why didn’t the emperor of japan do the right thing at war’s end and kill himself like hitler did? knowing the japanese affection for hari kari, it’s surprising the emperor wasn’t the one to off himself
mr koby may weigh in if he is japanese
I’m not Japanese, but I do play one on TV.
There are a number of reasons; like the situation. Hitler knew that only the gallows would await him, that he would be paraded through Moscow like a trophy and killed himself to rob Stalin of the satisfaction of taking him alive. This is also why he didn’t want go go down fighting, he feared being wounded and captured.
Hirohito on the other hand was not put on trial, but surrendered on the condition that he keep the throne, but in a purely ceremonial role and after a declaration that he was not divine. Unlike Hitler who as mentioned wanted to go down in flames and drag Germany with him, he also seemed to envision a future after the war, in his surrender speech saying;
“Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity…
Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future.”
On a personal level his feelings were “I would like to apologise to successive emperors and people by doing my best for reconstruction of the nation and people’s happiness.”
Secondly, ‘hari kari’, or seppuku as it is also known is a samurai tradition, for warriors in other words. The Emperor was not a samurai or a warrior. No Japanese Emperor had ever performed this ritual in any circumstance, a ritual that is intended to atone to ones lord for a failure. The Emperor has no lord, as he is the Emperor.
Their “affection” for it is also a bit overstated in popular culture.
You make it sound like Hitler did the right thing. He took the easiest way out and thought Germany would fall about him in ashes. He made tons of irrational decisions up to that point. No surprise his final decision was also based on irrational assumptions.
Of course, the Soviets would have been busy taking Brest over by then. And I don’t mean the one in Belarus 
Hitler didn’t want what happened to Mussolini to happen to him. (And how was killing himself the “right thing”? Didn’t the people deserve to put that fucker on trial? He didn’t get to pay for what he did)
Why did the Nazi war criminals escape to South America after WWII? Here’s my theory: There are seven continents, let’s examine where they could have gone. 1-Europe, too much heat there, it’s where the War was, high probability of being recognized 2-North America, not a good idea to hide out on the winner’s turf 3-Australia/N.Z., not a good idea to hide out on winner’s turf 4-Africa, white Nazis would not blend in with mostly black populus 5-Asia, white Nazis would not blend in with mostly Oriental populus 6-Antarctica, come on are you kidding and finally 7-South America, by default, is all that’s left, so that’s where they went…it wasn’t winner’s turf, not really, although most of S. America allied with the Allies, and there are a lot of white folks so they’d blend in and not stick out
is this an accurate theory as to why they ended up in S. America?
and have you ever heard someone speak Spanish with a German accent? it’s quite bizarre, every time they track down one of these guys on the news it’s quite alarming, they speak Spanish but with a harsh gutteral tone that’s quite frightening the first time you hear it, like come est-A u-STED
Well, there were existing German communities there that would make migration and assimilation a bit easier. Plus, the continent was largely run by strongman authoritarian rulers who shared the US’s growing hysteria about communism, but not the US’s nancy-boy preoccupations with human rights, so if anybody was going to find the nazis a bit less repulsive, it was them. Plus, the region already had a fairly strong tradition of political asylum; a practical attitude that sometimes the only way to draw a line under a conflict is to accept that the losers have to be allowed to bugger off and live quietly somewhere else, and it suits all parties if they can do that.
When you get that urge again, stop there. Unlike other cases, this is an example of fairly well documented history. No need to theorize or come up with just-so stories.
whatisit
See UDS’s response.
UDS gave a good response.
While I don’t want to just state “do a web search”, it’s seriously a good idea to do one before coming up with random theories.
Using Google to search for “Nazis in South America” comes up with a ton of sites describing the process of escape and the reasons several countries accepted them (you don’t believe Argentina and other countries didn’t know what was going on, do you?). Here’s a wiki page that’s a small portion of information that’s easily accessible and searchable.
Air superiority made it easier for land forces to advance but air power alone couldn’t hold territory. That required boots on the ground. It was land forces who were destroying the majority of Nazi tanks, artillery, trucks, and bunkers. It was land forces who were capturing and killing Nazi soldiers. It was land forces who were freeing towns and death camps.
