They are braver men than I.
I was under the impression that the dive bombers were under quite a heavy fire. Let’s both find some links.
“No one knows for sure how many attacking SBDs were shot down at Midway, but it’s clear that 18 of the 47 dive bombers that struck the Japanese carriers that morning never made it back to their ships. Two more had to ditch near their carriers because the pilots were running too short on fuel to actually land. Some planes were shot from the sky, others crashed into the sea when they ran out of fuel. At least three aircrewmen were plucked from the sea by the Japanese and were interrogated and executed”
The torpedo bombers did indeed disrupt the Japanese.
“By the time the Navy dive bombers arrived above the Japanese carriers, U.S. land-based and carrier-based planes had been engaging the Japanese formation nearly continuously for two hours. While no hits on the enemy vessels had been achieved, and more than 35 American aircraft had been shot down, the attacks had disrupted Japanese operations, scattered their ships, and had drawn Japanese fighter planes down to the surface of the sea.”
Same link:
(emphasis added)
The implication is that the Dauntlesses were attacked during or after their dive runs. They were still flying into heavy anti-aircraft fire and their escape would be contested by the Zeros, almost certainly recalled too late to try to prevent the bomber attack.
My read was that running out of fuel was the cause of most of the Divebombers not getting back.
One division of four SBDs from Enterprise’s scouting squadron (VS-6) under Lt Charles Ware headed out in a different direction after the attack and was never seen again, except by the Zeros escorting the Hiryu’s dive bomber attack. Apparently the fighter leader considered them easy pickings and got permission to go after them; none of the SBDs were downed, and they shot up two of the Zeros so badly that they had to return to base.
Closer to the point of the thread, as far as I’ve been able to tell only one of the SBDs in the 10:20 attack was lost to antiaircraft fire. This was by the Kaga, whose obsolete fire direction equipment was compensated for by a larger heavy AA battery.
That’s my understanding. Ens. J. Q. Roberts was sixth in line on the attack on Kaga and was the only dive-bomber bagged by an IJN carrier that day. As noted, they had 16 five-inch barrels in total, which is twice that of Enterprise and more than the twelve 12 cm (4.7 in) large AA guns on Akagi.
However, lookouts on Kaga (and the other carriers) were busy watching their CAP attacking Yorktown’s torpedo bomber squadron VT-3 and the six accompanying fighters lead by Jimmy Thach. This encounter was the first where the US fighters were able to hold their own against the more agile Zeros and drew away a large number of their fighters.
Zeros could climb more than 4,000 feet per minute so they could have been back up to proper altitude in five minutes. Their problem was less that they were down low but rather they had lost situational awareness and were not well coordinated. At this stage of the war, even the US was having problems coordinating CAP, but the Japanese had more problems.
The attack on Hiryu in the evening also resulted in no SBD Dauntless dive bombers getting shot down by AA but I believe three were downed by Zeros in the attack.
BTW, there’s a new WW2 Pacific naval battle podcast series on YouTube, many of them cohosted by Jon Parshall, all of them excellent. Here’s the first of the 3 on Midway:
So they did an episode “How real is it?” where they got an actual former senior USN officer to review naval scenes in movies and they discussed the scene in Under Siege where they shoot the main guns on the battleship, and he mentioned the danger from the blast of those guns (and how they clear the decks when firing because of over pressure from the guns):
Interesting. Not saying he’s wrong, only cautioning that “former senior USN officer” only gets you so far as a credential without more details on service history.
I would expect senior officers in common to know how to salute and wear a uniform, but even there I would suspect some outliers/disagreement. Beyond that, I wouldn’t assume any given senior officer has cause or expertise sufficient to speak as an authority on anything at all unless they can back it up with something more. Even someone who served once on an actual battleship could be wrong about the specific nature of the hazard posed by firing main guns.
For example, there is a common misconception about why certain main propulsion shafts on a given CVN have different RPM limits relative to one another. A misconception common even among nuclear engineers trained and qualified to operate the main engines and control shaft speed.
All that to say, even when people know what the restriction is, they very often still don’t know why that is the case.
Just missed the edit window, but for example… Admiral James Foggo III (featured in the video above) was a submarine officer. Never served on a battleship. No indication, or reason to expect, he ever served on a battleship. He is by no means a primary source
Maybe he has extensive personal experience with the capital ship deck guns on the 688-class. 
On the subject of how damaging a battleships guns may be to themselves from the wiki on the battleship Rodney during the sinking of the Bismarck, for sure this was towards the business end of the barrel but serious issues . I remember reading it was also a problem on some other battle ships when the forward turrets were rotated to maximum ( can’t remember the term) pointing backwards and damaged the superstructure.
King George class maybe?
Ironically, Rodney ‘s own main guns firing at low elevationhad damaged her more extensively than had Bismarck . Deck plates around the main-gun turrets had been depressed by the effects of the guns’ muzzle blast, and some of the structural members supporting them had cracked or buckled. Piping, urinals and water mains had broken, while the shock of firing had loosened rivets and bolts in the hull plating, flooding various compartments. One gun in ‘A’ turret permanently broke down during the battle and two others in ‘B’ turret were temporarily disabled.[48]
“Firing over the shoulder.”
Speaking of Rodney, naval engineering was a kind of iffy rule of thumb business in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Plus these ships’ designs were heavily affected by the Washington Naval Treaty. So much so that nearly everything about them was compromised to fit somehow or other under the many limbo bars the treaty imposed.
Even if constructed well, they were designed with little margin. And given the state of engineering analysis then, “little margin” very easily became “insufficient or no margin at all.”
They were petty wild looking ships but I kind of like them
Found the thing about pointing the guns aft
From the Wikipedia article and a mention of concussion of the eyeballs that doesn’t sound fun
When ‘X’ turret was fired 30 degrees abaft the beam and elevation of 40 degrees, considerable damage occurred to the two vertically stacked rows of bridge windows.[13]As a result, the guns of “X” turret were usually prohibited from firing abaft of the beam at high elevations during peacetime practice firing. Fitting tempered glass in the bridge windows was tried, but gun blast still shattered some of them and filled the bridge with flying debris. The design of the Captain’s bridge was altered on Nelson circa 1930-33 to reduce the window area and enclose the upper portion of the previous two rows of glass. A great deal of effort was expended in correcting this problem, and fitting of protective ledges below the new smaller windows proved successful. A new enclosed Admiral’s bridge with its requisite reduced windows was built on top of the Captain’s bridge and the forward signalling lamps were moved up one level and towards the aft of the bridge. The Admiral’s bridge on Rodney remained stepped back somewhat from the forward edge of the tower, but the Captain’s bridge had the same reduced area of glass that Nelson now had, with larger ledges.[3] Blast was also a problem elsewhere; D.K. Brown tells of a test firing that was suspended when DNC observer H.S. Pengelly, who was beneath the foredeck, reported a bright red flash after firing all guns in “A” turret. This was later discovered to be caused by concussion of the observers’ eyeballs.[4]
Anecdotal: When I was in Vietnam, the New Jersey was active. At one point while I was there, they launched shells that passed over our base. Honestly, it sounded like a train passing over head.
The shells of the main battery of the Iowa-class have been compared to explosive Volkswagens with good reason.
here, some sort of first-hand-experience from our RU friends in UKR:
seems those pesky 4-5" guns already pack a bunch … also interesting anecdotical stories in this reddit thread:
That exact video is what I was going to comment on.