering fewer losses and being easier to defend against than strategic bombing.
FWIW, I asked Jerry Pournelle, and he remembered the letters. His view is (still) that attention to tactical air – not necessarily close support, but zone interdiction and isolation – might have shortened the war. Heavy bombing ravaged Europe, but produced fewer strategic benefits than anticipated.
one of the few benefits was it forced speer to have skilled factory labor work a second shift, having to pay OT no doubt was bad for the german economy
The important word here is “mix.” As suggested in the OP. I don’t think any of us are suggesting that the heavies could be completely eliminated.
I understand that led to the addition of bombs to fighters, so that the defenders could no longer simply ignore fighter raids.
To be fair the Ju-87, as iconic as its sirens might have become, was something of a piece of shit. It could dive and…um…that is… it could also…well it dived real well !
Well the sirens were really good at panicking refugees clogging the roads as well. But yeah, the Stuka was a bit of a dog really.
Concur – practically everything I’ve read on strategic bombing points out that it almost always hardened the “will to resist” among civilian populations bombed. The idea that it would destroy morale seems to have been incorrect, at the very least, and may have been chauvinistic in origin – British Bomber Command believed that while strategic bombing had been unable to break British morale, concentrating Britain’s own efforts on German factory workers would “excite the laboring classes into rebellion against the upper classes of society” – a an argument rooted in class and national bias.
Historian John Keegan noted that it proved remarkably difficult to destroy steel machinery and tooling with high explosives.
I want to underline the points made by Muffin and McGyver. It wasn’t just fighter vs. heavy bomber. The Mosquito was designed to be a fast twin-engined bomber and carried a crew of 2 and no defensive armament. It was made of wood and was constructed in furniture factories, so from a strategic materials and resources standpoint, it was a “gimme” for the Brits. Almost 8,000 were made, and they continued in use after WWII. It was used in a wide variety of roles, including night fighter, pathfinder and precision attack (including several attacks on Gestapo regional headquarters). On occasion, the same plane with different crews dropped a 4000 lb bomb on Berlin twice in the same day.
The initial state of the bombing art was unbelievably crude, and the Brits were hampered by preconceived notions. The pilots didn’t know where they were (night bombing and lousy weather) and couldn’t even talk to each other (no VHF radio). It wasn’t until late 1942 that the Brits began to achieve the accuracies demonstrated by the Germans during the blitz (at least 10% of bombs on target). It wasn’t a matter of using the best single type of plane as much as working out effective technique combining several plane types on the same mission. Mosquitos and Mustangs (yes, they had some in 1942) both played notable pathfinder roles, often on the same mission. The Mosquitos could carry and use radio navigation equipment that the Mustangs couldn’t (2nd man was a navigator). The turbocharged Mustangs could get above the weather. The heavies, of course, carried the weight.
The Mustang was supercharged, not turbocharged.
I think there are some assumptions here that are flawed:
- Even if you had the fighter bombers available to precision bomb the targets who would fly them all? BCATP
Keep in mind that although the pilot training was 10 to 16 weeks that was a completely green pilot who still had to train up on whatever they ended up on. Further, while most people can use the business end of a gun, not too many have the diverse skill sets to keep an airplane in the air while others are doing thier best to shoot it down… - As others have noted, the really capable fighter bombers with legs were developed late in the war so existing tech in the period would limit your numbers. So, if you can’t be close, drop lots. To drop lots, use bomb trucks with 4 engines. Again, existing technology…
- Bombing the factory not only is an inconvenience, but destroys any product/experienced personnel about to go to the line or run your next rebuilt factory. The PITA factor of constantly rebuilding your factories is a major contributing factor that drove the Germans and Japanese to lose. Having the unhindered might of the American industrial complex able to put out massive amounts of firepower with no interference says it all.
