Damn the French! (well, OK, not really)

[Magiver]

Originally posted by AZCowboy **So, you are suggesting that Saddam could successfully build a nuclear weapon, while under active UN inspection? **
Yes, that is exactly what I’m saying. There is nothing stopping Saddam from thinking outside the box. It would be a lot easier to make a deal with cash-strapped N Korea than to go it alone. It would save SH money and give him a remote site. I’m not suggesting it happened, I’m suggesting it is logical to happen. N Korea also gives SH a ready made long-range missile to buy. The actual site can be anywhere.

**Wow. Perhaps you could share your data with Dick Cheney. He wrote the Nation’s Energy Policy, which reads:
quote:
National Energy Policy
Estimates indicate that over the next 20 years, U.S. oil consumption will increase by 33 percent, natural gas consumption by well over 50 percent, and demand for electricity will rise by 45 percent.
…
Yet we produce 39 percent less oil today than we did in 1970, leaving us ever more reliant on foreign suppliers. On our present course, America 20 years from now will import nearly two of every three barrels of oil – a condition of increased dependency on foreign powers that do not always have America’s interests at heart.
…
Almost two-thirds of world proven reserves are in the Middle East. Elsewhere, Central and South America account for 9 percent; Africa, 7 percent; North America, 5 percent; Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 5 percent; the rest of Asia, 4 percent; and Western Europe, 2 percent. **
Your post states what I already said. Natural gas consumption is a more pressing problem then oil. You might want to mention the recent deal with Saudi Arabia for natural gas rights. What your site does not say is the increase or decrease OPEC oil represents (as a percentage) in the projected US consumption. I could not find 1970-2003 data on import percentages. The closest thing I found was from a BP report which shows a decline in the percentage of OPEC oil in production until 2007 where it will again rise as a percentage. It is the percentage of US oil imports that gives power to OPEC.

finley.pdf

I hope your hobbies incorporate vehicles powered with ethanol additives. It seems Archer Daniels Midland will do quite well over the recently passed energy legistlation. Amazing what only $2.4 M will buy.
Just the daily econobox which will burn any gas mixture. Everything else is leaded or high octane.
Of course this is all off topic so if this interests you then a separate debate might be in order. You can even start an SUV thread and I’ll soapbox the evils of them for you.

[Desmostylus]

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
**Desmostylus…

You just made my case for me. The “regular inspections” you reference were NOT compliance of the UN security resolutions. Your claim is a dodge. A bit like comparing an automobile inspection with a warrant search. **

I did not make your point for you, and you haven’t made your point either. Remember? Your point was this:

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
**It’s important to remember that SH WASN’T under ANY inspections from 98-2002 or so.

It wasn’t UNTIL the US sent tens of thousands of US troops to the region that he suddenly decided to allow the inspectors back in. In order to try and outwait the US/UN. Even then, cooperation wasn’t anywhere near what it could/should have been.

Remember the scientists NOT being allowed to be interviewed without gov’t minders? Remember the inspectors NOT being allowed into various facilities?

The simple fact is that if the US hadn’t been acting as the stick for the UN, there wouldn’t even have been ANY inspections. **

In fact, I showed that your claim that there hadn’t been ANY inspections, was complete and utter bullshit.

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
**Here’s a sample from 2001 from the IAEA report to the UN:

"Letter dated 6 April 2001 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the President of the Security Council

"In paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is requested to submit consolidated progress reports every six months to the Security Council, commencing 11 April 1996,1 on the Agency verification activities in Iraq pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions.

As has been previously reported, the Agency has not been in a position, since 16 December 1998, to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions."

…

"as long as such verification activities are not reinstated, the Agency will remain unable to provide any measure of assurance with regard to Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under those resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be distributed as a document of the Security Council."

(Signed) Mohamed ElBaradei

http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/s_2001_337.pdf**

I notice that you cut a bit out of the letter you quoted above. Which bit? The bit that deals with the actual inspection:

As I informed the Council in my letter dated 12 February 2001 (see S/2001/129), the Agency carried out, in January 2001, a physical inventory verification of the declared nuclear material in Iraq, pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Iraq and the Agency in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. With the cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material remaining in Iraq that is subject to safeguards. However, such an annual verification does not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions.

