Ever read a description of Pickett incidentally? Perhaps he’s what we’d today call a metrosexual, but he was inordinately vain and spent a small fortune and ridiculous amounts of time (aLa Custer) on his hair and beard. He also wore perfume. Pic.
I’ve wondered if this had anything to do with his second wife. She was called Morning Mist and was a full blooded Haida Indian from what’s now Washington, and like many tribes Haida men (and their women) were extremely vain about their grooming. (Pics of Haida men.) Pickett took a lot of crap from his fellow Virginians for the fact his wife was Indian, including his own wealthy Virginian relatives. When Morning Mist died in childbirth and left Pickett a widower for the second time his family refused to take in his half Haida son which hurt him deeply; he arranged for a surrogate family.
Pickett graduated dead last in his West Point Class. That said he gave possibly my favorite quote about the war in a later interview and one that shows very keen military insight. When asked for the umpteenth time why he though his charge failed he answered “I’ve always thought the Yankees had something to do with it”.
Pickett’s third wife did send her stepson Jimmy (son of the Haida mother) whom she never met his father’s saber when he died. That’d be a good one for History’s Lost and Found. Jimmy was a fairly talented artistwhose works turn up once in a while.
True, but it continued to be used long after his days at the Point. To his face, by his friends. Not that there’s anything wrong with it, and not that he didn’t work on it. Back to “Waverly,” one must work at being dashing to be an effective officer of horse. I mean, look at Custer. The Federal cavalry was mounted infantry because the familiarity of Northern farmboys with horses began and ended at the plow end. The second sons of the Confederacy had been astride since childhood, and they brought their best mounts with them when they enlisted.
There are two good, readable and not too technical books on the climatic assault at Gettysburg that are widely available. The first is George Stewart’s Pickett’s Charge, a micro history of the final attack at Gettysburg , 1959, and Earl J. Hess’s Pickett’s Charge - The Last Attack at Gettysburg, 2001. The general answer from both Stewart and Hess is that the attack was doomed. Hess seems to say that the way the attack was organized and supported it was doomed while Stewart seems to be of the there-was-no-way-in-Hell-that-it was-going-to-work school. Stewart is critical of Lee while Hess is critical of Longstreet and, to a lesser extent, of Hill. In any event the two books will answer most questions and give a fair statement of the various controversies and arguments.
Another book to look at is Carol Reardon’s Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory, 1997.
One thing that is often neglected in thinking about combat in the Civil War is that while the rifled .58 caliber musket was potentially a killer at a half mile and in the hands of a trained marksman was, the way the weapon was employed tactically in the hands of an ordinary soldier it had an effective range of about 200 yards. Since it took from 20 to 30 seconds to reload and fire discipline was not a strong point for Civil War soldiers the volume of fire laid on Pickett’s and Pettigrew’s soldiers was not all that severe until the attacking force crossed the Emmetsburg Road.
In addition the pre-charge bombardment did badly cut up the three of four Union batteries stationed at the point of attack. Even when there were operating and crewed guns they were desperately low on ammunition. To that extent the bombardment had done its job. While flanking batteries did considerable long range damage, in the last few hundred yards the close range canister fire was not as horrendous at it would have been without the artillery preparation of the Second Corps position.
In terms of casualties, most authorities conclude that Pickett’s three brigades suffered losses of about 60% in killed , wounded and unwounded prisoners. It is almost certain that with one exception Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s six brigades suffered equally. The Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaclava had losses of less that 50%. The casualty figures alone should give some idea of what sort of a chance the charge had of breaking into the Union position.
As to the question of the OP, Pickett’s charge was doomed to failure. And it was Lee’s fault, as he said immediately afterward. If the Civil War should have demonstrated clearly to anyone anything, it should have been Lee who realized that frontal assaults were stupid as he had seen his enemies slaughtered in them repeatedly.
I’m not of the Lee was a great general or wonderful gentleman club. He was a son of a bitch fighting for slavery and usually a highly competent officer. He, of all people, should have known the frontal attack was destined for disaster.
