Not really. It is part of “will they kill again?”.
If the answer is “Yes, I will, I love killing! Kill, Kill!KILL!!!!” Then perhaps the DP is called for.
If the answer is “I am honestly sorry for this, I was deluded by Gang members, I was young and wasnt thinking, I have now snitched on my old gang and found Jesus…” Maybe then the system worked, and he can be returned.
You have yet to establish why you assert that taking “remorse” into account is not something that can be done even if “revenge” is not the focus. Indeed, I will postulate the opposite concept: that if we are all about “revenge” in executing the death penalty, then we won’t consider “remorse” at all. Revenge isn’t about how the killer feels about what he’s done; it’s about how we as victims/society feel about what he’s done. I don’t recall “eye for an eye” having any aspect to it that is “remorse” related.
Exactly. Revenge is far less likely to consider mitigating circumstances. Revenge is a need to cause harm in retaliation for harm caused to you and mercy is anathema to it.
I have read this four or five times, and I still don’t get your point.
If you are saying that we can’t craft a law that fits 100% of the time, well, sure, but that is an argument against any law. But many of the principles used to argue against the DP don’t apply to the Roof case, and his conviction is entirely within the law. He is clearly guilty against any doubt, he isn’t remorseful, his crime was particularly cruel - the law that applies the DP to this specific case seems to match pretty closely. He wasn’t wrongly convicted, he wasn’t convicted because he’s poor - the legal definition of “acceptable” when applied to his execution sure seem like they worked in this case.
If you are arguing that a different standard should be applied to the law, go ahead, but if it doesn’t fit this case, that’s a strike against it.
But suppose that there was a world in which rabies was not a terminal illness for dogs and rabid dogs could be kept confined in a cage to live out their natural lives and that doing so was cheaper than euthanizing them. Would you be in favor of euthanizing them then?
We euthanize rabid dogs neither out of a sense of justice or for revenge, but purely for practical and humanitarian reasons that are actually in the best interest of the dog. So it’s not the best analogy.
You said that, “Arguments against the DP in general have to apply in this case if they are valid in general”. I pointed out that actually, it’s entirely possible to have an argument against the death penalty which requires reference not solely to a single case, or which only make sense as applied to potential death penalty cases in general. That, depending on how you define your terms, it’s impossible to write a practical law to cover all cases. You replied that the way the law currently defines its terms, there can be a practical law to cover all cases. Which is true, but doesn’t actually address my point; I’m not claiming it isn’t possible to write a practical law.
Put simplest; Arguments against the DP in general don’t have to apply in this case if they are valid in general. Or any one single case.
Still not following you. What arguments against the DP are valid, but can’t be applied to an individual case?
The DP is wrong because we might execute an innocent person. Roof isn’t innocent.
The DP is wrong because life in prison works just as well, without the risk of executing an innocent person. Roof isn’t innocent, and there are many examples of people killing after being sentenced to life in prison.
The DP is wrong because it costs so much. The reason it costs so much is the endless appeals. The purpose of appeals is to prevent the execution of the innocent, and Roof isn’t innocent.
The moral part is there is a human judge and the right for a human jury. The law is explicit, but the moral part, including jury nullification, is implicit and that line of spoken and unspoken is enforced to keep each part separated.
As for oif the death penalty is better or worse then a lengthy prison sentence, I believe it could be either, as death can not kill the soul.
But make no mistake the legal system is revenge, not justice, only when the human factor surfaces do we approach justice.
I gave you one already. “There are acceptable and unacceptable time to use the death penalty, but because we cannot write a law which defines them apart perfectly, we shouldn’t use for either group.”
Roof may well, depending on one’s own definitions of “acceptable” and “unacceptable”, pass straight into the “acceptable” group. On an individual basis, without reference to other cases, there’s no issue. It’s only when you bring in those other cases, take it from a singular to a totality, that you then get an argument against the DP in his one case.
There are plenty of times arguments don’t apply in one single case but do apply once you take it to a total view, and yet are valid. It might not matter much if one factory pollutes; but it might matter a lot if all factories pollute, and so you have a general argument restricting pollution where the argument doesn’t apply to one singular case. Arguments that rely only on a general situation but don’t apply to one particular instance are hugely important when looking at any situation in which an aggregate has a different result to* one instance*. “Eating too much food is unhealthy” is a valid argument against eating too much in general, but can’t be applied to eating one biscuit. Is it therefore invalid, or valueless?
Just for the sake of arguing a different position than I argued with my original reply, I’ll say not necessarily. In sentencing, we are not just looking at the crime and then reflexively handing down a sentence, else we would have a single punishment for every crime. We try to come to a sentence we or the judge feels the defendant “deserves,” which can be influenced by intent, mitigating factors, perceived chance of rehabilitation, and how the defendant seems affected by his crime (ie. remorseful).
The other side of that is of course that “deserves” can have a strong sense of eye for an eye style revenge, reflexively dolling out a punishment that is equal to the crime or sometimes worse if we factor in our emotional anguish into what punishment we think a defendant “deserves.”