As requested in paragraph 8 of resolution 1284 (1999), in consultation with experts from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and from Member States, the Agency has revised and updated the nuclear-related list of items and technology to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies. This document also constitutes annex 3 to the Agency’s ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991), and lists those nuclear and nuclear-related items which are prohibited to Iraq or are subject to certain controls, including reporting by Iraq of their location and use. It was last revised in 1995. After consolidation of the most recent comments provided by the experts, the Agency will be in a position to forward the revision to the Council prior to 5 June 2001, as requested in paragraph 19 of resolution 1330 (2000).

During the period covered by this report, the Agency has continued to expand and refine the structure and content of its information system, in the areas of computer support to inspections and analytical tools. Recent advances in commercially available satellite imagery have led to its integration in the Agency’s Iraq-related information system. An enhanced analysis of the available original Iraqi documentation and results accumulated through the past inspection process has also continued, more specifically in the areas relevant to the remaining questions and concerns previously reported. This analysis is aimed at supporting and strengthening the preparation of the work plan requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 (1999).

The Agency remains prepared to resume its verification activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions at short notice, with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC. If it were to resume those verification activities, and provided that it could satisfy itself that Iraq’s past and present nuclear activities and nuclear assets have not changed since December 1998, the Agency would be in a position to move to the full implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan. This plan, as designed, would enable the Agency to investigate the few remaining questions and concerns that relate to Iraq’s past clandestine nuclear programme, along with any other aspect of this programme that may come to its knowledge.

I’m sure there are plenty of good points that you could make, without resorting to lying.

[YourOldBuddy]

ravage2

You should seriously consider where you link to. That site is a spitefull stupid anti French site. I trust it as much as any information I receive from a Neo Nazi site.

[OliverH]

*Originally posted by Magiver *
**Where to start.

1. Bush specifically said Saddam was NOT an imminent threat. The logic (and implications) of his major speeches were plain: the time to find out a ruthless dictator has a nuclear weapon is not the day after. If it wasn’t for Israel, Saddam would probably have a nuclear weapon today. **

You realise if that is seen as a justification for an attack, you justify every single act of agression in human history?

**
2. The French press refer to President Chirac as “Chiraq” in honor of his 30 year financial collaboration (oil) with Saddam. **

Ah, I see. Mudslinging. Always a sign of a solid base of arguments.

**
3. The United States does not use, does not need, Iraqi oil. I just paid $1.44 for a gallon of gas. I think that’s 22 Euro cents a liter. We have untouched oil reserves in Alaska along with offshore fields in California and Florida. We could drive the cost down even lower with our own reserves. To say we would go to war for oil is just goofy. **

Your lack of awareness of the development of oil consumption over the course of even just the next ten years is not an argument. Nor is the fact that you are unaware of how long it would take to develop said untouched oil reserves. By the time that oil was accesible, it would provide oil for an insignificant amount of time-demand.

**
4. England is an oil EXPORTING country. I don’t know what the price of gas is there but it has nothing to do with Iraq or any Mid-East Country. To say that a liberal PM would back a conservative US President in a war for oil is just plain goofy. **

No, what is goofy is your projection of US dualism, seeing the political opposition as the antichrist, on European politics.

**
5. The United States does not use, does not need, French military experience. If we did then our aircraft carriers would be too short for our own aircraft. **

It seems you need a dictionary. Experience and equipment are not synonyms.

**
As for actual nation building, we learned the lessons from WWI and the results are 3 successful countries. Germany, Italy and Japan are not accidents. They are examples of real commitment to help a country rise up from the ashes of repression. At the time of their defeat there wasn’t a love fest in the streets for Allied Soldiers. They were shot at. Our commitment to Germany went as far as the Berlin Airlift. That is pretty damn serious. What the United States learned in the last century is that it is futile to simply overthrow a dictator. It requires the creation of a fully democratic process that gives the power of leadership to the average citizen. **

Germany, Italy, and Japan, are not accidents, indeed. They are the product of very specific circumstance almost none of which are given in Iraq. Demonstration of historical ignorance isn’t going to raise trust in nation building adventures happening in a limbo of willful ignorance of local conditions and customs.