Ending wars quickly saves lives. Allowing Hitler time to mass more of his forces to the East would have cost more Russian lives. Not pressing Hitler from the East would have allowed Hitler to bring more troops, tanks, and artillery against the Western Allied forces. Halting the Italian campaign would have allowed Hitler to move troops to the East or the West.
The Nazis were still trying to develop the V3 and the intercontinental New York bomber. The Nazis were stilling trying to win the war.
On D-day, there were no nuclear gadgets. There was no way of knowing when a nuclear gadget might be available. There was no way of knowing if the bombs would work as advertised. Gen. Paul Tibbets’s 509th Composite Group was still developing a B29 that would be capable of delivering such a load as the as-of-yet undeveloped A-bomb.
The word you are mutilating is hara-kiri, lit. belly-cutting.
A bit more of a contentious point, but one that I think there’s sufficient evidence to consider, is that Japan was always considered the target for the bomb, barring some unforeseen catastrophe that would put progress in Europe back by months.
The first mention of targets, way back in May 1943, mention the selection of Japan over Germany on the basis that if the bomb were a dud the Japanese wouldn’t learn as much from it as the Germans would;
Truk (Japan’s Pearl Harbor, if you like) was smashed to bits in 1944, so was removed as a target.
Later on more concrete target lists were drawn up. A meeting in late April - Hiroshima is mentioned a priority as it was the “largest untouched target”. Although Germany hadn’t yet surrendered its defeat was so imminent that it was not even mentioned.
Also from April 1945 is this key phrase from General Groves, the head of the Manhattan project, in a memorandum to the Secretary of war:
“The target is and was always expected to be Japan. A composite group of the 20th Air Force has been organized and specially trained and equipped.”
The 20th Air Force had operated out of the Marianas Islands since October 1944, not the prime location from which to attack Germany.
As mentioned if things had gone badly enough in Europe I think they would have dropped it on Germany. After the war, according to General Groves Roosevelt discussed with him the possibility of dropping on Germany when things were looking bad during the Battle of the Bulge. Groves responded that this would be difficult, but possible if it became necessary. The reasons being given they had a pretty good idea of the timescale - it would be months before a weapon would be ready. Secondly, the aforementioned possibility that the Germans would learn too much from a dud bomb. Third, he thought that Japanese targets were more susceptible to the bomb due to their lighter construction and finally, as mentioned, the 20th Air Force and its Silverplate bombers were still in the Pacific (although a Lancaster bomber if modified could also drop the bomb).
This blog quotes a post-war interview with Groves where he sets it the points raised in the 1963 article in more detail as well as making clear that he thought Germany would be defeated before a weapon was ready:
“The bombing of Germany with atomic bombs was, I would say, never seriously considered to the extent of making definite plans …if the war demanded it and the President so desired, we would bomb Germany and I was so certain personally that the war in Europe would be over before we would be ready that you might say I didn’t give it too much consideration.”
(post shortened)
If by Japan’s Pearl Harbor you mean that the Allied Forces didn’t announce that they were coming to destroy Truk, I’ll counter that after war had actually been declared, all sides understood that their bases could be attacked at some point. It wouldn’t have been a surprise.
The decision on where to drop the 1st A bomb was based on the fact that the ground war at both ends of Europe were pinching the Nazis in between two massive Allied forces. If the ground war on either side of Europe had been stalled or delay to wait for the development of an A bomb, the list of possible A bomb targets would have been different. Maybe.
No, no, meaning the place not the event - their equivalent as a large naval base in the Pacific.
Incidentally Stalin knew about the Manhattan Project thanks to Klaus Fuchs. He didn’t and would never have been convinced that he should halt the Soviet advance to wait for atomic bombs, regardless of casualties the advance caused his forces (and regardless of what the Allies were doing - western Europe would be his prize earned by the blood of his troops if we dragged our feet. Remember he said “Tsar Alexander reached Paris” when congratulated in Berlin).
Yes, I believe that Stalin’s goal would have been to conquer all of Europe. Any deliberate delay (waiting for an A bomb) by the Western Allies and the iron curtain might have been on the eastern border of France or the east coast of the English Channel.