While the government in Canada was trying to introduce mandatory minimum sentences, part of the argument against it was that it would reduce the number of plea bargains - meaning more trials and log-jamming the system. Are there any stats showing this to have happened with the American experiment with mandatory minimums?
What does mandatory mininum mean? Is it like first offense must get the minimum or something like that?
And in general, plea bargaining does involve a trial, you just plead guilty in exchange for a light sentence, or to a lesser charge, and there’s no guarantee the judge will go along with it.
Can you explain why you think the rules are vague?
In the federal system, trial must commence within 70 days of the indictment. It’s true that clock is tolled by delays occasioned by the defense - but in this hypothetical, the defense is not pursuing any actions which would have a dilatory effect and is instead forthrightly insisting at every juncture their readiness to go to trial. I don’t see any realistic way that if the defense acts thusly, any delay can be chargeable to the defense.
There is another out for the government – the “ends of justice,” exception codified at 18 USC § 3161(h)(8) et seq. But the bulk of permissible reasons under that rubric are specifically limited, and the only one that has even a hint of vagueness is 7(B)(i), the “miscarriage of justice.” And caselaw provides that such a “miscarriage” can’t simply be, “…we won’t get to try you otherwise…” The law further provides that all findings in support of and ends-of-justice waiver must be made affirmatively, on the record, by the trial court…which makes them subject to review by the appeals court.
Now, I suppose it’s possible that the judges hearing such appeals would, in the face of this “mass rebellion” of trial requests, decide that the plain text of the law did not apply, and they needed to invent a solution outside the text of the law.
I can’t speak to the likelihood of that – I am just saying that your statement about speedy trial being a vague guarantee isn’t something I agree with.
Unless you meant, “…in the state of [insert state name here]?”
Mandatory minimums are statutory limitations on the discretion of the sentencing judge. Ordinarily, a judge has pretty broad authority to fashion a sentence that’s appropriate to an individual defendant – the court will get a sheet that sets out what the appropriate range is according to the sentencing guidelines, and the judge can pick where in that range the sentence should be, or even deviate from the range in the right circumstances.
In the interest of being/appearing tough on certain crimes, legislatures will sometimes pass a statute that says a conviction of X offense (or in some cases a second or third conviction) must be punished by no less than Y years in prison. Long story short, what mandatory minimums do is take away the option to give a defendant probation in lieu of jail time, or suspend a sentence on a second count of the same offense, or those sorts of things: you get at least Y years, no mitigation, for every conviction no matter what the circumstances are. This can lead to situations where courts are obligated to give extremely harsh penalties, even up to life in prison, for relatively minor offenses.
The relationship to the number of trials (the argument goes) comes from the situation where a defendant knows that a conviction is going to result in an unacceptably harsh sentence no matter what the prosecutor recommends, especially if it’s a “third strike” kind of situation. If you’re about to get 60 years in prison for a nickel bag of weed, it doesn’t seem reasonable to try to plead down to a lower offense if the lower offense would trigger the mandatory minimum anyway. You want to avoid the conviction altogether.
In E&W the defence can ask the judge what sentence he will impose (or what range he will consider.) In the US judges can’t make such indications before trial because mitigation evidence doesn’t come in until the sentencing phase.
Thanks, I should have realized that. We have that in the US too, but I’ve heard people call it ‘mandatory maximum’ so many times it got stuck in my head that way.
I see. In England and Wales, is mitigation evidence offered before the plea is entered, then?
Also, the original remark was:
Doesn’t any incentive to plead guilty have that same effect? American prosecutors might have a heavier stick, but the carrot is the same: a lesser sentence, in exchange for a guilty plea. If the goal was no one ever confessing to a crime they didn’t commit, then no such incentives could be offered.
I think bb’s “fixed 1/3 increase” thing is wrong. But AIUI the defendant in an English criminal case can ask the judge what sentences he will impose. The prosecution can’t make him an offer or negotiate.
I’m way out of my depth on the mitigating evidence thing, but I would guess the parties make an offer of proof of their evidence (“we will prove x, y and z”) and the judge’s indications are based on the assumption that they do subsequently make such proof.
IANAL, but it’s called a Goodyear indication: the way it works is the defence would draw up a basis of plea and the prosecution would draw up a response to the basis. If the basis is accepted by the prosecution (I think if the basis isn’t entirely accepted the Judge may still give a Goodyear if they decide the disagreement isn’t material to the sentence), the Judge will then indicate the maximum sentence they would impose to a plea on that basis. This would be before mitigation, though I believe they would take into account the defendant’s pre-cons when giving their indication and would also take into account the stage at which the plea would be entered.
However in practice, asking for a Goodyear is the exception in a guilty plea, which I would guess is because they’re mainly exercises in applying the sentencing guidelines to the maximum sentence and advice from counsel may be more useful to the defendant in terms of informing them of the realistic sentence they are likely to face. More likely the defence would ask the prosecution if a guilty plea to certain charges on the indictment and/or to lesser/alternative offences and/or on a certain basis would be accepted, so the Judge would not get directly involved.