[OliverH]

*Originally posted by clairobscur *
**Doubt it. AFAIK, the french government didn’t make any official statement about the presence (or lack thereof) of WMD in Irak

From what I read at the time, I gather that the french government believed there actually were WMDs (or more exactly forbidden weapons, like say, mustard gas, while for instance Irak being able to build nuclear weapon was deemed plain ludicrous in any foreseeable future), but in limited quantities and that most of them weren’t operable (in particular due to old age). French troops which would have been sent to Irak in case an agreement could have been reached with the USA (*) were to be equipped with NBC protection, if I remember correctly, though.

(*)adding by the way that the french president warned at least twice in broadcasted public speeches that the country should be prepare itself for a possible military involvment in Irak, and that plans were drafted for said military participation before the total failure of the negociations at the UN, since I guess that more than one poster is unaware of it. **

The French didn’t say there were WMDs. The French didn’t say there were no WMDs either. The French said that the possibility that there are WMDs could not be excluded, but that no solid evidence existed, and that as such, further evidence was needed before sending in troops.

[OliverH]

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
**

Remember the scientists NOT being allowed to be interviewed without gov’t minders? Remember the inspectors NOT being allowed into various facilities?

The simple fact is that if the US hadn’t been acting as the stick for the UN, there wouldn’t even have been ANY inspections.

Regards,
-Bouncer- **

The simple fact is that you are distorting the facts. The inspectors were allowed into all facilities they wanted to enter, and the government minders issue was also resolved. The simple fact is that you argue in total absence of any factual basis on a guilt by accusation principle that is the international equivalent of lynch mob justice. The fact is that you even assume Saddam Hussein to be beyond the laws of nature of this universe out of sheer lack of familiarity with modern methods of substance detection.

[clairobscur]

*Originally posted by OliverH *
**The French didn’t say there were WMDs. The French didn’t say
**

Hijack : I note that many people, you included, in particular in this thread but also in others, write : “the french” rather than “France” or “the french government”. I somehow feel that this habbit is hinting at something, though I couldn’t say exactly at what. On a similar note, it reminds me too that american posters (as oposed to european ones, generally speaking) tend to quite often say “we did so and so” when refering to things done by their forefathers/ country/governement, even when it happened long time ago.

End of hijack.

[OliverH]

*Originally posted by clairobscur *
**Hijack : I note that many people, you included, in particular in this thread but also in others, write : “the french” rather than “France” or “the french government”. I somehow feel that this habbit is hinting at something, though I couldn’t say exactly at what. On a similar note, it reminds me too that american posters (as oposed to european ones, generally speaking) tend to quite often say “we did so and so” when refering to things done by their forefathers/ country/governement, even when it happened long time ago.

End of hijack. **

Sorry, I obviously meant the French government and its representatives -though I know enough French -and consult French media often enough- to know that the opinion of a lot of French went in line with the government. As evidenced by the huge support for a President who is considered a crook by the majority of the population and was elected on a basis of ‘Prevent LePen’.

[clairobscur]

*Originally posted by OliverH *
Sorry, I obviously meant the French government and its representatives -

My comment wasn’t particularily targeted at you. I just pointed out this peculiarity, since I think it must have some impact at some level, or that it must be representative of something existing in the american psyche. (and by the way, it’s not only “the french”…it’s also frequently “the brits”, “the russians”, etc…).

[AZCowboy]

Magiver, first off, I would appreciate it if you would support or retract the original statement I questioned: that Bush specifically said Saddam was NOT an imminent threat. Second, on the issue of an off-site nuclear weapon, if that is the case (as you suggest, and I doubt), then nothing today is stopping Saddam from doing the same thing. The war accomplished nada, except perhaps to give Saddam more motivation.

Third, and for others on this list that say that the US is not dependent on Mideast oil, while it can perhaps be considered true today, it will not be that way into the future. I will not take this space to educate everyone on the world oil markets and reserves, but I’ll make a few statements, and if someone wishes to question them, I’ll back them up.

Oil is a finite natural resource. The US currently consumes nearly a quarter of the world’s total consumption. The US currently imports 30% of its oil from the MidEast. The fact that the US imports more oil from Canada than anywhere else is of little consequence. About 40% of the world’s oil reserves are in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 20 years, the US is projected to import two-thirds of its oil. Do the math. If that doesn’t convince you, then do a little research. Google the Carter Doctrine. Google the Hubbert Peak. This stuff ain’t new. And after that, perhaps you could read this one page.

