They didn’t lose two months of good weather for attacking Russia. Maybe the weather was good in Britain and Western Europe, but as I mentioned above, the spring rasputitsa, when the frozen ground melted and didn’t drain, turning the earth into impassable mud, lasted longer than usual in 1941, and the ground couldn’t bear tanks until the second or third week in June. The word rasputitsa supposedly means “roadlessness.”
The German offensive depended on armored forces and wheeled transport (although a surprising amount of that wheeled transport was horse-drawn, it still had wheels) and they simply could not have started significantly earlier. I know it’s been taught – it may be a fiction of British wartime propaganda? – that Greece, Yugoslavia, North Africa, or some other sideshow “delayed” Operation Barbarossa, but the attack on Russia was the centerpiece of Hitler’s long-term strategy for lebensraum and it’s not credible he would have said “oooh, Greece!” and delayed the big show.
It was the weather. In Russia, it’s almost always the weather.
Well, up and until France fell, he was right. Years of brinksmanship and overly bold decisions by Hitler had been rewarded with almost unbroken success. He’d learned that his impulses and ruthlessness were almost always rewarded. It didn’t last, but he’d gotten pretty far on that formula and his main error was in not unlearning the false lessons it had taught him. That failure, of course, was probably due to being an insane megalomaniac. But in persisting, he was behaving in some ways not unlike a sports team that’s falling behind but whose coach insists “we just have to keep doing what’s worked for us, and concentrate on the fundamentals,” instead of radically revising strategy.
You mean “at first.” Yes, Kasserine Pass and the Bocage battles were (foreseeable) disasters, and the entire Italian campaign played into German hands (although one can legitimately point to a failure to advance from the invasion beachheads, the mistake was principally in fighting in Italy at all). Other than those instances, what specific “lost” battles are you referring to?
Wasn’t the RAF concentrating almost entirely on night area bombing of “built up” areas (a euphemism for worker housing) – that is, killing civilians? It was the Americans who tried so hard to bomb factories and physical plant.