The more interesting question was whether he could have won Gettysburg at all, and I think the answer is no, and that he did realize that. And without winning Gettysburg, he could not win the war and would be crushed the by the every strengthening Union forces. I think that is why he ordered the charge: he was desperate and if everything went his way on that long mile, he could perhaps dislodge the Union and deal with them on a retreat. To let them dig in and perhaps have other forces come to the aid of the Union and cut off or harry the retreat if it dragged on for a few more days (were there other forces? did Lee know that?) would have been suicide.
Could Lee have retreated before the charge? I suppose so, but then the Union might have had the energy to follow.
Without better ground than Gettysburg to fight on, Lee was doomed. Outnumbered and in foreign territory with poor foraging ability as compared to home, it was a matter of time, unless the battlefield positions had been reversed and Meade made the mistake of engaging on that ground.
And I bet it broke their hearts. But that was more true in the later stages of the war. Early on there were some cavalry charges against mass rifle fire, with predictable results, but it still carried on traditional cavalry jobs of harrying the flanks of the enemy infantry and running down retreating soldiers.
Once mounted troops lost their role as shock forces – demonstrated in the Crimea and again in the Franco-Prussian War – they retained their function of reconnaissance, security and raiding. The Federal cavalry did its job well, making contact on the morning of the First Day, holding position long enough to force Hill’s corps to deploy and until Reynolds and Howard could come up. In addition, because of a headquarters screw up, Buford’s cavalry division was sent to the rear at Westminster, MD, to refit and was not replaced as flank security along the Emmetsburg road. Had cavalry been in place the Second Day could have been much different.
Stuart, on the other hand, was allowed to go off on a frolic of his own, depriving Lee of much of his recon capability. In fairness to Lee, it was not clear that Stuart was going to take himself out of contact with the army until it was too late to do anything about it. While Lee had other cavalry with the main body they were formations and commanders who were definitely second rate when compared to Stuart’s division and in whom Lee had little confidence. In addition the non-Stuart cavalry was covering Lee’s western flank, not the eastern flank where the Army of the Potomac was maneuvering.
In short, when Lee needed recon and security his most trusted cavalry leader was off raiding - the last thing Lee needed. Some of Lee’s staff and some of the corps commanders wanted Stuart to be brought up on charges of dereliction for his escapade and failure to perform his essential mission. That of course was papered over at the time and, when Stuart was killed the next spring, forgotten as JEB ascended into the Confederate Valhalla.
There is a fair argument that all of his senior commanders – Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, Stuart.-- failed Lee at Gettysburg, a failure facilitated by Lee’s hands-off style of command.
On the other hand Meade was ably served and assisted my most of his senior commanders – some of whom exercised admirable independent judgement in moments of crisis.
I’d hold that Longstreet’s failure was in not insisting on a flanking move much further to the south of the Union left. When he let Lee convince him to attack where and when he did on Day 2, it doomed the Confederate battleplan.
I agree, but then again I don’t. Lee had a full string of victories. He had beaten them the day before. Why go off and leave them in control of the field? They ran all of the other times, they will run again. Hit them on the rocky hill and they will leave.
Plus, the South didn’t have the luxury of a drawn-out war. They were invaders in the north and had to have a decisive victory. Longstreet’s plan would have worked with Grant’s army, but Lee knew better. Just because he ended up being wrong doesn’t mean that he didn’t make the best choice at the time.
I think Longstreet’s bigger failure on Day 2 was delaying his attack on the Peach Orchard until Law came up, which gave the Union the time to reinforce Cemetery Ridge.