And then come to comprehend that oil is a strategic asset to the US and other western powers. It ain’t just about money. The US can’t throw around its superpower weight if it can’t fuel its war machine. And then consider that Saudi Arabia’s government is not completely stable. Imagine if it should fall to a coup by radical muslims. Then try to imagine the US war machine toppling statues in Mecca. It ain’t a pretty sight. Then you might see how Iraq is little more than strategic insurance.

And folks, let’s please get over this, “but Saddam tried to kill Dubya’s daddy” bullshit. Repeating it over and over again don’t make it so (unless perception is reality).

[Bouncer]

DtC:

Once again, you make the point for me. I edited the sections out simply to make it easier to wade through them, and not to substantively change the tone. But since you brought it up, lets looks at what was cut by me:

“However, such an annual verification does not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions”

So ElBaradei is supporting my view that the verification activities (ie, looking at the same numbers in the same accounting book as last year), do not inspections make, under the terms of the resolutions. Ergo, no inspections. You’re not arguing with me, you’re arguing with the findings of the IAEA.

Regards,
-Bouncer-

[Bouncer]

Damn damn damn and double damn!

Apologies to both Desmostylus and Diogenes the Cynic for the confusion… bloody D names!

Regards,
-Bouncer-

[clairobscur]

Originally posted by AZCowboy *
[B
And then come to comprehend that oil is a strategic asset to the US and other western powers. It ain’t just about money*

Indeed, the USA managing to get control (direct or indirect) of the largest part of world’s oil reserves (not only in the middle-east, but also in Africa and south-america) certainly was (and stil is) one of the concerns of the french government. And i’m not talking about the short term, or about juicy contracts being handed down to such or such company, but about the long term control of the reserves. France doesn’t want the US to be eventually, 10-20 years down from now, to be in charge alone of the oil faucet.

Other governments have expressed the same concern, by the way. I remember the south african government did, while refering to US policies in sub-saharian Africa.

[Bouncer]

OliverH,

Jun 91: ** Iraqi personnel fired warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment. **

Jul 92 ** UNSCOM inspectors refused access to the Ministry of Agriculture. ** Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities.

Jun 93 UNSCOM were ** denied permission to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites. They then attempted to seal the two sites but were again denied permission. **

Jun 96: ** A Ballistic Missile inspection was denied access to four of six sites it was planning to search. **

Jul 96: A Ballistic Missile inspection, searching for illicit materials, attempted to inspect sites where it was believed Iraq had hidden such material. Iraq delayed the team at the first site for 2 hours, probably whilst the material was disposed of, and ** denied access to the second site **. Although other sites had been planned to be visited, the inspection was abandoned.

9 – 13 Aug 97: ** A Biological Weapons inspection team found that Iraq failed to produce selected personnel for Interview. **

27 Sep – 2 Oct 97: An inspection team was to investigate the Iraqi concealment mechanism. The team concentrated on the elements of the security and intelligence apparatus close to the Presidency which were implicated in this. ** All the sites that the team attempted to investigate were declared “sensitive” so that the Iraqis refused to apply the previously agreed inspection modalities. **

27 Sep 97: ** An inspection team denied access to a site which they believed was involved in the concealment of banned material, because the Iraqis declared that even the road there was “sensitive”. After a stand-off of several hours the team withdrew. **

29 Sep 97: Inspection of a site near Tikrit which included a “presidential palace”, and which had been nspected previously, ** was not allowed by Iraq. After a stand-off of almost seven hours, the Executive Chairman instructed the team to withdraw. **

1-2 Oct 97: When an inspection team attempted to inspect the Special Security Apparatus Headquarters during the night they were stopped at gunpoint by a guard. Subsequently the senior Iraqi stated officially that the building was partially derelict. Furthermore, the team could not get access to it since the only way in was via the “presidential area” which was off-limits. The team withdrew on the orders from UNSCOM HQ.

