[QUOTE=Bricker]
The problem is that we have to careful of imputing to the administration THEN then knowledge we have NOW. They had analysis teams – some saying A, some saying B, some saying C.
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By the nature of policy, political, and governmental operations, we are never going to have a smoking gun. The administration has worked hard to preserve plausible deniability and has used propaganda effectively to make sure it has cover, even from statements from the Democratic side. From a pragmatic point of view, we have to use inference and circumstantial evidence to decide whether the administration acted competently and good faith.
It seems to me that you are demanding a level of certainty that would prevent us from ever holding our government – no matter who is in power – accountable for acting in bad faith or incompetently. How can we survive if we give a tremendous degree of power to certain individuals to act in our name while at the same time grant them every single benefit of the slightest doubt when holding them to account? This is not a criminal trial – beyond a reasonable doubt is not the appropriate standard of judgment.
And here is where democracy fails then, because every plausible explanation is given equal weight to the preponderance of circumstantial evidence.
This might be facially true, but it is fundamentally misleading.
First of all, part of the reason why that few public voices were saying that there were no WMDs was that (1) the administration’s potential critics had only the adminstration itself as a source, and (2) for a variety of reasons, including many that were intentional on the part of the administration, the administration’s critics were politically cowed to a position of fearing to take a stance too much in opposition to the administrations claims.
Furthermore, the question “Does Saddam possess WMDs that he could use against us?” was not the only question that a competent and sincere policymaker should have been asking at the time. There were many others, including –
- What is the overall level of the threat presented by the Hussein regime?
- What is the likely effectiveness of means other than military action to ameliorate this threat?
- What is the likely effectiveness of military action – both invasion and actions short of invasion – to ameliorate this threat?
- What are the likely side-effects of the use of military action on this threat, or other threats?
- If invasion is the only effective option available, what are the minimum requirements for such an invation (troop levels, etc.)?
- What are the non-military actions that will be necessary to support a political victory in the wake of the invasion (restoration of services, public order, etc.)?
Not only does the number of questions go on and on, but the subparts to these questions go on and on.
Can you say with a straight face that the evidence has not showed that the Bush administration did not take these questions seriously? That, indeed, the administration had not entered office in 2001 intending to depose Hussein at the first opportunity?
We know that there were people in the State Department and the Defense Department that took these questions seriously, and that Rumsfeld refused to even consider their analysis and planning at all (and then punished some for their impertinence), much less take it seriously?