Also in a trial in England and Wales the maximum discount is 1/3. This would be for a guilty plea entered at the earliest opportunity. This discount decreases substantially to only a few percent if the guilty plea is entered at a very late stage. I think the Judge can also ignore the discount in certain situations (e.g. if the evidence is overwhelming), but as I say IANAL!
As to the topic of the thread,the US Criminal Justice System simply could not function in it’s current state without guilty pleas and If all or most defendants excersised their right to a jury trial the system would have to change fundamentally. IMO though it would change in a way that very likely would not be an advantage to those accused of crimes.
Partially ninjaed already, but since I wrote the thing out…
It appears to be fairly on the mark, at least for cases where guilt was admitted promptly:
Reductions in sentence for a guilty plea
Offenders who plead guilty will usually receive a reduced sentence, compared to the sentence they would have received had they been convicted following a not guilty plea. This was a well established principle under the common law, and has since been put on a statutory footing supplemented by sentencing guidelines. The rationale behind this is that it encourages defendants who know they are guilty to enter a guilty plea at the earliest possible stage, so saving court time and money and saving witnesses (including victims) from having to attend court to give evidence.
The level of reduction is at the discretion of the court, although sentencing guidelines require that the usual reduction will be one third where the guilty plea was entered at the first reasonable opportunity. A reduced discount of one quarter is suggested where the plea was only entered once a trial date had been set, and one tenth where the plea was entered “at the door of the court” or after the trial had begun.
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Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea, Definitive Guideline (PDF warning)
[QUOTE=Really Not All That Bright]
But AIUI the defendant in an English criminal case can ask the judge what sentences he will impose. The prosecution can’t make him an offer or negotiate.
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Understood, but that doesn’t ameliorate the basic concern of defendants confessing to crimes they didn’t commit, so as to secure a lighter sentence than they would if they pled not guilty and lost. That’s the essence of a plea bargian, and it’s practiced in England and Wales, as this article discusses:
Bolding mine.
Evidently, this process was reformed in the Criminal Sentencing Act 2003, and the subsequent case R v. Goodyear (2005), which created the Goodyear Hearing:
My thoughts years ago was of a cranky billionaire who gets caught in a drunk driving trap. He had been peacefully enjoying his 2 martini lunch for decades until pulled over and taken into custody for a (faulty) reading of .1% BAC. Meanwhile the police officer receives a bonus for surpassing his arrest quota.
Angered by this injustice the billionaire brings in outside attorneys not for his own case but to pay for the defense of every single person accused of a moving violation in that town. But only if they agree to go to trial (unless the plea deal is a complete slap on the wrist and really no different than the case being dismissed.)
I figured things would go along the lines people have suggested here. The courts would make examples out of those found guilty until defendants got the message that the free representation was actually going to be quite costly.
At some point in this dance there would have to be some due process violation. If it could be shown that drunk drivers, for example, got 4 months in jail for going to trial, but only a week in jail for a guilty plea, some court somewhere would have to see a punishment for insisting on a basic right like a jury trial.
Maybe I am too optimistic but something has to give in this plea system. Assembly line justice is no justice at all.
Why? Nobody is forced to accept a plea bargain. Anyone who wants a trial is granted one.
I imagine if this issue had been presented differently and the argument was “We need to stop letting defendants get reduced sentences from plea bargains. Every defendant should have to stand trial and receive the full sentence he deserves.” we’d have some of the same people who are now condemning the plea bargain system lining up to defend it.
Doesn’t your figuring include the assumption the judge would be allowed to impose heavier sentences just because people aren’t accepting plea bargains? Or that he would even be inclined to?
What if the billionaire promised to pay any fines as well? I bet people would sign on pretty quickly.
The idea is that plea bargains allow the criminal justice system to charge far more people than could ever reasonably be given a trial. That things like simple drug possession would never enter the system if the government had to give each and every case a full trial.
I have a hard time accepting the idea that the legal system is creating a demand for crime rather than what seems like the more probable relationship which is that crime is creating a demand for the legal system. If the former was the case then I think evidence like plea bargains and prison overcrowding indicate the legal system is already “full” and there’s no need for it to be seeking more crime. The fact that our legal system is strained as it is indicates that our society produces a certain amount of crime and the size of the legal system we have to handle it has no effect on that amount.
I’m sure you could establish similar facts right now. People plead guilty for a reason, and reason is a reduced sentence. “Go to trial and get 10 years if you lose, but we’ll let you plead guilty to a lesser crime and a two year sentence.” The strength of every case is a bit different, even for routine cases like drunk driving. So, there is always the argument that you’re being offered a reduction because the prosecution doesn’t feel that great about its chances. Still, it’s not secret that there are “incentives” for entering a guilty plea. If that’s a due process violation, it’s not one I’ve seen recognized by the courts.
Some of you are assuming the majority of court actionable cases in the U.S. are of the serious crime type. They’re not. They are minor traffic offenses, ordinance violations and such.
If EVERYONE who got a speeding ticket, disorderly conduct ticket, etc. demanded a trial, the system would in fact fall apart. Especially in larger metro areas. Right now the majority of people pay their ticket and walk without even going to court. Imagine tens of thousands demanding their day in court, not accepting a deal of reduced fines/demerit points. The system could not handle that.