Dec 97 ** Iraq created a category of sites from which it claimed authority to bar inspectors. These “presidential palaces” were, in fact, large compounds that had long been associated with Iraq’s WMD programme. **

Oct 98: Iraq tried to limit the scope and veracity of UNSCOM Biological Warfare monitors by ** preventing their access to sites previously designated at having Biological Weapons potential claiming that their ownership had been transferred to other (Government) owners. Also “minders” prevented or limited UNSCOM activities by questioning the need to take photographs, butted-in to prevent site personnel from giving their full names and tried to limit information gathered on legitimate monitoring topics. **

29 Oct 98: Iraq refuses access to UN inspectors with US nationality.

31 Oct 98: Iraq announces it will no longer co-operate with UNSCOM.

31 Oct – 11 Nov 98: Complete lack of Iraqi co-operation, no provision of Iraqi “minders” or escorts for routine monitoring or for designated inspections.

11 – 17 Nov 98: UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors and monitors withdraw from Iraq ** because of Iraqi non-co-operation which meant that neither routine monitoring of sites or inspections could take place. **

Dec 98: A Biological Weapons inspection team reported that the Iraqi-provided minders attempted to disrupt the inspection with one minder attempting to tamper with the material the team was seeking to inspect. Iraq failed to provide UNSCOM with details of movement (and therefore possible use) of the “tagged” dual-use equipment while monitors were out of the country.

On a number of occasions requested Iraqi personnel were not provided for interview in a timely manner and one individual never showed. In the team’s opinion this was premeditated by Iraq in order to withhold information. There were several supporting documents which potentially would have gone a long way to resolving the material balance equation. In spite of their importance Iraq failed to provide them. ** Because of the Iraqi lack of co-operation with respect to provision of relevant personnel, documentation, obfuscation, and attitude, the team was unable to resolve the issue of growth media imports. There is therefore the possibility that the missing media was used to produce additional undeclared agent in the order of many thousands of litres. **

9 Dec 98: ** An inspection team attempted to inspect the Ba’ath Party District Headquarters in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah neighbourhood where they believed illicit material and documents were hidden, but were denied access by Iraq. ** After waiting for over 2 hours, which allowed Iraq time to smuggle the material out of the building, and not having gained access, the team abandoned the inspection of the site.

13 Dec 98: In view of the lack of cooperation by Iraq, UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq.

I’m sorry, what was that you were saying about the Inspectors being allowed into sites?

Fast forward a bit:

2002 Jan. 30 - President Bush says Iraq is part of an “axis of evil” during his State of the Union address.

May - UN overhauls the prohibited-goods list, creating “smart sanctions” which focus on military and dual-use equipment.

Aug. 2 - In a letter to the UN secretary-general, Iraq invites Hans Blix to Iraq for talks on remaining disarmament issues.

Sept. 12 - ** President Bush, addressing the UN General Assembly, challenges the UN to confront the “grave and gathering danger” of Iraq - or stand aside as the United States and likeminded nations act. **

Sept. 16 - ** Iraq says it will allow international weapons inspectors to return “without conditions.” **

As I said, it took US force to back up UN inspections.

Sept. 30 - UN and Iraq discuss terms for weapons inspections. But ** talks leave eight presidential compounds off limits **, and US seeks authorization for a use of force if Iraq fails to comply with inspections.

Oct. 10 - Congress adopts joint resolution authorizing use of force against Iraq.

Oct. 16 - Iraq renews offer to UN weapons inspectors after “referendum” gives Saddam Hussein another seven-year term as president with 100 percent of the vote.

Nov. 8 - UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1441, which outlines an enhanced inspection regime for Iraq’s disarmament to be conducted by the IAEA.

Nov. 18 - UN weapons inspectors return to Baghdad.

Dec. 7 - Iraq provides UN weapons inspectors with 12,000 pages of information comprising a ** “complete declaration” ** of the regime’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Iraq states in the declaration that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Dec. 19 - UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix tells UNSC members that the declaration ** “is essentially a reorganized version” of information Iraq provided UNSCOM in 1997. **

2003 Jan. 12 - The Turkish government gives US military planners permission to examine ports and airstrips to see what upgrades are needed for a war against Iraq.

Jan. 16 - In their first significant discovery, UN weapons inspectors find 12 warheads designed to carry chemical weapons. The inspectors suggest the warheads were not accounted for in Iraq’s 12,000-page report.

Jan. 16 - Weapons-inspections chiefs report to the Security Council that, ** while Iraq has provided access to facilities, concerns remain regarding undeclared material, inability to interview Iraqi scientists, inability to deploy aerial surveillance during inspections, and harassment of inspectors. **

What were you saying about the minders issue being resolved?