The delay in getting Longstreet’s attack underway on the Second Day has been the subject of argument ever since it happened. Clearly he took much longer that might have been hoped to move the two divisions of his corps which were on the field from the Cashtown Road across country to the positions beyond the Union left flank. The surprise, however, was that Dan Sickles small two division corps had taken position along the Emmetsburg Road - Peach Orchard - Devils Den position. That is not what Lee or Longstreet expected to find, or Meade either. But the problem wasn’t that Meade had time to reinforce the Cemetery Ridge- Little Round Top position. Lee expected to find the Union flank in the air about half was down Cemetery Ridge which would allow a repeat of the Chancellorsville maneuver to roll up the Union army from south to north. This is why Lee positively forbid Longstreet and Hood from seeking to pass around the Round Tops and insisted on an attack up the Emmitsburg Road. The real problem with Longstreet’s slow movement to his jumping off positions was that there was only about four hours of daylight left when the attack got underway.
Again there is a fair argument that had Stuart been present Lee would not have fallen victim to misinformation and out of date information about the Union positions and strength.
If any one wants to pursue a detailed analysis of the Second Day they might refer to Harry W. Pfanz’s Gettysburg, The Second Day, 1987, probably the definitive popular study of the whole Peach Orchard-Wheat Field - Devil’s Den - Little Round Top fight.
Longstret was not convinced of anything by Lee on the Second Day or on the Third Day. Indeed Longstreet probably broke into out right insubordinate language in trying to dissuade Lee from a frontal attack on the Union center on Day Three. The inescapable fact is that Lee was the army commander and Longstreet was obligated by honor and duty to follow his commander’s orders even though he may have thought them wrong. His duty was to obey or ask to be relieved. No good officer can ask to be relieved when his soldiers are in contact with the enemy and a good officer can carry his argument only so far. Lee had the choice between leaving a clearly dissenting Longstreet in command or relieving him. Lee clearly thought he was better off with Longstreet in command of his corps that not.
It hardly seem fair to criticize Longstreet for not persuading Lee that Lee’s tactical plan was flawed.
I didn’t know that Longstreet’s dissent had reached that level where he was considering resigning or Lee was contemplating relieving him.
A lot of the time, sadly, history gets written by the men who live the longest. Wyatt Earp is a prime example. He lived until 1929, so most of the crap he spewed was taken as gospel.
Longstreet lived until after 1900, so he was out telling stories long after many other participants had passed. I’m sure that each time he told the story, his disagreement with Lee got a little stronger.
Keep in mind, though, he was already down Heth’s division that got chewed up in the Day 1 fighting, and Pickett didn’t get there until that night. I can understand his hesitation.
This is a nit-pick. Heath’s Division was part of A.P. Hill’s Corps, not Longstreet’s. Heath’s was pretty well chewed up on July 1. None the less, Lee chose Heath’s Division under the command of J.J. Pettigrew (Heath was wounded on the First Day) and two brigades from Pender’s equally cut up division (Pender had also been wounded on the First Day) to act as the left half of the assault force on the Third Day.
Longstreet’s Corps had not been engaged on the First Day. Hood’s Division and McLaw’s Division came up on the morning of the Second Day and were heavily engaged on the Peach Orchard – Wheat Field – Devils Den – Little Round Top line. Pickett’s Division had been covering the rear of the army and did not come into the Gettysburg vicinity until late in the afternoon of the Second Day. Longstreet persuaded Lee that both Hood’s and McLaw’s were too worn out to participate in Pickett’s Charge and that they both needed to hold their positions to prevent Meade from launching an attack that might roll up the Rebel line from south to north.
After the war Longstreet never had an empty field in terms of creating the history of the war. His mild criticisms of Lee’s generalship at Gettysburg roused any number of pro-Lee partisans, notably Jubal Early (who hated, in order The United States, Yankees and James Longstreet). Early was an effective advocate and a prolific writer. In addition Longstreet had ruined his credibility with many ex-Confederates by taking a job with the US government. Some have suggested that Longstreet’s biggest sin was that of being right. None the less, Lee relied on him and Longstreet was with Lee at the end at Appomattox Court House. Lee never did speak publicly or do any post war writing about the war.
Richard Ewell is reputed to have said when years later he was asked about Gettysburg, “It took a great number of mistakes to lose the Battle of Gettysburg: I made most of them myself.”