Bombing factories forced workers- some skilled, some not so much, to get into bunkers. Molten steel cooled- blah blah blah. Also the fire bombing of Dresden or Tokyo killed several tens of thousands of people. You don’t go into the nearest labour exchange and replace them on the spot, especially if a lot of the population is away in the armed forces.
The effective fighter bombers were ony available later in the War. Even planes like the Hudson were little more than converted mail planes, and the fighter bombers had less capacity, and very little range.
One point I believe is this- the fighter bombers- and dive bombers such as Stukas were designed for a tactical war, not a strategic war. When they tried to be employed in such a capacity they were found out.
That’s rather the whole point, though. When you have an aircraft built from the ground up to be really good at dive-bombing, what you get is an aircraft that’s not very good at much of anything else…and the opposite is equally true.
The entire “fighter-bomber” term was largely a marketing gimmick up until about the 70s. All WW2-era aircraft labeled as such were designed either as fighters, or as bombers, and the fact that they could theoretically dabble in the other field didn’t make them good at it. A light bomber with some forward facing guns isn’t a serious threat to anything but transport aircraft, and similarly, a P-51 with a tiny bomb or two strapped on doesn’t have anything like the accuracy or throw weight of a real tactical bomber.
The extra versatility is valuable, since you get some opportunistic air to ground use out of the patrol or escort that you were sending anyway, but it’s a ridiculous idea that fighters, in any quantity, could put bombers out of a job, for either tactical or strategic bombing, up until the development of precision guided weaponry.
Well…what if, in 1943, someone in the U.S. got the idea, “Let’s build a bunch of planes specifically designed for close ground support” – moving artillery platforms – and so designed, from the drawing pad up, tactical bombers? A bunch of the money spent on big bombers was spent on these guys instead.
So it turns into two questions: one: did the technology of the time permit the design of really effective tactical support aircraft, either tank-busters or railroad smashers, or anti-artillery strikers, or enemy command tent strafers, or whatnot…
and, two: if that kind of thing had been emphasized and deployed and really worked, would it have shortened the war, by moving the front lines forward more swiftly?
My opinion is yes to both… But opinions are like armpits…
You can answer that what-if by delving into the history of the Eastern Front. That was, in a nutshell, the Soviet approach. They largely ignored strategic bombing and sank massive resources into producing tactical attack aircraft instead. They produced more Il-2s than anything else and certainly thought highly of them, but I don’t think the results really bear out the idea that it was a (no pun intended) revolutionary approach.
The performance was about as you’d expect: very useful against supply lines and soft targets, but of limited effectiveness against anything hardened, and extremely vulnerable to fighters and air defense. No doubt that the outcome would have been more dramatic had they been able to obtain air superiority over the Luftwaffe, but that not being the case, it’s hard to say that the focus on attack aircraft gave them much, if any, of an edge in the strategic sense.
They already did, and long before 1943. There was the A-36 Apache dive bomber, B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder, and A-20 Havoc tactical bombers.
They were emphasized and deployed and worked as well as things went, but as I noted earlier using them at the front lines in close air support was as dangerous to friendlies as enemies for most of the war; it wasn’t until very late in the war that effective doctrine for close air support was developed. Most tactical bombing wasn’t altogether that different from strategic bombing aside from the targets being closer to the front lines. Interdiction targets could include bridges, railroads, and towns unfortunate enough to be road hubs.
Post-war analysis found that rocket attacks on tanks were far less effective than imagined at the time; but the technology certainly existed to make effective tactical bombers. For example the B-25G, B-25H and B-25J had the nose modified for strafing as can be seen here and here; the G and H had 10 forward firing .50 machine guns and a 75mm cannon, the J model did away with the 75mm cannon which was of questionable practical use allowing 14 .50 machine guns for forward firing.
[Underlining mine]
Hanh? By the end of the war the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front was pretty much an afterthought; while the Germans did have better pilots and arguably better fighters (maybe), they were outnumbered pretty much from c. fall '41 to the end. I’d say they lost air superiority specifically, as a whole, sometime in late '42.