Regards,
-Bouncer-

[Desmostylus]

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
DtC:

Once again, you make the point for me. I edited the sections out simply to make it easier to wade through them, and not to substantively change the tone.

You cut out the sections dealing with what they inspected, and what they found. That does substantively change the tone. You lie again about what you cut out below:

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
So ElBaradei is supporting my view that the verification activities (ie, looking at the same numbers in the same accounting book as last year), do not inspections make, under the terms of the resolutions.

That’s just a straight, flat-out lie. They inspected the nuclear facilities, not “numbers in the same accounting book as last year”. :rolleyes:

*Originally posted by Bouncer *
But since you brought it up, lets looks at what was cut by me:

“However, such an annual verification does not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, nor do they provide the needed assurances sought by the Council that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions”**

Let’s go back and look at the earlier report, which explains why “an annual verification does not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council”

STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

20. It is now more than 100 days since the last on-site inspection in Iraq. The status of IAEA verification activities in Iraq is unchanged from that reported in document S/1999/127, which was provided as a summary document to facilitate the work of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues established pursuant to document S/1999/100 of 30 January 1999. The concluding paragraphs of document S/1999/127 are, for convenience, reproduced below:

"30. The IAEA’s current inability to implement its mandate in Iraq, under the relevant Security Council resolutions, renders it unable to provide any assurance that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. To be able to implement its mandate and particularly to reinstate continuity of knowledge of Iraq’s nuclear-related assets, it is essential that the IAEA return to Iraq as soon as possible.

"31. The IAEA’s extensive verification activities in Iraq, since May 1991, have yielded a technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme. These verification activities have revealed no indication that Iraq possesses nuclear weapons or any meaningful amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material, or that Iraq has retained any practical capability (facilities or hardware) for the production of such material.

"32. However, there is an inevitable degree of uncertainty in any countrywide verification process that seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable or disguisable items or activities. It is this uncertainty which makes it essential for ongoing monitoring and verification to be a continuous process. Nonetheless, the IAEA, despite its extensive verification measures, cannot provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation. Similarly, it should be recognized that verification measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable proscribed activities, such as computer-based weaponization studies, explosives experimentation or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. A statement by the IAEA that it has found ’no indication’ of prohibited equipment, materials or activities in Iraq is not the same as a statement of their ’non-existence’. It is for this reason that the [ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV)] plan takes into account the prudent assumption that Iraq has retained documentation of its clandestine nuclear programme, specimens of important components and possibly amounts of non-enriched uranium. It is similarly assumed that Iraq retains the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future.

"33. Resolution of the few remaining questions and concerns … would undoubtedly contribute to the confidence in the completeness of the technically coherent picture. However, Iraq has consistently stated that it is unable to provide any further information or documentation. In this latter regard, Iraq states that much of the requested documentation never existed and that which did exist had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in 1991 and 1992. The IAEA holds no credible information to confirm or refute Iraq’s statements.

"34. The uncertainty deriving from the few remaining questions and concerns does not present any technical impediment to the full implementation of the IAEA’s OMV plan, which takes into account those uncertainties. Provided that it is able to exercise its right to full and free access in Iraq, the IAEA is in a position to proceed with the full implementation of its OMV plan and, as part of that plan, to investigate further the remaining questions and concerns and any other aspect of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme arising out of new information acquired by the IAEA.

"35. The scope of the activities to be carried out within the frame of the OMV plan is based upon the technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme, and remaining uncertainties are compensated for by prudent assumptions regarding Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. These assumptions, as, for example, the assumption that Iraq has the capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future, are based on logical assessment rather than clear indications to that effect.

“36. It is estimated that the annual direct costs of full implementation of the IAEA OMV plan will be in the region of ten million US dollars, not including the substantial costs of logistical and other assistance provided through the Special Commission. Arrangements for the resumption of the IAEA’s activities in Iraq should take into consideration the need for longterm funding of those activities.”

So what exactly was preventing the “full verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council”? That’s what paragraph 36 was about. The UN wouldn’t pay for it.

Your argument still doesn’t rise above the level of absolute bullshit. Don’t worry, Cheney’d probably be happy to employ you in the Office of Special Plans.